Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/91/1 - October 1917 - Part 10

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Awaiting approval
Accession number:
RCDIG1066659
Difficulty:

Page 1 / 4

21 91 green & the of the 2ase selted a yellow crest. up on flare avent instead Broodscind Redgl of a white It. us followed coupll wool of them, then th sheaf. to tep t right spread oth about Cradual inedates later, or less firman barrage began taltery to come down 6y 5.30 it as bakery really heavy about the rear especiall, atentor Woune Bossenen Iiverness cpse wec hear cramp crump cramp Leavy particularl c
first nothin the 92 Even but it as more continuous I front just opposite atong us to et & lep we were quite certain ond ta bemn seen narrative Thes was unfinished, evedeitly of time for want At Cam Curbare banged out & ecemed to apn wallow u Serman fom our saetthole Murdorh pullett I could see nothing for a lon time after our barage came down. Lal when it was brishs day we noticed that the the centsam of the Brood unde Redi oppost to us we could see fixnies abovusly austiation, to like wot srecine, but directy alead we could out see occasional fepres peep. low moving to regur or left crouched down was sure sifn that there
theae to fightin 4 t there caty for had bne I henk at We Cearnt the that 68BchHl cespet. had been atack priein s wscau i of the Ph Juard Dua realiset that our atack had run into a ferman & the barrage lad one thought down on our new at 5. 30 was thought to have been the balap ordained for this attact. I felt sud stell feet sare - the fermans saw our attacking force bearnt somehon that it was there & sent up tew siguals. Tals as outbriak of these was much too upcsi to have mcant anything-else. Thay ed could not have occu sonals to lengthen pange
artillury forth had tn not begun to fire. I afterwards tearet that they had (captred some of our pwe had taken people some of this but in eagh care too late for uniy action tbe taken upon the descovery of the pland This battle was felt t be a very b peati success neat Messues Feater tan thought, at the ane vy saccess the Butish than had ackened dunng the war Tis was never realined tn nation, but 67 there was a pout at the feelin it only wanted that one or two such chate victory would be th decesive Fee Butik corrupondents fet about to did stas dis it arny he adquarter Sec From statements made b feet C Hariston Sina. sane that he tooked upon it ost 2 as the second-Armys sucdeass; & we know that he & Panner thought we myle break through at thenext Stroke of weateer favoured us, & rolt back part of the german tie. He told as correspondents October 12th before Ret fett have always realinto does) not A 65 the menenagting potentia battle effects of this me 4, 1952 17 2e

91
D41
edge of the green & the
shelled crest a yellow 
flare went up on /
Broodseinde Ridge instead
of a White.  It ws followed 
by a couple more, &
then sheafs of them; then
others to left & right spreading
gradually.  About 7
minutes later, or less,
/ German barrage began
to come down, battery by
battery.  By 5.30 it ws
really heavy about the
rt rear especially; at Glencorse
& Noune Bossehin &
Inverness Copse we cd
hear crump crump crump
copse particularly heavy, 

 

92
D41
but it ws ^even more continuous
along / front - just opposite
us & to rt & left.  We were
quite certain our men had
been seen - 
(This ^narrative was unfinished , evidently 
for want of time.)
At 6 am. our barr. banged out & seemed to
swallow up / German barrage.
From our Shellhole Murdoch 
Gullet & I could see nothing
for a long time after our
barrage came down.  Later,
when it was bright day we
noticed that xx the Haxxx Centra Summit
of the Broodseinde Ridge
opposite to us we could
see figures - obviously
Australian - to left &
right, walking on the
skyline; but directly
ahead we could only see at 
first nothing - then occasional figures keeping
low, moving to right or
left crouched down -- a
sure sign that there was 

 

hard fighting There (as,
we found, later, that there
had been).
We learnt - I think at
6th Bde HQ - that the
attack had been successful.
As news came in - & prisoners
of the 4th Guard Divn - we
realised that our attack
had run into a German
one, & the barrage laid
thought down on our
men at 5.30 was
thought to have been the
barrage ordained for this
attack.  I felt sure - &
still feel sure - the Germans
saw our attacking force
or learnt somehow that
it was there.  & sent up their
signals .  The xxx outbreak of 
these was much too impressive to
have meant anything else . They
could not have meant "our 
been signals to "lengthen range" 

 

for the German Artillery
had then not begun to fire.
I afterwards learnt that they
had captured some of our
people - & we had taken
some of theirs - but in
each case too late for useful
action to be taken upon the
discovery of the plans.
This battle was felt
by everyone to be a very
great success - greater
than Messines - greater,
we thought at the time,
than any success the British
had achieved during the
war.  This was never
realised by the nation, but
at the front there was a
feeling that it only wanted
one or two such chokes
& the victory would be
decisive.  The British
Correspondents felt about
it just as I did, & so did
Second Army headquarters.
From statements made by
Gen. Harrington since, I feel
sure that he looked upon it
as the Second Army's greatest most important
success, & we know that
he & Plummer thought we might
xxxx xxxx break through
at the next stroke if weather
favoured us, & roll back
part of the German line.
He told us correspondents so
before October 12th.
I have always felt that
the world does not realise the
the ^potential or even actual effects of this battle.
C.ew.B. 17. March 1932 

 
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