Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/226/1 - Folder - Part 17

157.

put down a very heavy shellfire from Beaurevoir line and

58th lost all its officers except three or four; also M.G.

fire from N and NE.

It was then found that 57th and 59th had not got right

up to their objective. Loughnan got orders to turn the

whole line about; make the right-hand man of the line stand

fast; and swing the right hand round to a line running

across 24 Central.

XXX [diagram]

 

When they got to this line that night they put outposts

down on the road through 24 B, D and 19c., and were relieved

by 54th Bn.  53rd Bn. had stayed in Le Catelet line. A

few Vickers guns put in in 29A and B had covered the gap -

and a fighting patrol working between 58th and 53rd.

 

Lieut. Robertson.  J.O. was lost in the advance just N.

of Hargicourt by a shell - took 3 fingers off.

At 3 p.m., Sept. 29, in attack towards Cabaret Wood

Farm-

Lieut. Keane - killed;

Lieut.F.Weir - killed;

Lieut.Johnston- killed;

Captain Dawson, D.S.O., M.C., wounded;

Temp. Capt. Tait - wounded;

Lieut.Eggington - wounded;

Lieut. C.K.D. Campbell - wounded (?since d. of w.).

 

On afternoon of October 1st, when flank was swinging N. -

Lieut.Nicholson - wounded;

Lieut.Dalgleish (since D.S.O.) d. of w.

(That left: Capt. Loughnan, Lieut.Flixtoff, 2/Lieut.

Danager, 2/Lieut.Greene, the only firing line officers

unwounded; also Col. Watson and Adjt. O'Malley).

 

Dalgleish was twice out with an N.C.O. and two men to

Cabaret Farm to find out what the opposition there was - he

had been wounded in the head. (A garrison of about 40 men

with M.G.'s). Dalgleish was on right flank of Bn. (it

was decided same night to raid farm on his information).

57th BN. eventually decided dealt with Cabaret Wood

farm on October 1st. We had never had anyone in it before

then.

Dalgleish when he went out on October 1st with the lie

line, got half his face blown away (2nd wound). He went

back to Bn. H.Q and reported where the line was. As he

could not speak he got pencil and paper and wrote it. Died

later at Rouen. He was given D.S.O.

-----------------------------------------------------

158.

3rd DIVISION.

 

29th September, 1918.

Norman, who was attached to 27th American Division

under Maclagan and Brand, wrote to Gellibrand immediately

after the preliminary fight giving an exact forecase of the 

vagueness which would occur. The only safe way would be

for us to attach a Bde. to each division - he said - and

that the greatest caution would be required in dealing with

American reported reports before 3rd Division went through.

                                   ---

In Sept. 29 battle the American was in charge of the

whole artillery, including 3rd D.A. up to a certain time (?).

Officer of 3rd Div. T.M. Bty. went over with the

Americans to fight the German guns. He returned about

6 p.m. having lost 18 out of 30 men. This was

Gellibrand's first reliable information.

                         ------------------------------------------

All day messages kept reaching Gellibrand from the rear

that the Americans were on their objective - flares on the

red line. Gellibrand went up himself near Gillemont

Farm and was under M.G. and whizzbang fire. McNicholl,

being lame, rode up (previously) and had to get off horse

and crawl. He and Cannan thought it was a murder stunt

the first day - and were very down in spirits. Cannan

recovered next day.

                             -------------------------------------

SEPTEMBER 30th.

General Monash rang up Gellibrand and asked him where

his division was - and was given the line. He said surely

it was on a very narrow front - 2000 yds. for 3 Brigades -

surely it could do something. Gellibrand said that he had

intended using one brigade to clear up and put the other two

through it (as Beaurevoir attack was considered the duty of

this division). He was anxious to do all he could at the

least cost - (going on against bare M.G.'s was expensive).

The could do a set stunt with artillery. They had 9

brigades of artillery, but the Americans were ahead of them.

Monash said they were to plan a set piece - with the 9 bdes.

All the Americans ahead were either dead, or prisoners, or

strafed.

                                    --------------------------------------

159.

BRAY.

Plan of attack at Bray was Gellibrand's.

                   -------------------------------------

 

37th BATTALION - BREAK UP.

Sept.12. Got information that Bn would be broken up.

Gellibrand walked over with Lieut. Murdoch and told them,

and told them that he would keep Bn. tradition alive in

every way. 42nd Bn. also warned.

That night Storey came over and saw not Gellibrand but

Jess, and asked if disbandment were personal. There was no

protest at all.

 

Nights of September 13 in came Storey's letter to Bde. Div.

Corps, A.I.F., and Hughes. MacNicholl was on leave. The

letter charged 38th and 39th with repeated misconduct in

action - and the letter was known in the Bn. - they spoke

to Gellibrand about it.

 

Sept. 17.  From now on delegates of all units of 2nd, 3rd

and 5th divisions were meeting.

 

Sept. 18. G.O.C. spoke to 42nd Bn. No signs of any

trouble.

 

Sept.20. MacNicholl had 37th Bn. out on parade and

addressed them - "Now then, 37th, Slope arms,.Form fours

right -. ..move off as detailed . . . . Quick march." Only

officers and N.C.O.'s moved.

MacNicholl informed G.O.C. personally. Reply that

G.O.C. would interview selected men of 37th and find out

position.

 

Sept. 21. G.O.C. saw MacNicholl and sent Murdoch to Bn.

to pick out half a dozen intelligent llooking lads.

Gellibrand sat down with them. They said they would put

the lines he laid down before the men. (He told them they

must do so to help him- otherwise Bolshevism).

 

Sept.22. Sunday. G.O.C. saw each Coy. in turn. One

Coy. was quite willing to agree; the last two Coys. had

made up their minds and did not intend to do anything.

 

Sept.23rd. 42nd Bn. refused.

 

Sept.24. Monash saw delegates of 37th in presence of

Gellibrand and MacNicholl. He said - If you men comply with

your orders we will do this and that . . .  If you do not - you

will be transferred individually whenever you leave your

unit and the unit will slowly die - you will not be made

martyrs of.

 

Sept.25.  Corps Conference with Birdwood and Monash.

Hindenburg line battle in air. Rawlinson came in Gellibrand

said there would be no difficulty if they took a line

160.

of making double battalions to preserve identity.

 

Sept. 26. All other divisions tried except Elliott, and

all failed.

 

Oct.17. Cannan had issued an order that something was

to be done. It was disobeyed. Cannan refused to have

anything to do with them. G.O.C. interviewed 42nd and

found them much less responsible than 37th.

 

Oct.24th. Whole trouble over.

                       ----------------------------------------

21st. Bn. refusal was irrespective (so 5th Bde. say) of

37th Bn.

------------------------------------------------------

Gellibrand decided to speak to the men alone - without

officers - and to try and see the men's view with their eyes.

                                  ---------------------------------

The men said we will not go in as 38th. We will not

go in until not a man is left as 37th., but we will only go

in as 37th.

The decision was that there should be no attempt to

force the men to open rebellion - no pay, no rations.

                                ---------------------------------------

161.

42nd BATTALION) August 8th

41st BATTALION ) August 10th

                                   August 11th.

38th BATTALION - 29th August.   (204)

---------------------------------------------------------------------

38th BATTALION - 29th AUGUST.

(From Lieut.Sandford, who was a member of this Company).

Operations started at Curlu - Light Horse in front - a

screen. Check at Howitzer Wood. L.H.held up about

trenches in 4 B and D. 39th Bn. lay in those trenches for

a while till 4 p.m.

A patrol of 40th Bn. and some 38th Bn. cleaned this

opposition.

Then Bn. came on across country S. of Dock Alley, B Coy.

in support at the big bank where the road forks in 5c.

About dark a runner who had missed him came running up.

He extended his 40 men through Clery - going through Clery

extended they never saw a sign of a German. Germans were

shelling Clery all the time intermittently. They got right

through the village. There was a German post at the

building immediately north of the bridge at 12 B45.75. It

was a building on a rise - a slight rise and a broken

building. They stopped on the west side of this building

(the walls were in better condition thatn in most of the

village). The post was pused as far as it could get to try

and get the bridge - about midnight.

All night they were moving along in the W. edge of the

village - and runners going through the village back to H.Q.

of Bn. - but no one was fired at all night.

As soon as 38th. got established near the bridge the

post was quiet and remained quiet all night. Some of 40th

Bn. got there next day.

As soon as it became daylight this post became very

active and there was musketry fire from there all the

morning. The runners had a very bad time as the post had

a good field of fire in the main street and long the river

bank, and anything that showed there was fired at.

Just about dawn the Germans blew up the bridge at

Omiecourt.

All the shooting at people in the village came from the

E. of the village. Some of 40th Bn. worked up through the

village on morning of Aug. 30 and they were shot at all the

way - they eventually got through the village and capture

this post.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

162.

42nd BATTALION )- BROODESEINDE.

Lieut. Dunbar and "ALMA" - October 4th. 1917

XXX  [Diagram]

163.

41st BATTALION ) 

42nd BATTALION ) August 8th.

 

Bn. had been at Hamelet burying cable, etc., to Haemelet

Hamel; then they pulled out to Corbie to practice, equip

and organise for two days (they had a facsimile of the

ground, the barrage was imitated, etc.).

The barrage was oblique to the advance. This had been

practiced. Zero was 4.20 a.m. Bn. went up by C track,

which was blocked, and got in place one hour before time.

There wasnt went up lights in front of the Tommies.

The Germans put down a barrage on them and a certain number

of 77 shells on our 11 Bde. 41st and 42nd. both had this

barrage on the. It was getting light. You could see the

German lines. At zero there was a foot of haze in the

gullies; this quickly thickened. There were some casualties

in the Bde. from the German barrage, but the escapes were

lucky. The German had sent up coloured flares in front of

the Tommies at about 4 a.m. - red and green and golden rain

lights galore opposite the Tommies at Sailly Laurette.

(The Tommies made a good bit of noise before this - you

could hear them across the river).

The German front line (which the Bn had picked out

from air photos) was on the fore slope of the opposite

hill - in trench elements which were fairly well connected

up. There were M.G.'s in a zone system of defence. The

42nd Bn. crossing the valley came under M.G. fire from the

right.

XXX  [Diagram]

 

The mist came down very thick - 10 minutes after the

barrage you could not see 50 yards.

There were a fair number of Germans in the trenches -

but the men were on them so quickly - you could only see a

man at 8 ft. - the machine gunner had not time to switch

his gun round after he saw you. 42nd Bn. had the road and

the river to guide them.

The tanks had got up just at Zero - they opend the

throttle out and the whirr started.

42nd Bn. had started with an one Coy. front.

 

[Diagram]

They had to narrow down to one Coy. to pass the narrow

164.

neck and widen out later.

(The Brigadier had fought hard to have part of his Bde.

put across the river for liaison - probably the Divisional

General also - against the Somme being the boundary. 42nd

had three tanks.)

 

(41st Bn. had 4 Coys. in front line and one of 43rd.

to be support Coy. They had three tank sections (9 tanks)

with them).

 

Between Gailly and Cerisy a 77 gun on the road opened up

against 42nd Bn. and against a tank which was on the road.

The tank was hustled off the road onto the hillside just

in time.

 

2 platoons of 10th Bde. )?38 of 39th) worked the

north bank of the Canal, one platoon of 42nd Bn. worked the

south bank as far as Gailly Red Chateau, and dug in there.

The party working on the river bank struck several M.G.

posts and dealt with them. A second platoon of the same

Coy. secured Gailly Bridge; the remaining two platoons

were extended along the terrace east of this (and 100 yds.

north of hospital) for 500 yds. The next coy. took a further

600 yds. around the terrace eastwards. The 3rd Coy.

worked from there in a semi-circle round to the right of

Bn. objective. The support Coy. was placed along the

track from Gailly hospital towards Cerisy-Gailly to

support the other three. The 42nd. Bn. was really securing

the left flank of the Australians. The gund   which had been

firing point-blank down the road was found near Cerisy

Cemetery and was mopped up by our patrols, who fired through

the barrage on it.

The mist starte to thin after some hours. 15th Bn.

passed through exactly to time looking splendid - deploying

as they cleared the green line - everyone cheerful.

In the mist Lieut. Tardent with Lieut. Patterson

(Sig.Off.) found a tank in the mist just going towards the

Somme and managed to save him by shouting at him and turning

him off (against his will) in the right direction. Everyone

was lost but everyone found himself and got into their right

Coys. and so on.

Till about 8 a.m. our people were fired on by a German

M.G. across the river. An 18-pdr. pulled out on 12 Central

and fired 4 shots in that direction and it stopped.

The pioneers were at work within about 5 minutes of the

barrage passing - on the road.

                            --------------------

When 41st Bn. passed through 44th they got fighting at

the crossroads in 7c where there were a lot of Germans. In

the valley east of them they got 9 field guns and 20 M.G.'s.

They got to their objective - and found that Hamilton and

Forbes Woods were heavily held, by artillery and infantry.

These were just beyond the objective. Lieut. J.Lawson

went out with a tank and some infantry. The tank went

straight into the wood and they got over 200 prisoners in

these woods.

As the mist rose the Machine guns from Cerisy and the

ridge in 15 Central became very active; the field guns north

of the river (at Chipilly and Malard and Celestin Woods).

The Germans were also firing a M.G. from the Sailly Laurette

quarry. This Sailly Laurette gun was silenced by 8 a.m. by

the field gun.

When 4th Division passed through in lines of sections in

file with rifles slung and tanks in between the, the 41st.

got up and cheered. Out ahead were tanks out by themselves

dealing with M.G. nests - by Cerisy a crackling of M.G.'s

now and then as they reached them - and the transport and

165.

artillery creeping up the road from the rear.

Presently the Germans got their guns from Chipilly and

Malard Wood onto this raod and made it very dangerous. The

110th Howitzer Battery was on the reverse slope just south

of Cerisy Gailly just about 9 a.m. covering the advance -

they were very good. The Germans got onto this battery

from Malard Wood (the Chipilly guns fired more into 4th Bde.)

and knocked out all the guns. From 8 till 10 a.m. the Germans

gave 41st Bn. a very bad time. These batteries all day

caused the 4th Division a very large number of casualties

out ahead.

42nd Bn. had 2/Lieut.Germain wounded during the

advance against the line of resistance leading men between

hospital and Cerisy Gailly.

Lieut. Conrad was killed at the same place - instantaneously 

by a shell - probably our own. He was leading

his men.

41st. Bn. -

2/Lieut. R.H.O. Roberts died of wounds on battlefield

during the advance by a German shell.

Captain H.Chumleigh, wounded in the head by a German

shell during the advance.

Lieut.Dimmock, wounded in the advance by a German 

shell.

Lieut. Clark.

The casualties amongst men were mainly during

consolidation.

41st Bn., 480 actual fighting men, had to capture one

mile front to a depth of 1500 yds.

On Aug. 9 at 4.30 p.m. the Tommies and Americans

attacked. MG.'s in Chipilly firing up the valley north-

wards stopped the advance. There was no barrage on it.

The barrage was in fron of the Tommies going east, and

nothing was done to this M.G.

Some of the 42nd. and 50th and 1st Bns. were over on

the north side - on their own without orders, helping to

deal with the German posts which were holding up the

Tommies. These guns were mopped up before dusk at 8.30.

The 42nd Bn. got indirect fire from M.G.'s on the north

side. 41st and 42nd stopped on these lines. Aug. 8th and 9th

and 10th till evening. Then 41st. had to relieve 13th Bn.

fromQ13D5.0. (i.e., in the old Amiens defence line from

St.Germain Wood to west of Proyart).

AUGUST 10/11. That night north of the river the 13th

Bde. took Etinhem. 10th. Bde. made a similar attempt south

of Proyart which failed - through German aeroplanes and

tanks being discovered.

Next morning 41st Bn. was told that it was to take the

old Amiens trench system from their left flank northwards

to the river, cutting off Mericourt and Cateau Wood.

Mericourt contained German M.G.'s and T.M.'s.

Cateau Wood also contained Germans and M.G.'s.

The C.O. went down with I.O. to Bde. and I.O. arranged

an artillery programme as under :-

XXX[Diagram]

166.

(1) and (2) standing barrages and (3) creeping barrage.

This was agreed - but artillery turned out to be short

of ammunition and the Bn. was not informed of this at all.

They were to be given 30 mins. covering fire after

reaching the objective in which to consolidate.

At 8.30 p.m. it was broad daylight - this was the Zero 

hour - the assembly was difficult and had to be done by twos

and threes to prevent the Germans knowing what was happening.

It was done in the old trench system.

The artillery fire was very feeble. There was a smoke

barrage on 12B. As soon as the barrage started there

broke out heavy M.G. fire fromMericourt, Cateau Wood, the

trenches and St. Germain.

The men kept dropping into the trenches and clearing

them, and the trenches saved a lot of men. The Vickers

guns helped very greatly and kept up a good barrage all the

time.

The trench mortars were there under Lieut. D.Brown.

He was standing up on the trenches as Bn. went on,

directing his guns onto M.G. positions - he was hit as he

stood there and later died of wounds. The T.M's put fear

into the German gunners and our men were able to rush them.

Lieut. J.E.Woodford was with a platoon which was held

up by a M.G. He got it out in two parties in some old

trench on both flanks of this M.G. They then all rushed

it together - he going at it from the front. He stopped

the whole stream and was killed at once; but the men got

to the gun and got it.

There was fighting the whole way. When they rushed

the road just before the hilltop the barrage ceased. The

last 500 yds. had to be taken simply by infantry fighting -

throwing bombs into every dugout on chance.

When they got to the high bank above the marsh they

sent up the success signal - green Verey light. The three

Coys. which had gone in had taken about 130 prisoners. It

was dark long before this.

There were one platoon of each Coy. facing Cateaux

Woods and Mericourt and three platoons of each facing St.

Germain Woods.

Soon after reacing the Somme a party went into Cateau

Wood and got about 70 prisoners and 2 officers. These

were near the edge of the wood.

Next morning 43rd Bn. got the rest of the prisoners

without fighting. The Germans were walking into our line

all that night.

About 120 Germans were killed there. The Tommies

of 17th Division (Sherwood Foresters), who relieved, had to

bury them.

The T.M.'s fired on Mericourt during this fight to

keep it occupied - the H.T.M.'s

41st Bn. lost 75 men in this.

Lieut.Woodford - killed.

Lieut. Brown. T.M.'s - killed. (Old 41st Bn. man).

Lieut. Rogers - severely wounded. M.G. in shoulder -

staggered up -shell got him in the other shoulder - both

arms broken. (He had been hit through the stomach at

Ypres. In the C.C.S. he struck the same nurse this time -

and it probably saved  him).

Lieut.W.Pearson - wound in head from M.G.

Capt.P.Calow - wound in arm by M.G. which broke arm.

(All these returned to Australia).

 

41st Bn. stayed in these trenches on Aug. 12 and were

relieved on night 12/13th.

          --------------------------------------------------