Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/226/1 - Folder - Part 15

137.
C.O. sent to C-D Coy. to be support Coys. They were
in the front line. They had met Germans near Inferno
trench as they went up it northwards. The Germans were
coming south. Pte. Brock, who was ahead, used his rifle
and wounded two Germans and the rest cleared. C and D Coys.
withdrew into the trenches immediately S.E. of Berlin Wood.
McIntyre was then detached from B Coy and sent to get
touch with 38th Bn. and if possible the other Bns. (37th.
and 39th). to report position of 40th. - 38th. wanted to
form flank on right. Peters' Coy, came along to the lower
end of the trench.
From 10 a.m. the German was seen in numbers on the
Bouchavesnes-Feuillact road with M.G.'s and snipers. He
was also firing with two whizzbangs somewhere south of
27 Cent. and also two east of Feuillact (which he could be
seen brining in and later pulling out).
A lot of M.G. fire was also coming from the north and
south gully just east of the road in 27A and C. There was
a lot of movement to be seen at the back of Mont St. Quentin
into Feuillact and into Allaines (especially) transport.
It looked as if he were going to get up to the road north
of Feuillact to attack. It was clearly us or him for it,
and Col. Lord decided that it was up to us to push on. He
accordingly instructed A and B Coys. to attack.
Lieut. Rattray - B

Lieut. Game -    A

Diagram - see original document
Lieut. Jackson, Bn. Sig. Offr., was attached to B Coy.
and attacked with it. (Jackson bought into this fight and
did splendidly)
At 3 p.m. this attack began. B Coy. undertook the
actual raiding of the road, A Coy. moved in close support.
B Coy. were along Zombo trench in 2A and the bank
continuing it to the north. Jackson had seen from the
hill the two C.T.'s forking ahead of it. Jackson and
Rattray decided to divide B Coy. and each take a party. xxC
B Coy, was 25-30 strong.

Diagram - see original document
These were to be taken one up each fork. They were
taken as shown. But a third (unmapped) trench existed.
The parties divided - and when they had gone about 200 yds.
this trench led Rattray's party back to Jackson8s.
Rattray's came in just as Jackson's passed. They then
decided that a trench which Jackson had passed must be the
left fork - so (to avoid going back) they detached a L.G.
crew to do this. Jackson's and Rattray's parties then went
on, reaching the final bend of the trench. Jackson was
leading and saw a German sentry about 20 yds. ahead round the
bend. The sentry was fired on. This alarmed the rest of
the post on the road 40 yds. away. Another L.G. was moved
out to the right to enfilade the road from near it to the
right. Some of the party crawled out into shellholes on the
left - Jackson with them.
Rattray and his party bombed along the trench with these
two parties, keeping the Germans' heads down. Ahead, at the
junction of trench and road they had been able to see a
German xxxxx H.M/gun posted high on the road edge. When
the sentry fired the machine gunners stood right up. A
B Coy. man got him within the second with a rifle shot - he
was ready for someone to get in there.
 

138.
About 25-30 Germans were in the trench just west of
the Sunken Road. The Germans were tossing bombs without
looking over - stick grenades, eggs and rifle grenades.
He could not get his head up at all without being shot.
Rattray's party rushed the post and the Germans surrendered.
(The watchers on the hill could see both sides though
neither could see the other).
These prisoners were passed back - 1 officer and23 O.R.
The party then exploited the other side of the road
(the road was sunken). They were on the highest part of 3
the knob. They met opposition about the trench junction
in 2B9.7. That side of the road seemed strongly held -
much M.G. fire, one enfilading the road. They decided to
come back to the knoll and establish posts to hold the road -
one post was put on the east side of it.
There was lots of movement down the hill near Feuillact,
Fritz working S.W. Two posts were put into the right fork
of the C.T. to protect against this.
In the meanwhile A Coy, had (unknown to them) worked up
the N. fork of the C.T. No sooner had the right flank posts
been established than the Germans began to move over the bank
north of Ponsot trench. The machine gunner in one post had
his gun trained and the first three Germans fell. Others
tried to get into the trenches east of the road but the
Machine guns had them whenever they showed.
B Coy, held this position until withdrawn.
About half an hour after our B Coy, had reached this
position the Germans deployed for a counterattack and came
across 3A and B. This could be seen from Bn. H.Q. about
700 - 800 yds. away on the other side of the gully, and was
dealt with almost wholly by artillery. (Major Glover, D.S.O.
and Capt. Davies had moved forward to Bn. H.Q. and were in
tel. communication). Their guns had been registered on the
road and with a short lift got onto these people
xxxxx There had been telephone communication from the
Germans to their battery also - and when our attack began his
two whizzbangs got on at once. (The telephone was held).
A Coy. reached the road north of B Coy. (About 7 yds.
west of the road on left of B. About 7 men were wounded there
by bombs from across the road, but the post was held till
withdrawn later in the day when the field guns covered them).
About 5 p.m., as reinforcements could not be sent up
and these Coys. were weak and unsupported - and artillery
fire had been refused on Feuillact which was uncertain, it
was decided to withdraw both Coys. to the J.O.T. east of
Zombo trench. A barrage from the attached field guns was
arranged - also as signal for Coys. to come out (they were
informed). This was carried out about 5 p.m.
Shortly after instructions were received from Bde. for
the whole of the Bde. troops to work forward to the road.
39th)
37th)
40th|
38th|
A Coy. was then sent forward and reoccupied the position, and
B Coy, was held in support. A Coy. covered the knob. They
stayed there till the advance party of 43 with Major Ferguson
came to Bn. H.Q. at 10 p.m. On hearing the situation
Ferguson said it was not intended to take over on the road
owing to obscurity, but they would assemble in the gully.
A Coy. was then withdrawn about 2 a.m.
On August 30 B Coy., which had been support Coy. of
38th Bn., received orders (at the Bank west of Clery) to go
forward and look for a lost Coy. of 37th Bn. in Clery.
 

139.
McIntrye sent one platoon under Rattray to work round
north of Clery and the other platoon and Lieut. Walters
round the right. H.Q. tried to work down the centre of the
village but had to come to the right and go with Walters.
The opposition was all from the east of the village. The
left platoon first met fire about in Elen Alley about three-
quarters of the way along the village. They lay up and sent
on scouts. The right platoon as soon as it got over the bank
at the start came under heavy M.G. fire. There were four
M.G.'s and 70 odd Germans in the house north of Omiect Bridge.
Also four or five about 80 yds. north of the strongpoint (in
the house). Also a M.G. on each side of the river at the
bridgeheads. The Germans probably got back into Clery during
the night. Also M.G.'s from the trenches further east.
Half platoon and H.Q. were casualties by the time they
got a little way into the village. They tried drains,
mounds - everywhere he stopped them. He sent out scouts
to pick them up but could not. The Germans sent up S.O.S.
from the strongpoint north of the bridge and put down a heavy
barrage in the village. The scouts located the strongpoint.
Pte. Oates did well in this scouting - he also spotted the
M.G.'s on either side of the river.
McIntyre then sent back to the Brigadier (as ordered -
under 37th Bn.) for a barrage. This came down, very quick and
good. Under that they advanced to the road north and south
at the east end of the village. Our barrage had stopped
then and Fritz's atarted - but his was just over. They were
then 6c8.2. McIntyre reinforced Rattray - who was now
fairly close on the right - with some men (they had all been
crawling on their stomachs getting up close). Rattray
rushed the post - (between 11 a.m. and noon). They got the
post in the house - the Camp Commandant of Clery was there;
and some big dugouts.
About where the Coy. lay up before the last charge
were a Coy. of 38th Bn. Some prisoners were found about
there next morning also. B Coy. consolidated there.
Between 1 and 2 p.m. the Germans put up a small counterattack, 

but it was wiped out by our M.G.'s and captured
German M.G's. This counterattack came in single file up
the sunken road east from the post. At 1.30 p.m. A Coy.
came up and supported them. The whole afternoon they were
firing on Germans in Berlingott and the trenches around it.
Lieut. Walters was wounded there, and the same bullet killed
the British artillery officer who was there.
Towards dusk the 20th En. cam through Elen Alley and got
touch.
A Coy, on reaching B Coy's H.Q. got orders to push out
and establish posts on the far side of the gully. xxxx
McM. went forward with a corporal and captured certain posts -
the M.G. fire was too heavy to allow the men forward so they
went alone - there were 6 M.G.'s (3 on the right of the
sunken road 12B7.7.; one on the left of the road; and two
about 80 yds. further left.
McM, was going down Barge Alley (acorporal followed him
as he went - Cpl. Dale). Ge got across the gully and then
saw the shiny tops of German helmets in the road. McM. got
Dale to throw a bomb and directed (by shouting) the Lewis
gunners at the strongpoint how to fire; and then rushed the
M.G. on the right of the road (in a shellhole improved).
There were two guns pointing the opposite way. They threw
stick grenades at McM, as he came forward. Me fired and hit
two - and just as he was within 10 yds. an 8-in. shell burst
on the far side of them and killed several Germans and
probably frightened them. They put their hands up. Eight
men and two guns were left. They sent these prisoners back
and then rushed the M.G. on the left. When they saw the two
 

140.
coming the Germans ran and McM. fired and hit one in the leg.
McM. looked at him and sent him off. The Germans shot this
prisoner with a M.G. The Germans left the other guns also as
soon as they saw them coming. Two of these guns were brought
in by Sergt. Billing and put in a post that night.
McM. went back, brought the Coy up, and established 6
outposts, from St. Gond trench across Barge Alley to the river
bank.
The 20th Bn. came through later.
These posts would be 6D6.2. to due southwards.

40th BATTALION - BONY.
Deployment to be north end of the canal; startingpoint
to be Prospect Hill. Route (much the one we followed)-
north of Blue Road.
They ran into M.G. fire and casualties about F17 central
(where we did).
Decided (after conference with Henderson) to push on over
the crest into Vale-street (road running down valley).
A and B Coys. had run into M.G. fire and were just short
of Guillemont Farm. After a short reconnaisance their O.C.'s
took them into the trench system 400 yds. west of it.
Ruddock - D|
McIntyre - B|

Findlay   - C|
Foster     - A|
The Coys. had been instructed to go independently to a
position in Grub Lane just East of Guillement Farm where they
were to assemble.
C picked up D just south of Duncan post, and both
realised at the same time that something was wrong and both
Coys. were deployed there on the left of the road in shellholes.
Americans were seen coming back there and the troops
were getting casualties. The Americans were coming back
in small parties without officers. They said they had lost
their officers; and the N.C.O.'s did not know what to do
with them. It was on the left they were coming back - not
the right. There were numbers of disabled tanks - six or
seven xxxxxxxxxx all together - big tanks - in rear of Duncan
Post. Some of the tanks on our reverse slope were hit by
artillery fire and not blown up by mines. The C.O. there
asked Findlay and Ruddock where the other two Coys. were:
they had gone forward towards Guillement Farm by then.
Bn. was out of touch with Bde. To show the difficulty
of keeping touch: at 2 p.m. Bn. got by runner a notification
to Bde. H.Q. would open at Bony at 9.15 a.m. All the
following units such as Bde., etc., piled up against the
American Division like trucks in a train smash. The
artillery were getting casualties from indirect M.G. fire
(possibly direct) coming over the slope of the hill as the
infantry passed through them.
D and C Coys., in accordance with decision of C.O. 40th
and 39th to push on, crossed the sunken road in 18A and C
(where there were a good number of Americans), got into
trenches east of this about Vale-street. D filed out -
still under cover of the hill. Lieut. Boden's platoon
first moved in extended order half-left down to Willow
Trench (which became left of Bn.) Then Lieut. Lawrence's
platoon was sent to the same place and got into Willow
trench also.
 

141
(There were only two platoons in the Coy.) They occupied
from south of Grub lane to Lowland Post.
C Coy. followed 10 mins. after D as they had been
doing all the time - they took up a position in broken
ground under cover of Guillement Hill, and 11 Platoon
(Lieut. Parry) went forward and got into trenches forming
part of the front line between B and D.

D

C

B

A
No. 12 platoon - Lieut F. Lakin - was ordered to go to
the trench about F12 D8.4 to 8.8. He was sent there to
xxxxxxx cover the Macquincourt Valley and protect the flank.
He got down a trench leading left to the knoll. Lots of
Americans were in that trench and they were also coming back
up the valley. Lakin could see that if he got his men into
this trench it would only make more congestion. So he put
his out in shellholes in front - and then went back to the
Americans in the trench and told them to stay there and
organised them. There were some English troops there. The
Americans were with plenty of ammunition but sitting down
doing nothing. Lakin got them up. The Germans were not
in that trench - more down by Lowland Post
These Americans were in the southern part of Fag trench,
south of Lowland Traverse
Meantime Lieut. Parry had got in dugouts near
Guillement Farm about 20 Germans and sent them back.
A and B were already (where marked on my map) just west
of the farm in the farm system. The German was occupying
Guillemont Farm at this time and was using M.G.'s fire
very heavy, in getting into this position, from German guns
close by. They had some casualties.
At this time the Germans were reported to be bombing
up from the left (Lowland Postway) and also from the support
line of the Hindenburg Outpost system.
Lieut. Lakin's platoon had been handed over to D Coy.
Capt. Ruddock sent him forward to reinforce so that these
Germans could be stopped. Lieut. Bowden on first reaching
Willow trench had gone on to reconnoitre and found the
Germans bombing up from Grub lane into Willow trench against
the Americans there. Bowden bombed the Germans himself
and drove them out and then went back for his platoon. He
brought the platoon along overland to the head of Grub Lane
and got them in and was out of the trench again when he was
shot and died afterwards that night or next day. Ruddock
and the Official Photographer had been just behind Willow tr
Trench at this time. This was between 9 and 10 a.m.
(Lawrence followed Bowden then). There was a lot of
bombing in this trench, and although a number of mules had
been lost, the 40th Bn. managed to get up a lot of
ammunition and bombs - and supplied our own men and the
Americans.
The trenches were held without a block as it was thought
we were going on - the Germans made several bombing attacks
up Grub Lane. When Lawrence arrived the Germans had been
driven down Grub Lane. Lawrence went down Willow trench to
left, and as he got further the more packed the Americans
became, many being wounded, until you could scarcely move in
the trench. The Germans were bombing these Americans up
from the other side. A party of Americans a few minutes
before had broken from the trench and were shot with M.G.'s.
This constantly happened. On the knoll Americans could be
seen retiring up the knoll, stopping now and then to fire
and being chased out with M.G.'s. Bomb fights were going
on here and there up the knoll, and the Germans gradually
got established up there so as almost to enfilade our position
 

142.
but not quite. Lakin went down to the extreme left of
the Americans. Later he found two officers but they were
not doing anything and no one seemed to be in charge.
They had very few bombs, and M.G.'s were in bottom of
trench (2 Vickers guns). These two guns he got out and
got into position. The left of the Americans was just
at 7.D.6.7. near the trench junction. Lakin got all the
walking wounded out and organised the remaining Americans
along the front.
At this stage Lieut. Lakin brought down his platoon
to the left and formed a bombing party and drove the
Germans back and blocked the trench. Sergt. Braid was
with him. This settled the left flank, where there had
been bombing all the time till then - the Germans doing
terrible damage with the Americans. Cpl. Barwick with
the bombing party dealt with the Germans in Grubb Lane
about the same time - drove them right back and blocked
the trench, cutting down the trench.
At 9 a.m. a German plane came over about 500 ft. up
dropping lights and all the Coys. in the vicinity brought
him down with rifle and L.G. fire, on his second visit.
Coy. Commanders were then called together to BN. H.Q.
to confer about clearing up the situation, with a patrol
from each Coy. - about 1.30 p.m. on first day. This was
tried but M.G. fire was too heavy for success. You could
not move.
About 3 p.m. orders from Corps through Bde. having
come that the Americans were on the green and the line was
to advance. This too was impossible. It was then that
Capt. Ruddock went back to try the getting forward. He
got to his Coy., and was getting on the parapet to take
Coy. H.Q. on when hit by two M.G. bullets. Lieut.
Lawrence then for the second time took chargeof D Coy.
being the only officer left. Capt. Foster, O.C. A Coy.
was wounded in the same way. Lieut. Weston was left in
charge of A Coy.
Before this, about 8.15, Lieut. Rock had been wounded.
(xxxxx GILLEMONT is spelt that way).
The Germans then began to shell heavily.
At 3 p.m. in the general advance A Coy. got Gillemont
Farm. No Germans were got there. It was done over the
top. The effect of the general advance was to straighten
up a little - with casualties.
At night position was: We were in the Hindenburg
outpost front line (Willow trench, Gillemont trench);
Germans in Support trench (Gillemont Crescent).
Diagram - see original document
SEPTEMBER 30th. - Night was wet and most of it was
spent directing American patrols in the dark - things were
very obscure.
At dawn patrols were sent out to support line
(Gillemont Crescent). They found Germans had gone - the
place contained German dead, American dead - water red
with blood - empty cartridges everywhere. Coys. moved
into this trench.
Diagram - see original document
 

143.
Stayed there all that day. Shellfire was very heavy
on C Coy., meant for Gillemont Farm. It was all sizes.
We could not use our guns owing to vagueness - only
observed fire could be employed. This gave the Germans
a whip hand - all 29th. Cerman M.G. fire was killing our
artillery. C Coy. had to use gas masks four and five
times each hour through gas shells occasionally right into
the trench.
The machine gunners came in and occupied C Coys.
trench that day with a fine field of fire - C Coy. going
into the next trench forward where Bn. H.Q. was.
Night 30 SEPTEMBER/1 OCTOBER: Orders were sent to
get patrols out N.E. to Hindenburg main line if possible.
Lieut. Parry, patrolling, got out right past 37th Bn. on
left to the British on their flank. 40th were separated
from 37th but knew where they were. The patrols got
through the wire. Then they were fired on and spotted a
few M.G.'s on the left. They got into the xxx two
Hindenburg main lines north of Bony - Sergt. Billing had
one and Sergt. Rearden another.
They could not reach the canal tunnel. This was just
before daylight. Then orders were received from Bde. for
a general advance. Owing to casualties coys, were clubbed:
A and B under Mclntyre,
C and D under Findlay.
The advance was to be to Bony Point and the knoll - to be
taken and held. Dispositions were to be:
Diagram - see original document
Mclntyre went down the gully in the ridge N.E. from Bony
in two parties. The left party got in at about 9A 3.4
without difficulty, but the right parties got very heavy
M.G. fire from N.E., the other side of the canal on the left.
They got into both trenches (no sign of a dead American past
the Hindenburg outpost system here).
On reaching the Hindenburg line Lieut. Weston was sent
out with a reconnoitring party and established a post in
A1O.c.
C and D followed immediately after A and B. They came
under direct observed fire. 37th was moving at the same
time and lost one killed and 11 wounded. C and D lined
the tunnel till night when dispositions were changed.
From Zombo trench onwards 40th Bn. H.Q. were one trench
behind front line all the way - in a command post (bigger
H.Q further back). When Bn. pushed forward to tunnel they
moved up to 8 Cent, and got direct and constant fire. H.Q
flag finally had to come down. H.Q. was shelled by a gun
near A4 central.
39th Bn. coming from Bony were partly on the tunnel bank
before 40th Bn where 40th Bn should be. Orders were later
received for 39th to occupy Bony Point and tunnel and 40th
Bn the Hindenburg line in support.
Next night they were relieved by (?)
NOTE.- Capt. Wilkins, the Official Photographer, was in
Willow Trench when the Germans began to bomb up it. He
was there when Bowden started his fight and was going
back for reinforcements when he met Capt. Ruddock
bringing a party to the trench. A Lewis gunner was
killed xxxxxxxxxxxxxx in a shellhole beside him where
Ruddock was - and got into Willow trench by the Tank.
 

144.
38th BATTALION - PROYART - AUGUST 10/11.
11.15 through the outpost line. First stoppage took
place when head of 38th Bn, was just past the La Flaque
dump corner. Bn, was in column of fours with 100 yds.
distance between platoons. When the stoppage occurred
the column closed up. Three tanks had been leading all
the way; three more were between the 40th Bn. and 38th.
on the road. When the stoppage occurred the men got into
the ditch on the South side. On the north side the road
was on an embankment - and this saved the situation. The
M.G.'s firing onto the road had to fire up -

Diagram - see original document
After the stoppage any movement was simply closing
up of intervals from the rear. 37th (excepting one Coy.)
came through 38th. 38th. was to dig in on both sides of
road. About 3 a.m. orders came to shift right Coy, over
to a sort of support position on north of road (this was
not the position where 40th Bn. had been digging, but in
support to 38th front Coy). Later, when 40th Bn side-
slipped, this support coy. of 38th took its. place.
Diagram - see original document
Bn. H.Q. was in the house west of factory at La Flaque.
The tanks remained - one on road at head, one on left
and one on right of road. About 3 a.m., when one tank began
signalling down the road, the Germans in a post a short
distance north fairly lit him up with sparks from M.G. bullets.
At 3.30 tanks were allowed to retire. 38th Bn. R27D4.3 - 
c.4.8.
AUGUST 11. Heavy mist. When this rose the Germans
were seen 80 yds. away from A Coy. - they had seen this
post before but were not sure that these might not be our
people. About noon L/Cpl. Lewis and Pte. E.A.G. Smith
(Lieut Poole's Coy.) went straight out to these men - rushed
them and brought them in. Another post had been got in
earlier.
On the morning of Aug. 11 there had been a gap on right
of 38th Bn. of about 700 yds. to left of 20th Bn. This was
covered by a Vickers gun about xxx 200 yds. in rear of the
line till 19th Bn., which relieved 20th Bn., sent up a
platoon to fill in along road about 24 A.2.6.
(In the night before it was 40th Bn. which was bombed -
the ammunition which was at rear of 38th had a bomb dropped
right on it. The bombing was very heavy indeed. Next
morning 40th Bn horses were lting on the road - and about
10 men. Ahead up the road were about 30 men lying).
On Aug. 12 another advance to reach the original
objective. No artillery - probably they did not know where
infantry were. The smoke grenade was useful - Vickers
M.G.'s
 

145.
M.G.'s acted as covering weapon.
Lieut. J. H. McColl was killed that evening at Avenue
Cross by sniper from the German C.C.S. just before dark.
(The advance had been by little rushes covered by L.G. and
Vickers M.G.).
The E. Yorks being led up that night were heavily
bombed and lost 2 officers and 30 O.R.
Lieut. S. R. Warnock, wounded on morning of Aug. 11
by shell in post.
Lieut. E. J. Schlitz, M.C., on morning of Aug. 12
while going forward with No. 2 platoon.
The mist was heavy on Aug. 11 but no help on Aug. 12.
On August 12 Avenue Post, just at S.E. corner of the
Road Crossing, which had been the chief obstacle in the
night attack (together with line of posts N.W. of road)
was to be attacked by Capt. Dench as soon as it was known
that Fairweather on left of the road was making ground.
Lieut. Baxter of Dench's Coy., was to go straight up south
side of road and Lieut. McColl was to attack it by working
round to its right and behind the trees of the cross-road.
Lieut. F. S. Baxter moved so rapidly in working his
section forward (11 men) that he was onto the post before
McColl's party had really got going. He got 1 offr. and
28 O.R. and 3 M.G.'s from this post. It was in that post
that McColl was killed later.
38th Bn. lost 2 offixx 4 officers and 103 O.R. Of
these 1 officer and 18 O.R. were hit in the night march.
(This officer was Capt. Orchard).
On Aug. 12, when Bn. got to its final position German
shellfire on it was very heavy.
BRAY - 38th BATTALION relieved 33rd Bn. on night of 23/24th
August.
Left of Bn. was in the Chalk pit. 33rd. Bn. had no
men in this post at this stage. Capt. Dench on left was
in Chalk Pit with C Coy.
Diagram - see original document
33rd Bn was very done
Shortly after relief Lieut. Baxter and his batman
rushed a M.G. post 70 yds, out from the Chalk Pit.
Feature of this day was the heavy shelling from the
direction of Mametz - the longest the Bn. ever experienced,
from dawn to 8 p.m. The Tommies had fallen back after the
original attack on Aug. 22. Dench organised and got their
right (about 200) up onto the line north of the Chalk Pit
on the Fricourt Road. He had done this once - the heavy
shelling xxx drove the Tommies back. Dench went up again;
and he was sniped after he had got them up a second time.
Ammunition was carried up in spite of this shelling - 
it was very badly needed. The men who got it up brought
back wounded on stretchers.
A message rocket from the Chalk Pit from Baxter brought
news of Dench's death - 1700 yds. away - landed near Bn.
H.Q. (Dench at a conference immediately before had said
that he didn't consider the message rocket worth a damn.
This message now, charred, is in Australian War Museums.
Dench didn't want men burdened by it, but Major Maudsley
 

146.
ordered it. When it fell near Bn. H.Q. it was thought to
be a bit of shell and they scarcely noticed it. Pte. McCoy
went out under heavy shell fire and picked it up - it
sounded like a new sort of shell. Mc Coy (Maudsley's batman)
thought it was a rocket).
The same bullet that killed Dench wounded Lieut. Barker
- it came from 70 yds. away - a sniper. Barker had been
helping Dench organise the Tommies.
Baxter reported there were no Tommies left of these -
and another platoon was sent up from C under Lieut. W.P.D.
Murie.
Capt. H. Dench, killed.
Lieut. P. Kalloch, R.O.D., wounded.
Lieut. E. M. Barker, wounded.
Lieut. R. W. Gollen, wounded by one of our own air bombs
by which he was wounded and 3 N.C.O.'s and 2 men were
killed. This was about 200 yds, south of the Chalk
Pit post. The plane mistook it for a German post.
The whole 39th Bn, was sent up to form a defensive flank
from the Chalk Pit due west for 1500 yds. This plane was
circling round 4 or 5 times to identify them and then dropped
5 bombs. They were all looking up at it.
Relieved at 10 p.m. by 42nd Bn., who were attacking
that night.
Our own artillery was also very fogged by the vagueness
of the line.
BONY - 38th BATTALION.
Bn. got to Ronssoy on 27th September and camped in wood
west of Ronssoy. Night of 27th and 28th they were heavily
gassed and were practically up all night.
Diagram - see original document
Bn moved out from Ronssoy along field in valley south of
Ronssoy in column of route. They wore about in middle of the
valley. They had cleared Ronssoy and were about 300 yds.
short of Dog Trench when they came suddenly into all sorts of
fire - M.G., whizzbang, mainly. Coys. opened at once into
artillery formation. It was quite light and the mist had
cleared, but there had been a lot of gas in the hollow.
(Several men died of this later and others - coming through
pockets of gas - had to wear helmets and march in them almost
immediately from breakfast onwards).
A Coy., under Capt. Fairweather, was leading and dribbled
forward into Dog Trench. H.Q. was in a shellhole about 100
yds, west of Dog Trench. About half an hour later Captain
Fairweather himself came back and reported that his patrols
had located M.G. nests in Claymore Valley and much fire from
S. Gillemont trench. His Coy, was then moved forward from
Dog Trench to clear up the position and D (Capt. Collins) Coy.
took its place in Dog Trench. As soon as A Coy. got out of
Dog Trench it came in view of the Germans on the crest and
M.G. fire became exceptionally heavy. Many men were hit.
Three tanks had been allotted to 38th Bn. and were to have
been picked up at the elbow of the road north of Gillemont.
These tanks wero not seen by 38th, having been already
diverted to the Americans.