Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/247/1 - 1917 - 1933 - Part 13

FL.4151
5714.
14 April 1930.
Lieutenant-Colonel F.R. North, M.C.,
Bayswater Terrace,
Hermit Park,
Townsville, Q'land.
Dear Colonel North,
I have been writing the official account of the
First Battle of Bullecourt. The records for your battalion are
very meagre, but in conversation this week with Major Waine of
the 46th I have picked up part of the story. I should be
particularly thankful if you would help me with your recollections
especially on the following points:-
(1) Your company is said to have reached the trenches
either with few losses or with none at all, whereas
other reinforcements were almost annihilated. Do you
remember any reason for this, e.g., was Captain
Boddington (46th) just then bombing towards the left
in O.G.1, and might this have distracted the attention
of the Germans?
(2) Did you go on to the second trench (O.G.2)? Were
you present at the fighting on the left there? What
proportion of your company went to each trench?
(3) Major Waine mentioned that you were with him writing
an urgent report in the dugout entrance, when the
Germans broke through into O.G.1. Do you remember
through personal observation, how the flanks in O.G.1
were held, or what led up to this break-through?
(4) Can you remember the position of any of the tanks,
and also of the flanks of the 46th or 48th in the
Hindenburg Line? I enclose a rough map of the sector
and should be grateful if, in answering this, you could
use it in marking down any of the points referred to.
Yours faithfully,

48 Bn
Copy of Messages sent by H.Q., 48th Bn., on
11/4/17.
To G A BY
G.H./32.
In position
Time - 4.26 a.m.
To Capt. Mott and Capt. Moyes
G.R. /33 You do not wait for signals from tank. When the
first objective is taken you go on and take your objective.
Time - 5 a.m.
To G A B Y
G.H./34
G A I N Bn. advancing
5.16 a.m.
To G A B Y
G.H./35
On account of lateness of advance have arrangements been made
to keep barrage longer on flanks of Bullecourt
5.19 a.m.
To G A B Y
G.H. /36
Wind report aaa Sap aaa
5.23. a.m.
To A B C D Coys.
G.H./37
4th Brigade have gained first objective
5.38 a.m.
To G A B Y 
G.H./38 Priority.
Right of second objective gained by us
6.17 a.m.
To G A B Y
G.H./39  Priority.
2nd objective captured by us
6.18 a.m.

2.
To D Coy.
Priority.
Do you hold 2nd objective from your right to road on left.
6.20 a.m.
To D Coy.
G.H. /41
Do you require ammunition if so what amount
6.24 a.m.
G A B Y
G.H./42 Priority.
In continuation of my G.H./39
Capt. Leane reports strong parties of Germans reinforcing
up SUNKEN ROAD. This attack was broken by Lewis gun fire,
he is now short of ammunition. Have sent it to him. Also
sent up two Vickers guns and 1 male tank to assist him on
the flank
6.50 a.m.
To D Coy.
G.H. /43
Are you consolidating digging firestep and making block?
7.10 a.m.
To D Coy.
G.H./44 Priority.
Have called for barrage on SUNKEN ROAD V 22 D 2 3 Can
you give me map reference of right and left of your position
Are you in touch with 4th Brigade on your right
8.10 a.m.
O.C. 12 A.L.T.M.B.
G.H. /45
Please send up your 4 trench mortars 2 to report to 46th Bn.
2 to report to 48th Bn. in second objective this will greatly
assist in holding our flank Acknowledge
9 a.m.
The H.Q. of 12 A.L.T.M.B. not being where map reference stated
this message could not be delivered.

3.
G A B Y
G.H./46
Am not in touch with 4th Brigade Strong hostile post
with rifle grenades held me up Will you please ask 4th Brigade
to try and get in touch with us
9.30 a.m.
To G A B Y
G.H./47
Lt. Upton 1f 12 M.G. Coy. requires ammunition in front line
at once urgent
9.45 a.m.
To G A B Y
G.H./48
Confirming my verbal message the Intelligence Officer reports
that a body of men are marching from the direction of HENDECOCRT
From appearances the trenches are strongly held on our right
and left.
O.C. D Coy. reports that he expects a counter-attack.
He has only 7 officers and 200 other ranks left. Our casualties
apparently heavy. Most of my signallers and H.Q. men have
been either killed or wounded. The shelling has been very
heavy. I consider the position is very serious. Something
must be done on our left immediately if the trenches are to be held.
To G A B Y
G.H./49
Both 4th and 12th Brigades retiring. We hold this line but
you must assist with artillery barrage. Our casualties must be
very heavy.
11.15 a.m.
G A B Y
G.H./50
The 48th Bn. was forced to retire at 12.25 p.m. exactly
1 hour and 10 minutes after 4th Brigade 46th Bn. 47th Bn. retired.
We were forced to retire only on account of our own heavy
bombardment. Time and time again the Boche counter-attacked
after 46th Bn. and 47th Bn. retired.
Finally seeing our own barrage upon them what remained the
battalion fought its way back to our lines bringing in their
Lewis guns while heavy enemy rifle and artillery fire was
brought to bear on them.
12.50 p.m.

4.
G A B Y
G.H./51 Priority.
Reply to B M. 52.
Barrage sufficient.
Situation. The enemy is making no attempt to advance.
What is left of my men have been 2 nights without sleep.
Shall I withdraw them at dark as this place is too thickly held
and casualties are heavy
12.55 p.m.
G.H./52
All Coys. and specialists
Please give your approximate strength to bearer
3.30 p.m.
To G A B Y
G. H./53 Reply to S.C. 129.
Approximately 10 officers and 300 other ranks
3.50 p.m.
G A B Y
G.H./34
G A B Y order 138 received
4.15 p.m.
To G A B Y
G.H./53
Re your G A B Y order 138
Do you wish all 46, 47 and 48 Bns. to remain here in position
until relieved by 45th Bn. The position is very crowded and is
also held by 2 coys. of 13th Bde. Could not 45th Bn. relieve
2 coys. of/13th Bde. now holding right xxxxxxxxxxx sub-sector
and thus allow men of other Bns. here to move out as soon as it
becomes dark. Will you instruct by wire on receipt of this
so that I can make arrangements.
4.47 p.m.

5.
SPECIAL ORDER.
The Commanding Officer wishes to thank the 48th Battalion for
the splendid work Officers, N.C.O's and men did in the attack on
Enemy Trenches East of BULLECOURT, on the morning of the 11th inst.
Under the best conditions the task set us was one that
required the best of troops to carry it out successfully, yet you
did it, and did it well, despite the heavy barrage, rifle and
machine-gun fire that you had to face for over one hour from the
time you were in position until you were able to penetrate his
trenches. You successfully held the position for 6 hours, despite
the fact that you were outnumbered, held on to the position for
1 hour and 10 minutes after the 46th Battalion in your rear, and
4th Brigade on your right had retired. And then retired in good
order, Lewis gunners carrying out their guns.
It was an achievement of the very highest order and is
well worthy of the Battalion. Our casualties are heavy both in
officers and other ranks, but we proved again that we wre more than
a match for the Hun.
To have successfully broken into and held the Great
HINDENBURG LINE is something indeed to be proud of. We have all
of us lost comrades and brothers, yet we must not think the sacrifice
in vain, but rather let it make us firmer in our resolve to use
every effort to beat him to his knees.
We are waiting now for the next round. Let it be a real
knock-out blow the next time we meet him. Words of mine cannot
express the admiration and pride I feel in commanding such men.
You are indeed a credit to our loved Australia.
D.F.Twining Lieut.
Adjutant, 48th Bn.
The following are copies of messages received:-
From General Birdwood, Commander 1st ANZAC Corps, dated 11th April,
1917:- 

6.
"The Army Commander fully appreciates the splendid
effort made this morning by the 4th Australian Division,
which so nearly achieved a great and very important
success. Even though we have not gained any ground
locally, the Army Commander is satisfied that the
effect upon the whole situation by the ANZAC attack
has been of great assistance."
I am sure you all know how fully I appreciate the really good
work done by every man who took part in this morning's operation.
We have no cause to be disheartened at having failed to retain
our footing in the face of overwhelming odds. Rather can we
feel proud of the magnificent bravery displayed. Please convey
my feelings of gratitude to all.
(Signed) L. Craig,
Capt.,
for Lieut.-Col.
G.S. 4th Australian Division.
The following is a copy of wire from the Commander-in-Chief to
1st ANZAC:-
"Please convey to 4th Australian Division my appreciation
of the great gallantry shown by them in their operations
on the 11th last. Please convey this to all concerned."
Copy of letter received from G.O.C. 4th Australian Division:-
"My dear General Robertson,
Will you please accept yourself, and convey to
the officers and other ranks of the Units under your
command who took part in yesterdays operations my
sincere thanks for their gallant services, and my
congratulations on the success achieved in breaking
the formidable HINDENBURG LINE, notwithstanding the
failure of the Tanks from which so much was expected
in the direction of preparing the way.
The fact that we could not "stick it" in the
Line, was due to bad luck, and cannot be regarded in
any way as a reflection on your Brigade, which fought
magnificently, and in my opinion performed, under all
the circumstances, a herculean task in getting there
at all and staying as long as they did.
The Brigade has well maintained its previous
high reputation.
Yours very sincerely,
(Sgd.) William Holmes, Maj.-General. 

7.
Copy of letter received by Lieut.-Colonel Leane from Brig.-General
Robertson:-
Fricourt Camp,
13th April, 1917.
"It was indeed cheering to hear your boys arrive this
morning singing; it speaks volumes considering the terrible
experiences they endured during the BULLECOURT operation.
I consider the effort made by the 48th Battalion
truly magnificent. The failure of the Tanks upset all
calculations and for them to have pushed on without
artillery support through the thick xxxxx barb wire
and finally have stormed and taken the second objective
was wonderful and that the position was held so long
by the gallant garrison redounds to the credit of your
Battalion and the State from which they came. The
retirement had to take place and under the circumstances
it was the correct course to take.
I am very sorry for the heavy losses you have
sustained. Such men cannot be replaced and we shall feel
their loss very much. KISMET. We are in the corner
now but may be we shall be in the centre of the ring
again and our boys will not forget BULLECOURT.
My kindest regards Colonel to you and your
brave lads of 48th.
Yours sincerely,
J. C. Robertson. 

8.
AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE
From Commanding Officer
48th Battalion
To Headquarters
12th Aust. Inf. Bde.
Report on operation 11th April 1917.
The 48th and 46th Battalions were detailed to take part
in an attack on the Hindenburg Line, the attack to take place
at 4.30 a.m. on the 11th inst.
First Objective, 46th Battalion - U 23 a 6. 8 t o to U 22 d 4. 0
Second Objective, 48th Battalion - U 23 c 6. 1 to U 22 d 5. 3
The Battalion was in position to attack at 4 a.m. Receiving no
word of the advance I wired to Company Commanders at 5 a.m.
thinking perhaps they might be waiting for signals from Tanks
("You do not wait for signal from Tanks. When the first
objective is taken you go on and take the second"). The tanks
were slow in getting away. This proved very bad for us as it
began to get light, and an advance of 1,000 yards had to be made
before 1st Objective was reached under direct rifle fire from
trenches east of BULLECOURT. Only two tanks reached anywhere
near the enemy line and it was not until 6.18 that my men were
able to reach 2nd Objective. While the barrage remained on
enemy trenches East of BULLECOURT the fire was kept down, but this
lifted at 3 a.m. to allow the Tanks to operate on the flanks,
consequently the enemy had every opportunity to snipe my men
from 5 a.m. to 6.19 a.m. which he did inflicting great casualties.
I wired Brigade pointing this out at 5.19 a.m. as follows:
"On account of lateness of advance have arrangements been made
to keep barrage longer on flanks of BULLECOURT". On account
of arrangements made with the tanks nothing could be done.
No artillery barrage was on the trenches yet the men advanced
despite all obstacles and made their way through the wire. 

9.
This was necessarily slow work and many fell getting through
it. Captain Leane was the only Company Commander who reached
the 1st Objective. It was found that only a portion of
[*46th*] the 48th Objective had been gained and my first line had to
fight at the first trench to enable them to get through. It
was not until 6.19 that 2nd Objective was gained. Bombers
worked to right and established Block in trench at
Sunken Road U 23 c 85.05. On the left they could not advance
further than Sunken Road at U 23 0.4. Here they found the
Boche in strength. A block was established at this point
and several attacks driven off with loss to the enemy. Lewis
guns were pushed out in front and these did good work on
supports advancing from REINCOURT. The tanks never attempted
to do the work they were allotted. One tank reported to me
at Battalion Headquarters U 28 c 7.4 and I gave the officer
orders to try and assist my left flank. He started out to do
this but did not get far and the tank was hit returning.
The crew promptly left the tank and came to my H.Qrs. I asked
them could they not drive the tank away as it was standing
20 yards from my H.Qrs. and was being heavily fired upon.
The N.C.O. declined to try, and the party left for the rear.
This tank caught on fire about 30 minutes afterwards. Had the
Tanks shown more pluck and initiative I quite believe things
would have been different. The enemy trench mortars were
causing my men trouble and sent the following wire to O.C.
12th A.L.T.M.Bty. to the position given me by Brigade U 27 d 54,
but although my runners searched everywhere, both right and
left of this position they could not be found, and I have since
been informed that the mortars were never ^went forward. They
would have assisted my line materially. Every effort