Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/247/1 - 1917 - 1933 - Part 15

20.

This information was brought in by a man from the

47th Bn. who came over when the 46th retired.

Captain Leane then ordered at attack on the German

front line which was entered by means of the communication.

trench. About 250 yards of this trench was cleared up

after the evacuation by the 46th Bn., but owing to the

shortage of bombs on the right the 48th Bn. retired on

receipt of orders from the O.C. at about 12.30 p.m.

S.McKenzie,

2nd Lieut.

21

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

From   Commanding Officer

48th Battalion 

To  Headquarters

12th Aust. Inf. Bde.

Report on Operation of Tanks April 11th 1917.

The Tanks on the left sector were not in position at 4.am.,

in fact at that time I saw several behind Railway Embankment.

All the Tanks did not advance on our front, only two reached

Sunken Road near “Jumping Off" Trench. These went forward

to about U 28 d 9 1, U 28 d 8 1 and opened machine-gun and

six pounder fire on the Boche trenches. They did not arrive

at this point until after 5 a.m. and remained there for some 

time firing.

Our advance commenced at 5.16 not 4.45 a.m. as stated

by C.O. Tanks, and the men were exposed to heavy flank fire from

5 a.m., at which time barrage lifted off trenches East of

BULLECOURT.

The two tanks mentioned only went forward about 100 yards

and stopped again about U 28 c 2 5 , at this point the Infantry

left them and they were not seen again on our front by the

attackers. They certainly did not reach the HINDENBURG LINE 

for the stakes were still standing and the wire strong. In
fact my opinion is that they never tried to do so.

The statement that they captured the HINDENBURG LINE front
and Support Trench is not correct. They were never near it

on the left sector. The only tank to go near his lines was

the one that went into the south east corner of BULLECOURT

but that was some hours after.

 

22.

At about 6.30 a.m. I saw a Tank near my Headquarters

on Railway Track, and told the officer in charge of it to go

to the north east corner of BULLECOURT and assist my Battalion

to clear up their left. We were being strongly counter-

attacked at this time. It was a mule tank and went forward

firing its six pounders as it moved. I watched this tank

and after going about 300 yards it  turned, and returned. When

about 20 yards from my Headquarters the crew left it and rushed

to the Embankment. I inquired from the N.C.O. why he had left

it, and he said they had a direct hit, and I believe one man

was slightly wounded by the door blowing in. He said it was 

going all right and could be driven away but declined to try

and the crew left for the rear. The enemy put a heavy fire on

to the Tank and about 7.30 a.m. it caught fire. I believe

this tank could have been salved had the crew possessed the

necessary pluck. They were absolutely panic-stricken when

they reached my Headquarters.

What was achieved by this Battalion was in no way due

to the assistance given by the Tanks.  In fact they were a 

hindrance, not a help. The men would have gone forward at 

once under cover of darkness, instead of having to wait in the

open from 4 a.m. until 5.16 a.m. by which time it was daylight,

for Tanks that never advanced. Had we been able to get forward

half the casualties would have been saved.

Why the Tanks stopped and opened fire from the "Jumping

Off" Trench perhaps is best known to the O,C,  Tanks. It

was certainly bad tactics because it promptly brought a

barrage right on the men waiting to advance.

I am of the opinion that the Tanks absolutely failed to

carry our their part in the attack. I consider had they shown

more dash and incentive things would have been better and

 

23.

perhaps we might have been still holding the line

captured today.

In the field

19/4/17
Raymond L. Leane                                           

Lieut.-Col
Commanding 48th Battalion.                                                    

                                                                   

 

24.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

1st Anzac Corps, 11 April, 1917.

My dear Leane,

I cannot tell you how extremely grieved I am to

have heard of your brother’s death. Words cannot express

what I fell in the matter. Having lost the one brother,

I had hoped that the rest of your family, all of whom have

done such magnificent work for the Empire, would be spared

to return to Australia, and with all the honour which has

been achieved by you all. I know that nothing that I  can

say can lessen the blow, but I am sure you realise how

deeply I sympathise with you, for it is to those who

are left comes all the suffering, and I trust it may be

some small consolation to know what real brave work your

brother put in during his whole time in the A.I.F. and

how gallantly he fell.

With my deepest sympathy,

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) W.R. BIRDWOOD,

LIEUT.-GENERAL.

COMMANDING 1ST ANZAC

TEL-CITY10900-EXT. 81

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

HISTORIAN

NO. 5392.

VICTORIA BARRACKS SYDNEY

22 January, 1930

Brig-General R.L. Leane, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C., V.D.,

Chief Commissioner of Police,

Adelaide. S.A.

Dear Leane, 

I have been writing the narrative of the First Battle of

Bullecourt. the records are fairly complete, but there are a few

points which puzzle me.

(1) Regarding the 48th, I think you told me that each man

carried four bombs. Lieutenant Challen and another officer

after the fight both say that each man carried two bombs.

Would your memory today enable you to clear this up?

(2) I have a note that you had a telephone communication to

Captain Leane in O.G.2 most of the time. Could you tell me 

if this was by the same telephone which was used by the 46th 

who also, I believe, had communication?

(3) The 46th left at 11.15, and I have a note that at 12.5 you

received "by wire"a message from Captain Leane  that the

trench was becoming untenable. Could you tell me if the word

"by wire" are correct? If so, was the old telephone line

still in use after the recovery of O.G.1  by the 48th?

(4) Captain Leane's message book was brought back after the

fight. Can you tell me where it is, as I should very much like

to have the exact wording of all his messages.

(5) Your Intelligence Officer, Watson, informed you that the

Germans were reinforcing from Riencourt. Was this message

received from him by telephone after he reached the Hindenburg

Line, or was it information obtained by him from the railway

before he went? The time of the message also has some 

importance.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely

C.E.W. BEAN

[[?]]

SOUTH AUSTRALIA        HN

Police Commissioner's Office.

Box383E G.P.O.

Adelaide  25th January, 1920
REFERENCE NO.
(To be quoted in reply)

C.E.W. Bean, Esq.,

Historian

Victoria Barracks

SYDNEY.

My dear Bean,

I beg to acknowledge your communication

dated January 22nd relative to incidents in the First

Battle of Bullecourt. All messages received should be

with Battalion records and the War Diary should contain

accurate record of time etc. As you know, very few of the

commissioned officers returned from the fight. Both Captain

Leane and Lieutenant Watson were killed. Lieutenant Watson

did reach Battalion lines but so badly wounded that he died

soon after reaching Hospital.

(1) I made a practice of taking two bombs per man ,
(carried on the man) when the Battalion went

into the Trenches. I knew there would be great

difficulty in getting Ammunition and Bombs

forward after the attack was launched so gave

orders that additional ammunition and four bombs

per man would be carried. This would appear

in orders. I have referred to Twining who

was my adjutant. He confirms this.

(2) A Telephone line went through the attack. This

line reached O.G.2. I received messages in the

early part of the action. One I remember was 

that German Trench Mortars were giving us trouble

from a sunken road at the rear of Bullecourt.

I am of the opinion that the line was out of action

about 10 a.m. The 46 Battalion used the 48th 

line for some messages. These were forwarded to

the C.O. 46th. The situation was so obscure at

10.30 a.m. that I sent the Intelligence officer,

Lieut. Watson forward to reconnoitre. He sent

back that owing to the Casualties amongst the

officers he would remain in the line.

(3) The messages I received after about 10 a.m. came back

with wounded or Runners. The 46th Battalion retired

from O.G.2 at 11.15 a.m. O.G.1 became untenable

behind the 48th in O.G.1 after the 46th vacated it.

The message came by Runner.

(4) I have no knowledge of Captain Leane's message book

-2-

being received. Any messages received during

the fight should be with Battalion records.
(5) The Germans could be plainly seen reinforcing

from Riencourt This message was received prior

to Lieut. Watson proceeding to O.G.1. I believe

the time was about 10.15 a.m.

The First Battle of Bullecourt was ill-conceived

and badly prepared for. The English who were to attack

Bullecourt never advanced. Therefore, we were placed in an

impossible position. the was no artillery preparation or

support. The Tanks failed dismally. Only one tank ever

reached O.G.2. One apparently lost direction and went into

Bullecourt when it was captured. Another turned when just

in front of my Headquarters on the Railway line. The crew

jumped out of the tank and returned retired. Fairley, my Signalling

Officer, was sniped from Bullecourt endeavouring to shift

this Tank.

I have read, with pleasure, your last volume. It 

is wonderful that you have been able to obtain such splendid

record of the A.I.F. Unfortunately War records were not

perhaps as carefully kept as should have been the case and many

important documents were lost in transit.

Congratulations! The history when completed

will be a great achievement.

With kind regards to Mrs. Bean and yourself.

Yours faithfully,

Raymond Leane

Commissioner of Police.

St.Francis Island

Murat Bay

South Australia

Jan 1^st 1922

Mr Bean

Dear Sir,

Capt. Twining (Adj 48th Battn) has written

to me (an old friend) I am to send you an account

of Bullecourt, will do all I can for the

honour of the 48th, as I have always tried.

I can only give you the start from a private

in the Battn scouts point of view.

Dates, times etc exact I forget as I 

saw over two years as intelligence officer

in the 48th after that until the sad day we

(Broke up)

At Flers on the Somme we started

the Hun on his retreat back to the Hendleberg

line.

Next in Action along railway line in front 

of Bullecourt. (Embankments cuttings nor rails)

Our front was from the main road running

into Bullecourt along the valley running

between the above and Reincourt (I mean

village to the right of Bullecourt)

we had a  system of outs for out towards

the enemy wire.

The night of the take over a patrol of scouts

(moonlight night) 1 Corporal myself and another scout.

 

2

Came to enemy wire where the enemy wire crosses

the road running into Bullecourt from the right (Reincourt?),

we were at once fired on by an enemy 77 Battery

many of the shells burst in their wire (must have

been observed by post on opposite side of road

that we found after)

Made our way along to the road that runs into

Bullecourt from our front. Enemy had blown

the road up out side of the wire and were

consolidating the crater about 60 men at wiring

etc M.Gs as covering parties. We were right

behind them, they were working hard, & were fired on

as we were getting away.

Our Intelligence Officer L.W.Watson of W.A. (Both he

& his brother were killed in the attack) read a report

from G.H.Q. "Believed line to be very lightly held 

in sector; Sgt. Hammond (of W.A.) & 5 picked scouts

myself included had to get through Hendleberg line

wire and gain all information possible, "had to 

get through" Another Battn in 12th Brigade & 4th Bde

were to all try the same.