Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/249/1 - 1917 - 1932 - Part 8

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7.  Under such magnificent artillery and machine gun protection
as in this operation, neither ground nor opposition could prevent troops
reaching their objective.
ENEMY'S NEW DISPOSITIONS.
It was noticed that hostile artillery fire was very quiet the
night after the attack. On the 2lst. the RED LINE was subjected to
shelling all day.
ENEMY'S MORALE.
Low and was distinctly shaken by bombardment. Prisoners rushing
back without escort extremely glad of the chance to surrender.
The Commanding Officer wishes to place on record his deep
appreciation of the skillful and whole-hearted manner in which his
Company Commanders :-
Major            J. NEWMAN                "D" Company
Major       A.H. DARNELL                 "A" Company
Captain   G.G. Campbell                  "B" Company
Captain   W.R. HALLAHAN   M.C.   "C" Company
(O'Neil previously hit reconnoitering 2 days before)
and the remainder of his Officers carried out their various duties and
instructions.
The following addendi are attached:-
1.  List of Officers who took part in operation.
2.  Casualties sustained by Officers.
3.  Casualties sustained by other ranks.
4.  List of trophies captured.
G. Campbell
Lieutenant.
Adjutant, 11th. Battalion, A.I.F.
24/9/1917.

LIST OF OFFICERS TAKEN INTO OPERATION.
Lieut-Colonel  R A RAFFERTY    D.S.O.
Major                 J. NEWMAN
Major                 A H DARNELL
Captain             G G CAMPBELL
Captain             A S KEIGHLEY
Captain             W R HALLAHAN    M.C.
Captain             G F MASON
Lieut.                 J L  BARRY
Lieut                  ARCHIBALD J A
Lieut.                 L C COOKE    M.C.
Lieut                  C  PROUT
Lieut                  F R BEASLEY
Lieut                  F DALE
Lieut                  G CAMPBELL
Lieut                  P E M VOWLES
Lieut                  M E CLARKE
Lieut                  G W MATTHEWS
Lieut                  C O PIESSE
Lieut                  E S INMAN
Lieut                  E H SALTER
Lieut                  W D BROWN
2nd Lieut          W IRVING
2nd Lieut          W A KEELEY
Major                 G S ROBINSON    M.C.      Medical Officer.
Hon.Captain    G EGG                                  Quarter Master.        
Lieut.                  W C BELFORD                  Transport Officer.

LIST OF TROPHIES CAPTURED
1 - 77 mm Field Gun.
2 - Heavy Machine Guns.
2 - Light Machine Guns.
Prisoners Captured
150
 

Casualties sustained by Officers
KILLED
2nd Lieut.    E S FORDHAM      20/9/17.
WOUNDED
Captain      G F MASON             20/9/17
Lieut.          J L BARRY                20/9/17
Lieut.          J A ARCHIBALD      20/9/17
Lieut.          F DALE                      20/9/17
Lieut.          G W MATTHEWS    20/9/17
Lieut.          M E CLARKE            20/9/17  
Lieut.          C O PIESSE               21/9/17
Lieut          W D BROWN            20/9/17
Captain     J P O’NEILL   M.C.    16/9/17 )    Wounded whilst 
Lieut          H COLVIN                  16/9/17 )    reconnoitring Line

x Lieut       C G ROSS   M.C.        15/9/17 )    prior to Operations.

x Attached 3rd Aust. Infy Bgde. Hdqrs.

list of officers

Bleed-trough (reversed and upside down) of previous page - see original document

12^th Bⁿ A. I. F.
Report of operations near Polygon Wood 20/21 Sept 1917
The objective assigned to this unit for the attack on 20.9.17 was
the "Blue line", approximately the W. edge of POLYGON WOOD.
The Bⁿ moved into HALF WAY HOUSE on morning of 19^th
It was due to pass the starting point at 0130 on 20^th, but owing to
being blocked by 28^th Bⁿ, did not pass till 0205.
No trouble was experienced in finding the way to the forming
up place, or in placing them in position but it took a long while
for the men to get up owing to the marshy state of the ground. At
0410 all men were in position on the tapes.
On looking at the forming up place ∧later from the enemy's point of
view later it was seen that it was the crest sky-line of a rise &
the men were ∧evidently observed, as at about 0430 he placed a barrage on
& in rear of our front line. This continued till 0515 when it
ceased for a few minutes & then re-commenced & continued
with less intensity till our barrage started at 0540.
A considerable amount of confusion was caused by the
casualties & by men from the rear crowding forward to
miss the worst of the barrage.
At zero hour all 4 B^ns went over together & assisted in
the mopping up of GLENCORSE WOOD & NONNE BOSSCHEN.
While the 11^th Bⁿ was consolidating the Red line, the 12^th
Bⁿ was reorganised & moved forward to the Blue line.
On arrival at the edge of the POLYGON wood it was found that the
tree stumps made digging very difficult so a line was started
about just in the wood on the right running back to 50 yds. in
rear on the left. This was much broken & by connecting
shell holes quite a good trench was dug by 10.30

This was improved all the time during the whole time the
Bⁿ was in the line & by the evening of 21^st was a well
constructed line. The 10^th Bⁿ rendered a lot of help, & as they had too many men for 

their front line, eventually look over about 80 yds. of the 2nd objective
which It became too crowded after our mopping up Coy. came into the line.
Strong points were constructed at the corners of the wood at
J9 C8.2 & J9 A5.3  Each had a concrete pill-box as H.Q.
Enemy movement was observed near the Mound J10 A7.8 &
in JETTY WOOD J10 A & B but artillery fire was directed onto these
& no further sign of the enemy was seen.
The relief ∧by 1^st & 2^nd B^ns  passed off without casualties. It was late owing
to lateness of orders being received. Provided the way is well
known so that there is no chance of guides being lost I am of
opinion that the middle of the night is a good time for relief,
there being little shelling as a rule between 11 pm & 3 am.
The barrage standing in front of an objective was not
needed in this case by the Bⁿ consolidating, but it gave the
Bⁿ attacking the next objective an opportunity for reorganization.
Two hours in front of the 2^nd objective was ∧found to be too long. in this case 

Liaison between the various B^ns was good. We continually
received messages from our officers with flanking units, & their
officers sent back progress reports from our H.Q. Touch was well
kept & there was no need for assistance being given in any case.
Telephonic &c
The enemy's morale was low. In no case was fire from
M.G's or rifles brought to bear on our men. About 20 men & 3
M.G's were captured in one strong post. In one pill-box the
officers had not ventured outside to use latrines, but used a tin
in the passage outside.
The enemy appeared to have fixed barrages lines & by
observation of these, casualties could be were avoided.
The task of carrying from HALF WAY HOUSE & HOOGE proved almost
too much for the Coys. detailed for this duty, in view of the marshy
state of the ground to be traversed.
Rations &c

The Bⁿ H.Q. for the 1^st & 2^nd objectives at least should be near
their Coys. Many more messages are sent between Bⁿ H.Q. & Coys.
than between Bⁿ H.Q. & B^de H.Q. & a great saving of time is effected,
as well as saving the runners.
Telephonic communication with B^de Forward Report Centre was
well maintained on the whole.
Rations & water were got thro' to the front line without difficulty.
18 tins of water were handed over in the front line on relief.
2 Lewis guns were lost owing to casualties in the gun
teams & 3 were damaged by shell fire.
13 enemy machine guns were captured.  8 are now in
our possession,  3 were left mounted in the front line,  1 was
handed to 2^nd M.G. Coy. &  1 lost near Hooge, owing to the men
carr^ying it out being both wounded.
No record was kept of prisoners captured - probably about 40.
Total casualties: I officer killed, 1 missing, 4 wounded, 

Report on Operations of 20^th/21^st Sept
A Coy. 12^th Bⁿ
Assembly.
The Coy moved into position without incident
and the guiding tape was of greatest assistance
but had it been necessary to wear gas helmets
it would have been extremely difficult to move
from CHATEAU WOOD forward, owing to the absence
of tracks. Guiding tapes leading forward, with
a noticeboard to indicate their unit to use them
would have been necessary.
There was a lot of low whistling, evidently
for communication as 11^th Bⁿ moved into position
It would have been audible to enemy scouts.
Men did not take cover, even when on a
sky-line when flares went up, and they
were evidently seen by the enemy.
Advance to the Red Line
On the right of the BaOp^ns Bde sector all
units were mixed up and there was little

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control, consequent on the enemy's shelling and
the rough nature of the ground. A strong
p concrete post which resisted in NONNEBOSCHEN
WOOD was quickly surrounded and rushed, but the
three waves of the attack were so close to one another—
really in one mass, that the post inflicted undue
casualties on us with M.G. fire.
Advance to BLUE Line.
'A' Coy was quickly reorganised while tt waiting
to advance from the RED line and followed
close to the fo barrage, meeting no opposition except
a little M.G. fire from BLACK WATCH CORNER. Our
information concerning the position proved very
correct and there was little trouble in keeping
direction. The BLUE objective was rushed as soon
as the barrage passed it and the only strong post
there either did not have sufficient time or even the
men were too much demoralised by our shell fire,
to resist. They surrendered with two M. Guns complete.
Advance to GREEN line.
The protective barrage in front of the BLUE line
seemed of unnecessarily long duration. 9^th and 10^th
Battns. evidently advanced to their objective without
incident.