Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/249/1 - 1917 - 1932 - Part 15

29th. Battalion A.I.F.

at

POLYGON WOOD

on

26th. September, 1917.

 

It had been arranged that 5th Australian Division should

attack the enemy positions in POLYGON WOOD on 26th. September, the

15th. Brigade on the Right and 14th. Brigade on the left, with 8th.

Brigade in Reserve. The 98th. (English) Brigade was to attack on the xx

right of the 15th. Brigade.

There were two objectives in the Divisional Sector, the first

known as the RED LINE and the second as the BLUE LINE. Divisional and

Brigade boundaries are shown on attached map. The right Brigade

sector is the one which concerns 29th Battalion.

60th. Battalion, A.I.F. was to capture and consolidate the

RED LINE, and 57th. and 59th. Battalions A.I.F., the BLUE LINE.

On 25th September the enemy counter-attacked to the right of

the Divisional Sector and drove in portion of the line held by the 1st

Middlesex Regiment, with the result that 15th. Aust. Inf. Brigade had to

use some of its Battalions to try and restore the position, thus

rendering it out of the question for the attack to be carried out

the following morning by the Battalions detailed.

On night of 24th/25th. September the 8th. Brigade was disposed
in the CHATEAU SEGGARD AREA (South of YPRES) where three Battalions
were to remain in Reserve there.
At 7.40 p.m. on 25th. September 29th Battalion received orders

to move to HALFWAY HOUSE as forawrd reserve Battalion, and moved at

8 p.m.

On arrival at HALFWAY HOUSE the G.O.C. 8th. Brigade instructed

lieut. Colonel. PURSER to precede the Battalion with his Company Comand

Commanders and report to G.O.C. 15th. Brigade to HOOGE CRATER, and

informed him that 29th. and 31st. Battalions had been placed under

the Command of G.O.C. 15th. Brigade, for the purpose of taking part

in the attack the following morning.

On arrival at HOOGE CRATER the orders for the attack were

read and explained by G.O.C. 15th. Brigade and his Brigade Major.

These provided for the 59th. Battalion to take the RED LINE, while

the 31st. Battalion (on right) and 29th. Battalion (on left) were to

attack the BLUE LINE, each on a one-company front.

There was no time for the issue of written orders, so the

C.O. verbally detailed Companies as under:-

Attacking Company. -- "B" Coy. (Captain J.V. HOULIHAN)

Moppers Up -- "C" Coy. (Captain W.H THOMSON) of this

company 2 Officers and 102

other ranks were detached for

work with 8th. Field Company.

Reserve Company. -- "A" Coy. (Captain H.G. BENNETT.)

Carrying Company. -- "D" Coy. (Captain H.C.E. CATE.)

2 Guns of 8th, I.T.M.B. were attached to the Battalion, and were

ordered to move with "A" Company.

The fighting strength of the Battalion exclusive of the

Nucleus and the party with 8th. Field Company was 18 Officers and

541 Other Ranks (including stretcher bearers).

The zero hour was fixed for 5:50 a.m. on 26th September and

after receiving the above instructions for the attack, the C.O. and

Company Commanders left HOOGE CRATER, met the Battalion, and were

guided to the assembly tapes by Officers and men of 15th Brigade.

The journey to the tapes was made in pitch darkness and

across shell-hole country. Officers and men alike were ignorant of

their whereabouts, and many were the falls and courses,, and it seemed

as though the march would never end.

Near GLENCORSE WOOD the Battalion which was following its

guides in single file, ran into a heavy enemy barrage, but the C.O.

kept them moving and but few casualties were sustained. Shortly

after the leading portion of the Battalion was forced to lie down for

several minutes as enemy machine gun bullets were too close for

comfort.

contd/

-2-

So, stumbling on in the darkness, the Battalion at last came

to the tapes, and finished forming up on same 45 minutes before Zero,

half-an hour of which was spent in gas masks; owing to the enemy

putting over a gas-shell barrage.

Battalion H'qrs were established at BLACK WATCH CORNER.

Our guns had been firing intermittently throughout the night,

and shortly before zero hour increased in intensity. At Zero hour

it was very misty, but when the barrage came down the Battalion

moved up to it as though on parade.

The barrage was extraordinarily thick and heavy, and commenced

moving forward 3 minutes after Zero, and was thickened 4 minutes later

by the machine gun barrage. Never had the men seen such a barrage,

and many remarked that with such a one they "would march to BERLIN".

When the RED LINE was taken, it was found that there was no sign

of the 98th. Brigade on our Right. The C.O. 31st. Battalion did not,

therefore, consider it advisable to continue the advance to the BLUE

LINE and thus leave his right flank in the air, in which opinion

he was supported by C.O. 59th. Battalion.

Lieut Colonel Purser, however, considered that both 29th. and

31st. Battalions should push on and take the BLUE LINE, when, 31st.

Battalion could throw back their rright flank to the RED LINE, while

59th. Battalion could likewise throw back its right flank to our old

front line. C.O. 31st. Battalion, however, held to his opinion and

as he was the senior officer present, took the responsibility of

holding up the advance till further orders were received.

C.O. 29th. Battalion thereupon gave orders that the barrage

was not to continue its advance until ordered, and at 7. 6 a.m.

ordered his Battalion to consolidate on the position it then held.

While in the position many casualties were sustained from

enfilade machine gun fire, and on receipt of orders to continue the

advance it was found that "B" Company was too weak to attack alone,

so at 10.55 a.m. orders were issued to "B" and "C" Companies to reorganise

with a view to attacking the BLUE LINE as soon as the 

barrage advanced. As Captain Houlihan had been killed soon after

zero, Captain Thomson was placed in command of this attack. "A" Coy.

was ordered to act as Reserve as before, while "D" Company remained

the carrying company.

Being informed that the Royal Welsh Fusiliers were to attack on

the right of the 31st. Battalion at 12 noon, C.O's 29th. and 31st.

Battalion timed the resumption of their advance for the same hour.

Strong opposition was met after passing the RED LINE, and at

12.,25 p.m. "A" Company was ordered to support the attack.

Pushing on with his Company, Captain Cate became involved in

the fight, and at 1 p.m. the objective was taken and touch established

with both flanks, although 31st. Battalion had not reached their

objective.

On reaching the BLUE LINE only 3 Company Officers remained. viz:-

Captain CATE, and lieutenants A.M. GRANT and G.HARPER; of these lieut.

GRANT was shortly afterwards shot through the heart by a sniper.

Only 1 Stokes Mortar Guns reached the objective. Consolidation of the

position was at once proceeded with, in the course of which 4

captured Machine Guns were mounted for use against the enemy, and

then the men, who had been without food since the night before, set

to work to boil tea in their mess tins.

Enemy counter-attacks were delivered at 2.p.m., 4 p.m., 6.10 p.m

and 8.30 p.m., but were all repulsed, mainly by our barrage.

Ammunition and water were very short and the 1 Stokes mortar

was useless for want of shells, and it was not until about 6.30 a m.

on 27th. September that supplies reached the line, while as it was

impossible to weaken the line by sending back ration-carrying parties

the Battalion was compelled to live on its emergency ration and shell-

hole water on 27th. September.

Between the RED and BLUE LINES there were a number of "pill-

boxes" and nests of concrete shelters but the men dealt with these

as they had been advised in the course of training by the C.O. viz:-

rush them with a few men as soon as the barrage permitted, prior to

which time the enemy could not get out. Finding the doorwaxys blocked

by several men, the Huns generally surrendered quickly; if they did

contd/

-3-

not, a Mills grenade tossed into their midst never failed to make

them do so. About 120 prisoners (including a Battalion Commander,

his Adjutant and several Officers), about 30 machine guns and one

"Pineapple" bomb thrower were captured by the Battalion, while

the ground was strewn with enemy dead.

During the course of their training, the men had been taught

when using the bayonet to aim ^at their adversaries throats. Even in

the heat of the fight they did not forget this, fully 70% of Huns

bayoneted having taken the steel either in the windpipe or just

to the left of it.

As the enemy was expected to make a surprise attack on the

morning of 27th. September, our artullery put down a heavy barrage

at 5 a.m. on that date. At 7.30 a.m. the enemy counter-attacked,

but was repulsed, and shortly afterwards Battalion H'qrs were

established within a couple of hundred yards of the front line.

A

At 1 p.m. one of our own 60 pounder batteries shelled the

Battalion and caused several casualties, and at 1.55 p.m. and

4.30 p.m. repeated the performance, one shell striking Battalion

H'qrs at J.10.c. central.

At 6.20pm the enemy again counter-attacked and was

repulsed. During the S.O.S. barrage which was put down on this

occasion, shots from a 60 pounder battery again fell amongst the

Battalion.

During the night the Battalion was relieved by 30th Battalion
and moved back to the RED LINE and remained there during the
28th September, but owing to the BLUE LINE being too thickly held,

the 29th Battalion at 9.45 p.m. moved back to CLAPHAM JUNCTION
(J.13.b.5.0), where it remained till 9.40 p.m. on 30th September,
when relief by 6th Leicestershire Regiment was completed. 29th
Battalion then marched to Camp at DICKEBUSCH,
During the above period the Battalions losses amounted to
about 250 of all ranks.
Attached hereto is a list showing names of Officers who went
into action on the occasion.
 M Purser
Lieut. Colonel
C.O. 29th. Battalion.

List of Officers who went into action

with 29th. Battalion

at POLYGON WOOD. 26th Sept. 1917.

 

Lieut. Colonel M. PURSER                

Major A. W. MURDOCH                     

Lieut. C. K. DAVIS                                

Lieut. S.W. GULLETT.                           

Lieut. I. WALTER.                                

Capt. H.F. MAUDSLEY (R.M.O.)                                                                                                    

"A" Coy.                                                                  

Captain R.G. BENNETT                                       

Lieut. J.B. RODGERS

Lieut. S.I. PATTERSON.

Lieut. F.C. DUNDAS.                                                  

"B" Coy.                                                                                 

 Captain J.V. HOULIHAN                                                                                 

 Lieut. H.J.E. VEAL
Lieut. W.T. HOGG.
Lieut. G. HARPER.
 "C" Coy.  
Captain W.H. THOMSON
Lieut. P.L. FOWLER.         
"D" Coy.
Captain H.C.E. CATE
Lieut. A.M. GRANT
Lieut. H.F.B. CASTLE.                                                               

Diagram-See original Document

 

MESSAGE FORM

 

TO:-                                                            
No.

1. I am at ...

{Note:- Either give Map Reference or

{mark your position by a "X" on the

{Map on back.

2. I have reached limits of My Objective.

3. My Platoon Company is at ...and is consolidating
4. My Platoon is at ...and has consolidated.

5. Am held up by (a) M.G. (b) Wire at ....(Place where you are).

6. Enemy holding strong point ....

7. I am in touch with ....on Right. Left. at ....
8. I am not in touch with ....on Right. Left.
9. Am shelled from....

10. Am in need of:- 

11. Counter Attack forming....

12. Hostile (a) Battery (b) Machine Gun (c) Trench Mortar } active at ....

13. Reinforcements wanted at....

14. I estimate my present strength at .... rifles.

15. Add any other useful information here:-

Name....

Platoon ....

Company ....      

Battalion....    

Time ....m. 
Date....1917.

(A). Carry no maps or papers which may be of value to the Enemy.

(B). Give no information if captured, except the following, which

you are bound to give:-

Name and Rank.

(C). Collect all captured maps and papers and send them in at once.

NAUROY,

KOOYONG ROAD,

TOORAK. S.E.2.

Nov. 4^th.

Dear Dr. Bean

I am enclosing

herewith, a narrative of the Battle of

Polygon Wood by Lieut S.W. Gullett,

Intelligence Officer, 29^th. Battn. 8^th Brigade,

written when he was in the 3^rd London

Gen. Hospital. I came across it lately

and knowing that it was thoroughly

reliable, & written just after the Battle,

I thought it might be of some value

to you.

Yours sincerely
Edwin Tivey

3rd London Gen. Hosp

Wandsworth S.W.

11-11-17

Brig. Gen. E. Tivey, C.B. D.S.O.

8th Aust. Inf. Bde.

Aus

Dear Sir,

I am enclosing herewith a 

copy of the report on the Polygon Wood attack,

which you required.

It is only a very bald statement of facts,

which makes it prosy reading, and owing to

its length is limited to a very brief description

of each stage of the operations.

I hope you will not think me presuming

in stating that I have kept one copy for myself,

and given one to Lieut Harper, at his earnest

request. I can recall these, of course, if you

desire it, sir, & forward them to you.

The writing of such an account is

rendered somewhat difficult by the constant

cropping up of the 'first-personal" element,

but I trust that in the main it is what 

you desired.

I am, sir

Yours very respectfully

S.W. Gullett

UNOFFICIAL

TO BRIG. GENERAL E. TIVEY, C.B. D.S.O.

8TH AUST. INF. BDE.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

ATTACK ON POLYGON WOOD, BY 29th BN. A.I.F.

on SEP. 26th, 1917.

-1-
UNOFFICIAL

To Brig. General E. Tivey, C.B., D.S.O.,

8th Aust. Inf. Bde.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY.

Attack on POLYGON WOOD, by 29th Bn. A.I.F.

 on Sept. 26th, 1917.

Reference Map. Message Map No. 8, Scale 1:10,000.

Source of Information. Practically the whole of the remarks in this

report are the result of the personal observation and notes

by the writer, who was acting as Intelligence Officer for the

Bn. during the operations. Every effort has been made to

make these notes as accurate as possible, and they have been

checked in consultation with Lieut. G. HARPER, 29th Bn., and 

such incidents as were not personally seen verified as far as

could be done.

The writer would particularly desire it to be understood

that this is a bare narrative report only, and that any criticisms

regarding the movements or dispositions of other units are

merely his own opinions, as a junior officer, formed under the

stress of battle, and therefore liable to correction by persons

better informed. 

Period Covered. From 8.30p.m. on the night of 25/26th Sept., 1917 to

1st Oct., 1917.

THE ASSEMBLY

The Move Up. On the 25th Sept. the Bn. was bivouacked in the CHATEAU

SEGARD area, abut 4 kilos. south of YPRES. In the evening a

"move order" was received, and, after issueing bombs, flares,

sandbags, etc. the Bn. moved up along routes previously