Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/249/1 - 1917 - 1932 - Part 6

by British troops.  Each week a British Battn generally

giving a working strength of 400 men was attached 

to the Aust. Corps troops doing most of the work of

supplying the material.  Five such Bns. were assisted

some of them especially a Royal Welsh Fusilers Bⁿ bring

very keen and doing good work.

The value of the plank roads from Westhoek was at

once shown, as soon as it had crossed the [[Hauvellak?]]

the positions were occupied by Field Guns and a

regular ammunition supply commenced, the mules

being brought along the road with their panniers of shells.

If could not be avoided but the extra labor involved

on the Pioneers by large strings of mules using the

construction work before the planking was laid was

considerable.

After the last advance to Broodseinde Ridge the

road was pushed past Anzac House over Tokio Ridge

until it reached the outskirts of Zonnebeke and

was turned northward to meet the Ypres-Zonnebeke

main road.

The construction of the section of the Ypres-Zonnebeke road

from Frezenberg to St. Josephs Convent was without

question the most strenuous portion of the whole

work. It was mainly done by the 1^st Aust. Pioneers

under Lt. Col Henderson.  At Under plain observation 

from Paschendaele it was subject to severe fire

at any time and as often as some progress was

made it was again broken up, but gradually

the work progressed until to the good satisfaction 

of the constructing parties it was possible to get

vehicles right round the circuit from Menin gate

at Ypres via Hooge & Westhoek back to Menin 

Gate via Frezenberg.

The work of making the planking a double width

road from Birr x Roads to Westhoek was then taken,

in hand and completed first prior to the withdrawal

of the Australian Corps.

It can be understood that a plank road so easily

damaged by shell fire was not left untouched

and almost as remarkable as their construction by

The Australian troops was their maintenance by

the Army Service Corp attached to the Australian

Corps.

Three Army troops Companys in addition to much

other work with the assistance of labor Bns. maintained

the roads throughout excepting one or two occasions

when exceptional damage had been done.

On occasions as many as  60 shell bursts occurred

right in the road in a day but the patrolling

and organization was so complete that for no

period over two hours either night or day was

traffic held up except on twice when practically

craters had been made by heavy shell hitting

it. The Army Troops Companies were exceptionally

efficient and this was reorganized by Aust. H.Q.

later forming the 1^st Aust. Army Troops C^o is an

addition to the Field Engineers.

Two especially fine pieces of work were done

in the way of maintaining communications during

actions.  A length of sixty feet of plank road was

destroyed and three considerable craters formed

in a marshy place near Idiot Corner, a party

of the 1^st Australian Tunnelling Coy made the whole

of the blown out ground secure and relaid the

planking in under four hours under difficult

shelling circumstances .

The other instance was that a shell hit a brick bridge

on the Zellebeke road destroying one parapet and

smashing down portion of the arch. The 14^th British

Army Troops Coy stayed up the bridge and made

good the roadway in three hours, the enemy fire

bring sufficiently heavy to cause several casualties 

during the work.

The total length of actual planking laid was

10¼ miles at an average speed of 330 yards

per day.  The length of metal road remade and

maintained was approx. 10 miles, the work

done by the labor battalions being excellent and

 

the steadiness of these officially useful for fighting

service troops working in a frequently shelled

areas especially along the Menin Road was equal

to anything done by other troops.

The fastest piece of work was a special plank

road constructed south of Hooge Crater to enable

a number of 9" guns to be placed in position.

Orders were given for its construction at 9 p.m.

and by 8 p.m. the next evening 700 yards

were completed, the work being done by the

1^st Aust Pioneers 1^st Aust Tunnelling C^o and 1^st Canadian

Tunnelling C^o each completing its allotted section

much under the time allowed.

As an emergency work it was probably the very

fastest effort made at the war.

Two officers who contributed much to the

general success of this road construction were

Capt. W. M^cClean attached to the Aust Corps from

the British R.E. an officer of high standing as a

civil engineer who on at least two occasions

showed considerable gallantry and Lt. Dentrey

of the 1st Aust. Pioneer Bn.

DENTREY who acted as Field Engineer to the CRE Corps

Troops. McLean made from xxxxxx who was in charge of the bulk of the work. Lt. Dentrys work was exceptional and

he was killed while making the last inspection

of the Westhoek - Zonnebeke Road the morning that

work was completed.

 

41 Wallary Road

Woollahra

July 11^th 1932

 

Dear Sir,

I am writing to you to bring to your

notice a point of interest, in connection with the 3^rd

battle of Ypres, which I believe may have escaped record.

In a history of the battles of Ypres by a Canadian author

which I have read it is recorded that on the morning 
of the opening attack fr on the Menin road the enemy

put down a very heavy barrage just as the troops

were assembling for attack. The author states

that the reason for the barrage is unknown, though

at the time it was feared that the enemy had discovered

our intentions.

The real reason was unquestionably that the barrage

was in preparation  for a German attack on

one of our forward posts, close up to Inverness Copse.

This post had been taken and retaken on more

than one occasion prior to the Australians

taking over this part of the front, and as a result

had been held by two platoons, the other

two posts on the divisional front being held

by one platoon each.

As you will know, the 1^st Brigade, which

had been holding the line on the 1^st division sector,

2.

was withdrawn into support on the lo night preceding

the night of the attack. One company of the 1^st

Battalion was however left in the forward posts

until after the attack, and was instructed to

withdraw from these posts one hour before

the attack, and to go forward again with the

attacking troops and reoccupy them. The

reason for this was that our own barrage was

to fall on the posts, which were well forward.

It so happened that the company detailed 

for this duty (A Coy 1^st Bn) was only 3 platoons

strong, one platoon having been detached for

special duty. The right hand post was

therefore held by one platoon only, under

Lieut Ward, who was instructed however to

hold the post at all costs, since if it were

taken the tapes laid out near to it for

the attack would be discovered, & in any case

the orderly formation for jumping off would

be interfered with.

Approximately one and a half hours before

zero the Germans, after putting down the

above mentioned fi barrage, attacked the

post, two men with a Flammenwerfer

covering the attackers.

3.

Ward, however was in the qui vive, and though

several of his men were badly burned (& he 

himself slightly) he got his lewis gun into

action, & the No 1 gunner L'Cpl Sneezby

managed to put a bullet through the canister

of the Flammenwerfer which exploded on the

back of its unfortunate carrier. All hands 

then opened rapid fire & the attack wilted

before it had properly begun.

Ward, however, was afraid that another

attempt might be made, and decided^{, ©}contrary

to orders, to remain in the post and chance

the barrage, which he did, suffering a good

many casualties.

He was recommended for a decoration, and

would no doubt have received it only for

the unfortunate fact of his being killed by

a shell up near Polygon Wood two days

later. There may or may not be records

of this, as but I can vouch for its correctness

as I was the in command of A Company at

the time, and I can also refer you to Colonel

B V Stacy. I would like to see the incident

mentioned in the history for two reasons,

firstly the explanation of the barrage, which

was most inconvenient affair, falling as
[*^©The attacking troops could now be seen from the post as they formed up
on the tape. German occupation of the post would therefore have been disastrous.*]

4.

it did on the front line & communications  just

when they were closely packed with incoming

troops, and secondly in recognition of

Ward's _^& Sneezby's planking action. L Cpl Sneezby was

awarded a Military Medal for his part.

This is all recorded in my diary & memoir

which are now in War Records, but it

has occurred to me that as these records were

only lately sent in it is more than likely

that they have not come under your notice,

though apart from this incident they probably

record nothing of very special interest. *

I remain

Yours faithfully,

Kenneth H McConnel

ex Lieut. 1^st B'n A.I.F.

Perhaps my information comes too late

to be of use, if so I am sorry, it was

not until I read your volume in 1916 that

it occurred to me that I should write to you.

^*Unless it be a description of the gas shelling

in the sector in front of Kemmel early in

1918, culminating in a terrific dose in the

night preceding the big German attack

further South;  bn liaison with the French at

Meteren later on.

Franklyn Vale

Grandchester

Queensland.

Aug 4^th 1932

 

Dear

I have your letter of the 27^th July, and I

can quite easily find the name of the Sergeant, as

my company roll for that stunt is still in my

possession.  Unfortunately  however it is locked in

my desk in Sydney, & I cann am at present in

Queensland, & shall not be returning till the end

of this month. I am writing to the people who

are renting my house to see if they can find it.

From memory I believe it was Sgt Stanton, but

cannot be sure. I remember now that our wiring

of the post, which was more or less detached was

under this sergeant, but he must have acted

on his own initiative with regard to the gun, as

neither Ward nor I knew of this. However the

6^th Bn were forming up for the attack actually within

view of the post, so it is quite probable that this

sergeant got into communication with the nearest

men. Ward, finding this portion of the post vacant

probably thought the Sergeant had been wounded,

& in any case neither of us saw him again.

2.

I can assure you most definitely however that

the main post was never vacated. Ward, however,

at the last moment before the barrage opened,

withdrew most of his men into a pill box

which was actually  in the post; so this may

have led the Green to believe that the men had

been withdrawn. I was in the post myself

within 5 minutes of zero, and found the men

reoccupying the trench from the pill box under

Ward's direction.  Another N.C.O. who displayed

a great deal of courage & initiative in connection

with the Flammenwerfer was L Cpl Furnell FURNELL, who
was in charge of one wing of the post, there was

some doubt as to whether he or Sneezby had skittled
the Flammenwerfer party. The latter were lying

dead about 30 yds in front of the post amongst 

the old farm buildings when I came up.

There was another _^German machine gun firing from the

edge of Inverness Copse _^(or perhaps 100 yds inside the Copse) which kept firing well

on into the morning; the English on the flank

being held up by it. We were trying to work out

how we could get round it when it eventually

stopped firing.  It gave the 6^th Bn a bad time

from the flank however, & many of their dead