Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/251/1 - 1915 - 1936 - Part 12

HN
Swan Barracks, Perth.
30.10.33
My dear Bean,
I have just received the typed Instructions dated 27th
March 1918, and have perused them with much interest. I will do
my best to clear up this matter.
Firstly, the original of the message book Instructions
was handed to a battalion commander near the head of the column.
Up to now I have always ^thought that officer to be Woolcock. It was dark 
and confusing and perhaps seeing Woolcock in the vicinity, or
soon after, I erred in thinking it was he. I cannot understand not
mentioning this in the War Diary.
Secondly, I do not think I mad a third copy. It was not
usual to do so. I think possibly I read it to Cannan by the light
of a head-lamp, and kept the duplicate in my book.
The typed Instructions are the same Instructions in a
slightly embellished form. At Montigny we did not know the order
in which units would arrive nor even if all would be in the same
column: hence they are referred to in order of arrival. In my
notes (now in War Museum) no reference is made to frontages &c
because these would be marked on my map (I had my old Somme maps 
with me). Similarly, there was no reference to Woolcock and Cummings 
because we did not at the time know where Cummings was or 
whether Woolcock's battalion would be available. Woolcock could 
not be given any order to report before he  arrived at Franvillers.
We met the bus column and Monash stood chatting for some time with 
senior officers: at the same time I had to attend to other duties
and if the orders were verbal they were not confirmed in writing
unless the A.D.C. (Capt. P.Simonson) did so.
If we could find out which unit led the bus column we
would know automatically to whom I handed the Instructions. I
suggest also asking Woolcock where and from whom he received his
orders to report to Cummings. If I wrote them I have no recollection
of it.
As regards the typed Instructions, I certainly wrote a
draft just after daylight at Couturelle. This draft may have been
for the move of the remainder of the Division or it may have been
the reproduced Instructions. I may have written both. While I
wrote the draft Instructions on 27/3/18 it may not have been
typed until next day and this would account for the date of typing
entered above the Instructions. The reason for the reproduction
is that other people would require to know what was happening &

I was about to return to Montigny with my copy. Further, the original

was written under adverse conditions and the copy would not be very
brilliant. In drafting the reproduction I suppose I added a few
frills etc, but on no account would I alter or vary the orders
given. On this draft would be based the order for the move of the
remainder of the Division.
I believe if I were close enough to Sydney to be able to
go and read the War Diary the whole story would unfold in my mind. As
I was a somewhat prolific writer in the Diary I feel keenly that I
did not cover this part of the ground thoroughly. I was easily the
hardest worked man in the Division at the time and any omission is
excusable, I think. What I cannot understand is where my message
book copy of the Instructions has gone" I would give a lot to see
it. If I remember rightly its first sentence dealt with the fact
that no 1/40000 maps were available - this comes lower down in the
reproduction.
I am sorry I cannot be more exact in chasing  the Woolcock
"hare" but as I have ^no war papers of any kind I am forced to rely
entirely upon memory. The flesh is very willing but 15 years is a
long time. I would like to help in every possible way.
Thanks for good wishes which are fully reciprocated,

Yours sincerely,

Leo J Wieck

42 Bn Col. Woolcock.

Dunbar ws w Woolcock

through - was to get orders from Bdr

in Heilly. Marched down there &,

abt 7.am., saw Cummings in [bar?] (paring

his nails). Cummings told him by

map that he ws to take up

whole front - March to Somme.

W. asked if there were time for

breakfast. C. said no - it ws urgent.

(But the men had been told by W. to

get what they could - and had got some

bully-beef.)

(Woolcott didnt see Wieck

during the night,

but he had been with Cannan

when the order to change enbus came up)

Woolcott didnt get on with

Cummings & told him he wished his

own bdr were there; & he left &

went down to the square & showed

his offrs the map.

Cannan. Pyke was with Wieck in when Cannan

received Monash's order. They didn't give

C. a copy but read it to him as the Bde was

enbussing.

Woolcock was

Cannan was impressed with the

appearance of the peol  men after they had seen

the people of Framvillers & Heilly fleeing.

They were sitting by the road in Heilly

cleaning their rifles & L.Gs. with determined

faces - ^They knew what they were there for-They were not going to chance 
the Gr. coming thro: Cannan wanted

to rel. Cummings for a at once as he thought

its morale wd not be good for his own men.

 

(Advent of 3rd Div to Somme - Chap V).

Cannan & Vasey were on foot when

they reconnd the W French line - they

were not sure the line ws there &

Cummings was vague about it. It might

not have been there, & so they had

to be cautious in putting in the bde. Long

distance shots were reaching the trenches

when they were there.

3 Div.  TREVXWI. Mar 27-8. 1918

According to history of 35 Div

 

17th & 18th Lancs Div and

and 19th D.L.I. belonged to the 104 Inf Bde of the

35 Divn.  Brig Gen. J.W. Sandilands

commanded 104 Bde.

Jan.-Mar., 1916] REORGANISATION OF THE A.I.F.    485

 

first force during the corresponding season of the previous

year, is not to be found in any single factor but in the systematic

supervision now exercised over all measures for

controlling transmissible disease. The camps were spaced

out, the troops well fed, and not overcrowded; fly infection

was minimised, cleanliness of person promoted. It is,

however, probable that, while these direct measures played

their part, the most important factor was the provision made

for stamping out foci of infection by prompt evacuation of

all cases, control of contacts, and search for carriers. A

bacteriological laboratory, arranged in a railway carriage by

the D.M.S., M.E.F., was the forerunner of even more mobile

methods of ensuring prompt diagnosis, a task in which the

Australian medical service became very directly concerned. 20

From January onwards routine bacteriological work for the

A.I.F. was carried out under the direction of the senior

bacteriologist, A.I.F. ²¹

 

As regards inspiratory infections, the place taken in

1914-15 by pneumonia was now largely occupied by cerebrospinal

[Changes in disease picture]

fever, carriers and contacts^ being for/of infection

the most part brought by transports from

camps in Australia. Mumps took the place

of measles. Gastro-intestinal infections were

not conspicuous, though enteric was much more prevalent than

in the preceding year. The incidence of ^the endemic insect-/menace from borne diseases of Egypt was the subject of strict appropriate

procedures and the results were satisfactory. Stringent

orders were issued regarding bilharzia²² and relapsing fever.

The force was effectively protected against small-pox.

Ophthalmia did not become prevalent.

Of all diseases occurring in camps, with the possible

exception of mumps, venereal infections were again the most

[Venereal disease] difficult to prevent, the most troublesome to

treat, and the most productive of absence

-----------------------------------------

637    20 "See p. 485.

²¹ Lieut.-.Col.A.H. Tebbutt, and later Lieut.-Col. C.J.Martin. Hitherto the

great bulk of the work was carried out in the Cairo Central Laboratory 
under Dr.C.Todd, to whom the Australian medical service was greatly indebted. The 
Australian Dermatological Hospital (see p.519) was self-contained in respect of 
laboratory investigation.

 

²² Though bathing in the Nile waters was prohibited, a number of cases that 
remained infective in Australia till the advent in 1919 of treatment by antimony 
tartrate were contracted from the infested "sweet-water canal" at Tel el Kebir, 
chiefly when the troops were watering horses.

Extract from

3rd Div. Order No. 62    27/3/18

 

The 35 Divn having reported their troops

pushed forward in Wood in Square J 11G

east of Mericourt l'abbe, the 10th Aust Inf bde

will make necessary arrgts to get in touch & if

practicable incorporate the ground held by

these troops in their line.

486  THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN [Jan.-Apr., 1916

 

from duty ²³. The number of cases constantly under treatment

in the Abbassia Detention Barracks rose from183 in

October to 607 in January, 1,187 in February, and 1,493

in March. ^The average period spent the period of stay in hospital being thirty-five 
days, these figures represent approximately the number 

admitted monthly. By far the greater proportion of them

were from the training depot. In these diseases, contagion

being from without, isolation of cases and carriers could

not affect their incidence. Of the means taken to abate

the violence of attraction toward sources of infection -

such as moral suasion, counter-attractions, fear, and stoppage

of pay - the only one fully effective was distance from the 

sphere of influence source of infection. ²⁴  In the middle of March the D.M.S., 
A.I.F., found himself compelled to inform the corps commander

that drastic steps must be taken to deal with the

situation, "over 2,000 cases" being then under treatment.

Leave from the Canal to Cairo was stopped, and the training

depot was moved to Tel el Kebir. These steps resulted in

the number dropping in April to 914.

 

At the end of January the improvised unit which had in

October replaced the scratch staff that at first supervised the

self-treatment of these cases was itself replaced by a fully-

equipped and well-staffed scientific technical unit. The

"Australian Dermatological Hospital" took up duty at the

end of January, the two senior officers being sent on to

Europe to study the methods in vogue. Hereafter venereal

disease was treated with the same scientific accuracy as any

other, and, except for the "moral" stigma, and military

stoppage of pay as punishment for wilfully contracted disease,

was on the same plane as scabies or scarlatina.

The most important medical procedure in preparation for

the move to  France was a complete compulsory inoculation

-----------------------------------------------------------

²³ During the year which ended in February, 1916, beginning with the concentration 
of all Australian cases in the isolation hospital at the old Detention Barracks, 
Abbassia, 8,858 cases were treated there, of whom 5,924 were Australian, 1,979 
British, and 955 New Zealand, the average stay in hospital (taking all types of

case) being 35 days. Of these 1,344 were returned to Australia. The incidence 
per 1,000 of troops can be seen in graph No. 5, at p. 466.

 

²⁴ The Australian Y.M.C.A. and the Australian branch of the B.R.C.S. co-operated in running soldiers' clubs, etc., in Cairo, Alexandria, and elsewhere. Meanwhile 
an organised system of personal prophylaxis was developed by the medical service for the careless or uncontrollable.

27 March 1918.

 

10 Bde to RWI (38 Bn)

                   RWG (37 Bn) for information.

No. MN132 (untimed - but MN133 was handed in at 10Bde signal

office at 11.40pm)

The 35 Div have reported their troops pushed forward in wood

in J 11 G east of Mericourt l'Abbe. Please send out

patrols at one to discover whether this is so or not and

report result to this office. If the fact is as stated

You will at once get into touch with the troops now there

and if practicable incorporate the ground held by them in

your line. Report to be made to these HQ when ground

is taken over or if not taken over reasons for not

doing so. The 39 Bn is relieving 33 Bn tonight.

528   THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN    [1915

 

continuous rains converted the surface into a tenacious mud.

The tents were unfloored; mess huts and drying huts

were lacking. Inspiratory infection, which even in the

summer had caused the prevailing diseases, assumed a

prevalence that gave rise to anxiety. The troops were

transferred to Seymour pending the reconstruction of the

Broadmeadows Camp, but any benefit that might have

resulted from the transfer was frustrated by the rush of

recruits. Seymour Camp became greatly overcrowded, and,

in spite of improved hospital accommodation, deaths from

pneumonia (idiopathic or associated with influenza or

measles) became frequent.

 

A disease curiously similar to pneumonia in its epidemiological

features, and with even greater lethal potentialities,

now appeared. Since 1910 cerebro-spinal

[Cerebro-spinal fever]

meningitis-part of a world wave of this

disease¹⁹ - had been increasing in the civil

community. At the time under review the carrier incidence

was beyond doubt very great²⁰. The circumstances in the

camps, particularly in the southern States, provided precisely

the conditions welcomed by the neisseria meningitidis. A

few cases occurred at Broadmeadows in May. Among

the 15,000 troops at Seymour the outbreak assumed almost

epidemic proportions. The disease appeared to a lesser

degree in all the other States and, with measles, was a

contributory cause of the abatement of recruiting and of

the corresponding decrease in enlistments that took place

during the last three months of the year.

 

As elsewhere, preventive measures pursued the inspiratory

epidemic instead of forestalling it. In August the Principal

Medical Officer of the 3rd Military District asked for

increased tent space at Seymour. The Director-General

thought it "not so much the number of men in the tent as

the amount of fresh air" that mattered, but agreed that

"the numbers should be reduced as much as possible."

---------------------------------------------------------------

19 The prevalence of this disease in Canadian camps in England in 1914-15 
will be recalled.

 

20 Precise data are not available. The detailed bionomics of this disease have 
to a great extent been worked out during or since the war.

37 Bn to 10 Bde.

2.20 a.m.  28/3/18

No. EDW/08 in reply to MN 132.

 

My patrols searched the wood got touch with 35 Divn

and are in position on the East. This happened before your

message above quoted (MN132) was received. RWI has been

informed & my patrols will hold the ground until RWI takes

over the position. Am advancing my line to conform with

RWI line & will report result when established.

             ---------------------------------------

10 Bde reported this to 3 Div. at 4 a.m.