Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/226/1 - Folder - Part 16

147.
Till 3 p.m. A Coy, was lost to sight and news of them
only came, from Americans who dribbled back.  They said that
our men, were out in shellholes and had not reached S.
Gillemont trench, Patrols had been sent from C Coy. to find
A Coy. but were nearly all hit on getting over the ridge.
Smoke was arranged on Claymore Valley and a general
advance ordered for 3 p.m. Capt. Peters(C Coy.) lead from
Dog Trench but only got a few yards and met the same
withering fire as in the morning. The position was unchanged
till nightfall.
At nightfall some of A. Coy. came back. They said they
had only got out into Noman'sland about 50 yds. ahead of Dog
trench and had had to stay there. Fairweather had been
killed as soon as the Coy. hopped out. He was within 50 yds.
of S. Gillemont trench- nearly into the wire - ahead of
anyone as far as is known. He was shot through the neck and
died 10 minutes later. The officer guiding the tanks,
2/Lieut. Andrews, (a tank officer) was with him when he was
shot, and got back that night and brought the news. Lieut.
Callan, was also killed about, the same time trying to rescue
an American wounded man who was calling out in the next shellhole.
Callan couldn't stand it any longer. He was warned
not to go, but as soon as he got on top of the shell-hole he
was killed. (Some Americans were in shellholes in front
(E) of Dog Trench).
(one of the 38th Bn. tanks had previously got to S. Gillemont
trench with the Americans and the crew, some of them; were
found lying dead outside it.
A diversion was arranged to the south. (11th Bde. working
round). In the morning S. Gillemont trench was found to have
been evacuated by the Germans - and also Claymore Valley, which
was the worst obstruction 38th Bn. had had (the guns firing
largely from S. direction. (?Quennet Copse and thereabouts).
Gillemont Farm also gave a lot of trouble. The last dead
Americans were seen in S. Gillemont trench. There were no
dead Americans seen in Bony.
The patrols at dawn on September 30 having reported
S. Gillemont trench unoccupied, C Coy. moved over to it.
There they got touch eventually with 39th Bn. This and the
C.T.'s and support line in this area (Claymore trench) were
absorbed by 38th Bn. This was the result of an order from
Bde. to clear up A14. C Coy. there got 5 heavy M.G.'s and
4 light M.G.'s; and 4 hotchkiss guns, which had been taken
by the Germans from the disabled tank, were recaptured.
A post was placed in Bony Ave. but was withdrawn at
dusk to Claymore trench on Bde. directions:
On evening of Sept. 30, 38th. Bn. received orders that Bn.
would probably be withdrawn to make an attack at 6 a.m.
towards Vendhuille. This same night the instructions were
cancelled.
OCTOBER 1. The advanced post in Bony Ave. A14C8.2 was
re-established and all C Coy, was pushed along Bony Ave. and
the rest of 38th. followed into the Hindenburg outpost system
thus vacated. At 8.30 Capt. Peters pushed out his patrols as
far as Bony - reached at 9.45. Lieut. G.G. Bowman was the
first man through the village. They mopped up the village -
shots had been fired from it but the Germans cleared -and put
their posts on the tunnel line - the left post next to 39th
was on the tunnel just opposite N.E. corner of Bony. 
At 2.30 p.m. orders were received for 37th Bn. to go
through to the knob with left flank on canal tunnel end in A9-
facing N. and N.E. This was done.
39th then came to tunnel line and 38th withdrew to
Hindenburg line.
On evening of 2/3 38th Bn. was withdrawn to Ronssoy Wood.
Capt. Collins was wounded on Sept. 30 during advance to
Bony.
 

148.
The padre, Chaplain Freer, C. of E., - one of
Queensland Bush brotherhood (who had come brand new after
3 days' experience straight into the middle of the night
attack of 10/11 Aug. and went right into it) was wounded
after a day's work with the R.M.O. in Dog Trench - he was
going towards the dressing station and was hit while going
on an ambulance down the road and lost an eye.
Capt. G. V. Davies, D.S.O., the R.M.O. (Melbourne),
did splendid work throughout amongst our men and the
Americans - the only medical officer in reach. A couple
of hundred Americans passed through his post - in the front
line next to Bn. H.Q.
The stretcherbearers also worked amongst the Americans
and our own men and had on several occasions whole teams
wiped out by shell and M.G. fire. They brought in all
Americans within reach between Dog trench and S. Gillemont
Farm.
Signalling arrangements under Lieut. T. H. Dunn got
the line to the front line Coy. in Dog trench and wherever
the front line advanced. This took practically the whole
of the Bde. news and was kept up continuously - the linesmen
did fine work. An American officer, 108th I.R., Lieut.
Donnacker, was attached to C Coy. (the only remaining
American in the Bn. area about Gillemont) with 30 men.
They stayed till night of 30th. and acted as part of 38th.
Bn., doing good work. Of 38th Bn. 13 officers and 260
men were available on night of Sept. 30, including Bn. H.Q.
Casualties: 4 officers, 100 O.R.
There were no medical arrangements at all, apparently,
for the Americans, nor Q.M. arrangements. Those fighting
with us were entirely fed by us and depended on us for
everything. Our own Q.M. and transport arrangements were
admirable - they got hot meals right up to the front twice
every night. The waggons came east of Ronssoy the first
night and the Q.M. of 37th Bn., Lieut. Wilkinson, was killed
there and transport officer of 37th, Lieut. J. H. Chapman,
wounded, by a shell. The Q.M. of 38th, Lieut. Telfer, M.C.
carried on for 37th after delivering 38th Bn.'s rations.
The food and water and hot tea and cocoa were taken from the
cookers in west edge of Ronssoy Wood, in petrol tins.
(When Telfer got back from 38th he found 37th Bn transport
still looking for 37th Bn dump - Wilkinson had been killed
looking for it, and transport officer wounded doing the same.
Telfer found their Bn. dump for them and delivered the
rations). Eacj day Telfer and the transport Sergt. (Beard)
had to come (acting as transport officer) up and reconnoitre
where xxxx Bn. had got to and then go back and bring up
rations to the dump, which moved every night. He would come
up after lunch - then go back - arrive at 8 p.m. with the
first load (hot evening meal) and return to cookers and come
back with the hot morning meal at 3 or 4 a.m.
Ammunition was taken up with the rations (the lot
sufficient to last for a day or more). generally with the
first lot of rations, and was carried up from the dump by
ammunition parties (of Bn pioneers) and rations by
carrying parties from the Companies.
 

149.
58th BATTTALION.
August 8-9: Flamicourt.
Bellicourt
203
3rd DIVISION:
Disbandment of battalions.
BRAY:
xxx
3rd DIVISION - 29th September.
58th BATTALION - 8 AUGUST.
Diagram - see original document
I.O. led them to position on tapes. Had to wait an
hour. The Germans put down a very weak barrage after the
hop-over - the counter-preparation did not affect this Bn.
On way up to J.O. at Warfusee 58th Bn. struck a few
isolated posts missed by 2nd Div. which gave no trouble.
Just before getting to position for jump-off south of
Warfusee they struck a heavy barrage which seemed to be the
firing off by Germans of their ammunition before getting
away. The mist was gone by then. 58th Bn. was just coming
up. This barrage lasted half an hour (they could see the
guns and the men working them). Tanks were coming up. The
tanks formed so many with each Coy. The Coys were
reorganised. The road from Villers Bretonneux Road to
Bayonvillers was a good guide, and the Coys. kept their
direction well. Warfusee could also be seen and Bayonvillers
directly ahead. (These were taken afterwards).
Bn. started with a screen of scouts.
Diagram - see original document
The 18-pdrs. were right up with the Bn. and the moment
Bn. started they put in a heavy barrage. This helped the
tanks enormously against the German guns immediately ahead.
Artillery galloping up in heavy barrage just before this move
off was a very fine sight.
As 58th Came to Bayonvillers they went straight for it
with two tanks. Lieut Stevenson, I.O. of Bn., was
bringing two prisoners round the corner when he met a tank
which shot him by mistake (wounded). The Germans put up a
scrap in a few places and a good many were killed. About
 

150.
90 prisoners were taken, mostly out of cellars.
Coys, worked right through the village, one down the main
street and the other up the street from W. They were not
held up in the village.
After passing Bayonvillers it was easy going after
59th to outskirts of Harbonnieres. 58th Bn. dug in there
with left flank on crucifix while 59th went through.
Stayed there for night in support to 59th. After digging
in the Germans xxxx opened up with artillery.
The cavalry came up after 58th had been through
Bayonvillers and passed along the Harbonnieres side road
south of the town.
The cavalry took a train of reinforcements with 300
prisoners near Harbonnieres - not the same as that with the
big gun. The cavalry came back again and camped about
dusk just between 58th Bn. and Harbonnieres (others in
rear,
(The 15th Bde. had taken the outskirts of Guillancourt
north of the railway, and advanced report centre of H.Q.
was near the chimney, when the Canadian cavalry charged
the town. They gathered in a dip just S.E. of Wiencourt.
Then they charged the town straight - in two rather rough
lines with a reserve massed further back. The fire was
too heavy and as they reached the town they wheeled off
to the right and back into the dip to reform (Canadian
infantry was lying down just S.W. of Wiencourt waiting for
this attack). The Canadian cavalry went at it three times
at least - and the third time the tanks were coming up
round the south side of the village - then the Germans
began to clear out of it and the cavalry and tanks came
gthrough trying to catch them up. Within an hour the
Canadian artillery was in action just north of railway East
of Guillancourt.
(The 15th Bde. H.Q. in the factory north of the railway
there found an elaborate German signal station and took
a number of the personnel prisoner).
Supply tanks came to 58th Bn. on objective at once
with supplies, food, wire, picks, shovels, etc. A very
fair wire entanglement was put down at once along the front
of Bn.
AUGUST 9th. Next day 58th Bn. moved up through 59th
Bn. about 8 a.m. As they came through 59th on outskirts
of village they came under very heavy barrage of 5.9, 4.2
and all sorts and heavy M.G. fire. They took cover in the
olf Amiens line for a little while. Reconnoitring parties
were sent out from there. These parties went out under
great difficulties - there was a regular M.G. barrage - and
the parties also lost heavily.
There was a heavy M.G. barrage coming from the copse
of saplings and from the German D.H.Q. at 24 B7.7.(?).
The patrols had a lot of difficulty getting to the sunken
road by the railway station at Harbonnieres. From there
the Germans were seen moving through the Copse, and up
from certain low buildings beyond it - towards the
railway station.
It was then that 58th Bn decided that the only thing
to do was to advance with short sectional rushes with
covering fire. We started these rushes and had advanced
150 yds, when the German morale gave and they began to run.
Our L.G.'s then got onto them and they lost very heavily -
dead Germans everywhere. As soon as 58th saw them
retiring, 58th advanced at the double firing at the retiring
Germans till our men got to buildings. These turned out
to be the buildings covering the big dugouts of a D.H.Q. -
18 officers were taken from one dugout alone. 300
prisoners in all must have been taken, and 21 M.G.'s.
 

151.
(The M.G.'s were in portholes and positions around.
The potholes were full of Germans. As we got within 30
yards they stood up, threw off their kit, and began to hold
out revolvers or anything we had.)
About then the 60th En. came along on the right. C Coy.
58th. had come round the north side of the copse. Some
Germans were killed in the copse.
58th Bn. had been moving S.E.
The 58th Bn. had attacked without artillery and tanks.
When the tanks did come up with 1st Division they were
knocked out at once.
Brig.-General Elliott moved up his Bde. H.Q. to this
D.H.Q.
(While 59th Bn. was in the xxxx front line the first
evening a horseman rode up to a post of ours. As he got up
to the post the men there were astonished to see that he
was a German. He made a swipe at once with his sword
wounded him in the arm with his sword, and got away. Several
of the men spoke of this later).
There was a lot of rifle and M.G. fire from the left
at Vauvillers after the 58th arrived on its objective. At
this time Lieut. Robinson, acting as liaison officer with
59th Bn., brought word that they were not to go xxxxxxx
further as the 1st Division were doing their hardest to
catch up and go through. The Germans had just put down
a heavy barrage 800 yds. ahead and it looked an ugly place
to go into. The Germans were firing through fixed sights
at 58th Bn. during the advance also.
After 1st Division had gone through they waited half
an hour, then returned to the dugouts. 58th Bn. considered
that it was on the Vauvillers-Rosieres road.
Aug. 8 - Crockford - hit at Harbonnieres in evening by
shell - died of wounds
               Stevenson - wounded in Bayonvillers.
Aug. 9 - Garvett )- when advancing from station in
                Truscott) rushes on M.G. barrage on morning
of Aug. 9.
Also others.
8 Lewis gunners in one Coy, alone were killed, - on
morning of Aug. 9 - by this M.G. barrage.
5 or 6 were wounded also in the reconnaisance.
PERONNE - AUGUST 29th
58th Bn. was warned for the show on Aug. 29 (through
8th Bde.) and was lying out above the river (in J.O.
position which it had reached the evening before) when it was
declared off at 7.30 p.m. (This was all from Division
At 10 p.m. Brigadier was called to a conference. From
there he came back at 2 a.m. with plans for a conference
further north.
AUGUST 30th.- During the night of Aug. 29/30 the
B.M. and I.O. were collecting Bns. and giving them
instructions to move up north and attack through 2nd. Div.
who wero to make the crossings. This was to be at dawn.
At about 6 a.m. Lieut Moon went down to find the
dispositions ahead of Bn. - down Attila Alley. He found a
party of 28th Bn. (?) just returning after having failed to
cross the Somme. When Bn. found this they took over from
2nd Div.
 

152.
2nd. Div. Bn. instead of passing through, and spent the day
in N.6.
About 5 p.m. Aug. 30 they moved up and took a line from
2nd Division.
(15 Bde. H.Q. came up to 02.B8.9. from 0 1 D 5.4. about -
where they had gone from Varna trench - and had a dress
circle view of the fighting till September 5. The Bde. H.Q.
dugout had a sort of verandah with a black background where
the heavy artillery officers and others sat out on chairs
with telephones and watched everything. Brig.-Gen. Elliott
used to stand out in front in his socks and move about with
a map in his hand, and he drew the M.G. bullets.)
Patrols that night tried to find river crossings. Two
officers were badly wounded (Lieut. L. xxxxx Davis and Lieut.
Eric Beech) on the one patrol - whole patrol were casualties
going down the La Chapelette Road. They had to find if the
railway bridge could be crossed.
Another patrol was further south - also failed.
FROM BRIGADE:
One morning at Bde. Elliott, hearing that 14th Bde. or
2nd Div. had made a great advance into Peronne ran up from
his dugout and found Col. Scanlon (59th) and Major Doyle
(58th) with their boots off - Doyle one boot off and Scanlon
two. He said - "Have you heard what 2nd Div. have done?
Are your men across the river?"
Scanlon said - "Yes; we've taken all steps, General.
They are to send out a patrol from - Coy., and hold the Coy.
ready to....."
"But aren't they across there?" said Pompey.
"They are taking all the possible steps" said Scanlon.
"Damn it, I'll take them over myself" said Pompey, and
dashed off straight down the hill over the open in full view
of the Germans - got to a post of 59th Bn, west of the canal
and took it across and left it west of the canal. He then
started back. Meanwhile the two C.O.'s said: "We ought
to go down and follow him" They put on their boots and
started down the same dangerous slope and immediately the
German M.G.'s had them flat on their faces, running from
shellhole to cover. At the foot of the slope they met a wet
figure coming back. Pompey, striding back over the bridge
full of satisfaction had trodden on a loose plank and fallen
in the canal - 5 ft. of water. "I could take a battalion
down there in perfect safety any day", he said - referring to
the slope down which he had come.
August 31.- The Germans could be seen reinforcing
against 2nd Div. along the trenches this side of Mont St. Q
Quentin (Koros trench, etc.) Report came from 2nd Div.
that they had Mont St. Quemtin. 15th Bde, was advising them
that they had not Mt St. Quentin taken. The Germans would
work down the trenches east of the St. Denis-Aziecourt Road,
thence through Koros trench into the quarry and from there
into the wood.
Diagram - see original document.
They could also be seen coming down the trench to the east
of Peronne in parallel columns through all trenches and
thence across the open into Anvil Wood.
The artillery could not get onto these targets until
late in the evening, when a heavy shoot was done on Anvil
 

153.
Wood, and the wood on the hill from which they were stealing
down.
Lots of Germans could also be seen on the railway south-
west of Flamicourt.
It is absolutely certain 2nd Division was not in Gott
mit Uns trench.
SEPTEMBER 1. Major Ferris and Lieut. Moon at 6 a.m.
met a party of 54th Bn. on the railway bridge. They had
worked down through the west side of Peronne. They sent
back. 58th Bn. was then moved down the slope left of La
Chapellette - crossed the canal by the Bristol Bridge.
One Coy. (D Coy. under Lieut. Deane) was sent down to
the right to try and cross with 57th Bn. in 9A and B. It
was found impossible to get across the marshes East of La
Chapelette. C Coy. therefore took up a position where they
had a good position for keeping covering fire on the
quarries south of Little Flamicourt, while two other Coys.
went up through Peronne, through the east end of the town
and swung south to meet D Coy, and 57th and 59th Bns. on
the spur south of Flamicourt.
59th Bn. were dribbling men across the canal and along
the railway line with the idea of getting into Flamicourt.
They struck M.G. fire on the straight narrow railway bank
running through the marsh. The lost two officers and could
not get on.
The 2 Coys, of 58th, under Capt. Forsyth and Lieut.
Morrison, found that 53rd and 54th had only taken the west
of Peronne and the whole of the east was strongly held by
the Germans. They lay up in the moat just outside the
entrance by the citadel - in touch with post of the 54th
Bn. under Capt. Downey (27B.0.6). Things thus came to a
standstill. Troops were all withdrawn to the morning's
position except C Coy. (Lieut. Tait) who remained covering
Bristol Bridge as in the morning. They sent a party up the
road to keep touch with 53rd Bn.- 33.A.9.9. The Coys.
from the moat came back for the night.
SEPTEMBER 2. About 5 a.m. Sept. 2 orders were received
to push through the town, - Major Ferris to put himself under
Col. Marshall to attack and take the rest of Peronne, and
then swing to the south as before abd get the high ground
in 35 opposite Doingt.
(Gen. Elliott arrived back at 3 a.m. from Division with
these orders. Owing to the position of Gen. Elliott's
Bde. H.Q. the car from Division had missed him - hadn't been
able to find him. He walked all the way back to Division -
and the other Brigadiers had gone. He put 38th Bn. under
Col. Marshall without telling 14th Bde, commander (or before
the message reached him) - and the first Marshall knew was
when 38th Bn. turned up! Ferris went back incensed (when he
was wounded) and reported that Col. Marshall was in bed and
didn't know there was a fight on. As a matter of fact
Marshall didn't know that 38th Bn. was in the fight - and
there was a misunderstanding.)
Lieut. Moon had to find Col. Marshall and found him a
long way north of Peronne. They hadn't had instructions
that 58th (?38th) Bn. was under them, and suggested that he
should look for C.O. 56th Bn, who was running the show -
Marshall had instructed his Coy. under Downing to mop up the
rest of Peronne.
Meanwhile Major Ferris had sent two Coys. to the moat.
As they were getting into the town the Cerman retaliation
for our barrage came down (half an hour before Zero, However
which was the hour on which 15th Bde, was working), and our
shorts and the German shelling made this end xxxxxx of the
town very hot indeed. There was an hour's preparatory
barrage on east of Peronne (it began actually at 5.35) and it
 

154.
was very ragged, probably owing to the shortness of the
notice to the artillery also.
The Bn. going through Peronne had a number of casualties
through this shelling.
Lieut. Deane - badly wounded:
Capt. Forsyth - wounded: stayed there some time at moat.
Major Ferris - wounded - carried on.
They reorganised in the moat. Major Ferris, as he had
had no reply, decided to go on with the attack himself.
Major Ferris and Lieut. Slaughter made a personal
reconnaissance. The Bn. was in the moat. The two went up
the N. outskirts of the town under cover of mounds of earth
and brick buildings; and up at the first E. entrance of the
main town they came under M.G. fire.
They went back and brought the Coys. up on the north
side of the town and put them under cover of various mounds
and buildings. From there they decided to attack with two
Coys. Both had to cross the bridge, one to the right and
one to the left. The centre was a road running N.E.
They got across the bridge all right. But as soon as
they got through they came under M.G. fire from directly down
the street and from buildings on either side of it.
Cover was available on either side by earthworks and
buildings. The left Coy. under Lieut. Slaughter worked along
the earthworks just south of the moat. They were opposed.
They sent out fighting patrols with L.G.'s in front of either
flank of their advance. Owing to good cover of buildings
the patrols got to close quarters and brought fire onto the
German M.G. posts. These were mounted on the ramparts and
in buildings, firing through windows, sometimes from 2nd.
stories; some from little mounds of which there were many;
on the left from the ramparts where there were trenches all
along.
Lieut. McKinley was wounded by a T.M. - a few minutes
later we got the crew of 17 (about half way up the ramparts).
In some cases the German M.G.'s put up a good fight and some
crews were wiped completely out by our M.G.'s and rifles.
The Coy. was covering the patrols with fire and working
forward as patrols reported their advance. A number of the
patrols were wounded and were replaced from the Coy. They
pushed on till they reached the end of the ramparts, finding
posts the whole way.
Owing to the flank not being up, and M.G. fire from
St. Denis, they could not get any further forward - the left
had not moved at all at that time (N. of the town). The
Germans retired to trenches and pozzies about 300 yds. N.E.
of the ramparts in the St. Denis direction. He reinforced
these very strongly and was apparently reinforced there but
did not attempt to counterattack. The right had similarly
gone through the houses south of the road. We got about
100 prisoners (Bn. C.O., who rode up on his horse, 2 other
officers, a number of different units - all machine-gunners
who seemed to have volunteered).
L.G. and rifle posts were established on the left on
the ramparts, and in the front east of the ramparts across
the country guarding the road.
A patrol (standing patrol) was put on the railway line
about 28 B 8.9. They also took advantage of the large
number of German M.G.'s captured (7 or 8 mounted) and
established posts round the ramparts N. E. and S..
Word was sent to the other two Coys, who were brought
up in close support and dug in under the ramparts. About
then 14th Bde, came along to reinforce (Lieut. Harvey - 54th
Bn., about 11 a.m.). They were kept in support, and that
night about 8 or 9 p.m. were relieved (2/3rd.)
xxxx On afternoon of Sept. 4 Gen. Elliott got onto the
ramparts to watch the advancing troops. As everything was
 

155.
going well the General who saw a boat there got into this
with Major Doyle (who was about exhausted) and punted about.
Shells were falling into the water.
"I hope they don't mistake us for a dreadnought and
sink us" said Elliott. They heard a cat mewing. Elliott
had them rowing across to rescue it.
Lieut. Morey was killed on reconnaissance on the causeway
to Flamicourt that day. (possibly testing the causeway.
He had been sent back to report - had reported - and was on
his way back)
There were pretty heavy casualties also in N.C.O.'s and
men by bullet and M.G. fire.
Lieut. Bowler.
One German M.G. was doing a lot of damage from a two-
storey building near the east end of the main street. One
of our Lewis gunners got his gun onto him and he toppled
with his gun out of the top window onto the road.
The first of Slaughter's patrols struck a German M.G.
firing from the south of the road across onto the northern
ramparts. Cpl. Macleod fot to within 50 yds. He killed
three instantly with his L.G.; Sergt. Moss and Cpl.
Gladstone then rushed out expecting the rest of the crew to
Kamerad - which they didn't do. Seeing only two attacking
they in their turn called on them to surrender. Moss and
Gladstone fired shots at close quarters, and so did the
Germans; but they missed. Moss and Gladstone got their
men and the rest were accounted for by the rest of the patrol.
Gladstone was later killed by another M.G. the same day
10 mins. later.
58th BATTALION - BELLICOURT.
Started near Templeux about 7.30. Came up north of
Hargicourt in artillery formation of platoons.
As they reached American J.O.T. they began to get shelled
They went on till they hit the Hindenburg outpost xxxxxxx
line about 1200 yds. south of Quennemont Farm. No idea that
anything was wrong - saw large parties of 7 or 8 Americans
escorting few Germans to rear. Could get no information at
all of how anything was going They were in touch with 57th
Bn. on right. At the top of the hill the fog of smoke was
very heavy. 57th Bn. had an officer's patrol out for same
reason - Bn. halted in fog. After that 58th Bn. moved on
again in same formation. As they came down the slopes the
fog was getting lighter. A certain amount of M.G. fire
began to come from left and left rear. They came to the
conclusion that either the Americans had not mopped up or
that our people were not through on the left.
They came to the tunnel bank and found 57th there on
right; no sign of 59th. on xxxxxx left. Some fair number
of Americans were there but they did not know what they were
doing - quite disorganised. They knew their own people were
ahead - but didn't know where. Capt. Loughnan (senior
officer of 58th) went down to Col. Denehy's H.Q. and conferred
with him. It was then decided that, instead of waiting till
they got to the Nauroy line (their J.O.T.) they would jump
off from the Canal bank. Col. Denehy's H.Q. may have been
in touch with Bde. This decision was come to by Col.
Denehy and Capt. Loughnan on the strength of the reports of
our patrols. Officers' patrols had been out in front
(officer, sergt., 1 man, etc.) about 2.20 p.m., and could see
 

156.
scattered parties of Americans being walked off by the
Germans. It would now be about 2.45.
The attack was made at 3 p.m. with a barrage which was
very light.
At 3.p.m. the 58th hopped over on left of 57th. Going
direct East towards the signal station they had about 60 per
cent. casualties. They did not get further than the trench
which bends south through 28C and D. They had very heavy
M.G. fire from front (Nauroy line), left and rear. Here
they found that the Nauroy line was strongly held and that
the Germans were enfilading from left and left rear.
Except for a number of disorganised Americans on the
tunnel bank, and in shellholes south of the C.T. through
27B and 28c; Capt. Loughnan got the C.O. of these and got the
C.T. occupied by them together with a lost Coy. of 44th Bn.
The line was continued from there by 59t Bn, and then 3rd.
Division again, up the Hindenburg main line towards Bony.
(Just on dark Loughnan found this American C.O. of 119th
Regt. had been standing in the road behind the bank, getting
shelled, with no idea of where his troops were or what was
happening. There was an American aid post in the air shaft
just by the bend of the C.T. Loughnan took him along to his
H.Q. That night 118th Regt. came in to relieve 119th Regt.
 Loughnan would not let 119th men go but put 118th in the C.T.
and in the Hindenburg main line in 27c.
30 SEPTEMBER.  At 2 a.m. Loughnan was sent for to 58th
Bn. H.Q. and got an operation order for the next morning.
They were to hop over (with as many Americans as they could)
swing the bend of the left flank up into line through 28 Cent.
22 Central, tunnel bank, and then jump forward into the Le
Catelet line. This was done at Zero. No tanks. ?Barrage.
The left would be about 22c9.5. Right was 28 D.4.0.
Lieut. Green and an N.C.O. were with the Americans.
The American officers knew what was wanted and the men did it
very readily.
They got in along the whole front. They found that from
the left northwards the line was occupied by the Germans. A
bombing block was put in at about 22 B.0.5. The losses were
light - only about 10 for the 58th Bn. The right was on the
road just by the lamp signal station, in Nauroy line. The
Nauroy line was now held continuously by us up to the bombing
block.
Cabaret wood farm was very active with M.G.'s.
In the Nauroy line was found a 77 gun which was probably
the one which hit all the tanks the previous afternoon. (The
58th. had had about 4 whippet tanks with it, and they had all
been hit on the ridge in front of Cabaret Wood farm).
They decided to raid Cabaret Wood Farm at 3 a.m. on
October 1.
At 2 a.m. Capt. Loughnan was again sent for to Bn. H.Q.
and given some more operation orders which cut this out. They
were to jump forward and occupy an outpost line on the
forward slope and make Le Catelet-Nauroy line the line of
resistance. This was done without opposition at dawn. The
53rd Bn was to work its way north behind xxxx this advance
and bomb up the Le Catelet line. The 53rd Bn. came up
through Bellicourt, along the tunnel bank, onto the Le
Catelet line in 28B., then north. About 22B Central they
began to fight. Three times they attacked - the line
waving backwards and forwards three times; and then they
knocked the Germans out and got along.
When they reported meeting with no opposition an order
came along which practically meant that left of 38th was
to stand fast and the right swing forward to a line NWx
NW-SE and then attack NE. This was without barrage. 58th
got up to 24 B central - close to the Canal. The Germans