Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/135/1 - 1915 - 1916 - Part 7

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Awaiting approval
Accession number:
RCDIG1066634
Difficulty:
5

Page 1 / 10

71 were Cie lef faodd The bes1 ch to TN5 did this Fenn 2tt Fet 2278116 Exp. of 1corps be useall Mgs of brought up over undera heary herrige Taegt weight off fan cerione 60 again proved& D unde disadvantag Fen conditions Even very it to dismounte ap difficult to diag 12 ground heavy sledge over all regenate is under fire are unaninous in recommend lightes the introducte if a modelle come of can carriage on t oft inprovine fy cariage used by the in marksman sesttions mst Te hand na por both autir portand
72 943 attack o difence in t t uneversally penadessh sapply of hand inceased. If it is possible be enmuun a of sappt of different knos hand grenades, the gen opinion of Bal. a in favour of the use gvenader for attack 2fectin their small despite preferece to cytendsical grenader handles as a Carger with former can &e suppe of two but into action taten fade a expndnanl as the 1/ handle is on whole Der it as reco effecting anwe c to his fattern at be adopled 189 had Ferman conces for rifles
Stw 78 One field arty reft recommend the adopte of the new pattern sword bayonat with saw Edge, wh has alread by experimentely adopted for maunte troops. Chnlomatio vifles (Musteaten are state to be useful weapons for trench waifare Jerman detraining points have to be 13 Kilometies back in order not to be shelled. At beginning of battle Bapanne came under fore & tran clonly be run there during night (our acroplanis have bomber trains near Cille o then snot at the mch running away from them), 8 says t Dugant; comon of entangtements - sho be built in important switch tines Etc even before
directof enem bomb dropfing Aas 75 wh a itself the ering Easly & quiately day. In same way, we batteries put down your common 2 & cables etc first Renners advised in relay of not more than 100 wetes. The casuallies were comparative slight it is avoiable to wereless stations std be alotted to slafts of wfantry Repts & Bnd Light signals used but not ens of them The common betw the pont live &f the arty for the direction of barrage fire ws enterely confined to light - pistol 5ignals Tenumerical seperioutyof evemy's airmen & also I fact to thei were ocder, were made dis¬ ackly acreeabl apperent& as parties an te
Capt up 2612 right of 26th std have rest on thear. As it ws 26th crowding r whw boken down & unpois 2514 was, unable to move out into posity his we before arty opened Hetcher was hit bringin A boy dig Tumping off.2. shot in knes. Bn Aug 4/1 Alec Lt. Stewart ws with D coy in port. Healy & Cpt Boys with A Coy just bethind (. Boys had bin away & Healy ws brought fom D Co to Cele over. Boys we sent for just before attack). BStelle we in c of 13 coc o Lt Cornes Men were sitting on bottom Poydnen of waiting for arity when tiue and for artz Mr Stewart, Healy & Boys decide to se take men over the side of trench to the N. Stewart pmped out last Healy saw of him. There as a lot of
78 shalling artiller on the ground & the formation under the cirss. ws naturally toon. Sot into O.J. 1. & as very much knocked abt. Here were a few dead about Harbs bombin duy orts straight avay. There wa some hand t hand fighty ferme as my came out of dujonts. some shooting, but mostly bombi Where H. was here were 2 deep dug outs t one of these the inside practically collopser wit two or three Mills bombs. It was impossible todie this out during the night tho' the reached the bottom of stairs. The other as casel
79 prepared for an aid post. There were 5 dead german on the stairs & one badly wd man lying atterneds i our own wd at the bollom. One Officer ar bayonited here. probe at entrance of day out. Hral had to remain in & holdi Sapt Boys of to C 9. 15 on t O.P.E. & st & end waves took O.J. 3d &4th wenbon to PJ.2. went on prac without stoppin Capt. Boys ws shot in the head & died fwods. - not clear where hews shot I. sonie (C. Oy) ws in Op.1 & as wd - stayed as long as he
Fump Day Attack C. altack 45934 morning of 81 for some hours) cd directing operations. Hewitit on the hand . here wos no officer lp on the Bn in OJ. 2 - mess age got back somehow & Lt Holdgen tsend Fausport ofor ws send up as an emergency He of hit by a m.g. in He arm - probl in the Early Lours. N found tey were short of everything a O.J. sandbags, 5.60, loots itc. They were senbap but it of the afternoon before ty got there. The ferms bombarded Of. heavily bot during night & day. Abt Spm on Sudy a
7 pnsovers were sent back fom Abt ndugonto etc. 82 6.9.1 4 the abt daybrect on Enee O attacked. Thes 4 as wo t ou fla of new observing seels this Ed hear repoti then m 9s Lernians Co H secmes to beI con from wondwill 4 25 on et of way wosth coners thero were abt 200 pr taken - no ancertain Seriously did not tike the Thinking here might be sooe till in shle hole Sergt Harrison (now 2/14H. 4 5 may want out coit arecomsac but foung in post of their sector none 2 il went 65 all day D.RS Seavaty shelle to shellswere all round the dugouts all day e a lot of work as but ara done before light
Pa 83 again by knocker in feam P.M Thompson steff. wt there too afternoon hes I from honbling there tere Astoro ofice I Healy wiote (5] Capt Davie te w5 tt adt w to take going to Of.2 P.M. charge & leaveny Thompson in charge of 44 in Sector he lad only one runner & back O'Connell, got thow messages up to afteroon least of Sth. He went at once there & back 5 OF. H. went to ther togetter 23 & sot th then 26t were on on epofH. Capt. Boad ws

15     71
The front lines were left 
to T.Ms wh did this best.
----
Exp. of German IV corps in July. (Pub. 22/8/16)
M.g.s usually have to be
brought up over open ground
under a heavy barrage.
The gt weight o / gun has
again proved to be a serious
disadvantage under these
conditions. Even if / gun
is dismounted it is very
difficult to drag up /
heavy sledge over ground wh
is under fire. All regiments
are unanimous in recommending
the introduction of a lighter
form of gun carriage, modelled
on tt of / improvised gun
carriage used by the m.g.
marksman sections.
----
The hand grenade ws / most
important infantry weapon both

 

15      72
in attack & defence. It is
is universally suggested tt
/ supply of hand grenades shd
be increased. If it is possible
to ∧ensure a supply of different kinds of
hand grenades, the genl opinion
is in favour of the use of "Ball"
& "Egg" grenades for attack,
despite their small effect, in
preference to cylindrical grenades
with handles, as a larger
supply o / two former can be
taken into action; .... but
as the cylindrical grenade w
handle is on / whole / most
effective, it is recommended
tt this pattern shd be universally
adopted.
Germans had no ∧(cloth) breech
covers for rifles

 

15     73
"One field arty regt recommends
the adoptn of the new pattern
sword bayonet with saw
edge, wh has already
bn experimentally adopted for
mounted troops."
"Automatic rifles (Musketeer)
are stated to be useful weapons
for trench warfare"
----
German detraining points
have to be 13 kilometres back
in order not to be shelled.
At beginning of battle Bapaume
Stn came under fire & trains
cd only be run there during /
night.
(Our aeroplanes have bombed
trains near Lille & then shot at the
men running away from them).
It says tt Dugout; commn trenches; &
entanglements - shd be built in
important switch lines etc even before

 

74
directn o / enemys arty fire
& bomb dropping.

15       75
the firing trench wh is itself
easily & quickly dug.
In same way, w batteries
put down your commn trenches, xx∧O.Ps
& cables etc first
----
Runners advised in relays
of not more than 100 metres.
"The casualties were comparatively
slight."
---
"It is advisable tt wireless
stations shd be allotted to /
staffs of infantry Regts & Bns."
---
Light signals used but not eno'
of them.
----
"The commn betw the front
line & the arty for the directn
of barrage fire ws entirely
confined to light-pistol signals."
----
The numerical superiority o /
enemy's airmen & also / fact tt their
machines were better, were made 
disagreeably apparent to us particly in the

 

76
Diagram - see original scan
?right of 26th shd have
rested on T head.
As it ws 26th ws
crowding trench wh ws
broken down & unfinished
So 25th was unable
to move out into positn
(This ws just before arty
opened).
Capt Fletcher was hit bringing A Coy
up to dig "Jumping off" trench. Shot in knee.

15        77
25 Bn Aug 4/5
Lt. Alec Stewart ws with D coy
in front.
Healy & Capt Boys with A Coy
just behind (. Boys had bn
away & Healy ws brought
from "B" Co to take
over. Boys turn ws sent
for just before attack).
Lt Steele ws in c. of "B" coy.
Lt Corney  "   "   "       "C" -
----
Men were sitting on bottom
of Sydney St waiting for arty
when time arrd for arty
Mr Stewart, Healy & Boys
decided to go take men
over the side o / trench
to the N. Stewart jumped
out - last Healy saw of
him. There ws a lot of

 

15       78
artillery ∧shelling on the ground
& the formation under
the cirss. ws naturally loose.
Got into O.G.1;  H ws very
much knocked abt. There
were a few dead about.
Started bombing dug outs
straight away. There ws
some hand to hand fighting.
as they ∧Germs came out of dugouts - 
some shooting, but mostly
bombing.
Where H. was there were
2 deep dug outs. In one of
these the inside practically
collapsed with two or three
Mills bombs. It was
impossible to dig this out
during the night tho' they
reached the bottom o / 
stairs. The other ws easily

 

15      79
prepared for an aid post.
There were 5 dead German
on the stairs & one badly
wd man lying afterwds w our
own wd at the bottom. One
Officer ws bayoneted here -
probly at entrance of dug
out.
Healy had to remain in
O.G.1 ∧& hold it Capt Boys ws to
go on to O.G.2.
1st & 2nd waves took O.G.1
3rd & 4th went on to O.G.2. They
went on prac. without stopping.
[Capt. Boys ws shot in the
head & died of wds. - not
clear where he ws shot].
Cornie (C. Coy) ws in O.G.1 &
O.G.
ws wd - stayed as long as he

 

80
Dug Jumping off trench of 3/4.
Attack                                       4/5
C. attack morning of             5th.

15               81
cd ∧for some hours directing operations.
He ws hit on the hand. There ws
no officer left in the Bn
in OG. 2 - message got
back somehow & Lt Holsgen,
ws send transport offr., ws
sent up as an emergency.
He ws hit by a m.g. in
the arm - probly in the
early hours.
H. found they were short
of everything in O.G.1
- sandbags, s.bs., tools etc.
They were sent up but it
ws the afternoon before
they got there. The Germs.
bombarded O.G.1 heavily
both before during night & day.
Abt 5 p.m. on 5th Aug a

 

15       82
Abt 7 prisoners were sent back from
OG.1 from dugouts, etc.
Abt daybreak on 5th the
enemy c. attacked. This
ws mostly on flanks of
this sector. Men observing
reported them - Cd hear
m.gs going. They Germans
were seemed to be coming from windmill
way mostly. On rt of 25th
there were abt 200 prisoners
taken - no. uncertain - men
did not take this seriously.
Thinking there might be some ∧Germs still in shell holes
Sergt Harrison (now 2/Lt H.)
went out with H & made
a reconnaissance, but found
none ∧in front of their sector - went nearly to O.G.2.
All day O.G.1 heavily
shelled - the shells were
all round the dugouts all
day. The A lot of work ws
done before light - but ws

 

15    83
knocked in again by heavy
stuff. C.S.M Thompson ws
there too.
In afternoon hearing
from front line tt there ws
no officer there, H. was
Mr Healy wrote to Capt Davies
Adjt. where the tt he ws
going to O.G.2 to take
charge & leaving C.S.M.
Thompson in charge of 25th details
sector he had in O.G.1.
All run Only one runner
Pte O'Connell, got thro ∧& back w
messages up to afternoon
of 5th. He went at least
once there & back.
H. went up to O.G.2
& got the 25th there together.
26th were on their left.
Capt. Bond ws on left of H.

 
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