Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/251/1 - 1915 - 1936 - Part 22

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31st August 1936

C. E. W. Bean, Esq.

"B" Company, commanded by Captain Dervis Cummings,
occupied a position at right angles to "D" Company
running back in a westerly direction and facing
North, overlooking the road leading into Albert,
and with "D" Company occupied the apex of a salient
which jutted into the enemies' territory. "A"
Company, commanded by Captain "Fred" Anderson was on
the right of "D" Company along the railway embankment 

facing east.
At about 9.30 a.m. after prolonged and intensive
shelling from field guns, 5.9s. and minnenwherfer
shells, which caused heavy losses along the railway
embankment, the enemy who had assembled in deep 
depressions to the North and North East of our line,
left their positions and advanced wave after wave
in sections against us. There was a short and
sanguinary fight. Our lewis gunners and stokes
mortar crews disposed of most of them. The few
who actually succeeded in penetrating our line were
immediately killed.
I then moved my lewis gun teams to a position to
assist "B" Company situated at our left rear as some
of the enemy had got in behind them. The wounded
and dead were then evacuated. As soon as we had
cleared up, and after ascertaining that "B" and "A"
Companies were in their respective positions, we 
became troubled by bursts of machine gun fire from the
South which enfiladed parts of our position. The
exposed men were soon moved but, being unable to
locate the trouble I walked behind the embankment
to speak to Captain Anderson, and met him on his way
to me to report that the enemy had broken through
the 47th Bn. on his right. A 47th man informed us
they had lost heavily and that all their officers
had been killed or wounded. Captain Anderson and
I conferred, and as it was clear from the flares
fired into the air by the enemy that he was progressing 

rapidly up a depression a little to the South,
and that there was grave danger that he would soon
be behind us, we immediately posted certain lewis
gun teams on to a ridge overlooking the depression
up which the advance was being made, to protect our
flank and to cover our retirement up a corresponding 

depression on our side of the ridge should it be
necessary to withdraw. Positions had already been
prepared for such an emergency on higher ground to
our rear. A report was immediately sent to Bn.
headquarters by Captain Anderson.
After arranging the method of retirement, we returned 
to our respective companies and gave our officers 

and N.C.O.s directions for gradual and orderly 

retirement should it be necessary.
 

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C. E. W. Bean, Esq.
31st August 1936
Lieut. Roy Potts volunteered to make the somewhat
hazardous journey across to "B" Company to inform
Captain Cummings of what had taken place and of the
arrangements made.
By about noon the pressure had become severe, and
it was clear that we would probably be cut off if we
remaineder, and an orderly evacuation was made to the
prepared position in our rear with relatively few
casualties. One of the lewis gun teams protecting
our withdrawal disappeared and I have since learned
the survivors were captured.
I was wounded by machine gun bullets when nearing
the new position.
The details set out above will be of no value to
you, but it presents a summary of a morning's hard work, as
viewed from one actually in the scrap, and it might assist
in building up the whole.
Yours faithfully,
Gordon A. Parry
 

Extracts from
∧ Notebook of Captain C.A. Pyke,
DAAG, 3rd Aust Div
Instructions received from General Monash after the interviewing
the commander of the

March 1918
(? X Corps) VIII Corps
26th Albert-Bray.
4pm. told to hold at all costs.
Orders not up in time.
considerable confusion.
West of Bray - position obscure
up to nightfall.
A line of wire & trenches in fair order
not far east of line of Road
Me^aricourt - Sailly le Sec will be
occupied during night by 2000 odd
infantry.
1 Brigade South of Corbie Bray road
1 Brigade North
Both flanks resting on respective
rivers.
1. Brigade in reserve.
Div HQrs - Franvillers.
1st 2 Bns of 11th debus at Heilly -
1 Bn to cross river south of Heilly
make by track "Halte" across spur
spread out on line S of C-B road in
 

2
a series of posts. Other bn. approach
the position by going up valley to
Mericourt make good line between
 X roads xx & N - River. 
? If 3rd Bn arrives to go in

support of Right Wing

Gen. Cannan to take over all troops in
position
Next brigade take front N of X roads.
11th close to right
All bridges destroyed as far west as
Bray. West of B - all preparations
made to blow bridges.
South of Somme - 5 th Army position
of left flank not known, believed
to be somewhere S of Bray. This
not assured.
N. of Ancre is 39^th Division, hold
here of Ancre - DHQ al Lavieville
River valley to be held.
Probable critical time will not exceed
 

3.

48 hours - possibly only 24 - but
situation so serious that if line not held
Bosche may reach Amiens.
Artillery. Corps Artillery - along
River Ancre.
Bulk of Vickers should be on his
right sector - owing to good
observation.
No direct artillery & support until ours
arrives.
Reserve Brigade - Heilly
Pioneers & spare M G Coy. Vicinity
of DHQ.
? Artillery concentrate Lahoussoye
No 40,000 maps available
Enemy not much artillery.
Habit to make max thrust
11-1 & 3-5. Quick in discovering
gaps & getting through them.
Usual method for infantry to 

4.
advance in higgledy piggledy ^order for 600 yards
then lie down, & then for us to suddenly
find ourselves enfiladed by his M.G.
which have crept up to our flanks -
his inf. then get up & walk over us.
? Least
Last definite infor. re enemy East of
line E. of Albert-Bray vague
rumours he has got through.

               ________
Corps say. Artillery ordered to
move to Biencourt.
S.A.A. for 11th Bde.
400,000 to be dumped at point
East of X roads of "Halte" track
& Vaux -Mericourt road sometime
tomorrow.
 

5.
Gen. Cannan to be found either
at Heilly Cha. or Quarry
point 107 = S. of Heilly.

           _____________
Visited 11^th Bde HQ at Heilly at
8am. 27^th inst. 

6.
Locations 26/3/18.
DHQ  .              Courturelle
Div. Art.            Humbercourt.
7th FA Bde.     Coullemont.
8th.     "              Humbercourt.
DHC                         "

HQ Div Engrs   Courturelle

HQ Div Train            "

HQ  MG Bn               "

23 MG Coy                 "
Pioneer Bn         Warlincourt

Supply Column  La Bellevue

Mob. Vet Group       "

9th Bde Group.   Famechon

                                Grincourt

                                Henu, Bayencourt

Bde HQ ?              Mondicourt.

10th Bde Group  Thievres
                                Authie
11th  Bde Group. Couin

                                St Leger

                                Coigneux

MG Coys with Brigades.

DADOS ½ mile N of Mondicourt

in field.
 

Hist. Notes.
Ap 4/1918
Maj. Carr 35th Bn at Villers Bretonneux.
On the day of the Hamel fight Lieut. Hawkins, 35
Bn, gave Murdoch and myself lunch at 11h Bde Hgrs; and at lunch
I found out that he was with Maj. Carr at Villers/B on April 4th.
He told me that it was utterly unfair to connect Maj. Carr in
any way with that retirement. The last man but one to leave
the line was Carr, Hawkins being the last.
Hawkins said that in the morning the flanks had
been bent back and they managed to keep the line, In the afternoon 
however, about 5 pm the Germans put down a heavy bombardment
on the right and the right - the British - went. The movement
spread along the line and the Australians on the right, who had
been in the line 4 days after their relief was promised, began
to give with the British. Hawkins and Carr tried to stop this.
They got hold of the officers and tried to make them get hold
of their troops - which could easily have been done; but the
35 th happened to have there some young officers who were not
of the right stamp, and they would not heed. Maj. Carr accordingly 

took one half of the line and tried to steady that while
Hawkins tried to steady the other half. Hawkins said that you
could quite easily get the men around you to stay; but the moment
you moved on to the next lot those whom you had left began to
pick up the general movement again. The whole line in that part
went and there was nothing to do but to follow it.
The Battalion Headquarters was in V/B under old
Goddard who is a very amiable man but not a man of the crude
determination necessary for a job like that one. He was in
charge of the Brigade in the forward area. He gave the order
Hawkins says, that the 34th Bn was to cover the retreat of the
rest. Sayers counterattack with the reserve company was a thing
off Sayers own bat - he jumped up and went out without his
revolver, and led his men out till he actually got amongst the
Germans in a shellhole, when he killed one of them with his
tin hat, strangled another, and the third ran.
Morshead was in V/B with Goddard. Hawkins thinks
that Morshead was preparing to retire. Anyway, he says, when
the position became known, Morshead, in spite of Col. Goddards
order to the 34th Bn, xxxx went and found that battalion and
- so far from ordering it to cover the retreat, ordered it to
come with him to support the counterattack. Fry wouldnt do this
in view of the order he had received, until he got a written
order from Morshead. M. then gave him a written order and he
obeyed it. (This of course needs confirmation - about the
written order).
 

Hist. Notes

1 2 3 
35^th Bn. Villers Bretoneux, Ap. 4^th.
During the night of Ap. 3/4 by / light of a burning house
in Warfusee the 35^th's outposts, holding / line (^of posts) in front o /
V/B cemetery, cd see Germans passing in thousands. They
informed Bn H.Q. that something ws up.
In / morning, abt 6 a.m. after ½ his bombt. the
Germans came on, massed. One column ws a bit to /
rt of the cemetery, one ahead of it; one to / left.
The one ahead came to within 500 yds before the 35^th fired.
Then they opened – never had such a target. The Germans
got down flat & were tied to / ground.
The German column on their left however got through
& began to T out; & another got through B Coy of the 35^th on
their right. They first beat back the flank o / Coy
on their left – they had a coy bent back, but it wdnt
stretch far enough. The whole line came back in some
disorder. It stopped twice. The second time it ws
near the aerodrome. They had bn told tt there were two
lines of support trenches behind them, both garrisoned but
they found no trenches & no garrison. Each time they stopped
in an open field & dug in
In the afternoon about 3.30 the line ws almost
asleep when some ^in / detached pozzies on / right woke & saw / British line
on right retreating - the whole of it. They went back
too - right into / village - ^They put up an SOS but the guns didnt answer - but a counterattack with the
6^th Londons & the 36^th - up along / rly - put things right again.
(My informant, of the 35^th, believes there ws no one left in front of V/B at all
but / Germans never got into / village. The Germans were dead tired, at he says at / end.