Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/246/1 - 1916 - 1929 - Part 10

and then there was some fun. The Germans must have been gathering
for a big frontal attack as well, for several of them came in from
that direction calling out "Mercy", and gave themselves up.
The German certainly made a very determined bombing attack on
our left flank but we easily held them in check. Our arty support
was splendid: the German barrage also was very good; and stuff was
flying in all directions. Casualties began at once, but all were
wounded. J's best corporal, McCallum, was hit on the instep by a
piece of bomb. Some of our men became very excited at first, firing
their rifles off at nothing at all, and it took some time to quieten
them down. After a bit they settled down and were quite cool and
steady. The s/bearers were magnificent, carrying through a murderous
barrage up and down the winding slippery trenches all night long,
and well into the follg morning. The Germans at first were able to
throw bombs into our left post and our fellows cd not reach them with
our heavier Mills. Our own rifle grenadiers came up and threw rifle
grenades and the enemy was soon driven back. We were very fortunate
in the sector we occupied as the German arty barrage mostly went
right over our heads and fell on the support trench which the 5th
Bn. was holding. In a couple of hours the arty on both sides eased
down to normal, and the Germans ceased their bombing. One of our
 splendid sgts (Leay) suddenly spotted a number of Germans leave
their posts and crawl out into shellholes in NoMans Land. Without
waiting for rifle he sprang over the parapet, with only his helmet
in his hand as a weapon, and was folld immediately by Lt. Erry armed
with a revolver. The two of them, darting among the Huns, took the
lot prisoner, 5 in all, and jolly glad they were to give themselves
up. Shortly afterwards J was standing near his L.Gun when two Germans
were seen walking across NoMans Land. WIlliams, the gunner, turned
his gun on them and they dropped like stones. A few hours aftwds J
was at the same place when four Huns were spotted. Williams fired
a burst and dropped two; the other two at once started shouting out,
so J stopped the firing and yelled out to them to come in. J had
great difficulty in restraining a couple of men from shooting
them as they were coming in, but after threatening these men that
he would shoot them if they shot the Huns they laid their rifles
 

down. They belonged to the 9th Grenadier Guards.
When daybreak came the Germans commenced another bombing attack
on our left, but this time our fellows took it all as a joke and J.
actually saw men with pieces of bread and jam in their hands throwing
a few bombs and then sitting down to finish their piece before throwing
some more. This time our chaps gave the enemy such a hiding
that some of the Huns evidently to escape from our bombs jumped out
of their posts and got into shellholes. These were shot at and
bombed until one by one all had been killed to the number of 12.
Our fellows exposed themselves recklessly in their endeavours to have a
shot, so much that a German m.g. opened fire on several who were
well out over the parapet. The enemy m.g. crew exposed themselves so
much to shoot this good target offering that one of our m.gs spotted
them and fired a burst killing or wounding the lot. There was one
German who was seen to jump into a shellhole but he was too quick
for our fellows to take a sight and shoot him. They fired rifle
 grenades at him but could not get a good eno sight to put the
missiles in the shellhole, tho quite near eno to make him scared out
of his wits. Sometimes the poor terrified individual would raise his
head very slowly and steadily, evidently to see if he cd manage to
regain the trench he had left. Every time he showed a bullet wd be
fired at him and down he would go, head with a jerk. Eventually
it seems they got him at dusk as he rose to make a bolt for safety.
Altho it was broad daylight the German were in such a state of
uneasiness that they again sent up their S.O.S. rockets, calling for
arty support which was only given to them after a delay of abt 5
minutes and then only a feeble barrage at that. The rest of the day
passed quietly. At 10 p.m. J. was relieved by/a company of the 58th Bn., the
enemy arty fortunately being very quiet.
 

Nov. 14.
Hand drawn diagram – see original document
6.48 am : Attack.
7.45 : Heard that Peach & left of Pear failed.
7.47.     "          "     25^th were in 1st Objve &
                               attack going well.
7.55 .     "         "     25^th were in both objves.
8.15       "          "     Whole of Peach back.
8.16. on information: 25th in D to E, & G to H; Right flank open.
Action:
Holmes ordered up 2 Coys 20th (xxx for support requested)
Legge ordered that position be cleared in this
locality - suggests bombt. by Stokes Guns.
8.30         Heard that 25^th consolidating both lines.
9.10-10.15   "          "  enemy barraging 25^th Bn; that
300 massing agst 25^th were dispersed;
that sap ws thro' to first objve.
that 25^th in touch with 19^th.
11.11 Deduction from
information. {25^th Bn in G.H and D.E
{Enemy had bn meaning
to c-attack 25^th whose flank
was still open tho' they were in
both objectives, sap thro'
consolidation proceeding & in
touch with 19 Bn in first objve.
Action. Holmes asks 26^th whether
attack had bn renewed. Reply:
"ready in an hour." An hour & 
20 mins later further inquiry by
Holmes. Reply at 1.20 suggests that
force for attack is very weak &
that another (3^rd) Coy of 20^th Bn is wanted.
1.30pm. Heard that 25 Bn reached second
objve, but was driven out. Now in
first objve, wh confident of holding.
Information. 25 Bn in 1^st Objve (DE)
continuous with 19^th Bn & sap
completed. (GH lost).
Action, Apparently, to send Bde [[intelligence]]
officer to find out position for himself,
& find out what was wrong with
the supports for 26 Bn attack.
3.15. Heard ^from 19^th that 25 Bn was not in
touch with 19^th - but 19th was in
1^st Objective.
Heard that supports (2 coys of 20^th Bn) should
have reached 26^th Bn in opinion of
officer who took them down.
Information: 19^th Bn in Gird Trench & 25^th
Bn in Gird Trench with gap between
the two; & gap on right of 25^th.
Sap through to 25^th.
Action . Further conversation with O.C. 26^th
urging him to attack - finally ordering
him to attack by 4.45.
By Lt.Col. O'Donnell's order it
looks as if the objective were the
trenches EZX (the map used
is clearly not the 1/10,000 which I
have) The idea is to straighten
up the line M24 a from Y
"to the portion of Gird Support Trench
held by the 25^th Bn." At this time
The order ws printed written in the morning
& may have been changed by
the xxxxxx of the conversation
on the telephone.
(The objective seems complicated,
- on my map. It was explained
to 20^th Bn officers on the spot by
2/Lieut Single who went over in
the morning attack).
5.20 pm Heard The attack failed.
8.28 pm. Heard for first time that 25^th Bn
had left the 1^st objective.
9.30 p.m. 9.30
Information: Only 19^th Bn in part of 
Gird trench.
Action. One coy of 6 Bde ordered to Jumping off
Trench. Walker told that 19^th Bn must
not be left out of touch.
 

xx
Summary of Narrative of events connected with failure of 25th Bn
on 14 November 1916. 
(with my comments
made at the time - C.E.W.B.)
6.45 a.m. Zero time.
6.48 a.m. Infantry advanced from Jumping Off trench.
(26th on right;25th in centre;29th on left) 25 Bn
had a frontage of abt 250 yds.
7.27 a m. Message from O.C. 25 Bn that about 40 prisoners were on
way down - no further news.

7.47 a m. Message that 22 prisoners of 5th Grenadier Guards had
passed Bn.H.Q.; that they were taken by 25th Bn at their
first objective; that attack was going well and that xxx
left Bn had taken 25 prisoners also.
7.55 a.m. Message that wounded reported that Bn had reached second
objective; and asking for s.bs.
8.30 a.m. Bn reported that both lines of enemy trenches were bei
being comsolidated.
9.10 a.m. Bn reports that enemys barrage increasing - intense on
our original front line.
10.15 a.m. that sap in 25 bn sector was completed to 1st objve.;xxx
that work was proceeding on the more northerly sap; that
300 of enemy reported massing behind Gird Support trench
had been dispresed by artillery and L.G. fire; that situation
was approaching normal and they were in touch with
19th Bn in first objve.
1.30 p.m. That 25 bn was now holding  1st objve. Second objve was
reached but enfilade m.g. fire from right and left flanks
where flank bns either did not reach or did not hold on
to 2nd objve, and heavy artillery fire, compelled retirement
to 1st objve , which they felt confident of holding
3.15 p.m. Intelligence Officer 5th Bde reported that he had bn xxxx
informed by 19th bn was in 1st objective and that their
flanks were in the air, and Capt. Scott had established
bombing posts on either flank and was holding on with 80
men of Northumberland Fusiliers; tt positions of bns on
his right and left were not known to Capt.Scott; and tt
there were Germans on the same line on his right and his
left.
8.28 p.m. Major Bridges reported 25 bn back in jumping off trenches
enemy back in first objective; full report wd follow whe
when reconnaissance complete.
9.30 p.m. Reply by Bde. "It is absolutley necessary you regain objective. 
The right of 19th must not be left out of xxx
touch. Where is Lieut.Col. Walker and what report has he
to make? One coy of 6th Bde has been ordered to support
you in jumping off trench; send guides to Cobham trench
to lead this coy up. Show this to Major Nicholas as his
authority to act."
As no further informatn had bn received from the 25th
bn the following message was sent:
11.9 pm. "It is necessary that the G.O.C. receive a report at xx
 

(2)
once from Lieut.Col. Walker as to the present situation of the 25th
bn. Has the first objve been reoccupied and is the 25  bn
in touch with the 19th bn? No report has been received
from Col. Walker personally for some hours."
1.40 a.m. Nov. 15th Lieut.Col. Walker reported:
"I ws in my advanced report centre (formerly Headqrs
of centre coy of left bn) this morng collectg xxxxx informatn 
from observers and wd until 1.20 pm. wh I passed 
by wire to my 2nd - in commd. at bn H.Qrs who passed x
it on to xxx bde.Of my right coy I have heard nothing
except tt bomb fighting ws seen to be going on in its
objve and digging ws also reported. No men of this coy
who reached first objve have returned. Some men of xxx
other coys penetrated enemy first line capturing prisoners;
but these men are now with the 19 bn or have
fallen back. On the rest of my front machine gun fire held
up the attack and attackers dropped into shellholes
about 50 or 60  yds from the enemys front line. Major Nicholas
has bn killed and Captain Godfrey is in charge xx
of 2 coys of 24 bn here and is awaiting instrns. I xxx
have 70 or 80 men who are very done up in jumping off
trench. I think that an attack carried out by them wd
not have much prospect of success. Can I use one or
both of the 24 bn coys for an attack at say 5 a.m. The
sap from M 24 a 7 6 has not bn dug and I think the xx
best prospect of success wd be a bombing attack down x
the German front line from 19 bn front. I enclose report
just received from a coy commdr, a very reliable
officer, who took pa t in the attack. All reports indicate
tt the enemy is in great strength and tt enemys
m.gs from the road wd doom frontal attack to failure.
I am therefore awaiting your instrns. I am not now in
touch w t 19th bn as I understand they have moved ther
H.Qrs."
The report of Coy.Commdr referred to is :
"I ws in charge of B coy 25 bn, 3rd and 4th
waves. First and 2nd waves comprising D coy. This ws
on left half of bn sector. At 6.48am we jumped off and
crossed to abt 60 yds past jumping off trench. Enemy
 machine gun and shell fire heavy agst four waves and
practically wiped waves out. Remainder of men stayed in
shell holes through out the day 50 yds in front. Enemys
front line well manned by Huns who sniped until 12 noon
and had three machune guns in position abt 50 yds apart.
On extreme right o f sector I noticed bombing in Hun
line at abt 7.15 pm and saw final dispersal of our bombing
party. On the  extreme left about 50 Huns during xx
the day made their way through to xxxxx their O.G.2.
Huns were noticed repairing O.G.2 throughout the day.
Consider more H.E. shd  have bn used by our arty when
barraging this morning. I returned to jumping off trenh
immediately after dark and collected about 30 men of A
B and D coys . About 15 wounded men still in saps and x
some in Nomansland. I saw nothing at all of our C Coy.
Estimate casualties at 150 o.r. A Fletcher Capt.
1.55 am. Order sent to Walker saying G.O.C.cd not understand why
he left his first objective, and it was necessary that he
 

(3)
sd regain it. "You may use  the coy of the 8th bde
now in the jumping off trench if necessary; but you mus
must regain possession of first objective and hold it.
Show this to xxx O.C. coy of 24th Bn as his authority
to act. You  must yourself decide  course of action."
4 a.m. An almost indecipherable copy of an operation order by OC
25th Bn was received which provided for attacking the
1st objve with a view to regaining possession by 4.55 am
7 a.m. No report as yet from 25 bn as to result of their operatn.
Brig.Gen. Holmes and Capt.W.P. MacCallum (G.S.O.3) visitd
1st Objective passing by the new commn trench leading to the
positn held during night by 19 bn. Saw Capt. Scott here
He was under impression that the Germans were in portion of
1st Objve on his right vacated by 25 Bn, but had not
yet sent any patrol to find out. He had estab. a bombing
post in  trench on his right flank. Holmes and Scott xx
went along trench past this  blocking post foe 50 yds. x
No enemy met with. From there another 100 yds of trench
was xxxx  visible " and in it there were no signs of
enemy occupation". Capt. Scott and his men had had a
rough time during the night and were very cold, being
without blankets or greatcoats, and it was not thought
advisable to utilise them by extending their already
attenuated line any further to the right.
Gen. Holmes returned to 25 bn Hqrs . Col Walker
told him that the attack set down for 5am did not eventuate,
but wd be launched almost at once. He too had not
patrolled during night to find whether trench was occupied,
but said one officer had told him that "the enemy
were 4 deep in the trench." He was surprised to hear
that the G.O.C. himself had found that for 150 yds to
right of 19 bn the trench was unoccupied. "The G.O.C.
then personally and definitely ordered Col. Walker to
immediately occupy the trench. Lieut. Col Walker clearly
understood these orders and expressed his intention of
complying forthwith."
1.40 pm. No report from 25 bn,  but follg instructions sent from Bde
to 26 bn. "The 25th bn are occupying Gird Trench and
working down from M 18.c.6.2 to connect with your bombing
post at M 24 a.9½.5. The G.O.C. orders that you take
action to push up from your bombing post to meet the
25th bn at once and report results."
Abt the same time: telephone commn was obtained with 25 bn and Maj. Bridges
was asked to convey to Col. Walker the instructions
which had bn given to the 26th bn and ask him to cooperate
by connecting up with 26th bn.
At 3.42 pm Major ∧G.A.Reid  commanding 28th Bn who ws in trenches 
preparatory to relieving 25th bn, reported that 25th bn was
not making much progress, but were cleaning up trenches
as they went - trenches were very sloppy - and were then
120 yds from the 19th bn blocking post. and expected to
reach 26 bn before dark.
 

(4)
4.15 pm 25 bn telephoned tt they had reached 170 yds up Gird trench
- and found it very muddy. They had stopped to clean
trench. Bde major answered that orders were to push
on first and clean up afterwards. Maj. Bridges said
this wd be done.
4.35 pm: Bde major telephoned to 26 bn for report on their progres
with their bombing attack. Answer - that it had not
been started yet but wd be begun at once. Follg
instruction ws then sent to 26 bn: ""The G.O.C. orders
that his instructions be carried out immediately, and
you are not to wait till dusk. Report compliance."
5. pm. 26 bn began bombing from their end. 25 bn was not yet in
position to cooperate, from their side.
5.45 pm. Lieut Hinman, Intell. Offr 7th Bde, who had visited trenchs
at request of G.O C. 5th Bde., reported: This afternoon
under orders f om G.O.C. 5th Australian Inf. Bde
I went up to Gird Trench in M 18 c. to reconnoitre
progress made by 25 bn in establishing themselves
in Gird Trench. At the m.g. position on the right of
19th bn I found Sergt. Gordon 25th bn with 4 men at
abt 4.20 p.m. I asked him if he could explain the
situation  and tell me how far the 25th Bn had
gone down Gird Trench. He told me that he had gone
down the trench for 125 yds to the right without xxx
meeting any opposition from the Germans. He stated
that the had no officer with him and that he found
the mud and slush so bad that he decided to come
back. Sniping was also bad as the trench was practically
a series of shellholes. The net result was
that Sergt Gordon and his party had dug out about
6 yds of the trench, but had reconnoitred, according
to his statement, 125 yds.
At abt MIDNIGHT 15/16, when the relief took place, the connection
between the 25th and 26th bns  was still not complete.
It was therefore arranged with Col. Wisdom
that the work of connecting shd be taken up by the
27th and 28th Bns which were relieving.
 

Failure of 26th Bn on Nov.14-16 1916.
26th Bn started at same time as 25, same barrage. It occupied front
of 200 yds on right of 25 Bn.
The 26 bn arrived in line on night of
12/13 November. AT 6 am 14 November O.C. reported
that Germans had put wire 4 feet high in front
of our line.
7.45 a.m. from 26th Bn. Officer reports that left of Peach failed.
(?26 bn.) also it appeared that Pear (?25bn)

failed. He knows no more.
8.15 am from 26 bn. - that whole of Peach had arrived back in 
original line. May I use su port Coy to man front
line, xx casualties heavy.
8.16 a.m. Two coys 20 Bn ordered to move xxxxxx to support 26 Bn by Gen.
Holmes.
8.35 a.m. Divisional Commander advised "that position be cleared in
this locality" and full use made os Stokes
mortars.
9 a.m. 26 bn reported our own shells bursting short. Artillery officer
at once advised.
11.11 am, Holmes asks bn whether attack has been renewed. Reply
not yet, but it wd be ready in one hour.
12.30 p.m. Further inquiry by Holmes.
1.20 Bn replied: "D Coy 20 Bn consisting of about 45 men getting
into position. A Coy of 20 Bn reported 12.30pm
but are weak. Have 14 riflemen and 2 Lewis machin
guns only. My line is held very weak and C.O. 20h
Bn requires further order from you before sending
me his third coy. My right old trench is held
with 2 L.machine guns on a front of 450 yds, and
centre with bombing posts.
3.15 message recd. from Bde Intell. Officer, who had been sent to asx
certain positn., as fols.- "Have seen O.C. 20th
Bn. He reports he sent 2nd Coy at the time
stated in his previous message under Capt. Rush
who led them to within 200 yds of 26th Bn H.Qrs
and then handed them over to 26th Bn guides who
accompanied the coy. He still has 100 men in support
in Cobham trench ready to move if then O.C.
26 Bn has not received the 2nd Coy.
Conversations over telephone with O.C. 26 bn. in reference to renewal
of attack. Bn commdr did not want to carry on
but G.O.C. definitely ordered that operatn must
proceed at 4.45 pm. at which time it was understoodd
that an effort ws to be made by 50th Divn
which had also failed at its first attempt.
 

(2)
5.20 p.m. report from C.O. "The minor operation commenced at
4.45 pm. The first wave is reported to have
reached the communicatn trench where they were held
up by M.G. fire. The 2nd wave reached this point and
also seemed to be held up. The whole lot, accordg
to a report wh has just come in, are in shellholes
in Nomansland. The remaining coys 20th bn are holding
original line. Casualties not known."
9.20 pm. C.O. 26th bn reported that failure to obtain objve in the
Maze was due to its being practically untouched by
our arty, and enemy getting m.gs going promptly as
soon as our men appeared in Nomansland. Also activity
of snipers and "absence of spirit of aggression
in our men due to the health of the troops not being
first class on acct of boggy conditions of trenches.
Experienced officers were very scarce.
Later he reported that the shooting of the
Trench mortars in afternoon was good but ammn not
very effective. After correct range had been obtained
the mortars traversed the trench accurately.
November 15th.
1.40 pm Message from Bde to 26 bn to bomb up from bombing post at
M 24 a 9½.5 to meet 25 bn who working down from
M 18 c 1.2. and report results at once.
4.35 pm. No information yet. Reply to inquiry - that it had been
decided to carry out the operation at dusk.
4.42 pm. "The G.O.C. orders that his instrns be carried out immediately
and you are not to wait until dusk. Report
compliance. "
5.12 pm O.C. 26th informed that this operation must be completed
before battalions cd be relieved.
6.50 pm 26 Bn reported: "Have reached ∧about 150 yds xxxx from our front
line. enemy strong."
7.30 pm. O.C. 26th reported in writing: "Have reached intersection
of enemy commn trench running at right angles to our
trench. Enemy resisting stubb rnly; almost impassabe
state of boggy trench prevents bombers from advancing
at anything like fighting rate. One  man wounded by
enemy bomb."
(Holmes notes as to this that the intersection of German
trench was a long way short of 150 yds up Gird x
Trench, though the first message said they had reached
the further point).
 

Holmes raises the question, in connection with Lt.Col. O'Donnell's
fitness - where was his battalion on November 14th? On Nov. 12/13
there were 19 officers and 531 other ranks. His casualties
were 8 officers and 179 other ranks. This left
11 officers and 352 o.r. The O.C. did not seem to have
any grip of them. He pleaded that his battalion wwd xx
not an offensive spirit, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
An attack on the Maze needd
a dash straight for it by determined men.
The operation order of the 25th Bn: Objve of 25 bn: -Those portions
of Gird (O.G.1) and Gird support (O.G.2) trenches xxx
between Turk Lane and its continuatn Bank Trench, and
the road through M 24 a and M 18 D.
The 25 Bn will occupy the new Jumping off trench betwen
Turk Lane and the road M 24 c 6.4. X^X
[*?a 6.4*]
Coys - -  -D-  -C- (Jumping off trench- ½ coy wavs)
                -B-  -A- (Front line trench-½ coy waves)
Boundary between right and left coys a line runn ng
parallel to Turk Lane from M 24 a 2½.7.
1st and 3rd waves to leave at zero. 2nd and 4th waves
as soon as 1st and 2nd were out of trenches. Formation
desired 4 waves at abt 30 yds intervals.
OsC. rear coys to come under commd of Os C. leading coys
1st and 2nd waves to go for O G 2; 3rd and 4tg for OG1,
and after clearing up this to O.G.2. But 1st and 2nd
waves to drop specially detailed mopping up parties in
O.G.1. and go straight on to O.G.2.
Lewis guns to be posted immediately abt 150 yds ahead of
O.G.2 to protect consolidation. Each L.G. to have detaild
escort of bombers and bayonet men.
Sergt. Gordon with 2 sections of Bombing platoon to remain
in reserve in support trench east of Turk Lane. White
stakes to be placed by scout officers night before on xx
the dividing line between coys.