Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/226/1 - Folder - Part 14

127.
of August 26 - in came the Brigadier. The I.O. and
Adjutant were going to sleep and the Doctor and Lieut.
Dutton were having a swim - "a swim, a good feed and a
sleep" they proposed - Within an hour Dutton was killed.
(It was thought that the Brigadier was coming in for a
snooze). The Brigadier said - "Get your Bn. ready
immediately to move forward as the advance guard of the 10th
Bde.; and they must be on the move within 20 minutes. Clery
is burning and if possible your H.Q. are to be there tonight.
The lines were hard to keep up owing to constant shelling
and the Brigadier was exhorting them about keeping up these.
They were salving German wire to make up for our deficiencies
and had used 9 miles to then, ail man-handled. (The space
between the Vaux Cliff and the river swamp was a trap - and
the top of the hill was in plain view of Peronne and further).
The Bn. moved out from Clery in artillery formation
covered by a troop of 13th. A.L.H. under Major Buchanan. The
Bn. had to wait for this troop - moved out about 1000 yds.
before the troop passed them. The troop having a very long
way to go had to come up at fast speed, down xxxxxxx the road
through Curlu at the trot. They passed Bn. just at Wormwood
xxxxx Scrubs north of Monacu. The A. L. H. after getting
through the infantry opened out on either side of the road.
Shellfire came down at once as soon as they got to the head of
the Bn. - 4.2 and 77. They first tried to deploy round the
N. side of Howitzer Wood, but as they came xxxxx round the
N. side of it at the gallop the heavy shellfire met them.
They doubled and wheeled round at the gallop to the south side
of the road and went straight up over the rise until on the
down slope by Sancisse Wood trench they came xxxxx on heavy
wire and M.G. fire. The Germans could be seen running back
up the road past the high bank west of Clery and up hill
towards the trenches on 29 Central and the high ground.
When the Light Horse struck these obstacles they reported
back to the infantry.
As soon as the Light Horse went through, Lieut. Dutton
with his scouts (about 3) was sent out by Major Maudsley to use
his scouts as a screen to find out the situation in front. In
the heavy shelling which followed he was killed as he was
going towards the front Coy. At the same time Lieut Poole
(D Coy.) was badly wounded in the jaw and several men hit - by
several shells just about 400 S.W. of Wormwood Scrubs.
(The Light Horse was a screen - as soon as they got in
touch with the Germans the infantry was to push forward and do
the work).
This was what happened.
All the way Bn. could see on its left fron the high
ground of the old Somme battlefield at Hill 110 which it was
intended to take; and Copse 5, a few stumps which was scarcely
xxxxxxxxxxxx recognised when they got to it, was another
objective.
The M.G. fire from 110 and the trenches on it was so hot
that Bn had to halt in the valley below it and get artillery
which was following immediately behind, to fire on the
approximate positions of the M.G.'s. All communication from
forward to rear was bu runners - and this caused a little
delay. Signal wire was unobtainable.
Under cover of this shellfire the Coys. which were
deployed from Howitzer Wood onwards, worked up till by 10 p.m
they were on a line from Copse 5 down Hennequin trench and
thence in a S.E. direction to the S.E. corner of Clery.
The left Coy, was in touch with 34th Bn.
Diagram - see original document
 

128.
xxx
(see foot
of previous
( Page)

Peters was lost from 3 p.m. to 3 a.m. It was midnight
when Lieut. Crispe, I.O., went through Clery and worked out
to the far end of it, where Sandiford's men were heard digging
just short of the road at the far end of the village - there
was heavy M.G. fire from the strongpoint east of the village
at the bridgehead. Thence Crispe went up the gully north of
Clery and met a party of B Coy. coming down for rations - they
said that B Coy, was on the left a quarter of a mile up; so
he found them in Hennequin trench; from there he found A Coy.
on right; then up near Clery Copse he could hear nothing of
Peter's Coy. This copse could not be found. But presently
he struck part of them in a trench near it which they had got
into in the night, facing north - and they xxxx said that
Peters was in the copse.
AUGUST 29..- There at 3.15 a.m. 37th Bn. moved through
to continue the attack. 38th Bn. became the support Bn.
From 3.15 a.m. Aug. 29 till 10 p.m. on 30/31st the Bn. was
subjected only to shellfire and fell fast asleep dead tired.
They had gone 9000 yds. in 84 hours' continuous fighting.
No one had a second's sleep since moving from road west
of Bray at 5.30 a.m. on morning of Aug. 26. (They had reached
Ceylon Wood about 7 p.m. Aug. 26 expecting to stay the night,
and got orders at 9 p.m. that they had to push off at midnight)
D Coy. (Collins) got a sleep there. Before that, on night of
25/26th they had a sleep on the road just before reaching Bray.
26th    27th    28th    29th

5.30 a.m.
18½      24         24           5    - 71½ hours without a

                                                   winky of sleep.

AUGUST 30. At 7.30 p.m. C.O.'s were called to a
conference at Bde. H.Q. in the big bank W. of Clery. They
were told that the attack was to be continued against the
trench system in 2a and c.- Zombo trench. Major Maudsley

was C.O. When they finished, Maudsley and Crispe (I.O.) went
along the tram track to H.Q. of 37th and 39th in the banks
west of Clery xxxx Ridge to get the dispositions. They got
back at 12 p.m. to 3 D.H.Q. where Coy. Commanders were waiting.
Diagram - see original document
39th and 40th were to go through under the barrage.
At 7.30 p.m. it was decided that the Bn. would take over
line of 37th to relieve them and later make an attack - but
no one knew when (Bn. thought probably Sept. 1).
Then at 3.25 a.m. on the road up to 37th Bn. a Bde.

 

x
 

129.
runner came to Lieut. Robbins, Adjt., and said he had been
looking for him, and that it was an order to attack at 6 a.m.
Till then not one Coy. knew of this. There were 2hours and
25 minutes to find the Coys. and tell them. They were to take
over from 37th Bn. and had already moved to do this - and it
was uncertain where 37th Bn. Coys, were. Only one 37th Bn.
runner knew where one of 37th Bn.'s Coys, were - and from that
Coy. Lieut. Crispe ultimately managed to find out where the
other Coys, of 37th (and so) the 38th Bn Coys, were. All
this time the valley was being heavily shelled.
37th Bn. said it had a Coy. to north of Clery Copse in
Berlingott Ave, and was uncertain if that Coy, were there or
had been cut off (their A Coy. under Capt. Towl). They also
thought they had a Coy. in St. Gond trench. They proved to
have a Coy. in St. Gond trench. The relief was completed by
4.20 a.m.
The orders which 38th Bn. first received were for Bn. to
J.O. from Berlingott trench; and then at 4.30 a.m. they got a
new barrage line 400 yds. in rear of Berlingott trench - and
between 4.30 and 6 these new orders had to be got to the Coys.
and they to be brought back to St. Gond trench. Lieut.
Crispe did this. Two Coys. were supposed to be in Berlingott
trench; but they were not there - they were in a C.T. running
east towards Berlingott and towards Clery Copse. By 5.50 a.m.
Crispe got them back from there into St. Gond with 10 mins.
to spare. Just then Lieut. Churchill arrived on the scene
with the objectives.
(At the 7 p.m. conference the attack had not been
definitely decided on and no objectives settled. Consequently
a large number of the officers went off with no idea of where
they had to get to except that they had to go forward).
At 5.25 a.m. the O.C.'s of Coys. got the orders. By
then they could not find the platoon officers. All the platoon
officers knew was that the barrage would come down at some time
(unknown).
The barrage time was 6 a,m. But at 5.30 a.m. the
German put down his shoot and kept it up till nearly 8 a.m.
harrassing fire - later a barrage with gas. Most of it was
on the debouching point from Clery.
At 6 a.m. our barrage came down and 38th followed it -
39th being later and a good deal behind their barrage, having
gone further back to avoid the barrage (it was uncertain in
many people's minds which St Gond trench was). 38th
followed their barrage. Red line was the old French support
line. By 7.15 a.m. they were in this line. The Bn. held
from the Canal du Nord to trench junction of Zombo trench and
Boeseller Alley (Red line).
Diagram - see original document
About 6.35 a.m. Major Maudsley, A/O.C. was killed by a
shell at Bn. H.Q. The A/Adjt., Lieut. Robbins took control.
Bn. H.Q. went up to Van trench. At 10 Col. Henderson
took over by instructions of Bde., but Lieut. Robbins remained
practically responsible. All communication depended on
runners in this fight. Four Coy. runners were killed that
day.
STRENGTH: 18 officers; 45 N.C.O's; 251 O.R.
Maudsley, killed.
Robbins, A/Adj.
Crispe, I.O.
Dunn, Sig. Officer
Churchill, Scout and L.G.
McCusker, wounded - by same shell which killed
Maudsley.
 

130
A. Addison
Major, wounded.
Bult.
B. Sandiford, wounded.
Wilson
Bogle
C. Peters
F. Baxter
Mallock
D. Collins
Greenwood, wounded
Potter.
KILLED:
Major Maudsley.
WOUNDED:
Lieut. Major
Lieut. Greenwood
Captain McCusker, R.M.O.
Lieut. Sandiford, R.O.D.
Diagram - see original document
In the afternoon xxx 2nd Division were seen working on
the opposite side of the canal in the W. edge of Feuillacourt.
They got to the Bap. Road but did not stop there. (It was not
a Coy. of 38th Bn. which was sent up to 20th Bn.) The whole
trouble of the 38th Bn. came from the head of the gully on
their left.
AUGUST 31, - 6 p.m At 4.30 p.m. 38th Bn. got an order
that probably it would be relieved that night and that all
ranks could be notified of the chance, but that it was not
to be a piece of definite information.
This Lieut. Robbins sent to O.C.'s Coys. only - and asked
them not to pass it on to the men till it was confirmed.
At 6 p.m. came an order that Bn. would attack and take
the second objective (Bouchavesnes Road). This was to be the
J.O. line for the 11th Bde., a Bn. of which would pass through
that night after the objective was taken. What Bn. of 11th
Bde., and what time it would pass through and attack, were
unknown; but it was definitely stated that it would be
preceded by a heavy barrage. Robbins wrote out an order to
Coys. and told them - and about 7 p.m. they prepared to move
forward - they were in pretty close touch by runner now and
could be seen from H Q. across valley. The position of 39th
was not known at this time - Col. Henderson did not know and
it was a great worry.
This attack was not actually made owing to the physical
inability of the men to carry it out. This applied also to
40th Bn. The men were absolutely done. This was put to
Bde. Col. Lord confirmed this - and the Bn. remained where
it was with the consent of Bde.
 

131.
In the morning 43rd Bn. went through. The Germans put
down their shoot first - counter preparation on the area
held by our troops. Then our barrage wont down at 5.30.
The 11th Bde. attacked, but whether they passed through 38th
Bn. this Bn. does not know. Two of the Coys. of 38th Bn.
stayed till 7.30 a.m. before they came out - they had seen
no troops come through and wanted definite orders to come out
before they moved back.
When Lieut. F. Baxter got onto the 1st objective he did n
not realise that he was on it owing to the complete absence of
objectives. He knew that the Bouchavesnes Road was an
objective - and thought it was the only objective and therefore
to be reached.
He found himself with only 5 men; but pushed on and xxxx
reached the road - working from Berlin Wood towards the high
ground. On the way he met very heavy M.G. opposition and
whizzbang fire. Two guns were firing point-blank from the
high ground - and by skilful handling of the L.C.'s Baxter
had with him they silenced the guns - killing the crews. At
least three M.G.'s were met on the way up, the crews being
rushed by this party. Baxter's men did not want to go, but
he said he would go alone. Baxter's xxxxxy party got up
through Jesupol trench to near the road - not quite to it -
the Germans were making down Poinsof trench at the time
towards the canal. While B was on the forward journey he
captured 30 prisoners.
(Baxter has gone back to Australia with old heart trouble
- the doctors said they could not understand how he had ever
been passed originally). Baxter fought this way back, when
he realised that he had got too far - one of the men with him
was killed on the way back.
In the same fight Sergt. A. V. Grinton of C Coy. bombed
for 400 yds. along a tronch (working with bomb, bayonet and
L.G.) and helped 9th Bde, to reach its objective along a
trench on the left which was holding up their advance. He
was the man of 38th Bn, who worked with Sergt. Walters of 39th
Bn.(mentioned in 39th Bn. account).
 

132.
40th BATTALION - Aug. 10 - October 2.
38th BATTALION - August 10 - October 2/3
202
40th BATTALION - PROYART.
Night of August 10/11.
On night attack order was -
3 tanks.                 3 tanks
000                         000
Diagram - see original document

The transport of 40th Bn. (mules) and drivers, with
ammunition and tools, were hit by bombs passing the hospital
(no flares - just luck that night). This was going up.
40th was in the middle of La F. dump when column was held
up and the Germans started to strafe the road. A lot of gas,
and H.E.
They utilised the ditch along the roadside on right for
getting along, and when finally held up were following 38th
past La Flaque. Message came that Knight was killed.
Tanks were coming back. Majoy Payne stopped them.
One Coy, of 37th was still with 38th.
Orders were given to 38th and 40th to dig in covering the
road, and reported to Bde.
Diagram - see original document

(major Maudsley, 38th, was with Payne about 500 yds. east of
La Flaque mill). No answer came for half an hour to one
hour. Major Payne sent Major Giblin back to report personally.
By about 2.30 a.m. no word being received, and tanks still
there, Payne gave orders for the whole column to withdraw,
tanks to cover.
Diagram - see original document

This had begun and 37th Bn. were clear when orders came
from Bde. to dig in on a line covering left flank of 20th Bn.
attack. 38th Sn. on N. side of the road stood fast. The
rest took over from 40th. and 40th sideslipped across the
Proyart-La Flaque Road.
Diagram - see original document
 

133.
They dug in - morning was foggy. Stayed there all
Aug. 11. At dusk on Aug. 11/12, 40th Bn. sideslipped
again (38th taking over) and extended to the two trees on
the Proyart-Harbonnieres Road and dug in. Bn. H.Q. came to
La Flaque dump; D remained in support near the factory
(which was heavily strafed); and B Boy. out of the line to
reserve north of La Flaque dump.
Diagram - see original document
All Aug. 11 and night of Aug. 11/12 the Germans were
very active with M.G.'s and artillery, especially on La
Flaque mill. About 8 a.m. Aug. 12, Lieut. Crosby, O.C.
D Coy., rang up to say there did not seem to be Germans out
ahead. Our men were walking out on top (C and A Coys..
and no one seemed to be worrying them.
Payne rang up Bde., who had a similar message from 38th
Bn. Matter was discussed with Brigadier, and the two line
Coys, were instructed each to send out a patrol. Lieut.
Rock and Sergt. Braid went from C, and Lieut. Parry and
Sergt. Billing from A.
They found abandoned M.G.'s, one or two, abandoned
food - and indications that the Germans had left in a hurry.
They were able to walk out, but when they crossed Proyart-
La Flaque Road they were fired on.
Their first objective was Proyart-LaFlaque Road;
2nd objective spur north from La Flaque;
3rd objective railway and road crossing immediately
east of Proyart and the old trenches east of
the valley.
When the left patrol got to 2nd objective and reported
O.K. a platoon was sent up to the road (1st objective) to
support him. On right Rock was held up after getting as
far as the high ground about 27A.3.7. Bother officers
reported back, and a platoon supported him and Lieut
Dalgleish, C Coy., took a platoon to the La Flaque road on
the right.
The right patrol could not get further during the day
38th Bn. had got along the main road to 28c and had a post
or two north of the road. From there to right of 40th Bn.
there was a gap. (Next para. but one should come here)
Lieut. Macmillan, when Parry rejoined him, pushed the
scouts up to two little trenches just south of railway in
21D.5.9½. The platoon followed by twos and threes. Germans
gathering in trenches across the valley enfiladed the railway
cutting.
(See above). Meanwhile, about noon, orders had reached
Bn, from bde, to push whole line forward. It was after this
that Macmillan's platoon was pushed forward The Coys.
started to move after their platoons about 3 p.m.
So Macmillan returned - telling platoon to hug the bank.
He got Sergt. Statton; who was in charge of No. 2 platoon
A Coy., in support to Macmillan in a dugout in the south end
of Proyart, to bring his platoon and 2 L.G. and put them on
the bend of the railway embankment, which was about 5ft.
high (broad gauge). Macmillan pointed out the German
M.G. which was giving the trouble on the road about 21B3.6.
and snipers (in the trees on both sides of the road). Sergt.
Statton kept the heads of these Germans down with 2 L.G.,
while
 

134.
while Macmillan got the platoon through and across the gully.
On reaching the gully bottom Macmillan sent a message to
Statton to bring his platoon up and scouts, Sergt. Billing
and Pte. Cox, to reconnoitre the trench on the further side
of the gully. Cox came back and reported all clear.
Macmillan sent the men in twos and threes to occupy the
trench. A M.G. from the left of the road and one from the
road kept spasmodic fire on them.
On reaching the trench 37th Bn., which was working
through Proyart trying to get into the railway cutting north
of the road, sent a message asking for supporting fire from
the right as they could not get forward.
While this message was being read in the gully,
Macmillan and those with him found that there were M.G. nests
east of the railway about 40 yds. E. of it, about 200 yds.
north of the road. Another on the road bank (21B0.5) and
three or four west of Robert Wood. Macmillan got the message
and sent back word to say that the M.G.'s nests in question
could be seen, and that Sergt. Statton had his gun on the
extreme N. end of the trench and could enfilade the guns
east of the railway.
37th got this message and sent about 12 men under and
N.C.O. across the railway cutting (it is a cutting all
along really) to collar these M.G.'s. Owing to the heavy
M.G. fire from west of Robert Wood they could not get as
far as the guns. Some were killed and two got back. Then
Sergt. Statton with three men left the trench and rushed
across the sunken road. (The gun crew in the road bank
retired when they saw him start and was under L.G. fire
from rest of 40th Bn.) He ran straight on with revolver -
cleared the first M.G. post - went on to the next killing
and wounding the occupants. The 3rd and 4th ran out and
were killed by our Lewis Gunners. One of the men with
Statton was killed and one wounded from Robert Wood. That
cleared the 5 M.G.'s and enabled 37th to come up and
consolidate in the railway.
Right of Bn. when it advanced found German artillery
heavily sweeping Proyart-La Flaque Road and dump - to and
fro - The Coys, attempting to move east of Proyart-La
Flaque road were met by M.G. fire from flat ground in 22
and 28 A. and C. Coys, were accordingly ordered to take
cover in the trench 150 yds, east of La Flaque-Proyart Road.
Some got out further than that - up to 500 yds. They were
ordered to stay there till dusk.
Diagram - see original document

Half C Coy. worked up before dusk via A Coy. and the
rest straight over the top after dusk.
They got onto the objective on the east side of the
gully in 21D and 27B in old trenches.
In the red huts at 27A 4.9. our troops stayed all day
(in an old Nissen hospital) and were heavily shelled.
Aug. 11. WOUNDED. Lieut. C. H. Cane (tempy. Capt.)
by M.G. bullet early on 11th while digging in.
Aug. 12: WOUNDED. Capt. W. G. C. Ruddock (C Coy. O.C.)
by shell, just as word came to prepare to move (noon).
Relieved by E. and W. Yorks of 17th. Div. on Aug.12/13
by 2 a.m.
 

135.
BRAY - 40th BATTALION
First three M.G.'s opposite D (Major Giblin's) Coy.
were in the trees at N.W. corner of the village. The men
(xx a special party had been fixed up) were on top of them
quickly - under the barrage. The M.G.'s next met were on
the Northern outskirts of the village and in the main road
bank was one which did a lot of damage - this moved as our
men got round to the right.
Going down the hill Major Giblin was hit by a bit of
H.E. The Germans put down a heavyish barrage with gas
pretty quickly (gas into the re-entrants). Bn. was
pretty well squeezed between our barrage and his. There
were several M.G.'s just beyond the railway on the other
side of the railway yard - and one difficult to locate
began from the village in right rear. It was a bright
moonlight night.
The S.P. which Lakin's platoon took was out near the
bank with the 7 trees, where there were a number of
positions.
There was a big explosion in Bray, and gas was thick
afterwards. It was off the road.
A Coy, worked through to the S.E. edge of the town.
The M.G. posts dealt with by it were on the railway line
there beyond the S.E. of the town.
We were clear of Bray by the time the German shelling
became heavy, and we left it behind us - and left the
village alone. Linesmen and runners going through had a
hot time.
40th BATTALION -CLERY COPSE - AUGUST 30.
C Coy. and A Coy, had been acting as left flank guard
to 10th Bde. and liaison with 9th Bde., and were extended xn
under banks between Odde Alley and Bontemps alley under the
bank west of Clery Ridge in 6A or 6B.
D Coy, which had been sent up to reinforce 37th, were
in the front line (then) approaching Berlingott trench.
Clery Copse was holding up the line both north and south.
This was with M.G. D Coy. rushed at it (the arrangement
with 37th Bn. to do this miscarried). D Coy. tried it.
Diagram - see original document
Support Coy. of 37th Bn was to make the left of the
attack.
D Coy. about 2.30 p.m. Aug. 8, went up a C.T.
(possibly south of Bontemps) N.W. of copse. The Germans
were holding Berlingott with M.G.'s and got cross-fire over
the C.T. 37th Bn's Coy. never got onto the hill at all,
coming under M.G. fire further back. D Coy, was under
Lieut. Cranswick (Lieut. Lawrence with him). Coy. pushed
up. Cranswick got wounded. They tried to get Lewis
gunners on to parapet to open on Germans holding the
junction, but they got shot at once. 8 were killed and 14
wounded of a weak coy. Lieut. Mahoney was killed trying
to get out and deal with the M.G.'s - he got out of the
trench. In trying to recover his body L/Cpl. Masterman
and L/Cpl. Heron were taken prisoner by the Germans - they
just got to
 

136.
just got to Mahoney's body when the Germans got up all
around them. (The Germans were going to shoot Heron when
the German officer stopped them with his revolver). Lieut.
Lawrence took over command. Mahoney had told Lawrence to
get touch with 37th Bn. He could not find them - but
found O.C. at starting point. He said he could not give
any support - his Coy, was with him there (6A.7.5) or in
unmarked trench (1A.2.5.). He advised Lawrence to pull
his Coy. out. Lawrence did so. By that time the Germans
had worked round and D Coy. very nearly was cut off. It
was reported that D Coy. had been heavily knocked about.
Accordingly, when this attack failed, C Coy, (under orders
from Bn. H.Q that Cand D Coys. should become a xxxxxxxxx
composite Coy. under Lieut. Whitaker) went up to xxxxxx
reinforce.
(This sketch is rough - get it
corrected from air photo).
Diagram - see original document
They found D Coy. as shown. They organised into one Coy.
and held on all night. Aug. 30/31 as shown. It was then
decided by Bde. not to take the copse at once but do it
next day with 38th Bn. in a general advance.
Diagram - see original document
(Last position of Germans at XXX).
On Aug. 31st 38th Bn. (which relieved 37th) attacked.
They were supported by 40th Bn.
A and B came out through Clery to operate on right.
C Coy. came through Clery Copse and through Berlin
Wood. They took this direction as following in support of
38thth. There is a bit of steep donga just west of Berlin
Woof. When they got to this about 40 Germans got up ready
to surrender. They marched themselves back without escort.
After this point the men of 38th Bn. did not seem to
know what direction to go - and veered round and followed up
the hill to S.E. as that faced them. 38th had lost many
officers. xxxxx Some were in the trenches in I.C. Others
just past S.W. corner of. Berlin Wood. And some in Inferno
trench in 2A and C.
About 10 or 11 a.m. B Coy. 40th Bn. (support) moved
up north along Magen trench. Capt. McIntrye had gone along
to see what was happening ahead of Berlin Wood in Zombo
trench. He found C - D, 40th Bn. and part of a Coy. of
38th. there.
At this time a Bn. command post had been formed in
Zombo trench about 2A6.6. They were there in the front
line without any troops on either side. C.O. sent for B
Coy. to come and fill it on left and A on right. This was
done.