Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/251/1 - 1915 - 1936 - Part 26

 [*H/N
Dernancourt*]
COPY.                                                                                  
Army Form

W.3121.

Number:

12th Aus. Inf. Bde. 4th Aust. Divn. Aust Corps.  9/4/18.   Date of Recommendation.

46th Bn.                   

A. I. F.                         

Hon.  Capt. 

Q. Mstr.                                 

Reginald

OUTHWAITE. 

Action for which commended.    

For gallantry and devotion to duty near ALBERT                                       on the night of the 5th April 1918. During the       

progress of the enemy attack he went forward to                            

Bn. H.Qrs in the line in order to make arrangements                               to meet the changes of disposition, and,
although wounded, remained on duty in order to
ensure that supplies and hot food were delivered
to the Companies. The nature of his duties
allowed him little time for rest during the
previous five days, and his determination to see
the matter through resulted in maintaining the
fighting power and good spirits of the men in
the line. Throughout the period of his work
forward his only shelter from the enemy fire was
the Bn. H.Qrs for a few minutes.

Recommended by                                  

J. Gellibrand                                                        

Brig. Gen.

Cmmdg. 12th

 A.I. Bde

Honour or Reward

M.C.

(Sgd) E.G. SINCLAIR MACLAGAN Maj. Gen.
Cmmd. 4th Aust. Divn.

Personnel 
Dear Bean

Herewith 

Copy of our report 

on recent operation 

as promised you

Am also sending 

one to Cutlack

Sincerely yours

R. Morell

21/4/18.

EFW. 

SECRET.

ril 1918.

13th. A.I.Bde. H.Qrs.

10/4/18.

Reference 1/40,000 combined sheet. 

ALBERT and disposition sketches attached.
(1) DISPOSITIONS. At 11 p.m. on 4th. April the Bde. was disposed as
shown in sketch 1, the 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde. being on the right 

and the 12th. Aust Inf. Bde. on the left. The 52nd. Bn. had 
relieved the 51st. Bn. in the line the previous night (3rd/4th)
and was fairly fresh. The 49th. and 50th. Bns. were in Divisional
Reserve.  All units had been bivouaced in open trenches since

26th. March.

(2) WARNING OF ATTACK AND ALTERATION OF DISPOSTIONS. At 11.20 p.m.
on 4th. April a wire was received from Div. stating that indications 

pointed to a probable enemy attack the following morning and at 

11.45 p.m. the Reserve Coy. of the 52nd. Bn. was ordered forward 

to occupy the line of posts in E.18.b and E.20.a. which was

done by 2.15 a.m. (Sketch II) Other units of the Brigade were

informed of action taken.

(3) RECONNAISSANCE. The night was misty with showers of rain. 14

reconnaissance patrols were sent out by 52nd. Bn. but no unusual 

enemy movement was reported till dawn.

(4) ENEMY BOMBARDMENT. The usual desultory enemy shelling continued
during the darkness but at daybreak it increased and between
6 and 7 a.m. developed into a brisk bombardment of the forward
areas with heavy and light guns and minenwerfer which lasted 

until 8 a.m. when it lifted on to the area in D.17 and 18 where

the H.Qrs. of 51st. and 52nd. Bns and a Coy. of 51st. Bn. were

located.  About 9 a.m. the shelling of the forward areas slackened

and a heavy shoot was carried out on our battery areas in the 

BRESLE - RIBEMONT Valley and bivouac areas in the vicinity of

BRESLE WOOD and HENENCOURT. The bombardment does not appear

to have done very much damage amongst the forward troops, but
the 50th. Bn. in particular suffered about 60 casualties and were
obliged to move from the aerodrome in D.2.a. The shelling cut all
wires to the Brigade Forward Report Centre (D.21. B:7.2.) and 
until 10.30 a.m. the only means of communication with the Forward
Bns. was by visual so that in the early stages information as to
the progress of the operations was rather scanty.

(4) INFANTRY ACTION.  Taking advantage of the mist and under cover
of the bombardment the enemy worked his troops forward to the
Railway Line from the Road and Railway Crossing at E.20.b.2.6.
eastwards. While the assembling in and near DERNANCOURT he was
engaged by Vickers and Lewis Guns, Rifles and Stokes Mortars,
and heavy casualties were inflicted. Later a strong party
advanced towards te our left flank but was met by rifle and M.G.
fire and was practically annihilated. At 9 a.m. our line was in
its original position.
At about 10 a.m. seven men of 47th. Bn. came to
our left Coy. H.Qrs. near Railway Arch and said that 47th. Bn.
had withdrawn. The Company Commander sent his C.S.M. back with
these men along the embankment. They went 200 yds. into 12th.
Bde. Sector and found no trace of 47th. Bn. so returned.
Between 10 and 10.15 a.m. large parties of enemy
were seen moving North and North East over the high ground near the
Prisoners of War Cage in E.14.d. The left Coy. Commander then
ordered his Coy. to fall back to the line of posts in E.19.b.
and E.14.c. While doing this they were subjected to a heavy
M.G. fire from E.14.d. The right of the Coy. remained in touch
with the centre Coy. on the Railway Line. This Company Commander
was wounded and is now missing and the facts given above were not
clearly known at the time.
At 11.[?]5 a.m. when it became definitely known 

2

that an Infantry action on some scale was taking place the 49th.
Bn (under orders from Division) had been moved forward to the line
in front of LAVIEVILLE and became Brigade Reserve.
At 11.30 a.m. an Artillery F.O.O. reported that enemy were
massing in DERNANCOURT and all available artillery was put onto
this village.
At 12 noon our dispositions were as shewn in Sketch III.
At noon the Divisional Commander and the Brigadier discussed
the position on the telephone and it was decided to restore the
situation at once by working along the railway towards DERNANCOURT.
The G.O.C., 12th. Bde, at 11.35 a.m. had reported the 47th. Bn.
were in front of E.14 Central and at 12.5 p.m. that his right
was on the Railway Line so that it appeared possible for 52nd.
Bn. to carry this out and at 12.50 p.m. orders were accordingly
sent to this effect. At 1.5 p.m. as the situation at the junction
of the Bdes. was then obscure the Divisional Commander decided that
the 49th. Bn. was to be used to clear it up and 50th. Bn. was to
occupy line in front of BRESLE WOOD.
At 1.10 p.m. the 12th. Bde. reported that the enemy were
in E.13.d. and subsequently in conversation with G.O.C., 12th. Bde.
plans for launching counter-attack were discussed and it was
decided that as H.Q. 49th. Bn. adjoined his H.Q. he would get in
touch with C.O. 49th. Bn. direct and arrange co-operation - the
boundaries of 49th. Bn. to be LAVIEVILLE - DERNANCOURT Road and
a line through D.18. Central and E.19 Central. Previous instructions

to 52nd. Bn. were cancelled verbally and orders in accordance
with above issued to 49th. Bn. at 2.0 p.m.
At 3.55 p.m. following on instructions from Division orders
were given for 50th. Bn. to move forward and occupy the LAVIEVILLE
line from DERNANCOURT - DLAVIEVILLE Road [exclusive) through
D.16 Central to D.23.a. joining 51st. Bn. [Chere?] who were to connect up
with 3rd. Aust. Div. at BUIRE Cemetery.
The right of 52nd. Bn. was now being enfiladed from the
vicinity of DERNANCOURT with M.G. and rifle fire and the centre
and right Coys. withdrew to the line of posts in D.24.d. and
E.19.c. the extreme right remaining in touch with 10th. Aust. Inf.
Bde. (situation 3.15 p.m. Sketch IV).
At 4.00 p.m. the left of the 52nd. Bn. was again attacked
and 'A' Coy, of 51st. Bn. was sent to reinforce it.
Meanwhile the 49th. Bn. had moved forward for the counterattack
which had been fixed for 5.15 p.m. and at that time was
deployed between E.18 Central and the DERNANCOURT - LAVIEVILLE
road, being in touch with 46th. Bn., on the right of the
3 Bns with which the 12th. Bde. were attacking (situation at
5.15 p.m. Sketch V).
The 49th. Bn. attack relieved the pressure on the 52nd. Bn.
and pushed forward the line on the left. In doing so they had
had heavy casualties from M.G. and Rifle fire, both the Coy.
Commanders of the two centre Coys. being killed and the majority
of the Officers and many N.C.O's killed or wounded. The result
was that the information sent back was very scanty and also a
gap occurred in the middle of the line.
The right of the 52nd. Bn. pushed forward and re-established
themselves on the Railway Line. The position at 6 p.m. is shewn
in Sketch VI.
During the night 5th/6th, the line was consolidated and
'C' Coy 51st. Bn. was put in to fill up the gap in the line
and at 10 p.m. the Brigade was disposed as in Sketch VII with
continuous touch from flank to flank.
The enemy remained inactive during the night 5th/6th. and the
following day, and on the night 6th/7th, the 50th. Bn. took over
the right sector of the front and 49th. Bn. the left Sector
being disposed as shewn in Sketch VIII and these dispositions
remained unaltered until the Brigade was relieved by the 7th.
Aust. Inf. Bde.  on the night 7th/8th. April.

3 

(6) COMMUNICATION. During the artillery bombardment prior to the
attack on 5th. inst. the lines to the Brigade Forward Report
Centre at (D.21.b.7.2.) were repeatedly cut and till 10.30 a.m.
communication was restricted to visual signalling. Fortunately
the ground and weather conditions were very favourable for this
work and it was possible to send messages forward, as the mist
rendered observation from the high ground above MORLANCOURT
impossible.
The wireless set which had been allotted to the
report centre was not in working order and though several efforts
had previously been made to obtain them no power buzzers were
available.
Owing to the roads being in good condition runners
were able to use bicycles between Bde. and Bn. Headquarters and
this method of communication was therefore considerably quicker
than usual.
At 10.30 a.m. the wires held fairly well and it
was possible to get information and orders through quickly.
Communications forward of Bn. H.Qrs. were not so easy, owing to
the long bald slope down to the front line, which was under enemy
observation.
Pigeons would have been useful here when lines
were down had they been available. Considerable difficulty
was experienced in getting wire and it was not possible to
duplicate lines. For this reason it is considered that too
much reliance was placed on this method of communication and that
whenever possible power buzzers should be installed at least as
far forward as Brigade Report Centres and pigeons should be issued
to Bns. in the line.

(7) ARTILLERY CO-OPERATION. The Brigade was covered by the Right
Group Artillery consisting of 3 English Army Bdes under Lt-Col
YOUNG R.H.A. A senioliaison officer from 4th. Aust. Div.
Artillery was stationed at Bde. H.Qrs. and a junior officer at
the H.Qrs. of the Bn. in the line.
Prior to the action telephone communication had been
established with Group H.Qrs. and also with the H.Qrs. of the other
Bdes. R.F.A. composing the Group, and the wires held well during the
day.
When the first attack developed against the 52nd. Bn.
an S.O.S. was fired, but after that targets were engaged as often
as they presented themselves either at the request of Brigade
through the liaison officer or direct by F.O.O's. The 35th.
Div. Artillery attached 3rd. Aust. Div. co-operated by enfilading
the Railway Embankment near DERNANCOURT during the day.
Both forward Bns. report that Battery Commanders visited them
on several occasions to obtain the latest information and
arrange co-operation.

(8) MACHINE GUNS. In no action in which the Bde has taken part have
machine guns had such an opportunity. The whole of the front
except the left flank was covered by the R. ANCRE which enabled
a certain proportion of guns to be pushed well forward to the
Railway Line and they were thus able to bring enfilade fire
on to the Railway Embankment and the ground North of DERNANCOURT,
without any risk of being attacked frontally.
Other guns were sited on the rising ground in E.19.a.
(complete disposition as shewn in Sketch I).
Throughout the day all parties of the enemy assembling
near DERNANCOURT were engaged and frontal and flanking fire was
brought to bear whenever he attacked. Hostile M.G's were also
engaged.
The withdrawal of the left Coy. of 52nd. Bn. to the
C.C.S. line was covered by machine guns two of the guns remaining
in action until the crews all became casualties and were overpowered
by the enemy. Except for a little indirect fire on
the QUARRY and sunken road in E.14.c. all firing was done with
[di?]rect observation over the sights.

4

(9) TRENCH MORTARS. Two 3" Mortars were in position covering the main
street of DERNANCOURT and the railway bridge with 150 rounds
of ammunition per gun. Fire was withheld until asked for
by the Company Commander in the line and 80 rounds were then
fired on previously registered targets in E.20.b. When the
attack pressed forward excellent living targets presented themselves
and both mortars opened fire into the crowding enemy with
direct observation.
Firing was kept up until almost all the ammunition was expended
and the Infantry were falling back towards the C.C.S.
Both mortars were then blown up to prevent them falling
into enemy hands and the crews joined in with the 52nd. Bn.
as riflemen. When fire was first opened the legs of one mortar 

 collapsed but the N.C.O. in charge immediately removed the
damaged bipod and supporting the mortar with his arms and
legs carried on firing with great success. The other mortar
was traversed by being picked up bodily and pointed in the
direction required.

(10) MEDICAL. The Medical arrangements worked without a hitch.
Wounded men were cleared from R.A.P's by wheeled stretcher to
A.D.S. at LAVIEVILLE whence they were taken on by Motor
Ambulances.

(11) PRISONERS. Two prisoners were captured by the 49th. Bn. of the
229th. Regt. and 3 Light and 1 Heavy Machine Guns.

(12) CASUALTIES. Our casualties for the period and the 7 days

preceding were as under

	49th		50th		51st		52nd
	Off	O.R.	Off	O.R	Off	O.R	Off	O.R.
KILLED.	8	54	-	11	2	13	1	29
WOUNDED.	6	153	-	50	1	43	6	117
MISSING.	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	14	207	-	61	3	58	8	146

	M.G. Coy		L.T.M.B		TOTAL
	Off	O.R.	Off	O.R	O	O.R
KILLED.	-	2	-	-	11	109
WOUNDED.	1	15	1	1	15	381
MISSING.	-	9	-	-	1	9
	1	26	1	1	27	499

 

GENERAL. (1) When the action started a party of 1 Officer and 40 men
from 4th. Aust. Pioneer Bn. were tunnelling M.G. positions
in the Railway Embankment near DERNANCOURT. They left their
work and joined in the fighting with 52nd. Bn., as did
also a party from 3rd. Aust. Pion. Bn. who were working
near BUIRE Cemetery.
(2) At 11.30 a.m. on 5th. April 4 tanks were placed at the
disposal of the Brigade but they were not used.
(3) With the exception of the Two Vickets Guns previously
referred to and the two Stokes Mortars that were blown up,
no guns were lost to the enemy, though 1 Vickers Gun and
3 Lewis Guns were damaged by shell fire. Thesee were
replaced the same night.
(4) Twice during the day on the 5th. April the Brigade
Intelligence Officer rode forward and made a personal
reconnaissance of the situation, and on the night 5th/6th.
he again went forward with another officer of the Bde. Staff
and remained until the line was re-organised.

5
CONCLUSION.
The 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde, was not involved in the
fighting at any time and the enemy's objective would therefore
seem to have been the high ground North and North-West of
DERNANCOURT.
When this sector was first taken over the original
intention was to hold the line D.24.d., E.19.c., E.19.b., E.20.A.
as the line of resistance; this being the best tactical position,
but it was subsequently decided to hold the Railway Line in order
to conform with 12th. Aust. Inf. Bde.
The enemy's gain of ground on this Brigade
Sector was therefore of little tactical advantage to him, and;
though it is impossible to make any estimate of his casualties,
they must have been very heavy.

(sgd) T.W. GLASCOW: Brigadier-General,
Commanding 13th. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

I

SITUATION :- 11 P.M.. 4.4.18

T= 1  Coy
Diagram - see original document

II

SITUATION :- 2.30 A.M. 5.4.18

T=1 Coy
Diagram - see original document

III
SITUATION :-  NOON  5.4.18
T=1 Coy

Diagram - see original document