Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/247/1 - 1917 - 1933 - Part 10

6314.
3 December 1930.
Brig.-General J.C. Robertson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D.,
"Roseneath",
Taylor Street,
Toowoomba, Q'land.
Dear General,
In studying the orders for the Bullecourt attack, I find
that there is a serious mistake in those of the 46th Battalion.
I have seen Denham, and he tells me that this was due to the fact
that instructions issued at Brigade Headquarters were capable of
bearing the meaning which he assumed from them, as well as the
correct meaning which was attached to them by Colonel Leane.
They were verbal instructions - he states that the amended
written order was not in his possession until after the attack.
The mistake will be clear to you from the pages which I
extract from the chapter and forward herewith.  It is a long time
since the events, but if you have any recollection that would
throw light upon this I should be grateful for the assistance.
Would you be so good as to return the pages after perusal.
Yours sincerely,
C.E.W. Bean.

J. C. ROBERTSON
(J. C. ROBERTSON A. O. JACKSON)
REGISTERED SHARE BROKERS
TELEPHONE  OFFICE NO. 1335
RESIDENCE  J. C. ROBERTSON  1770
"  A. O. JACKSON 685
APPROVED VALUATORS
SHARES
AGENTS - BRISBANE
SYDNEY
MELBOURNE
TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS
"STRUAN"
TOOWOOMBA
POSTAL ADDRESS, BOX 160, G.P.O., TOOWOOMBA
Exchange Buildings,
Margaret Street,
Toowoomba,
Queensland.
[*HN.
11 Ap 1917.*]
December 9th. 1930
C.E.W.Bean Esq.
Historian
Victoria Barracks
Paddington N.S.W.
My dear Bean,
I am in receipt of your letter dated 3rd. inst.
The following has been taken from my personal Diary, it might
throw a little light on the subject.
Tuesday April 10th.  Orders received at mid-day
that we are to carry out last night's postponed attack, to-night.
Busy making arrangements all day, the plans have been slightly
altered.  Our definite orders did not arrive until 10.0pm.  Held
a conference with my C.Os at 10-15pm. and made the final
arrangements.
The arrangements were verbal ones based on the
Divisional Order and these arrangements were confirmed by the
Brigade Order as soon as it was possible to get the order out.
It is a long time to remember but the failure of
the tanks appeared to have delayed the movement until it was
impossible for the attacking Battalion to carry out its role.  The
Bullacourt salient on the left dominated as soon as the barrage
lifted and a fly could then have hardly got across.

C.E.W.Bean Esq.
(1).
The failure of the Tanks was a contingency thought
of for in my notes I mention a conversation with the Tank Commander
who stated that only a direct hit by a heavy gun could put a tank
out of action and such would be improbable.
It is many years since we have met, I hope the yaasr
years have treated you kindly.  What a wearisome task you have had
compiling the History, you must be truly tired of it.
Kindest regards and remembrances,
Yours sincerely
JC Robertson.
N.B.  Pages returned herewith

FL.4151
5795.
8 May 1930.
Lieutenant-Colonel H.K. Denham, D.S.O., V.D.,
"Montreaux",
85 Redmyre Road,
Strathfield, N.S.W.
Dear Sir,
In writing the narrative of the First Battle of
Bullecourt I have come upon an important discrepancy between the
orders of the 12th Brigade and 48th Battalion and those of the
46th.  The order of the 12th Brigade for April 10 (the abortive
attack) was that the infantry should go forward fifteen minutes
after the tanks, etc.  The order for April 11 was that the
tanks should go forward at 4.30 and the infantry at 4.45, the
intention being that the infantry should advance at 4.45 whether
the tanks arrived or not.  The 46th Battalion's order for the
April 11 attack, however, is that the infantry should advance
fifteen minutes after the tanks, and I am informed by officers
of the 46th that this instruction was the reason for their not
advancing at 4.45 independently of the tanks.
I should be grateful if you could assist me by throwing
anyhlight on the discrepancy, which obviously has an important
bearing on the outcome of the attack.
Yours faithfully,
C.E.W. Bean
Official Historian.

[*Pentland (in Melb w brother running a coach bldg place).*]
[*Edgley, Waine, & Brooks were Sydney University Scouts officers - who had gone to the Bn from
the 19th after the Evacn.  Denham was sent along to it afterwds as colonel. He was a nice fellow,
& had command w the Sydney Univy Scouts - but they were not really whole-heartedly
pleased to see him: he could not manage men.
Denham had told him: if no tanks turn up, of course you will have to go
forward alone.  But they will turn up.*]
H.N.
Major Waine, 46^th - Re Bullecourt. Ap. 11^th
D Coy.  4 waves intended.  Ts were to be folld. xx Left Coy wd
direct the advance.
One tank got k.o. in line w rt flank.
2nd tank got k.o. just in front of Sunken rd (Centre Coy)
& 3rd k.o. behind the J.O.T.  These Waine could see.
Coys on left were seen to advance & W. went on
too.  xx  Rifle, M.g. & arty fire ^had opened already,
& cas.s were occurring in J.O.T.  (Later much of
this fire came from left.)  Formatn ws lost & they went
on as one line -  Pentland got too far to right. where
wire ws not cut.
Wire well cut where W. got in.  Few Gs there - as we
got to wire they bolted.  Boddington's Coy ws prob.
first in.  Almost from 1st Gs were attg from both flanks.
B. started to att. towds l. & while bombs lasted he
drove Gs well back - Losing so many men on way
over we lost many bombs - W. saw no bags of bombs in trench.
B. blocks pound on both fls - on rt-Sandbags pulled
down into trench & party watched it.
Then occurred lull.  Count taken & 65 men (incldg wd)
found.
W. ws trying to  One ^large pty of ammn carriers (A Coy) ws seen
to leave but only abt 6 arrd.  47 Bn ^North's Coy got thro. (probly thro C/a
by Boddington) with few cass.
About 9 Waine saw many Germans outside Rct, & in
a S. rd on the near side of it.  There were He sent back notice of these by
runner & by pigeon - numerous messages.  A trench mortar
bomb was now dropping in the trench.  The wounded
had been collected in a bay & one of these bombs dropped
among them killing a number. W. then had them carrd to a
[W. thinks 47 Coy (North) had Cass. in coming over
w had telephones but not in order.
^North himself ws with Waine.]
dugout.  A message wh arrd from Denham showed tt he
thought everything ws going well - To show him tt everything
ws far from well, W. decided to write a long full message.
He went into a dugout entrance - the 2nd entrance o / dugout,
w North & sat down on / steps part o / way down, writing
a full the message.  A number of men suddenly tumbled down /
dugout entrance saying: "Look out, / Germans are on us" - & carried
W & N with them.  N. must have gone at once up / stairway.  W. tried to
get to / other stair but found the blockages wd passage blocked w wd, ^on whom he did not want to
tread.  They cursed him & he turned back but found / first stair guarded by Germans.  Going to the 2nd
he found it also guarded.  The time he had lost in turning back had been fatal.
[Was North in the C/A in OG2?  How many men did he leave in O.G.1?
What did he see of Tanks & of the C/A.]  He ws bitterly disappointed at his capture

FL.4151
5683.
9 April 1930.
W.F.H. Master, Esq., M.C.,
11, Allister Street,
Cremorne, N.S.W.
Dear Sir,
I have been writing lately the official account of the
First Battle of Bullecourt.  The records for your old battalion,
the 46th, are very incomplete, but I have managed to arrive at a
story which, I hope, represents something very close to the truth.
I would, however, be most grateful if you, who are one of those
who took part in several of the events described, could assist
me by calling in for half-an-hour to talk over some of the
matters dealt with.  Major Waine is kindly coming in on Saturday
morning between 10 and 11 o'clock.
If you would drop me a note or ring FL.4151, I could
arrange to have the maps and air-photographs ready in case they
would be of any assistance.
Yours faithfully,
C.E.W. Bean
Official Historian.

Master - 7 Illiliwa St Cremorne . . X3377 (Lt Master . 46 Bn Bullecourt Ap 11 1917
Coulson I.O. Bn Scout offr. could give some details (Res. of offrs)
as to distances - He made the recssce on night of 10^th or same night as Jacka
Bn HQ in Sunken rd.  Shallow trench in front
abt 600 ^x from H.T.  The left of trench wd be
well in front of Sunken rd.
C Coys tank broke down on the hopping off trench
in the dark.  The Ts were making much noise
before they reached this point.
When C Coys tank broke down close in front of J.O.T.
Davies of Centre Coy rang up on telephone Denham
& asked what to do.
 B          C        D              
——    ——    ——          — —   — —   — —
Bodd  Dav.  Waine      — —   — —   — —
                A
              ——
            (Sqxx)
Abt 200^x walking without a sound.  Then mgs in front towds
Rct opened.  Cd see bullets sparking on wire.  M. blew his
whistle & gave the double.  Davis ws probly k. then.  The
row ws v. gt.
Got to wire & got thro - it ws thick - & into the
trench.  M. made to rt to pick up D - who were separated.
Big dugout w 2 entrances- Posted sentries at each
threw couple of Mills down - Gs came out - 3 k.
& 1 wd.  From wd G. ^(speaking rough French) M. heard tt after they saw Austlns
going back right before they had rfed line w m.gs.
x C/a  A part of D Coy got in with C Coy. but v.
little.  D Coys objve ws not taken.  Right was blocked
w a bit of timber.
Short of men & bombs from first.  Collected
what could & made dumps.
The dugout was 3 or 4 traverses from rt flank
Masters sent a pigeon msg "Gs massing in Rct. must have
artillery suppt."
Boddington on left abt 7 asked for men & bombs.
He ws sent what cd be spared - & stopped the C/a.

German food ^parcel mail ws found in dugout, with food parcels wh
46th ate.
There was no C/a early on rt. - more on left.  Had Commn
thro C.T. with 48th.  In mg cd see Gs at S. end of Rct.
Aft Masters sent a pigeon message asking for Arty
fire on Riencourt, "Gs massing Rct - must have
arty support."  Abt 10 am M. had a sleep in the dugout.
So after xx
About xxxxx xxxxx xx xxx
xxxx  He left (he thinks) Ridgewell & some men at the block.
They must have been bombed out for the next thing
M. knew was someone running down the stair o /
dugout shouting tt / Gs. were on them, counteratly.
He ran up the stairs, Spear after him, & found / trench empty
& bombs flying over.  Spear he did not see again.  Stanton
& a Corporal & Masters contd to fight - the Cpl. warned
the men in the dugout (one of its entrances ws still free)
but they would not (or did not) come up again.  Masters,
Stanton & the Cpl continued to fight back along the trench
until they came on 5 dead men who had bn k. by C/a
from the other flank.  Then they jumped out of / trench, having
seen no one else in it.  M. ws wd 30 ^x from the trench -
but xx xx lay still & was not killed. * A little later
*[*A 48^th man afterwds
came up & sd he wd
get S/Bs, but M told
him merely to take off
M's equipt - wh he did-
except his gas mask.*]
he crawled to a sap where he & Sergt Rafferty sat. into it.
separated  They watched / Gs collecting all the walking
wd - they left the stretcher cases - and 2 one G. offr
was going along saying.  "All right Tommy - you need not
be afraid?"  2 Gs got into the same Sap, ^& were separated from
M & R by only by a sheet of galvd Iron.  M & R quietly
put out their cigarettes.  Later these Gs got out - & at
dusk M & R got back.  Gs didn't fire on our S/bs
tt night.
[∴ Waine, spear, Ridgewell, Master were in dugout]
resting when fatal attack occurred.

[*Denham's order shows tt
½ of A Coy under Lt Stanton
ws attd to B & some of
its LGs to C & D Coy.
A Coy also provided 3.30 as carrg pty.
Coy bdies in JOT marked on my May 3 map.*]
11 - 13 St. James St.,
Melbourne,
17th. June 1930.
Capt. C. E. W. Bean,
Historian,
Vict. Barracks,
SYDNEY, N.S.W.
Dear Captain Bean,
Your memo of 14th. inst. to hand.
Unfortunately, I am not in a position to
give you first hand information regarding the movements of
"A" Company 46th. Bn. in the Bullecourt show.  Although
with "A" Company at the time I was left out of this action,
being in charge of the "Neucleus" party withheld from this
attack.  Perhaps a few notes from my diary may be of some
service.  On the night of 9/10 April "A" Coy. was detailed
for special fatigue, and we carried Stokes Gas Shells to the
Front Line.  On our return at 1.30 A.M. 2 platoons of "A"
Coy., under Lt. Stanton, were ordered to the front line
into support trenches.  Although everything was in readiness
for the attack, orders were received that the attack would
not take place, and I believe the troops came back over the
snow covered ground in anything but precise military formation,
and, although in practically broad daylight and presenting a
wonderful target for the Boche, for some unaccountable reason
they were practically not shelled at all.  We were told the
attack did not take place because the Tanks did not get into
position in time.  My recollection of "B", "C" and "D" Coys'
movements was that they were in a front line position for
this cancelled attack, but that "A" Coy. were to be left out
of this attack.  After our men returned dog-tired from the
fatigue work and their subsequent trip to the front line they
slept for most of the day.
The Battalion went up again that evening and
got into position for the attack, which took place next
morning 11th. April.  Just on midnight when I was turning in
I received orders to supply a Carrying Party of 1 officer and
20 o' ranks to report to 12 Bde. H. Qters. in Noreuil.  I took
all the men left in camp, about 20, and we were carrying water
and other articles to Advance Bde H. Qters till just before the
attack commenced.  I cannot give you details of the attack,
but my diary gives me the names of the 46 Bn. officers who
took part in the attack.  The "A" Company officer who took

2.
Capt. C. E. W. Bean.
17/6/30.
part and was the only officer to return unwounded was Lt.
J. A. Stanton.  I don't know where Stanton is at present
but he was in business as an Estate Agent at Mont Albert
for some time.  The Secretary of our Battalion Association
is F. J. Hurren, 39 Bambra Rd., Caulfield, S.E.7, and he
may be able to give you up-to-date addresses.  Other
officers wounded were Capt. Kimber, Lt. Master, Lt. Spiers,
Lt. Bishop, Lt. Pentland.  The last two named are both
resident in Melbourne, but I am out of touch with the
others.  Besides these officers, Major Waine and Lt.
Ridgewell were taken prisoner, and we lost Captain Davis
and Capt. Boddington killed and there were probably others
killed also.  The remnants of the Bn. returned to our lines
near Vaulx Vraucourt and an old Sugar Refinery nearby at
about 7 P.M.  Next morning I was put in charge of what was
left of "B", "C" and "D" Coys. and we moved off for a back
area - the average strength of each Coy. was about 35 and
"C" Company were without an N.C.O.
I was with the 46th. Bn. practically continuously
till 28/8/17 when I went to 3rd. Div. as A.D.C. to
the G.O.C. 3rd. Div., and if I can be of any assistance in
verifying dates or names of officers, etc., I shall be only
too pleased to assist.
Yours Faithfully,
P.W. Simonson