Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/249/1 - 1917 - 1932 - Part 7










were lying round about the farm.
I am glad to think that my little tit-bit
of information has not arrived too late, & I
hope the Sergeants' name may be available
in time.
Yours Sincerely
Kenneth H McConnel.
Historical Notes.
Sept 20. 1917 Ypres.
6Bn & 1st Bn.
(Inv. Copies?)
↓
Post script & 4 or 5 am
X Bn10 ( left here till xx 11 w.yks
shd come up).
Lt R Green 1 Bn.
( 1Bn Post two from
Germans
a short time before.)
W concrete dugout.
1Bn withdraw
when 6 Bn arrived.
Post Sergt & 4 or 5 men
X 10Bn. (left here till yes 11 W.Yks
shd come up).
Serg. O→. ←O 5 [[?]]
This was Green's plan
but as the gun wdnt
work they all threw
their bombs together
& rushed the place,
Green leading.11 w Yorks(were not up.
----------------------------
Tapes. 6 Bn 11 W.Yorks (didnt leave here till Zero)
2 Bde got onto tapes at 1 a.m. & moved up to
forwd post abt 3 or 4 a.m.
11 W.Yks didnt go forwd at same time, so
post of 1 Bn remained were to remain at x till the 11. W Yks
came up.
Zero ws to be 5.40 am. Germs came down as
shown abt 5.20 am with flammenwerfer.
& got it; they set up a mg where marked [symbol]
in right rear of 6th. The Sergt of 1 Bn reported
to Lt Green. His men some of them were burnt but cd all
walk. Green had obviously to act instantly. The m.g. cd not be left there. He took the Sergt (who
sd there ws a L.G. in the post) and some bombs continuing to attack with L.G. & bombs.c.d all is able. G. with the Sergt of 1 Bn & f/cpl
L/Cpl Knight & Green were to throw our bombs from either flank & Lewis Gun to shoot from centre
& there they wd rush the post.
L/Cpl Knight of 6th (in/c of bombers of G's platoon) went
along to where the post was & found that the 1 Bns
2
L.G., which had been left in the post, was
out of action (covered in mud - it ws
raining). The Gs were not in the post but
about 15x to rt rear with m.g. G's party could The Germans were
firing occasional short bursts. Gs party
bombed them from the post & then went
over. The Germans appeared all to have
been k - lying around their m.g.
It was then 2 mins to zero - So
G. & pty left the m.g. & came back to his
pln. The German m.g. wd have caught
the 6th in the right rear & the W. Yks
(who were not yet up). G. got back
just before Zero.
Green did not see the flammenwerfer, but
the Sergeant reported that a fl.wfr attack
had been made. The officer of the 1st Bn
was still up in Green's post when the f.w.
attack happened & reported it to G. & left
it to G. to retake it.
Green is certain the shell that hit him
came from the Gs. There had been a fight for
a concrete dugout, & it had been captured
before Green was hit. The dugout was on
the 6 Bn's objective ^ The G. offr in c/ was captured. They were not then in
touch with the 11 W. Yks tho' 3 men of W Yks came in.
Lt Joynt and Menin Rd
Battle. 20/9/17 [*H/N*]
shortly after the attack
started Joynt came on
an obstruction on the rt.
Here, just over the edge
of a hill he found a
member of the 7th held up by
a two-storied pillbox. They
were in a ^wide circle round it,
& fire was coming both from the
upper & lower stories. Some
were out in the circle shooting
at the slit loophole of the
upper storey - he saw one
man close below it firing
calmly standing & firing up
at the slit until a shot got him
& he fell over backwards
like a man in a war-picture.
Then there appeared from the lower
storey a ^white flag which was
waved to & fro. (probably a
handkerchief). The Australians
stopped shooting and began were taking
it easy when a shot was
fired from the upper storey
killing a man. The Germans
in the upper storey wd not
know tt those below had
surrendered, but the Australians
were too hot to realise this.Every As the Germans began to
emerge from the lower
chamber they were bayoneted
by the men around them. One
Australian who tried to
bayonet a man found he had
no bayonet on his rifle, &
proceeded to fix his
bayonet with the wretched
German standing in front of
him imploring for mercy
& then killed the man.
[These horrid deeds, in the
heat of action, against
defenceless men were a
feature of the fighting at
Ypres - where the resistance
of Germans in blockhouses
up to a late point in the
advance upon them raised
the temper of the men & caused
them to show little mercy
to the first men who emerged.
"I wouldn't care to be the
first poor b— to come out
of a pillbox," said one man
to me, half-laughing, half
recognising the unfairness
of it - the first few were
generally bayoneted.]
Joynt told me that (as
I always knew) the bayonet
was immensely overrated as
a weapon of heroic combat.
His "own" "bayonet charge" was
widely misreported & he
promised to tell me the
truth of it.
Note
General Rosenthals private diary
is in Mitchell Library
—————
M.D. Healy 25 Bn k at
Zonnebeke 25 Sept ws
brother of W.P.H. k. at Flers,
& ^had got him tfd from 17 Bn.
—————
See Jungers book
11TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BATTALION.
Narrative of Operations from 17/9/1917 to 21/9/1917.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Reference Sheet 28 1/40,000.
On the evening of 16th September 1917 the Battalion
bivouaced at CHATEAU SEGARD. Under orders the Battalion moved out
at 10 a.m. on 17/9/1917 to HALFWAY HOUSE. The journey was
completed without incident by 1 p.m. via SHRAPNEL CORNER and
WARRINGTON ROAD. At HALFWAY HOUSE the Battalion came under orders
of the 1st Australian Infantry Brigade and immediately on arrival
was ordered to furnish a Carrying Party of 10 Officers and 300 Other
Ranks to carry ammunition from HOOGE Dump - J.11.B.2.6. - to CLAPHAM
JUNCTION - J.13.D.9.8. Further Carrying Parties were furnished of
20 and 10 men to carry from SHRAPNEL CORNER and HOOGE to HALFWAY
HOUSE. We also supplied duties to the extent of 41 Other Ranks
for the maintenance of 1st Brigade Headquarters, DORMY HOUSE, RIDGE
HOUSE and Control Posts. The casualties sustained by Carrying
Parties during their duties were 5 Other Ranks wounded. Casualties
sustained by Battalion whilst in occupation of HALFWAY HOUSE were 4
killed and 7 Other Ranks wounded by shellfire.
Under orders the Battalion less "C" Co. moved up at 11.30 p.m.
on 18/9/17 in the following order:- Hdqrs., "D", "A" & "B" Co's.
"A" & "D" Co's occupying Front Line (JARGON TRENCH) from J.14.A.6.6.
to end of trench on left. "B" Co. in Tunnel at CLAPHAM JUNCTION,
Battalion Hdqrs. being in the same place. "C" Co. remained at
HALFWAY HOUSE as Carrying party.
During the 19th the Front Line was subjected to intermittent
shellfire. CLAPHAM JUNCTION was subjected to continuous heavy
shellfire all day. At 8 p.m. on 19/9/17 "B" Co. moved into LONDON
TRENCH - just in rear of Front Line.
At 9.40 p.m. the Tape, representing Jumping Off Trench, was
reported laid ^by Capt Keighley and orders were issued to Companies to move to Jumping
Off Tape Line and Carrying Company, "C", was ordered to move into
-2-
position. This operation was carried out successfully and
Battalion was in position for attack at 3 a.m. in the following
manner:-
"A" Co. on Right. "D" Co. on Left. forming
First and Second Waves in two lines of skirmishers, two lines of
sections in single file.
"B" Co. (Mopping Up Co.) was drawn up behind "A" & "D" Co's in
lines of sections in file and formed Third Wave.
"C" Co. (Carrying Co.) was in position with full loads behind
"B" Co.
About 3.50 a.m. the enemy apparently observing the movement of
troops in rear opened a bombardment on Front Line trench and 100
yards in front of trench in the area occupied by the Battalion
lying out in position. This shelling was continuous and heavy
and lasted until our barrage opened at 5.40 a.m. It was during
this period that the Battalion suffered most of its casualties
which were not heavy owing to the fact that men were able to take
cover in the numerous shell-holes. At 5.40 a.m. our barrage came
down terrific, accurate and heavy. The Battalion then moved up
to within 30 yards of barrage and as it moved forward all ranks
followed it with commendable coolness and decision. It was
noticed that the control and discipline was admirable. On the
right a small Strong Post and three (3) machine gun positions were
captured in rapid succession by leading platoons ofxthe Right Co,
who then pushed forward and encountered a very strongly held Strong
Post in deep sunken road at J.14.b.15.85. This was promptly
attacked by Right Co. and Mopping Up Co. A machine gun mounted
on tripod placed on top of concrete structure momentarily checked
the advance. Corpl. HODGE, of "B" Co., on his own initiative
dashed forward alone, shot the gunner, and overturned gun, enabling
the whole line to rush the position and capture it. Some 40
prisoners were sent back from this point, the remainder of garrison -
which was at least 100 - were killed and wounded.
-2-
was ordered to move into position.
-3-
The German Officer in command of this post surrendered to Lt. VOWELS
of this Battalion. The Right Company then advanced to its objective,
leaving the Mopping Up Company to clean up the dugouts etc. This work
was completed and Strong Post garrisoned by Mopping Up Company and at
5.55 a.m. From this point Right Company moved to its objective,
capturing 2 machine gun positions on its way and reached RED Line at
6.5 a.m. The Company was immediately re-organised, consolidation
started, touch established with "D" Company on left and a patrol sent
out to get in touch with 6th. Battalion on right. Two platoons of
Mopping Up Company proceeded to Strong Point mopping up on the way
and joined Right Company in RED LINE. The whole of the ground
traversed was extremely difficult wire, undergrowth, fallen trees
and ground pitted with shell holes had to be crossed.
The Left Company advanced under the protection of the barrage
until the RED LINE was reached. Slight opposition was met at several
concrete blockhouses. ^2/Lt Fordham ws shot at entrance of one of these Nome [[Bosschau?]]
blockhouses . The company advanced over difficult ground
(series of shell holes and marshy ground). The blockhouses in this
sector were promptly mopped up by 2 platoons of Mopping Up Company.
On reaching the first objective some slight difficulty was experienced
by Left Company in checking their men from going past objective
owing to pressure of other troops behind. The Left Company promptly
commenced consolidation and established touch on both flanks.
"C" Company moved up from HALFWAY HOUSE at 9.30 p.m. on 19th.
through CHATEAU WOOD on the GLENCORSE track. The ground was very
boggy owing to the heavy rain which fell in the evening and enemy
were shelling CHATEAU WOOD with Gas shells as Company pass through.
Company was formed up at Jumping Off Tape in rear of other companies
at 3.0 a.m. On the barrage lifting the Company moved with others
to the first objective. On reaching RED LINE dump was promptly
established. Consolidation was carried on until barrage lifted and
BLUE and GREEN LINE troops moved to their objectives, company was then
re-organised and various parties told off, returning to dumps Nos.
1 and 2 and continued carrying to forward dump until, owing to heavy
-4-
shelling and bad tracks the supplies at dumps Nos. 1 and 2 were
discontinued. A dump was made at CLAPHAM JUNCTION and material
was brought forward from there by Carrying Company during remainder
of operation. The supply at dumps on Red Line was so well maintained
that at no time did the forward Carrying Parties have to wait for
material.
During the counter-attack on night of 20th. it was reported that
there was a shortage of S.A.A. in the GREEN LINE. A party was
immediately sent forward carrying S.A.A., bombs, and wire, to the
GREEN LINE. On arrival there it was found that the stock of material
already there was ample for requirements.
CONSOLIDATION.
This was carried out quickly and satisfactorily, the tools
carried forward by the Attackers proving of great value.
COUNTER-Attacks.
Two counter-attacks, one on 20th- and one on 21st. were smashed
by artillery fire before they could develop. The S.O.S. signals
being answered very promptly by artillery.
RELIEF.
The relief of Battalion by 1st. Battalion was commenced at
9.30 p.m. and completed at 12.10 a.m. without incident. The
Battalion marched out to DICKEBUSCH AREA. The relief was carried
out in a very satisfactory manner.
LESSONS LEARNED.
It is necessary to have at least 1 Officer per platoon in
the initial stages of an operation, as the work of consolidation and
re-organisation is hampered by lack of control.
2. Smoke shells in this instance were ineffective because of
smoke caused by barrage.
3. Badly shelled areas, although difficult to pass over
localise the effect of bursting shells.
4. It pays to send the men over lightly equipped.
5. Pigeons might be used more in the initial stages as a means
of communication.
6. Tommy Cookers would be of great advantage and comfort to
the men.

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