Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/247/1 - 1917 - 1933 - Part 8

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Awaiting approval
Accession number:
RCDIG1066609
Difficulty:
5

Page 1 / 10

FL.4151 5842. 16 May 1930. Captain R.S. Somerville, D.S.O., M.C., 59. Wattle Street, East, Tuliarton Estate, Sedust. Dear Captain Somerville, I have to thank you for your letter and for your offer of further assistance. I should be very grateful if you could give me the benefit of your recollection of the fighting at Bullecourt on the 17th of April 1917. In particular, I should be obliged for information on the following pointss - (7) What did you see of the tanks in you part of the advance, and did you see any tanks in frent of any other parts Any particulars of the defence of the trenches, and (2) of other officers seen there. (3) Did you take part in the conference about 17 o'clock with Captains Gardiner, Murray, Hummerston, and others, when the withdrawal was discussed and provisionally decided upon. (4) Any particulars concerning the few men who advanced beyond O.G.2 towards Hiencourt. The fourth volume willbbe finished about the end of next yeary the narrative of Messines and the Third Battle of Ypres having still to be completed. Yours faithfully, C.E.W. Bean.
CaatSoverville BallecouitI Denham. The Bde orders for 66th 11.48 cannot have 09 Wattle St eas been clear as his ovders would have been in accordance 584 Sullarton Cotadi with them. JR 88/5730 The Official Kisorian Dear Copto Bean 16th Just to Yours & reprence Ballecouth Acton hand There is acertain information that I can amount I give you. Though it will only repr to a few mam, points owing, to tha fact that the damage that received & the consequent following miconscirncess has coured me to forget most of the ninor details. 1 Tanks. Two or there points I can bring to memory, a) I noticed particularly that the tanks icequite posible fom a good distance off owing to the blue light that was continualty showing apparently fom the top o the Lidksc) That when we were about 300 yards from the enemogharbed wire a tauk &toppid + heldapour
advancing frontwave owing to its continunng to fire at the eveny Hough it te ciew appaiently had lost contiol. & were unable to continue to advance. This was on my left pont, but before I reached it, some one had appaiently got the ciew to clase firing as the tine commenced to move forward again (c) The sale other tank hat I remember partie alarfy to ticing was one that 9o to, the evemy pout fine + Stuck there. This was on the right of wher Featered, the Lienches, & was so under the evemy gun fixe that that Spot was acorded by the in fantry as particalarl dangerou I regret that I am aot able t give map repeences as all any pappers kaps etc were rewored). I have n clear recollection of any other Lams in the action. of Dycate If to Lrenches, (at Enemy The wiil where I first attempted to enter was not bedken & to find on spening (as it was too thick to go through
had to move down to the right. hee 9It an opening there which Tink had ver opened up by Itell Fire. The machine gan depence at His time wear very strong the even fing along his own lives of wire. There was a lange collection of men at this point they apparently having come from the right also owing to lack, of spevings, Ane remarkI have heard suice by a wan who was lying maunded outside the wire was to the effect that the wire seemedto be a mass of fineflies owing to the spacks coused by the bullet stuking On going through we the wire. entered the pont tine moving along till her came to a cap waning hach to the second line. I assing down this he cleased a dug out + collected further o couple of prisoners wds had cone across dlagonally from the right, from the post tike & were making for the sap to effect an escape to the rear. Leaving these neeg under contol we woned on to the second line. I thnk the com
hounication French ran straight on through. It anay rate at his coiner, I stopped to see how things wlre going on our planks. There was aoh wuch happening on the right of me but on any left in the German seond tive a German machine gun was mounted pring at our anew in the fist line t holding them up. I fewis gun was obtained (whether this was with me or whether I sent back for it I cant remember), and the necessary action taken to bring it into dperation from the side of the communication trench where, it continaed past the second live at this time the men in the first line were engaging the enemy gun with machine gan & reble fire from the first line. Infortunately on the Lewis gun coming into action to fire slightly into the rear of the Tenman gun cren, our ownt men must have taken it for a second Genmangun as swarg I lack of time we had at hem able to though up a side protetor RIA
AU to mask the fire as they immediately opened up on us & the ganner diopped with a bullet wound hrog The head. Deciding that here was ad time to ahe action to cover our fire we moned down the trench to the gaa only to find, that the gun had been remssed + I thnk 3or &f dead Sermans lift there all being killed with head wounds, he moned some distance down this trench coming across to me but one small austichan + a big Ferman down with a bayovet wound. The A had been moving down the French towards towards al frm us & the two had net the boy getting in first & as a result recoming very surprised. He was still standing looking at his coptive when we reached him & immediatly asked what he was to do. The adoice given by someone was to go on & bayonet some wore. hoving back we continued on the communicaton trench toward the rear, till I think an spen road with the we came to
enery holding the other side. A post was established at this point. Yoing tack to the 2rd line we went some + het distance to our right resistance. (From this point things are hazy as far as I am conceined though hombing was I can remember much indulged an) My aect poitie alar recollection is that we were held at all paints & that I it was daylight. Bombing must have bemgoing on hecause I went back acrangements could to see what be made to get more hombs found that the Frenches at the back were fall of men doing nothing. They were a wisture if anr own new & the supporting hattahon who appointly in stead of going straight on nrough as had dropped into our liess. made what arrangements. I could to have hombs collected from them & sent up to the hombig posts By this time it was certain that we could cot anganise another the day & it was a a Back during
question of if possible holding the enemy till noght & making another try toget on. Bomks were where possible collected from hose lying out side the trenches if they were under cover from eveny fire. The enlivy machine gwas had done much damage Particulary on a Sunken track that ran through their linees) By this time our dxpensive had stopped &it was a quistion of holding as much, as we had got. The only officers that I remember seeing about this time ws wa I were seent b Carthy I think whom I auet in he second hile ruaning a hombing post. (A) Our defence This really started from the time that our pambers were teld up + continued through out te monning wil we got Owing to lack out of the Tienctes of bosmts we were not able to hold our posts & the enewys presonce Bept steadily increasing. of fits were Strongly made. to kup of the supply I bambs but they could not hegot up fast enough, I am unable to
the tighting hy next give ditalts recollection is of the conpesnce. bem hould by you. I thik I arrioed as it was just over & do not remember the detapts except that Immediately left to have our telephone communication distroyed. These were situated in a dagant to the right of the position when the conpience was held. On the way there I was able to use the trenches, bept on the resuin juraly owing to, the even pressure our post had been frced to reture +. I had to take to the open between the truhes. On entering our own, time I found that in the, spot I had entered an instruction had been given but a janion officer o our supporting bo Kation allowing our men to put up the white flag, which they had effected by, tying hand per. cheep on so refly with fied beyoults, These wlre immediately Taken down + suitable advice given. I ten went up to the posts again & found them beng much pashed in & after advising
tose that I saw as to the decision to retur slowly a the supportenee not be kept up, I moned beck towards the first line. There seemed to be beay few of our men about then + the stimans were coming in very close. so I decided to leave some where shout between 12.30 & 1 pa There could have been very few of our mew on our left then as an getting in to the open, the Germans had their guis pring again from te pont time. There secmed to be a fair number & our mew in shill holes in pront of the german lines but they did not seem to bbe to move owing to the fire. A lot of these were probably taken prisoner, After leasing the cives & peing the men in the shell holes & then getting hit Ionly sow one your men moving & he was trying to take his gun out Iregret I am anable to 4 give any informition regarding these men is I did not see them + have ao arfoniation. Our RIA

FL.4151

5842.

16 May  1930.

Captain R.S. Somerville, D.S.O., M.C.,

59, Wattle Street, East,

Fullarton Estate, S.Aust.

Dear Captain Somerville,

I have to thank you for your letter and for your offer

of further assistance. I should be very grateful if you could

give me the benefit of your recollection of the fighting at

Bullecourt on the 11th of April 1917. In particular, I should

be obliged for information on the following points:-

(1) What did you see of the tanks in your part of the

advance, and did you see any tanks in front of any other

part?

(2) Any particulars of the defence of the trenches, and

of other officers seen there.

(3) Did you take part in the conference about 11 o'clock

with Captains Gardiner, Murray, Hummerston, and others,

when the withdrawal was discussed and provisionally

decided upon.

(4) Any particulars concerning the few men who advanced

beyond O.G.2. towards Riencourt.

The fourth volume willbbe finished about the end of

next year;  the narrative of Messines and the Third Battle of

Ypres having still to be completed.

Yours faithfully,

C.E.W. Bean.

 

[*Bullecourt I   Capt Somerville (16th)

Denham.: The Bde orders for 

11.4.17 cannot have

been clear or his 

orders would have 

been in accordance 

with them.*] 

5842

59 Wattle St East

Fullarton Estate

S.A.

28/5/30

The Official Historian

Dear Captn Bean

Yours of 16th Inst to

hand reference Bullecourt action

There is a certain

amount of information that I can

give you, though it will only refer

to a few main points owing to

the fact that the damage that I

received & the consequent following

unconsciousness has caused me to

forget most of the minor details.

(1) Tanks. Two or three points I can

bring to memory. (a) I noticed particularly

that the tanks were quite visible from

a good distance off owing to the

blue light that was continually

showing apparently from the top of

[*1*] 

the tanks (b) That when we were about

300 yards from the enemy barbed

wire a tank stopped & held up our

 

advancing front wave owing to

its continuing to fire at the enemy

though it the crew apparently had lost

control & were unable to continue

to advance. This was on my left

front but before I reached it, some

one had apparently got the crew to

cease firing as the line commenced

to move forward again (c) The only

other tank that I remember particularly

noticing was one that got

to the enemy front line & stuck

there. This was on the right of where

I entered the trenches, & was so

under the enemy gun fire that

that spot was avoided by the infantry

as particularly dangerous.

(I regret that I am not able to give

map references as all my papers

maps etc were removed). I have

no clear recollection of any other tanks

in the action.

(2) Defence of the trenches. (a) Enemy

The wire where I first attempted to

enter was not broken & to find an

opening (as it was too thick to go through)

 

I had to move down to the right.

We got an opening there which I

think had been opened up by shell

fire. The machine gun defence at

this time was very strong the enemy

firing along his own lines of wire.

There was a large collection of

men at this point, they apparently

having come from the right also owing

to lack of openings. One remark I

have heard since by a man who was

lying wounded outside the wire was

to the effect that "the wire seemed to

be a mass of fire flies owing to the

sparks caused by the bullets striking

the wire".) On going through we

entered the front line moving along

till we came to a sap running back

[*S via C.T.*] to the second line. Passing down this

we  we cleared a dug out & collected

a ^further couple of prisoners who had come

across diagonally from the right, from

the front line & were making for the sap

to effect an escape to the rear. Leaving

these men under control we moved

on to the second line. I think the com -

 

[*? Came later*] xxx communication trench ran straight

on through. At any rate at this

corner, I stopped to see how things

were going on our flanks. There

was not much happening on the

right of me but on my left in the

German second line a German

machine gun was mounted firing

at our men in the first line &

holding them up. A was Lewis gun

was obtained (whether this was with

me or whether I sent back for it

I cant remember). and the necessary

action taken to bring it into operation

from the side of the communication trench

where it continued past the second line.

At this time the men in the first line

were engaging the enemy gun with

machine gun & rifle fire from the

first line. Unfortunately on the Lewis

gun coming into action to fire

slightly in to the rear of the German

gun crew, our own men must have

taken it for a second German gun

as owing to lack of time we had not

been able to throwgh up a side protection

 

to mask the fire as they immediately

opened up on us & the gunner

dropped with a bullet wound through

the head. Deciding that there was no

time to take action to cover our

fire we moved down the trench to

the gun only to find that the gun had

been removed & I think 3 or 4 dead

Germans left there all being killed

with head wounds. We moved some

distance down this trench coming

across no one but one small

Australian & a big German down

with a bayonet wound. The A had

been moving down the trench towards

us away from towards us & the two had met

the boy getting in first & as a result

becoming very surprised. He was

still standing looking at his captive

when we reached him & immediately

asked what he was to do. The advice

given by someone was to "go on &

bayonet some more". Moving back

[*S. in Calwer*] 

we continued on the communication

trench toward the rear, till I think

we came to an open road with the

 

enemy holding the other side. A post

was established at this point. Going

back to the 2nd line we went some

distance to our right & met

resistance. (From this point things

are hazy as far as I am concerned

though bombing was I can remember

much indulged in). My next particular

recollection is that we were

held at all points & that I it was

daylight. Bombing must have

been going on because I went back

to see what arrangements could

be made to get more bombs. I

found that the trenches at the back

were full of men doing nothing. They

were a mixture of our own men &

the supporting battalion who apparently

[*S Cobs
bombs*] 

instead of going straight on through

us had dropped into our lines. I

made what arrangements I could

to have bombs collected from them

& sent up to the bombing posts.

By this time it was certain that

we could not organise another

attack during the day & it was a

 

question of if possible holding the

enemy till night & making another

try to get on. Bombs were where

possible collected from those lying

outside the trenches if they were

under cover from enemy fire. (The

enemy machine guns had done much

damage particulary on a sunken

trench that ran through their lines).

By this time our offensive had stopped

& it was a question of holding as

much as we had got. The only officer

that I remember seeing about this time

was I were was Lieut McCarthy. I think whom

[*McC in 

2 line*]

I met in the second line running

a bombing post. (b) Our defence.

This really started from the time that

our bombers were held up & continued

throughout the morning till we got

out of the trenches. Owing to lack

of bombs we were not able to hold

our posts & the enemy's pressure

kept steadily increasing. Efforts were

strongly made to keep up the supply

of bombs but they could not be got

up fast enough. I am unable to

 

give details of the fighting. My next

recollection is of the conference. mentioned

by you. I think I arrived as

it was just over & do not remember the

details except that I immediately left

to have our telephone communications

destroyed. These were situated in

a dugout to the right of the position

where the conference was held. On the

way there I was able to use the

trenches but on the return journey

owing to the enemy pressure our

posts had been forced to retire

& I had to take to the open between

the trenches. On entering our own

line I found that in the spot I had

entered an instruction had been

given by a junior officer of our

supporting battalion allowing our

men to put up the white flag which

they had effected by tying handkerchiefs 

on to rifles with fixed bayonets.

[*S found
some men
surrendering*]
These were immediately taken down &

suitable advice given. I then went up

to the posts again & found them

very much pushed in & after advising

 

those that I saw as to the decision

to retire slowly as the support could

not be kept up, I moved back towards

the first line. There seemed to be

very few of our men about then &

the Germans were coming in very

close. so I decided to leave some
where about between 12.30 & 1 pm.
[*Some of 

the last*]

There could have been very few

of our men on our left then as

on getting in to the open the Germans

had their guns firing again from

the front line. There seemed to be

a fair number of our men in shell

holes in front of the german lines

but they did not seem to like to move

owing to the fire.  A lot of these

were probably taken prisoner after

leaving the lines & seeing the men

in the shell holes & then getting hit

I only saw one of our men moving

& he was trying to take his gun out.

(4) I regret I am unable to

give any information regarding

these men as I did not see them

& have no information. Our

 

 

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