Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/98/1 - February 1918 - Part 3

Forrest

3rd Bns 7

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German concrete shelters.

We struck one isolated post of

this sort in the reserve line

(Divisional) in the [[?]] on

Roozebeek Valley, E of the NE and

of Oostaverne Wood. It was a 

built up length of trench - fairly

well hidden from / port except tt

it ws not turfed but looked like

an embankment of mud. No

men at all were in it. The

Garrison ws living in pill boxes

near by. We looked into one of these

but there ws no sign of occupation.

There ws half an inch of water on

/ floor (wh cd have bn scraped

clean) - the men -" I bet you'll 

find them living under a

sheet of galvanised iron somewhere," sd

[[Mac?]] - not too please.

The men of course had decided

to live somewhere else where it

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ws dry ; but / trouble ws tt the

place they had found ws probably

further from the post; & in a sudden

alarm it wd take them longer

to reach / trench. That is where,

unless the junior officers are strong

& capable - & also careful - our Australians

each thinking for Themselves, are liable

to be careless soldiers.

These Trenches were very seldom

camouflaged. A few of them were, but

not many. This much care had bn

taken - to make the Place

difficult to see from / front by

raising the parapet a little so tt

it screened / scarred earth around

/ diggings

Diagram

But only actual camouflage I saw ws over

certain new concrete blockhouses

in process of construction by

ourselves; & over one commn.

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trench far back beyond [[?]]

It ws very well covered indeed

w dark netting threaded with

dark green ribbons sacking - very

like the country around. Some

lenghts of trench around /

posts also were camouflaged

 - I do not know why. The

most [[?]] camouflage ws

on one observation post wh

they are building at [[?]]

 - it stood up 6 feet like a square

tower - men were xx right on /

top o / hill. Men were working

under it at their concrete, wh

perhaps ws / reason o / camouflage

for it cd not be to hide the 

actual post - it attracted

attention to it.

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to have a great number of

smaller posts further out -

six men and an N.C.O. & perhaps

a L.G. ; but these men very liable

to be cut off & captured; & also they

lived in miserable conditions

in / mud. Hobbs applied

for leave to withdraw the line

generally all 200 yards &

group it in much bigger posts

 - wh White also favoured; but

the 4th army ws very shocked -

'Giving up ground!" However

Hobbs I believe asked Rawlinson

to come & see / position - or one of

his staff - & at last got leave

to do as he wished.

There is this objection - to

our front line of wire, wh ws

in front o / old posts, is now

too far away from / platoon

posts - It is 200 yds in front

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of them; & tho they cd hear

/ enemy if he tried to creep

out & cut it opposite /

post itself (for they have a cd not make sure

of knowing it if he were

cutting / wire somewhere

between / posts. Patrols go

out every night a to between

/ posts & along / wire &

an officer has to go along it

on at least two nights in every

week. The position is not at

all a touchy one - very

much / opposite. But Mac.

told me tt / German has

in a bit befogged. He is so

quiet tt we really do not

know what he is doing or

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where he is. He never shows by

day & thing [[?]] ever see

anything of [[?]] by night.

They did get onto a working 

party once or twice & cut them

about with Lewis gun fire but

otherwise there might be no

fighting on / sector." We had bad luck yesterday -"

sd [[Mac?]] tt we -"We

had a casualty, a wiring

party was out working

in front, & the Germans

turned a m.g. onto their. They 

ought all to have been killed

 - but as a matter of  fact

only one man ws hit -

he got a bullet in his lung, 

& is seriously ill.

[[Mac?]] & [[?]]

the young G.S.O. ll  of the 5th

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division both told me tt they

were xxxx sure, from /

German tactics tt the

German [[?]] is on a small daily

allowance of ammunition,

& is saving for some big

stroke. The germans guns are

extraordinarily quiet - we

only saw about 5 distant

shell bursts - all nearer

to [[?]] or Ravine

Wood - wh is the part o /

line where, if anything

happens, they expect it to

arrive. But not even the

officers responsible for tt

part o / line expect any

real offensive there - they

cannot believe, from / signs,

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tt / German will attack there.

Some of them rather wish he 

would.

I f he did he wd find

one coy in the four little posts

o / outpost line, one in / 

support line, on in / reserve

line & another near it -

In case of sudden surprise

attack the garrison of the

reserve line wd reach across

& help to hold / support line,

while the sister battalion (the

55th), camped nearby in or 

just behind the Corps line.

Other troops are detailed to

hold / corps line (wh as

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fr as I cd see only

contains one finished line

at present. All these are

on / fore slope(E) o / Inessines

WytsChaete Ridge -  the last abt 3

miles from / front line

The army line is

far back on the Kemmnel 

Ridge - another two miles

or more. I do not know

how far it is complete. Some

o / old Wytshaete  trenches

are fairly good. The northern

bde sector of 5th Div / front being /

more likely to be attacked is

held by battalions two deep

 - the southern brigade o / two,

however, opposite [[?]]

has all four bns in the

line.

If the Germans showed

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by bombt tt they intended to

attack, The front line of

platoon posts wd be thinned

& only Lewis gunners & a 

few stout hearted picked men

left there. The reserve divisional line

wd then probly be / main

line of resistance. The

 wire in front o / reserve

line seemed quite good

& strongfor British wer.

It is always peculiarly

anchored down - differently

from German wire. 

Diagram

The wire in

front o / Corps line seemed

weak but in front o / reserve

line ws pretty good -

I had my eyes open