Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/249/1 - 1917 - 1932 - Part 21

5.

On the evening's of the 23^rd & 24^th of September

our artillery "just over" extra heavy trial

barrages & "Fritz" ^as usual lit up the line for miles

each night with Verey lights. On the evening

of the 24^th I received an order to dig an

ammunition dump for Brigade requirements

& that supplies would be brought up on

the night of 25/26 for a "hop over" at

day-break on the 26^th inst. The dump was

dug at the extreme ^south end of our trench &

was all ready, but after dark on the

25^th the German artillery "put over" such

[*24^th*] a heavy continuous barrage-fire that

no "hop over" troops nor ammunition

were forthcoming, in fact I heard a

number of causalities occurred trying to

bring forward "rations". Word reached me

that the "supplies" would be delayed

24 hours.

As the grey dawn of the 26^th September

[*25^th*]began to show up the heavy ground

fog, the German artillery fire slackened

into drum-fire & gradually die away

my platoon (No.1) consisted of 38 N.C.O's &

men with Corporal Mascord, second &.

6

little Lance/corporal "Barney" Allen in charge

of the Louis-gun team. - I really forgot

the names ^of my other N.C.O's -

At 5.20 AM I observed weird shapes

appearing on our right front & Corporal

Mascord ran to me saying "The Tommies

on our right are falling back". I then

noticed men retiring from the first high

mound. I communicated to right left &

rear (Coy H 2) & ordered men not to

fire at any object over 400 yards away.

The ground-fog was now lifting & firing

became general along the entire front.

The 1/16 Middlesex, who had replaced the

[*24th*] 1/8^th Yorks & Lancs on the evening of 24^th

at once fell back on their support line

-which was a dug-in trench. -

my flank was "in the air" & I "called"

for reinforcements & put up a heavy

rifle fire. The enemy "drifted" from

our heavy-fire to north & south. - As

the first lot of reinforcements arrived without

causality - I was given time to bend

back our line by placing men in shell

-holes. [[?]]Boyd doing the same from

7

the support line, we closed up the gap

with this right-angle line of shell-hole

hidden riflemen.

The attack pressed & our artillery were

conspicious by their silence. The

enemy pressed closer & four or five

Germans reached the extra large shell

hole on our right front. Suddenly the

German artillery opened on our outpost

trenches but slowly lifted to further

back. The Germans massed almost

shoulder to shoulder, tried to rush us

but the boys stood the test wonderfully

& heavily repulsed three determined

attempts to get close. It was after this

that the German soldiers in the large

shell-hole started throwing "egg-bombs".

We tried a score of times to reach

them with Mill's bombs, but the distance

was just too far - nearly every man

noted for his bomb-throwing had a try -

meanwhile we had several causalities

form the egg-bombs, also the Germans

had brought forward machine-guns &

had them placed on the sides of the

8

high mounds on our right^flank. These also

caused some slackening of our rifle

fire. As things had cooled off some

-what - the German artillery were

throwing their shells behind the support

lines & the attack was not pressing -

I determined to try & route the Germans

out of the big shell-hole. I told Corp

Mascord to take charge & informed him

of what I was going to try & do, also

arranged a sign by which he would

know I was trying to return to the

trench & order cease-fire until I got

back. I then crept out of the south

end of the trench & working my way

towards a point from where I could

throw a mills grenade into the large

shell-hole. The machine guns were

active & not allowing me to proceed

very quickly when I noticed a slight

depression on the south side of the old

road. I crossed into this and after

working my way a good distance

noticed I was nearly as far from the

big shell hole as ever. I stopped about

9

to go back the way I had come when

I saw three Germans jump up from

the ground on my right & run towards

me - making I was sure for the

large shell hole - I lay quiet knowing

they must almost pass me. When they

were within a few yards I jumped

straight at them & got the middle one

through the throat with my bayonet.

The other two turned tail & fled almost

as quick as I could withdraw my

bayonet bayonet. It was madness to

attempt to follow especially with the

machine guns cutting up the ground

just above me so I threw myself

flat & shot the other two down at

close range. I then worked back to our

own trench, got my best rifle-grenadier

& directed him where I wanted the

grenade to explode ^ in the large shell hole. The very first

shot did the trick & three German

helmets went sky-rocketting into the air.

Then at last our artillery awoke &

some twenty minutes later - after I

had called for a second ^ lot of reinforcements

10.

to replace causalities - the attack died

out & the Germans were retiring on

our front but were still occupying shell

holes & the two high mounds in front of

the English lines.

Our artillery roared & did a lot of

"moping up" but at about 10.10AM the

enemy guns starting throwing over

every kind of shell in use, from "coal

boxes" to "pine-apples" (these from the high

mounds)

At 12 noon massed blue grey lines were

seen approaching & presented a wonderful

target. I noticed at this stage that my

boys shooting was not as good as it was

earlier & on using my own rifle found

that fouling, due to overheating with the

excessive use was interferring with the

correct flight of the bullet. However they

proved quite effective when Fritz got to

within 200 yards. Our artillery lending

splendid help this time the attack was

repulsed in about an hour & then

the enemy's artillery got spiteful & tried

to blow us into the channel trench & all.

11.

I got wounded ^on the head by a splinter of shell in

fact my steel helmet undoubtedly saved

my life. A number of my boys got blown

to pieces & others buried. When barrage

lifted we were a sorry crew. As I was

loosing a fair amount of blood & my

hankerchief with which I had bound

up the wound would not stop the bleeding

I worked my way along our trench towards

Dr. O'Malley's & found Lieut. McKinley who

bound me up with my field-dressing &

ordered me out. I went back to A Coy's H.Q.

& then along the tape-line to Battalion H.Q.

where Capt. Hooper (Battalion [I.O.) was

waiting to conduct me before our acting

O.C. (Major Freeman). I was questioned

& my advice asked on numerous

matters & offered to lead portion of the 

60^th Battalion to outpost line as further

reinforcements (runners & guides had

had an awful time due to heavy

artilley fire, & no one answered the

call when at first made). I was not

allowed to go back however and but Major Freeman

himself saw me to the forward dressing

station.
[[*by telephone
A Coy's HQ
informed Battn HQ
that I was on the 
way*]]

12.

A little later when leading a blinded

soldier from the forward dressing station

to Menin Road Hooge A.M.C. Post (not the Poperinghe

C.C.S.) I came across Lieut. W. Flintoft

wounded & close by a 57^th Battn Lieut killed.

I took W. Flintoft along with me & left both

him & the blinded man in charge of

A.A.M.C. Later I came upon Quarter-master

Sergeant Price wounded near the "dug-outs"

that sheltered 15^th Brigade H.Q's & took him down

to Hooge. That night the 58^th Battn was

withdrawn from the front lines to a position

in Glencross Copse between Battalion &

Brigade H.Q's. I was sent off to hospital

via Poperinghe C.C.S. but heard that a

large portion of the remenant of the

58^th Battn participated in the "hop over"

next morning.

J Graham Colclough

3.

party towards the English outpost, but

this time we approached the more

easterly xxxx portion but were not "challenged"

until we actually reached the "pill-boxes"

Lieut Boyd failed to make any impression

on these two Middlesex subalterns who

simply stated that they had all their front

covered by machine gun-fire & were not

going to exhaust their men with digging in.

The distance between the end of my trench

at the old road & the "pill boxes", which

seemed to be the night & day quarters of

two Middlesex posts, was roughly 200 to

220 yards. The number of officers &

men is incorrectly stated by Lieut Flintoft

as there as 2 officers an at least

twenty men around the pill-boxes &

twice that number of men must have

been on the easterly face of the rise

on guard. A sergeant of the Middlesex

(with whom I was in hospital later)

told me they had 60 men & 2 officers

but that ammunition ran short. This

is not true as they retired at the first

German attack firing very little ammunition.
[[*As the Middlesex fell back at 5.20 A.M. - I fail to see how
Lt. Flintoft could estimate the number who never held
Carlisle Farm.

J Graham Colcough 
Ex Sgt. 58^th Battn.*]]

7464.

30 May 1932.

H.J. Boyd, Esq., M.C.,

14, Moor Street,

Sandringham, S.8. Vic.

 

Dear Mr Boyd,

In describing the fighting of September 25, 1917,

in Polygon Wood, I have been assisted by an excellent account

from yourself, but am in a little doubt as to events which

preceded that fight. I understand that Sergeant Colclough

was in charge of the platoon holding your fight right-flank

post, and that he went across on previous nights, and on

that of the 24th in company with yourself, to the neighbouring

British post on the knoll north of Carlisle Farm, to get

the British officers to dig in nearer to your flank. I think

that Lieutenant Flintoft, who was acting as your second-in-command, 
also went across (probably he was sent by you)

several times that night with the same object, but without

result.

I should be grateful if you could inform me whether

all three of you visited the British, and if the result was

as I have stated.

The chapter dealing with the matter is going to the

printer, and I should be glad if you could let me have your

advice upon it as soon as possible.

 

Yours faithfully,

C.E.W. Bean

Official Historian.