Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/226/1 - Folder - Part 1

AVM38
Official History,
1914-18 War: Records of C E W Bean,
Official Historian.
Diaries and Notebooks
Item number: 3DRL606/226/1
Tile: Folder, Folder
Comprises typed copies of items 3DRL
606/192/1 - 3DRL 606/205/1.
 

1st SET 

DIARIES Nos. 192-205
AWM38
DIARIES AND NOTES OF C. E. W. BEAN
CONCERNING THE WAR OF 1914-1918
THE use of these diaries and notes is subject to conditions laid down in the terms
of gift to the Australian War Memorial. But, apart from those terms, I wish the
following circumstances and considerations to be brought to the notice of every
reader and writer who may use them
These writings represent only what at the moment of making them I believed to be
true. The diaries were jotted down almost daily wih the object of recording what
was then in the writer's mind. Often he wrote them when very tired and half asleep;
also, not infrequently, what he believed to be true was not. so – but it does not
follow that he always discovered this, or remembered to correct the mistakes when
discovered. Indeed, he could not always remember that he had written them.
These records should, therefore, be used with great caution, as relating only what
their author, at the time of writing, believed. Further, he cannot, of course, vouch
for the accuracy of statements made to him by others and here recorded. But be
did try to ensure such accuracy by consulting, as far as possible, those who had
seen or otherwise taken part in the events. The constant falsity of second-hand
evidence (on which a large proportion of was stories are founded) was impressed
upon him by the second or third, day, of the Gallipoli campaign, notwithstanding that
those who passed on such stories usually themselves believed them to be true. All
second-hand evidence herein should be read with this in mind.
AUTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL

ACCESS STATUS

OPEN

16 Sept, 1946.
C E W. BEAN.
3DRL 606 ITEM 226 [1]

No 1 Copy
No 226
NOTES OF INTERVIEWS
WITH
BATTALION OFFICERS &c.
This folio contains copies of
Books No 192 to 205
 

192
1st Battn.   )23 August
4th Battn.  )18 September.
Lone Pine  (Oxford Circus)
6th Battn. (Little value).

lst Battn. - August 23rd.
xxxxxxxxx ^1st Bn started just short of top of ridge W. of Chuignolle^s
N. of East. The main Cappy-Proyart road ran on the ridge top
dividing German posts from posts of 1st Bn. The J.O. line crossed
this road W. of Chuignolles.
Diagram. See original document

The Germans had posts in the old trench system in G.B. and
roughly north and south at about 300 yds from our J.O. line which
was 200 yds. in rear of the outposts (which were withdrawn (59 Bn)
quarter of an hour before the barrage.
Some German posts fought till we got to them. Some posts
in the trench system had to be fought down. The fight moved down
hill - the left being fairly level. Lt. J. P. Kelly, who was
killed, did fine work in leading against these posts and was shot
there rushing straight on a machine gun which shot him in the
stomach. Lt. Vic. Fowler (long with the 1 Bn) was wounded at the
same system but not by the same gun. Fowler was ahead. Kelly
finding him in trouble, moved his platoon across to help him.
(A 14th Bde. Bn. swung with the flank to Luc Wood).

Rhe left flank after passing the trench system took Little
Wood (S.W. of Long Wood), and there the easier progress ended.
The first objective included Little Wood and 2/3rds of Chuignolles
village.
 Diagram. See original document

It was C Coy. on left. D Coy. in the centre got through on
the right of Chuignolles with little trouble, working along the
xxxx spur. The first objective in the village was reached without
great trouble, one or two little fights in the streets, Germans
firing from walls and having to be chased out. The battn, left the
main village street alone, woeked through the back gardens on each
side and mopped up backwards later. It was in the mopping up that
the one or two little fights occurred. Only one strong section
with a Lewis gun was sent on this work, the rest of the platoon
responsible for Chuignolles being kept by Scales for explotation.
B Coy. on theright got on well, their boundary being the road.

The exploitation on the left into Long Wood was with the aid
of the support Coy. - A Coy – - which took the leading part. There
was strong opposition in Long Wood. The Germans were through the
wood with machinegun nests through it and largely on the N.E. edge
of the wood; and there was also heavy machine gun fire from Marly
Woods opposite. The tanks were signalled to and succeeded in (on
crushing out some machinegun nests - working during this exploitati
period without any smoke cover.

Longwood contained many nests. When exploitation began A Coy.
passed through C Coy. on instructions received on the spot. One
platoon passed to the left of the wood and one to the right. The
wood was fairly thick. They skirmished towards the wood by
section rushes, well extended, under heavy machine gun fire from
another point - aoross the valley R.5.A.4.6. A battery of guns
 

2
xxxx
(H.A. Coy.) were attached to the Bn for this fight and they were
put onto those machineguns. This kept the fire down while the
infantry got across the open on both sides of the woods towards
the wood. We had a few casualties getting across. As soon as

the infantry got into the wood some of the Germans surrendered and
some ran. A tank was working with A Coy. there - it could not get
into the wood but fired its guns at the machineguns, circling round
the wood. Just as the tank started to get back it was hit just by
the wood and had to be abandoned. All the tank crew got away
away. This ended the morning fight. At 2 p.m. they went on again
here .... and were relieved the same day.

Lieut. Blake managed to get a line established through the middle
of the wood - he won his M.C. in this fight.

The exploitation line ran from there, through the valley, E.
of the village (in S.E. direction) including the whole of
Chuignolles wood down to the road corner by Arcy Wood.
In front of Chuignolles some interesting scraps occurred. In
the main street Sergt. Osmund was going ahead by himself (of D Coy
He met four Germans in the street there and went for them with the
bayonet. He killed two and wounded one - the fourth ran away.
One of the Germans shot him across the face. He got a D.C.M.
This was during exploitation. A little later D Coy was debouching
from Chuignolles wood when some Germans in dugouts on the S.E. side
of the main road (in road bank) just E. of village saw them and
brought out two heavy machineguns.

A party of C Coy saw them just as they were getting the guns
up; tow youngsters shot the two No. xxx 9nes on the German guns
dead with their first shots. One was 200 yards away - he simply
took a snap shot at him standing - Pte. Semler, a youngster who was
platoon scout to Scales. We captured these guns. The expolitatin
here reached its objective.

The posts in the valley N.E. of E. of village came under a
very heavy 4.2 fire; but as the two German machineguns above -
mentioned were mounted and were covering valley from the xxxx road
xxxx Diagram. See original document

the posts in that part were withdrawn to the road where there
were dugouts and the men had the chance of a sleep. On the right
of the village the posts came under mixed Machinegun and howitzer
fire - mostly machinegun. There were not very many casualties.

At 2 p.m.m a barrage came down - a very good one - and the
1st Bn was told that it was to go up under this (the barrage was
stationary) and seize the crest line opposite. There was little
German opposition and C Coy worked across the Goods yard up the
face opposite by the isolated trees tree.
The 3rd Bde, was to attack passing through 1st Bn.; but
owing to a heavy bombardment of their assembly positions they
were running pretty late. On the extreme left they were very
late indeed. Scales, when he got to the isolated tree, saw no
3rd Bde, moving to the north of him - there seemed to be no
Germans about, and as it was not essential for his platoon to
remain where it was (for this reason) he pushed north along the
edge of the crest to cover the left flank. They struck an anti-tank
gun on the spur north of the isolated tree, with two machine-guns.
These fired until they saw our men were in force (the
platoon had picked up some 3rd Bde. men and who were around the
isolated tree leaderless) - the Germans put their hands up: 22
prisoners surrendered here, coming out of a big dugout. A 77
gun was about 100 yds further on. The anti-tank gun had knocked
out our tanks in the morning but it was not firing now.

Between there and Froisay Beacon (about 1000 yds.) a few
prisoners were found - lying in dead ground, etc., waiting to
surrender - but no organised opposition. Scales reached
 

3.

Froissy Beacon and remained there about a quarter of an hour. By
that time the 3rd Bde were working up the slopes towards the Beacon
and after the first o them got up there he took his platoon back
to the isolated tree.

There was desultory machinegun fire from Garenne wood all this
time - and machineguns had to be rooted out of Garenne wood long
after by the 3rd Bde.
On the centre and right the 3rd Bde were more on time and the
crest was taken with little trouble and the 3rd Bde pushed on.

(100 yards N.E. of the beacon was an old trench but nobody in
it. Possibly the odd Germans found came from there).

About 8 p.m. the Bn. got orders to move back to the J.0. line
of the morning and went back there.

wxx 23rd - 26th: Killed -
Lieut. Kelly.
Lieut. Burrin - killed on right of village with
B Coy during the early morning operations. He had had four
brothers killed in the British army in war and one sister killed
in an air raid on London, and he was fighting recklessly. He got
under our own barrage and was killed by our shells.
Wounded: 3 4 - H. Fowler.
-----------------
1st Battn. - September 18th.
Came up on tape to Herbecourt. Had tea at Roisel with hot
stew. During tea it started to rain and the German planes dropped
four very heavy bombs very close - flying low. J.O. position was
jjust east of Herbecourt. 

It rained till J.O. at 5.20. 1st Bn. followed 2nd Bn., and 

at zero when barrage opened there was slight rain, heavy mist and
smoke. You could not see more than five yards and way was found
 by compass. You could not see xxx your own platoon. The sound 
of our own barrage gave you a good guide (In one place Steen
came across an old British signpost in the old barbed wire giving
the exact pinpoint location). The 1st Bn kept the Herbecourt-Villeret
Road on its right flank.

No trouble till 2nd Bn took it sobjective. While 2nd Bn was
consolidating they collected the men in a sunken road running
south from Hargicourt to Fervague. The mist had lifted. Rain
had stopped. And they got most of their men together organised.
At 8.30 the 1st Bn moved through 2nd Bn to go to objective and
exploitation. By then the German was pretty alert and several
machineguns from Villeret were troublesome. The 3rd Bde had to
take Villeret but were not quite in line. Steen's company
worked round Villeret
xxx Diagram. See original document
 

and forward from there. Machineguns were still firing from
Villeret and these were eventually mopped up by 9th Bn. The
machineguns which were firing on the Bn. from left and right.
The advance was made in a series of rushes - the machinegun fire
was pretty well distributed over the front.

After the Bn. had passed "The Egg", which was a quarry about
30 ft. deep with three dugouts in it. H.Q. sent up some engineers
and some men to see if it were mined. They found a number of
Germans there - and it became H.Q. 1st Bn.

4.
The Bn. took the red line - the barrage got ahead owing to
machinegun opposition. The red line was reached by dealing with
machineguns. Lieut. Hudson engaged machinegun position with his
Lewis Gun and rushed them with the rest of his platoon. The
platoon took a lot of prisoners and a lot of guns. In one trench
which this platoon took there were 8 machineguns - Railway trench.
This was taken by a fine series of section rushes and a final
charge.
Just after the barrage came down at Zero Lieut. Bull was killed
by a shell. After reaching first objective, after lst Bn. advance
began xxxxxx Lieuts. Judd, Page and Gaskell were wounded (D Coy.)
on right (Steen's coy.) - Page by M.G. and Gaskell and Judd by a
shell - all wounded except Steen.
C.A. Clark was wounded on the 19th.
The protective barrage had ceased before Red Line was reached.
A and D coys. simply carried on until they reached commanding
positions on the high ground overlooking Bellicourt and Buckshot
Ravine which leads down to it. "A" Coy, was in a continuation of
Minnow Trench and D Coy. in Bank Trench which is the trench in front
A post was put in between these two trenches to cover the ground
between the two. B Coy. dug in E. of the Egg in the sunken road
between the two S. of the railway line.
xxx Diagram. See original document

That was really the end of the day's fight. The Germans
could be seen moving about a lot in and around Bellicourt and D
Coy's Lewis Guns got onto them where possible. The Germans did
not attempt to counterattack.

That afternoon Major Street was shot in the wrist in the same
place where Cpl. Gosper was killed, but later. He was having
a look round. The Germans seemed to be holding some parts of the
trenches N. of 2 Central.
Within an hour of the 1st Bn. advancing the 6-in. howitzers
(which had come up to Herbecourt the night before) came up to
Villeret! They got into position at once on the road between
Villeret and Hargicourt.
The German barrage was quickly shortened.
(In the earlier part of the attack a number of Germans were
taken out of Hagson quarries and thereabouts after 2nd Bn, had
passed).
The German very quickly got on to Bank Trench with 5.9^s+guns.

There was a 5.9 howitzer one of a battery standing out
right on the skyline beside a trench (Steen's Coy. H.Q.) G7B9.5.
1st Bn. could not see the British being counterattacked that
night.
Lieut. Clark was wounded early on the morning of September

19 by a machinegun bullet as he was going up the railway line
with a ration party.

Germans shelled heavily during this time but the Bn lost
only a few men.

1st Bn came out on night of 20th to the Sunken road N.& S.
of the railway line S. of Hargicourt and had a hot meal, xx 6^th Bn

taking over that part of the line.
 

5.

Sept. 21
1st Bn.
Mutiny.
1st Bn. was about to be relieved when the men heard that
there would be another attack. Someone seems to have said - 

"That's pretty rough". Then the bext man said - "I'm damned
if I'm going over - they can go over without me." And this spread
like wildfire. The Coy. in which it happened was D Coy. which
had been used pretty heavily and which would not have been sent
into the attack but kept in support - but D Coy, did not realise
this - nor xxxx did the men know that it was only a small attack.
When the officers heard of it they got a good hold of their men -
it spread to other companies also; and so long as they were there
their men seemed all right. But when their backs turned the men
would leak away. The C.O. would not believe it when he heard of
it. Many of the men are very good men and he could not believe
it. When he found it was true he told them the Bn. was going
over all the same (the men probably thought the attack was
impossible). He moved his Headquarters up to Minnow trench.
the front line - and though D coy. and one platoon of another
xxxx Coy, stayed out, the Bn. went over 70 strong - "about two
bomb blocks", as young Lieut. Traill, who did splendidly here and
on Sept. 18, said. Traill got through, but should have been
killed many times.
Col. Stacey puts the thing down to -
 (1) The idea of the men that they are troops of greater
value than all others, encouraged vy over-mention in
the newspapers - so that they over-valued themselves
in comparison with others. 

(2) The idea that they were too many, and that the attack
could not go on without them (as it did) - many officers
were hit) - The men were not against their officers -
they simply drifted away. 

(3) The general democratic spirit of Australians.

(These are Stacey's explanations, not mine).

The Bn. moved up to Minnow Trench to what was the front line
of Right Coy. of 3rd Bn. (which moved back). Battn. H.Q. moved
up into a dugout in the front line in Minnow Trench. The Colonel
decided to move up from the Egg where he had intended H.Q. to be.
They moved up between 2,30 a.m. and 3 a,m,

At 5xxxx 5.40 a.m. (a fine day) the barrage came down and was
immediately replied to by the Germans. They had been bombarding
minnow trench while the 3rd Bn. was in it. The German barrage
was between Ruby Wood and Minnow Trench but the 1st Bn. here
again had few casualties.
Two coys, went over in front line and one coy. in support.
Capt. Moffatt, M.C., of "A” Coy., about 10 mins. after Zero had
his arm broken by a shell and died of wounds the same day - he
was originally with the 6th Light Horse. The Bn. went through
Ruby Wood, and worked up Doe Lane, where there were Germans.
The Germans did not give any excuse for being killed - mostly
they came up from their dugouts with their hands up at once.
They were bringing out watches, glasses, etc., all the prize
articles, as if they had been through it all before.

The objective was gained including all the high ground on
the the ridge over ridge overlooking Bellicourt. The 3rd Bn. on left who had
gone forward had to come back.
 A lot of machinegun fire came from Quennemont Farm, especially
at the start before the British took Quennemont Farm. When the
Tommies took Quennemont Farm this stopped; but the Tommies
were driven in and the Germans retook Quennemont Farm.
 

6.
The 1st Bn. put in about 70 men into the attack, leaving
behind about 130. The xxxxx battn. took the objectives assigned
to it without putting in any men from one Coy. of 2nd Bn. which
was lent to it for reinforcement. This Coy, was put in in close
support but was not used. They were returned the same night
partly by 6 Bn. and partly by 5 Bn. The 6 Bn. had swung up and
and established one post at xx G2.C0.4 on S. flank of 1st Bn.
The effect of the attack was to give us the high ground.
Vickers guns commanded the valleys on either side of the high
ground.
Diagram. See original document

There was a lot of movement xxxx round Bellicourt. Many
German rifles were picked up and we sniped at these Germans around
Bellicourt and picked off a number. The Bn. had six Lewis Guns
and three more were sent up from Battn. H.Q. (with Battn. H.Q.
gunners). Battn. H.Q., signallers, etc., remained in Minnow
Trench.

That morning September 21, as Capt. Steen and Lieut. Blake
were sitting in their Coy, H.Q. in the Sunken Road before moving
up about 2 a.m. a shell hit the dug-out on top and buried both -
they both were casualties.
As B Coy, was moving from the Sunken Road Lieut. Booth was
wounded by a shell. Lieut. Kelleway had a shell burst almost on
top of him as they moved out of Minnow Trench and badly
shell-shocked; and Hudson was wounded by a shell at the same time.

Many started into this attack without getting their meal - xxxx
owing to the hurry and worry. The German dropped his barrage
at Zero and followed the attack over - and this caused casualties.
The German gunners must have been standing by their guns - and they
also xxxxxxx  shelled our assembly position correctly.
 

7.

8 Aug. Ist Bn. followed 4th Division. 

On night of Aug. 8/9 Bde. formed defensive flank along S.
bank of Somme Canal opposite Chipilly and round Cerisy. 

On morning of 9th C.Q.M.S. Hayes and Sergt. Andrews were out
having a look at the front line xxxxx positions and from curiosity
crossed the footbridge from Cerisy to Chipilly, which was passable
for foot traffic. They went into Chipilly and found no Germans
there at all. There were meals on the table, etc, They came back.
Later in the day an English division north of the river launched
an attack against Chipilly and the high ground N. of it. About
4 p.m. the attack seemed to be held up. The German was holding
the high ground at the neck of the peninsula.

Diagram. See original document

xxx C.Q.M.S. Hayes and Sergt. Andrews volunteered to take the patrol
across to help the British forward as they knew a good way of
advancing the right flank. A patrol of six went over - Hayes,
Andrews, Privates Fuller, Kane, Turpin and Stephens. ON crossing
the river they found a platoon of (?) London Regt. held up west of
the village - about half a mile west of it. They tried to get the
Tommies ahead but they would not come - (Hayes had crossed just
ahead and gone back to them). Hayes and his party turned round
and went ahead by themselves. Going ahead about 300 yds. Hayes
sent Turpin and Stephens to the right to reconnoitre the village;
Fuller and Kane to bring the Tommies up into the Quarry. He and
Andrews pushed on N.E. along the high ground.
 
Diagram. See original document

xxx  Hayes worked up along the edge of the high land (under the brow)
west of the valley. They found there a small German post. Sergt.
Andrews got into a position to give covering fire and Hayes rushed
the post. Three Germans were in the post and and they surrendered.
Andrews returned to the Tommies with two prisoners. One German had
been killed. On returning to the Quarry they picked up Kane and
Fuller and went back up on their previous track. North of the post
they had already taken they found a large post with six machineguns.
They worked round the south flank of this post - and the Germans
seeing them coming dived for their dugout. There were 40 Germans
in this post. They induced the Garrison to come out with a Mills
bomb. Two officers and 40 O.R. surrendered when our men were seen
.threatening them with a Mills bomb. 

The Tommies seeing this came up - more to the right - and they
handed over the prisoners. In the meantime Fuller and Kane
captured another post of 9 men and one machinegun.
The attack wasnow going well. The Americans on the left were
going ahead coming out of the woods. Sergt. xxxxx Andrews mounted
one of the German machineguns in the big post, and brought covering
fire to bear on a post S.W. across the valley which was firing on
the advancing Tommies - and also fired on other Germans due East.
The attack went past them and they returned to the S. side of the
river.
The Germans were expecting the attack which was approaching
from in front and when English platoons came on, not using much
cover or their heads, they brought heavy fire onto them. Andrews
 

 8.
and Hayes got around them or on their flank and had already taken
the small post - the taking of which was a wonderful exploit.
Andrews, in the taking of this small post, took up a position and
dfired at everything that moved and kept their heads down. Hayes
got to within a yard of it and then stood up with a bomb in each
hand. The Germans got in one shot at him but missed - and they
surrendered. Hayes and Andrews got D.C.M. and Fuller and Kane a
M.M.
_____________________________
 4th Battn. The C.O. considered that the Bn, was in very good form and
ought to do the job well. The preparations were quick but good
Aug. 23rd. and the results seemed to show that if a stunt can be prepared
for quickly and carried through quickly, this is all for the
good of the morale. This was the first time the Bn. had worked
with tanks. The tank officers came to the Bn, two days before and
stayed with theBn. - and got to know all the officers; and this
helped enormously. (See Sketch 8A) 

The attack was timed for 4.30 a.m. The barrage was very good
and most of the tanks passed through the front line two minutes
before Zero. Battnz was supposed to have six tanks - ono was
hung up before Zero and it started with five. Two were knocked
out, leaving three.
Germans were met with about 300-400 yds. from jump-off in
small posts and trenches. There seemed to be a relief on and
rather a number of Germans were there. The barrage was very good
and we were on them while they were still unrecovered. There were 
Germans in the sunken road leading into the valley. Opposition
began to come - machinegun = from Robert Wood and the next wood.
The tanks here were very helpful, continually cruising out, their
officers consulting ours and dealing with any special point of
resistance.

We reached the artillery halt line well on time. There was
¼ hour halt there. Here A and C Coys. passed through.

They were held up for a time at the first big gully. The

Germans were on the xxx opposite side with their machineguns.
These got onto them as they came down the slope. (During the
fighting for the woods there were instances of very fine work here -
one man, L/Cpl. Budge, working well out to the left on his own and
getting behind the German machineguns with his Lewis gun.)
While Newth was waiting to go though there was a good deal of
machinegun fire from the hillcrest in 24A. When the barrage lifted
Newth moved on. His Coy. crossed the valley - the right flank of
his Coy. has a bad time from the same machineguns (all along the
forward slope of the opposite ridge) which held up the right Coy.
The left xxxx of the Coy.m however, by doubling across got under a
very steep bank which made dead ground. They went straight on up
the hill and into the old trenches 17.D 8,5 to 8.9. Lieut. Guan
was killed rushing up the hill towards the guns on the right of
this advance. (Guan - A Coy. - had been with the Bn. from the ranks -
did fine work at Boursies). The Coy. on the right was still
occupying the line of the first objective. The Germans were not in
the trenches in which Newth's coy, was but were firing on them from
the trenches in 18 A Central and the long C.T. through 18 C.
 Newth had left a tank at the foot of the hill. He sent a
runner back for it (he was now on top of the hill) and it came up
the hill by a detour to the left. Just as thetank reached the top
on the left of Newth C Coy. got across the flat and up the hill
(the Germans on the forward slope being now outflanked).
 Previously Newth had sent L/Cpl. King across to his right
(got D.C.M.) to see what was holding C Coy. King struck on his way