Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/90/1 - October 1917 - Part 8
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200 feet it saw our
men on / blue line -
saw the colour patches on
their arms. The Bdiers
sent out patrols & wdnt
believe it, but one has
very seldom know /
planes wrong. N.Z. also is
- right back - We have not gained an
inch. The real reason for
the retirement of men on
such occasions is tt in
/ rain - w / blackness &
extraordinary difficulty of
the mud - they know they
are isolated & unlikely to
be found. They know
tt others may be going
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back & each isolated
post feels itself forgotten.
They think tt our barrage
will be brought back onto
them - & they are not far
wrong. The Bdier & battalion
commandr, when his patrols
do not get in touch w
them next day, is most
positive tt / men are
not there; fights / aeroplane
statement - says it ws
dead or wounded they saw.
And if he had his way, in
wd come / barrage.
The Germans are
not on tt ridge yet so far
72
Pozieres:
Kennedy of the Heavy Gunners
tells me there were 4
fights for Pozieres before
ours. They used to attack
it from the Sunken Rd
(? to the Chalk Pit Rd) - some
brave men, in one attack
he saw go on while others
started to dig in half way.
Then when the brave chaps
who had gone on began
to come back some of
them, he thinks, were shot
by the Devons, lying behind,
for coming back.
I don't know tt this is
true - this last; v. likely not. But
it gives an idea o / fight.
Our attack had a more complete bombt.
[*& ws at night*]
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as we know. Their nearest
flares ^even last night ^(13/14) were
1000 yds ahead of our
line. It looks as though
they had not occupied
that country yet either.
The last two fights
Oct 9 & Oct 12 have
been complete failures -
in the first we made some
way; in / second none.
They were undertaken for
two reasons.
(1) They banked on /
demoralisation o / Germans
- wh has certainly happened
& is important. They wanted
to make use of it & to increase
it; & they thought tt by giving
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him no rest we might
do this; & might add
the ^strategic advantage of driving
him off this ridge; & further;
perhaps breaking him - the
cavalry ws in readiness.
It was held tt we were
through the last line of
defence, up there; "he has
"only flesh & blood apt,
"us, not blockhouses -
"they take a month to
"make " - Haig told us.
On this theory they
hoped to go further than
Paschendaele - certainly
one further step; possibly
more.
(2) They wanted to
get / Germans off
/ Paschendaele board for
Ridge. For strategic & tactical
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reasons I am sure Haig
had determined on this, &
is still determined. If / Germs.
have / observatn over us
during / winter, we shall
be in an awkward salient,half (overlooked though also
overlooking) & in / mud.
We want to put the
Germs. down into / mud &
to overlook them. If we
put them there they will
lose ^men & we gain not. The top o
/ ridge is sandy & gravelly
& good living. Therefore
even if we lose 50,000
men in getting Paschendaele
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we shall gain more than
tt in life & comfort & morale.
As a strategical object
this is clearly sound. The
only question is as to whether
we choose / way to carry it out.
_______
We pushed in each
case against the weather.
The weather prophet had
warned us. We knew /
weather had bn bad & ws
likely to be bad on Oct 9;
& we knew it wd be bad
on Oct 11.
In / face of our Somme
experience, we tried it.
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Under these circumstances
(1) We tried a bigger objective
than we had ever tried
before - 3000 yards
for the 3rd Divn.
(2) We had a thinner, much
thinner arty than we had
ever had before, owing to
/ guns being bogged &
ammn hard to get up.
(3) We gave the place only
one days arty preparation.
The Germans, in pursuance
of their new plan, massed
troops in their front line
at Bellevue. This new
plan only wants shattering
bombt - They had wire in
front of their trenches & /
N Zealanders reached it
& dug in before it uncut.
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The object ws so badly carried out
tt the result ws tt instead
of lowering / German morale
& raising ours, / we lowered
ours by each of these battles
& raised / German; & we
won not an inch of ground.
What is / good of excuse is the very best
strategic ^(or psychological) object in / world, if
/ plan you pursue does not
& cannot get it?
Oct. 14
As I finish -
Murdoch has just
come in to tell me tt two
bodies of our men did
get to Paschendaele
- 37th & 40th; one near
/ church & one ^probly on the left,
and tt they did clear out
79
and tt they got to
Crest Farm thro our
own barrage (I ad have written
that I thought / shells there
were hard to tell from
our own shells when
we saw tt party go
thru the hedge).
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some blockhouses across
the Ravebeck & 3 men
got back (the 3 I saw I suppose) tho
they lost an officer. And
that the 37Bn were out
in front on Saty morning
till 11am. altho the
SOS line had bn brought
back by Genl. Monash in
superabundant caution
/ previous evening & a
practice barrage ws
put thro ( can this be
true, wounded or no
wounded?) at 5.30 am
on Saty. I think this
must have been an
SOS at dawn - unless
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it was a General's nervousness
agst an attack. It fully
justifies what I fear wh I sd / men
out there feared entertained.
The Canadians are to
take / place of the 2nd Anzac
Corps & attack Paschendaele. 2nd
Anzac go at once to rest,
as they have had none;
1st Anzac will stop in
& make roads for 10 days;
& then perh. 5 Div will
act on / rt of Canadians.
1st Anzac having had 3
months rest cannot get
out at once but will probly
go to a quiet part o / line.
As / pioneers were working
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