Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/252/1 - 1918 - 1935 - Part 16

see the RUS 9 Journal
vol 67 for an article
by Lt col A M Ross -
"Australian Patrol Operations,
Strazelle, July 1918"

HN
Plumer's opinion of the 1st Divn, 1918
Glasgow told me (6.4.33):
When the 1st Div. was sent for to join
Aust. Corps in Aug 1918, Plumer repeated
Glasgow ^its commander to bring some of his senior officers
to a ^small memorial service which They we was being held
on Aug 4 in commemoration of the entry of
Britain into the war.
When the service was over he
called, Glasgow & his officers aside
& asked them to gather round him.  "You are
leaving my army I am sorry that there you I cannot inform you where you are going, or what
you are going to do.  I xxx your xxxx & I am sorry to lose you, but I wish
you success.  You know, gentlemen, he said, "that it is
not my practice to make eulogistic
speeches; there will be plenty of time for
that after the war.  At the same time I
would like to tell you that there is no
division, certainly in my army, perhaps in
the whole British army, which has done
more to destroy the morale of the enemy
than the 1st Australian Division."
During the operations ^at Hazebrouck Plumer used to come
 

2
down constantly to see Glasgow.
"What is this that your fellows have been
doing?" he would ask.
"Only carrying out the principles that
you lay down," says Glasgow; "they get in on
the flank of a German post & then scoop it
up, & then ^make use of the opening mach so as to scoop outflank
& scoop up another post, & so on."
Plumer would look at the map & then
turn & walk back to his car, & Glasgow
could see his shoulders shaking with
laughter as he rolled down the path.

JC:
Correctns Vol.V.
31305 2.37
H.N.
THE GOVERNMENT OF. NEW SOUTH WALES
THE SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT.
SYDNEY.  N.S.W., 6th August, 1937.
IN YOUR REPLY,
QUOTE THIS NUMBER - NO_________
ADDRESS:
"THE SHERIFF,"
BOX 3A, G.P.O., SYDNEY.
TELEPHONE {B 06
{ EXTENSION 565

Dear Dr. Bean,
I have for some time been considering whether I
should write to you regarding certain matters that appear
in Volume V. of the Official History of Australia in the
War and now do so, hoping that you will not mis-interpret
my motive.  I have no desire to traverse any comment which
you have made or which may be implied in the particular
matters to which I refer.
At Page 516 commences a short account of the operations
of the 18th Battalion at Hangard Wood in April, 1918.  On
Page 518, (three lines from the bottom of the page), the
following statement appears:-
"Lieutenant Frewin himself started back to see to
these matters but did not return."
We have an 18th Battalion A.I.F. Association and
several members of the Executive drew my attention to the
sentence quoted and were somewhat hurt at the implication
therein.  I pointed out that on Page 519, (three lines from
the bottom), occurs the statement:-
"Frewin lay out, mortally wounded"
and the members of the Committee were thereupon appeased.
Would it not be possible, in any future edition, to so
arrange the context that the momentary impression created
by the statement on 518, and which certainly is not to the
credit of Frewin, may be avoided.
Now to another matter, four (4) posts were ordered
to be established prior to the zero hour on 15th inst.
As you set out on Page 520 of the Official History, No. 4
post was not established. I am not suggesting that what
I am now about to narrate should, necessarily, be included in
any future editions of the volume, but I think you should be
in possession of this information.
You will remember that I took over the sector
immediately following the death of Lt. Colonel Milne and the
battalion headquarters were for a few hours in a small
copse on the western side of the road leading from Villers
down to the French area.  Later, after the dug-outs in the
roadway to the west of Hangard Wood had been reconditioned,
we moved there.  So far as my recollection goes, we did not
receive the brigade order until late in the afternoon.  I
have not been able, so far, to put my hands on my records
dealing with that phase of the campaign.  My recollection at
the moment is that, at or about 1730 on the 14th inst., the
brigade order came to hand.  I had not been consulted by a
brigade, nor had I been asked to submit any appreciation of the
situation.  It did appear to me at the time, and I have had no
reason to reverse that opinion, that the time that elapsed
between the German attack and the launching of our attack on
the 15th inst. gave ample time for the brigade to have ascertained
from me the situation that prevailed at night-fall on the
14th.
/The
 

JC.
- 2 -
The next point which I desire to make, and upon which
my recollection is very definite, is that the difficulty
which the 20th battalion encountered on the 7th April was 
not made known to the other units of the brigade. You will
remember that the southern platoon of the 20th battalion had
been unable to approach the cross-roads on the 7th April and
this difficulty and the incidents which led up to the award
of the V.C. to Lieutenant Storkey were certainly not known to
me, nor, I believe, to the other battalion leaders in the
brigade.  We hand no opportunity of conferring with one another
and no information was circulated to us.  I am very definite on
this point, because I remember that I had a very stormy
interview following on the operation of the 15th inst. in
which I made some very caustic comments and my allegations
on that occasion were not denied.
The next matter is that I arranged that a code
message should be sent back to me on the establishment
of each post and I received this code message in each instance.
This led me to believe that around about 2130 on the 14th inst.
the whole of the posts, including the fourth, had been established.
Had I been otherwise advised I would probably have arranged to
meet the contingency.
In company with Lt. L.C. Robson, M.C., (now Headmaster
of the Shore Grammar School) I went forward to visit the
posts.  My recollection is that I saw posts 1 and 2 and whilst

proceeding to Nos. 3 and 4, (which at that time I believed
had been established) , a runner intercepted us with an urgent
request to get in touch with the brigade and I thereupon returned
to the Quarry where the battalion headquarters were.  It was
not until next morning that I found that No. 4 had not been
established.  The mishap that overtook Lt. McLaren, M.M.,
on approaching this point was referred to me at a meeting
of Officers the following day. Apart from some personal
observations  I offered that a subordinate Officer must accept the
responsibility of departing from orders if he found that the
conditions had changed to such an extent and in such a manner
that the Officer who originally issued the instructions might
reasonably have varied them had he himself been on the spot, but
this did not justify the sending back of the code message.
I, at that time and now after a lapse of many years,
attribute the failure of the battalion to the fact that:-

(a)  The difficulties encountered by the 20th battalion
on 7th April were not make known to the unit;
(b)  The battalion was not consulted as to the situation

before the brigade order was drawn up;
(c)  The transmission of the code message which led
me to believe that all posts have been established,
whereas, in fact, an Officer had decided that he
should vary the instructions issued.

Yours faithfully,

 Geo. F. Murphy.

Lt. Col.

18th Bn. A.I.F.

DR. C.E.W. Bean,

Victoria Barracks,

S Y D N E Y .

 

EIGHTEENTH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BATTALION.
Battalion Headquarters
15th April, 1918.

Headquarters,

5th Aust. Inf. Bde.
I must submit the following report on the operation carried out by this
Battalion at 3 a.m. this morning against enemy positions in CEMETERY
COPSE and Cross Roads in U.23.d  The conclusions I have formed are
subject to modification as a possible result of further enquiries,
but in the main, I think they are correct.
Preliminary orders were received at 5'7 p.m. from G.O.C. - I
returned to Battalion H.Q. and issued my instructions to Company
Commanders, "A" and "B" Coys. who were detailing the troops.  All
preliminary arrangements had been completed early in the day.  The
Company Commanders left me at 6'17 p.m. - Lieut. Frewin, "A" Coy.,
proceeding to HANGARD to discuss final arrangements with the French.
Written orders , confirming my verbal instructions, were issued to all
concerned at 9 p.m.
On the night of the13th/14th  a post had been partially completed at
U.22b.70.65.  I instructed O.C. "B" Coy. to push on this work and
occupy it prior to Zero hour.  He was also to construct a post at
U.29.b.95.15. and occupy it prior to zero.  Both these tasks were 
completed as ordered, despite the darkness and he hard nature of the
soil.
A third post was ordered to be constructed at approx. U. 23.c.45.85
to be occupied by one officer and Platoon with Lewis gun prior to
Zero, if possible.  If the enemy prevented the construction of the post,
the locality was to be taken at Zero hour, and I impressed on the 
O.C. "B" Coy. that the post was essential and should be completed
by Zero unless enemy opposition was met with.  The O.C. "B" Coy.
detailed Lieut. Thompson for this work and I am satisfied that the
instructions were clearly given to this Officer.
At 12'55 a.m. (15th inst.) Capt. Cadle reported that he three
posts had been occupied, confirming this telephone message in writing
at 1'15 a.m. He had seen Officer (Lieut. Jones) at U.22.B.70.65
and N.C.O. at U. 29.b.95.15. and was on his way to see Lieut. Thompson
when he met a runner from this officer who reported that he "was out
and O.K."  On this authority Capt. Cadle sent the report to Battn. H.Q.
AT 1'30 a.m. Capt. Cadle met Lieut. Thompson near the cross roads
in U.22.d.50.65 when Lieut. Thompson informed him that he had been
forward, and had decided to wait until Zero hour before attempting to 
construct the post. He could give no reason for his delay in
carrying out the orders. Capt. Cadle ordered him forward at once and
returned to his Company H.Q, to report the matter.  The wires were cut
and he could not get through for some time.  The post was not constructed.
Lieut. Thompson waited until Zero hour, and I am strongly of the
opinion that the failure on the part of this officer was in the end
mainly responsible for the men in the Copse being overrun.  Lieut.
Thompson certainly made a brave fight against heavy odds and paid the
penalty with his life, but he did not carry out my orders.
The parties were  in position at Zero- 45 as ordered, and the

dump ordered the established at Copse in U.29.a.
The Stokes mortars opened up at 3 a.m. and their fire was well
directed.  then the Copse was entered later, numbers of dead bosche
were seen and one light machine gun at N.W. corner of the Copse was
blown out.
 The artillery barrage came down at zero plus 10 and though
reports are varying, the officers say it was placed as arranged,

and was good.

/The
 

-2-

The party of 2 officers and 50 O.R. got to the Copse , passing
through a hedge about 150 yards on our side of the Copse.  Behind this
hedge the hun was dug in, but did not put up much of a fight.  A second
line was encountered near the edge of the copse and a fairly stiff
resistance was offered.  Our men got through to the far side and were

there reorganised by Lieuts. Frewin and Gascoigne-Roy and began to dig
in under machine gun fire.  A patrol was sent towards the Cemetery to
gain touch with the French but encountered the enemy about 50 yards
South of CEMETERY COPSE and had to retire.
A carrying party, under orders sent back by Lieut. Frewin
carried S.A.A. 9000, &c. and some shovels to the Copse.
The success signal was reported about 3'22 a.m. from the Copse,
but so many different coloured flares were being fired by the enemy
that it was impossible to distinguish our own.
At 4'20 a.m. Capt. Cadle reported that Lieut. Thompson had been
wounded and that heavy fighting was in progress at the Cross roads
U.23.a. and U.23.b.  He moved forward to reconnoitre.  At 4'25 a.m.
Lieut Maxwell who was standing by in rear of the Copse in U.29a. was 
ordered forward to Copse where he found Lieut. Frewin wounded.
Lieut. Frewin has not been seen since. Lieut. Gasgoigne-Roy who was of
the party, was severely wounded in the Copse and later was evacuated

through the French.
At 4'42 a.m. Sgt. De Saxe reported that he was being strongly
counter attacked at cross roads in U.23.d.   The enemy had been
encountered in large numbers at both crossroads in U.23.c. and d. and
had previously  been driven in the direction of the BOISE de HANGARD
but had reorganised in gully at U.23.b. and advanced again.  Heavy
casualties were inflicted  upon him but our men were driven in and the
huns swung down from cross roads at U.2.d. and attacked our men in
the Copse.  Had the post at U.23.c. (cross roads) bee established,
this attack would have possibly been broken.  As it was an attack
came form the direction of U.30.a.50.50 and the garrison practically
surrounded.

By 7 a.m. the troops were back on their own line with the
exception of the posts at U.22.b.70.65 and U.29.b.95.15. which are still
held.
In the attack on the cross roads Lieut. Thompson's party got to 
the south of the road and entered a sunken road abut 15 yards east of
a row of poplars. (approx. U.23.c.40.35) and found it heavily manned:
three machine guns were seen there.  Later three stretcher bearers
counted 78 enemy dead around cross roads in U.23.c.

Our casualties definitely ascertained at 7 p.m. today are:-

Officers : - 1 Died of Wounds               O.R. : -  7 killed in action

                     1 Wounded & Missing                   38  wounded
                     3 Wounded                           ∅        33  Unaccounted for

                                                                   ∅ Probably some in front line. 

(sgd. ) G. F. MURPHY

Lieut. Colonel,
Commanding 18th Battalion, A.I.F.

Battn H.Q.

8 p.m.

 

EIGHTEENTH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BATTALION.
Battalion Headquarters
19th April, 1918.

Headquarters,

5th Aust. Inf. Bde.

 

I forward herewith an appreciation of the Right Battalion
Sector in squares U.16, 17, 23 and 29. a. and b. on Sheet 62 D.

The appreciation is based on  -

(a)   My own observation,
(b)   Reports from Company Officers and Observers,
(c)   Reports from those who took part in operations
against enemy positions in U.23.c. and d. and 
U. 20.b.

The principal features are : -

(1)  The BOIS de HANGARD in square U.17.
(2)  The re-entrants in U.23.a. and b. and the valley along
grid line between squares U.23 and 24.

The BOIS de HANGARD is fairly open timber with brushwood of average height from 4 to 5 ft. and is not dense.  A terrace of some
4 ft. high runs from U.22.b.40.80  for 100 yards along the South edge
of wood.  The wood is not so far as we could ascertain wired.

The enemy holds the wood mainly by machine gun fire.  Movement 
and concentration of troops have been reported in Copse U.23.a.

40.80.  and U.23.b.20.80.  For this area see aeroplane photo 35 AE.

B.816 and for enemy's works in U.23.a. see photo 52AE.A.317 which

will well repay study.

The ground in U.17.a. is best commanded from post on
vicinity of U.23.b.40.80.  The ground dips away rapidly from U.23.a.
90.40. and the ground between this point and U.24.a.80.00. is not
visible from anywhere except from post at U.29.b.25.60. and even
from this spot numerous hedges mask the view. It is from this ground
in U.23.b. and d. and U.24.a. and c. that his main counter attack was
delivered.  the ground along the grid line between squares U. w and
24 cannot be effectively dealt with by 18 pdrs.; howitzers are very
necessary.  The ground in U.22.d. has for its highest point the
cross roads in U.22.d.50.65. sloping away more rapidly to the North,
a fairly gradual slope towards HANGARD with road through 23.c. and d.
running along the ridge.  Our posts here are back on the CACHY-HANGARD
Road and the field of fire is here about 250 yards.  The cross roads

In U.23.c.45.60 are not visible but the road running south from this
spot is marked by a line of poplar trees.  From the cross roads this
road running north and south is sunken and when our men entered it
was heavily manned, five machine guns were in action in the Poplars
and a trench mortar behind a turnip heap in about U.23.c.60.60.
The enemy retired towards U.23. central, reorganised, and counter
attacked from there.
The ground in front of our posts in U.29.a. and b. rises
slightly for 200 yards, and then falls away towards CEMETERY COPSE
and the tops of the trees there can be seen.  Very little of the ground
is under observation between U.29.d. central to road in U.24.d.20.00
to Copse about U.24.c.00.70. along which line a fair amount of
movement is seen, and it is thought that a large quarry or depression
exists in Copse at U.24. central. Fairly large parties of the enemy
have been seen here,

/I

 

-2-

I would like again to emphasise the importance of thoroughly
searching all the round along the grid line between squares 23 and
 24 with howitzers and if possible by heavy machine gun fire from the
direction of HANGARD.
The enemy has observation over right sector as far as road
running through U.22.d, 23.c.and d, from is position on hill
south of HANGARD in C.10.b. (beet 66 E).  On our positions in
U.22.b. and d. from U.24.b. and on the left of our sector from the 
BOIS de HANGARD.

Our experience was that he did practically no patrolling
but sent individual men out some 150 to 200 yards to fire very lights.
He held his forward posts in strength with the garrison dug
in along hedges.  The garrison was protected from shrapnel by deep
narrow pot holes.  His machine guns were very active at night and
numerous with a predominance of light guns.  The many hedges etc.,
make "mopping up" a very difficult matter.  His infantry will not
wait for a charge:  his counter attacks are delivered only after
thorough searching with machine guns.
Between 4'30 a.m. and 5 p.m. he puts down a barrage along
line of road Villers Brettoneux-Hangard, particularly in squares
22 b. an d d. (to cross roads).  He concentrates his fire on
U.22.b.20..90.road from U.22.b.60.90. to U.22.d.55.60. Copse at
U.22.c.50.90. and U.29.a.50.90.

On the morning of the 15th inst, he put a barrage down along
line U.23.a.00.50., U.23.c.00.50 to Copse U.29.a.80.90. and searched
area back to U.22.a.80.00. to U.28a.95.95., twice up and down.
The barrage was mainly 4'4 s.  The searching was done mainly by
77a and gas shells.
Enemy machine guns - 

In poplars along road south of cross roads:

U.23.c.45.65
U.17.c.70.20
U.17.c. 20.60
U.23.a.20.90.
U.23.a. 20.60

U.23.a. 25.50
U.23.a.40.80

Upper storey of  White House in Bois de Hangard

Aeroplane photos worth careful study: -
35  AE. B 850
35  AE. B 816
52  AE A. 326
52  AE A. 313
52  AE A. 314
52  AE A. 315

52  AE. A. 316
52  AE. A, 317

(sgd,) GEO. F. MURPHY.

Lt. Col. 

Commanding 18th Battalion A,I,F,