Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/244/1 - 1916 - 1933 - Part 28

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means of reconnaissance. Artillery fights are under the artillery commanders, infantry aeroplanes under the divisions, and all other aviation units under the Corps, unless they are retained at the disposal of Army Headquarters. 
181.  Balloon detachments are under Corps, who allot them to the various artillery groups.  In this manner, the observations made in neighbouring sectors will be better utilized than if these detachments were under the divisions.  A balloon central station has been formed for the whole Army area.  It disseminates
the information to all Groups, collects the results of reconnaissances and is responsible for disseminating them . It can also take over the supply of material. Infantry balloons are under Corps or Divisional Headquarters, depending on their employment.
182.  The other means of communication are, for tactical purposes, grouped together in "headquarters communication sections" which facilitates their proper employment and co-operation.
Whereas flights and balloon sections, as Army troops, are stationed permanently in certain areas, a portion of the other communication units change with their divisions.
 183.  For those units which belong to Groups (Corps), a special organization appears to be necessary. 
The existence of many small units which are distributed throughout the whole Army militates against their being rapidly engaged on the main battle fronts.  Small units are not desirable either from an administrative or a training point of view, and during a long drawn out battle they cannot effect the necessary reliefs. In the next battle, the troops and commanders will make still greater demands on cable communications, and a still greater expenditure of ammunition by the enemy, with a corresponding destruction of the communications in the front battle zone, must be expected. It appears essential to have large reserves of communication troops available (telephone, wireless, field signal sections, power buzzer stations, carrier pigeons and messenger dogs). It will be advisable to form communication units which comprise all these means of
communication in various detachments. The formation of these reserves under General Headquarters would enable as many communication units as were necessary to be engaged at once at the beginning of a trench battle. The gradual withdrawal of many small isolated units from other fronts, which so easily leads to
their being engaged 'drop by drop, would be obviated. The formations would be accustomed to working together and would be able to effect the requisite reliefs, within themselves, the necessity for which has been so clearly shown. On the other hand, the majority of these means of communication can be dispensed with
on quiet sectors of the front where telephone communication is maintained. 
184.  As regards organization after the units have been engaged, the following points have been brought out:- The changes in the telephone units of Corps and divisions lead to the experience and the absolutely necessary knowledge of the telephone system being lost.  Consequently, a permanent communication officer
is necessary for each Corps and divisional sector during the whole period of the battle.  The telephone squad: which are necessary for the construction of the special artillery, anti-aircraft and aviation systems must remain with Corps throughout the whole battle, as permanent traffic and construction personnel. This will

obviate the otherwise unavoidable friction, with all its disadvantages to the conduct of the battle.  It will be the duty of the communication officer to keep up maps showing which portions of the battle zone are heavily shelled or otherwise (communication maps). Many casualties can be avoided by these means.
 185.  The wireless units are tactically under the division; their technical control, however, must in view of the jamming within the Group which would otherwise be unavoidable owing to the narrow fronts of the sectors, be exercised by the wireless commander at Corps headquarters.  The allotment of wave lengths to
aeroplanes is also included in this officer's duties. The organization of the wireless detachment must be such that there is a reserve station, with personnel, available in case of break-downs, or for employment with the forward artillery observers. In addition, some detachments should, if possible, be kept in reserve to act as
reliefs.
186.  The Held signal sections and power buzzer stations are entirely under the control of the head-quarters communication section.  Here, too, organization in fairly large units is desirable, so as to make reliefs possible.
187.  Mobile carrier pigeon lofts should be filled up with fresh young birds whenever they are moved to a different point, as the latter accustom themselves to the new place in a comparatively short time.
188.  The means of communication of the troops in line (telephones, signal apparatus) must remain entirely at their disposal.
189.  The survey section, owing to the wide extent of the battle, is no longer in the position to sift all the information sufficiently quickly and disseminate it to the troops in the form of a map. It is essential that each Corps Headquarters should establish a topographical section, which will undertake the sifting of the information received and print maps for a particular sector both in front of and behind the front of the Group. The topographical sections must be provided with skilled staffs and plenty of materials.
190.  When fresh Army or Corps Headquarters are established, the employment of newly formed telephone detachments, survey sections, &c., must, in principle, be avoided. It takes weeks for the units in question to become fully efficient, a circumstance which is perhaps unobjectionable on a quiet front, but which may have very serious disadvantages on a principal battle front. It seems better to withdraw existing formations from quiet fronts and to send the new formations to replace then.
(c.) Preparations on quiet fronts.
191.  A special aviation telephone system should be prepared, sufficient for the conditions of a great defensive battle. The infantry aeroplanes should practise frequently with the infantry.
192. The balloons should practise signalling with the infantry. A large number of balloon observers from the other arms should be trained, so that, if new detachments are brought up, the necessary number of observers who already know the ground is immediately available.

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193. The system of telephone wires should be relaid, avoiding roads and villages as far as possible, so

that telephone lines for use in battle lie entirely outside villages, while several lines run to the most important

points by different routes. Preparations should be made to enable communications to be quickly established

in case fresh divisions are put into the line or the existing divisional headquarters are moved. (Construction

and alteration of local communications.)

194. The construction of dug-outs for a large number of power buzzer and wireless stations and field

signal sections; these should be provided in the rearward positions as well. The establishment of a large

number of light - signal lines.

195. The ground to the depth of about 30 miles behind the front should be surveyed. Topographical

sections should be established. The personnel should be despatched to the survey sections of the principal
battle fronts to learn the new requirements which have arisen (e.g., maps in which the enemy’s artillery
positions are numbered consecutively, become useless at once, if the enemy brings up a large number of new
batteries as it then becomes impossible to find any battery number. They should be designated by letters
within map squares. Our own trenches and those of the enemy should be numbered).

H. THE FIGHTING TASKS OF AEROPLANES AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT
ARTILLERY.
I. - Causes of initial failures.
196. The beginning and the first weeks of the Somme batter were marked by a complete inferiority of our own air forces.
The enemy's aeroplanes enjoyed complete freedom in carrying out distant reconnaissances. With the
most extreme accuracy on the trenches occupied by our infantry; the required data for this were provided by
undisturbed trench reconnaissance and photography.
By means of bombing and machine gun attacks from a low height against infantry , battery positions
and marching columns, the enemy's aircraft inspired our troops with a feeling of defencelessness against
the enemy's mastery of the air.
On the other hand, our own aeroplanes only succeeded in quite exceptional cases in breaking through
the hostile patrol barrage carrying out distant reconnaissances; our artillery machines were driven off
whenever they attempted to carry out registration for their own batteries. Photographic reconnaissance
could not fulfil the demands made upon it.
197.  Thus, at decisive moments, the infantry frequently lacked the support of the German artillery either in counter-battery work or in barrage on the enemy's infantry massing for attack.  Heavy losses in personnel and material were inflicted on our artillery by the enemy's guns, assisted by excellent air observation, without our being able to have recourse to the same methods. Besides this, both arms were
exposed to attacks from the air by the enemy's battle-planes, the moral effect of which could not be ignored.
198.  The causes of this inferiority on the part of our own aeroplanes lay, firstly, in their numerical inferiority, which, at the beginning of the battle, was in the proportion of one to ten. We were also insufficiently supported by our anti-aircraft guns, the small number of which had been reduced still further both by numerous casualties to equipment caused by the hostile artillery and by the wearing out of the
guns themselves.  An adequate anti-aircraft telephonic system was also lacking, so that the reports about the appearance of hostile aeroplanes mostly arrived too late. The fact that our battle-plane squadrons were stationed far in rear of the front made  it difficult for them to arrive in time, and the fact that the lst Battle- Plane Squadron was equipped with "G" machines made its employment for air fighting almost impossible.
II. Measures by which a gradual improvement was attained
199. The reinforcement of the air forces which was gradually effected, and especially the arrival of
powerful pursuit machines, was principally responsible for the improvement of the position in the course
of the battle.
200. A well-organised grouping of the available aircraft on the most threatened sectors of the front,
as well as our own counter-attacks, enabled us to obtain a local superiority in the air, at any rate at decisive
moments. The distribution of aircraft units to Groups (Corps) ensured their suitable employment on the
days of ordinary fighting.
201.  The organization of defensive patrol barrages, which only lead to a dispersion of strength, was forbidden.
On the other hand, it was made the duty of every flying officer to attack the enemy's machines over the enemy's lines in order to facilitate the work of reconnaissance and registration. Strong fighting patrols of at least three machines were employed to carry out this task. 
202.  As soon as sufficient aircraft units were available, bombing and machine gun attacks on the enemy's infantry and battery positions were undertaken.
203.  The aircraft units in rear were brought up as close to the front as the choice of aerodromes and the range of the enemy's guns allowed. By this means it was ensured that they were always well-informed about the situation on the front, and could arrive rapidly on the spot whenever a number of hostile machine
appeared. With the same object, during days of heavy fighting, aeroplane liaison officers were sent to Divisional command posts or observing stations.
204. Owing to the extension of the front and the activity of the enemy's machines, it became impossible to control the struggle for air superiority from one office at Army Headquarters. Each Group (Corps) was. therefore, allotted a wing commander (Flieger-Gruppenführer) corresponding to the allotment of aircraft
 

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units to the Groups. This officer controlled the employment of the available more especially as regards air fighting.
205.  The battle-plane squadrons were split up as protective fights (Schutzstaffeln) and allotted to the various artillery flights, their aerodromes being changed at the same time so as to ensure close co-operation between the fighting and reconnaissance units.
206.  Cooperation with anti-aircraft guns, especially as regards utilizing their observations of the enemy's aerial activity, was ensured by the organization of joint antiaircraft report centres, and of a single aircraft and anti-aircraft telephone system. Reports concerning the situation on the front and the demands of the troops for anti-aircraft protection were collected by these officers of the anti-aircraft service stationed close to the front.  The information was passed on by them to the wing commanders of pursuit fights attached to Army Headquarters, who, in turn, could regulate the employment of their units accordingly.
III.-Experiences and lessons.
207. In trench warfare, to obtain the mastery of the air during a battle is an essential condition for long distance and trench reconnaissances as well as for artillery registration.  Next to the strength of the artillery and the quantity of ammunition available,  the mastery of the air forms the decisive factor for success in the artillery combat.  The struggle for supremacy in the air must, therefore, precede the artillery
battle.
Only the early employment of strong air forces is here productive of success. These must be supported by a numerous anti-aircraft artillery and the efficient working of a well-organized telephone system.
The attacker will, by the employment of strong air forces, be able to acquire the mastery of the air from the outset, but at the same time will betray his offensive plan.  As soon as the first preparations for hostile attack are recognised, it will be the task of the defender to concentrate rapidly all the air forces which can be spared from quiet sectors of the front, and, particularly numerous strong pursuit fights, with
a view to depriving the enemy of the mastery of the air.  If he is successful, at all events, in hindering the enemy considerably in his reconnaissances and in disturbing his artillery registration to a certain extent, he may then in certain circumstances delay the attack considerably and gain sufficient time to complete
his other defensive measures. The sooner he can employ strong aerial forces the better will be his chances of success.
208. The main object of fighting in the air is to enable our artillery registration and photographic reconnaissance to be carried out, and at the same time to prevent that of the enemy.  All other tasks, such as bombing raids, machine gun attacks on troops, and even distance reconnaissance in trench warfare, must be secondary to this main object. So long as the execution of the main task is not ensured, all available forces must be employed for this purpose. All subsidiary tasks must be abandoned, even when the enemy's attacks in the air are causing us considerable annoyance.
209.  So long as our air forces are insufficient to attain a superiority of this nature upon the whole front, endeavours must be made to obtain superiority at least at the decisive points, either during the preparation of an attack by ourselves or by the enemy. For this purpose, the aerial forces must be concentrated  at the right time and the right place, which is best effected by orders from Army Headquarters.  In other respects, the available aircraft units should be allotted to Corps Headquarters, where their employment during the operations will be controlled by the wing commander in accordance with Corps orders.  On days of ordinary fighting, the most effective employment of all units will be best obtained on these lines.
210. The employment of numerous single-seater fighting machines is the best method of destroying the enemy's aircraft. These units are most suitable for offensive work. Their task is to attack and destroy every hostile machine which shows itself.  Whether the enemy's machines fall into our hands or not, after they have been shot down, is immaterial in estimating results. The shooting down of machines beyond the enemy's lines bears equally good testimony to our superiority in the air.
The number of pursuit flights engaged should be sufficient to gain the mastery in the air from the enemy. Their number in not the only decisive factor, but also their success in action.  During the Somme battle, the First Army had, attached to it, the 2nd Pursuit Flight, which now bears the name of its heroic commander, Capt. Boelcke, who unfortunately perished too soon. This pursuit flight shot down 87 machines during the Somme battle, 21 of these having been brought down and crashed by the commander alone.
211.  In order to carry out their tasks, the pursuit flights must be allowed the greatest latitude in their employment. A primary condition is, however, that they are stationed so close to the front that they can at once act on their own observations. There is no truth in the widely-spread idea that, owing to the speed of the machines, the billeting of the unit several kilometres farther back is of no importance, for reports of the appearance of hostile aeroplanes arrive too late at positions in rear, and a constant patrol barrage with the object of always being on the spot involves an unnecessary expenditure of force.
212.  Artillery machines are prevented by their functions from paying sufficient attention to hostile aircraft.  Therefore, in addition to the presence of single-seater battle-planes, they require special protection by escort machines belonging to protective fights. In order to obtain perfect co-operation it is indispensable-
that their protective fights should be housed in the same aerodrome.
213.  The machines detailed for photographic or distant reconnaissance during a battle are no longer able to carry out their tasks alone; strong patrols of at least three machines should be employed on principle.
214. Attacks on kite balloons are only seldom successful, in consequence of the effective protective measures adopted by the enemy. Such attacks require thorough preparation, and sometimes the assistance of artillery, in order to neutralize the enemy's anti-aircraft guns. In offensive operations, they may be carried out with advantage shortly before an assault, in order to divert the attention of the enemy's artillery.

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215.  Bombing attacks by single machines have only a small chance of producing results, even when by frequent repetition they succeed in making an impression on the enemy's moral. These attacks are, therefore, only worth while when they are carried out during the course of other duties and not as a sole objective.
Bombing attacks by whole squadrons against previously selected targets may produce most successful results, especially at night when the enemy's counter-measures are less effective. The best targets are large camps and ammunition depots known to be occupied, as well as railway stations.
216.  Machine gun attacks on troops, when carried out frequently, undoubtedly produce great moral effect, especially when the troops have been previously shaken by a severe artillery bombardment.  This form of attack cannot, however, cause the enemy any considerable casualties.
In any case, the employment of machines for these subsidiary tasks can only be justified when the main objective has been obtained, that is, to enable artillery observation to be carried out.
217.  All operations of battle-planes must be supported by numerous anti-aircraft guns in order to hinder the enemy's reconnaissance and artillery observation.
The employment of anti-aircraft units is best organized by arranging a forward line of anti-aircraft guns, the individual positions being on an average not more than 2,200 yards apart.   Any gaps in the front line should be closed by a second back line. The defence of important railway junctions, ammunition depots, &c., will also be undertaken by anti-aircraft guns in order to set free the battle-planes for operations on the front.
218. In order to engage the enemy' artillery machines, which work at a low height close behind the enemy's lines and are therefore out of reach of our own battle-planes, single guns must be pushed forward as close to the front as possible (say 2,200 yards).  These guns must be placed in concealed positions in order not to expose them to premature neutralization. Suitable positions are afforded by large villages, which are easy to get out of, and where the cellars provide cover for the detachments in case of emergency.
219. The machine gun anti-aircraft sections may be used with advantage for the protection of kite balloons. One section should be permanently allotted to each balloon.
220. So long as the anti-aircraft guns are stationed within effective range of the enemy's artillery three alternative positions must be prepared for each gun.  In the case of motor anti-aircraft guns, it is advisable to allot to each gun a small area within which it can change position as required.  It is necessary to maintain an adequate supply of ammunition (800 rounds per day) at the positions of the front line of anti-aircraft guns.
221. Co-operation with aeroplanes, especially with pursuit flights, must be ensured by setting up a special air defence telephone system, with which all aircraft and anti-aircraft units are connected.  All reports are sent to a central station in each Group, with which the wing commanders and Group anti-aircraft officers are directly connected.  Reports are collected here and forwarded as required to the units concerned.
 222. The establishment of joint observing posts for aeroplanes and anti-aircraft guns is recommended. The firing of a few direction rounds by anti-aircraft guns, in order to call the attention of their own aeroplanes to hostile machines, has proved very successful.
 223. The infantry must always take part in the defence against hostile aeroplanes by means of machine gun fire. In many cases, hostile machines which have caused great annoyance have been successfully shot down by this method.
I. EFFECTS OF GAS AND PROTECTION AGAINST GAS.
Experiences and lessons.
224. The lack of effect of the great British gas attacks at the end of June, which were delivered as a preparation for the infantry attacks in spite of the unfavourable weather, resulted in our troops beginning to underestimate the effects of the enemy's gas. Later gas attacks on a smaller scale, which the enemy delivered
successfully owing to the weather conditions being favourable, caused the same troops losses which were partly due to carelessness.
225. The enemy's employment of gas shells caused a large number of isolated casualties, especially when the enemy combined high explosive shell with gas shell. When gas shells were employed on a large scale by the enemy, the gas was less effective in causing losses than it was in interfering with our action. 
Poisonous gases were employed along the whole front; lachrymators, which had but little effect, were only employed by the British.
226. The casualties from gas, apart from the usual number of unavoidable accidents, were for the most part attributable to the fact that the individual did not sufficiently understand to what dangers he was exposing himself, in a gas attack, if he waited to put on his mask until the smell of the gas became intolerable, or if he became excited by the fact that the attack was over and took his mask off too soon. Disobedience of the order that, in the line, gas helmets are always to be carried in the alert boxes on the person, was another reason for casualties
 227.  The methodical instruction of the men in these matters, which is obviously very necessary from what has been said above, is the duty of commanding officers, who must be assisted by efficient anti-gas officers.
The training and equipment of fresh drafts must be begun at the training depots in Germany, and be emphasized when the recruit joins his unit.
228. Our own gas shells were employed for counter-battery work against hostile batteries which had been located, and, according to prisoners' statements, have often proved effective.  In methodical attacks, a bombardment with " green cross shell of the enemy' observation posts and barrage batteries just before the assault considerably reduced the intensity of his fire.
No experience is yet available of the effect of combining " green cross" shell with high explosive shell in harassing and annihilating fire.
 

APPENDIX.
PREPARATORY MEASURES BEFORE THE ENGAGEMENT OF A DIVISION IN
A DEFENSIVE BATTLE.
The following preparatory measures, taken by a particularly successful division which was three times
put into the Somme battle, have proved both necessary and suitable.
A. DIVISIONAL STAFF.
Organization of the Staff for the increased stress of work which may be expected during the battle, and
attached troops. An orderly officer for intelligence, maps, and examination of aeroplane photographs.
Office work to be so arranged that the G.S.O. may always be able to obtain personal knowledge of the
battle-field and the tactical situation. Formation of officers' servants entrenching detachment from the
servants of the junior divisional Staff Officers.
As soon as it is certain that the division is to be engaged, a personal reconnaissance should be made
of the position,approaches, existing communications and distribution of the artillery
Issue of large scale maps to the troops so that they may be informed beforehand of the situation.
Sketches of the individual infantry sectors for advance parties when the relief takes place. Allotment of
motor cars to facilitate personal reconnaissance on the part of the infantry sector commanders.
B. TROOPS.
I. -  Infantry.
Training. - For the combat. - Bombing, competitions with live grenades, practice with captured
grenades, the best throwers to be formed in bombing squads; the attack of small parties with a view to
clearing up lengths of trench from front and flank; training of as many officers and men as possible in
machine gun work; early allotment of reserve material to the machine guns and registration of new machine
guns; formation of a machine gun central depot. to which a serjeant-artifcer is allotted and which is provided
with a reserve of material; later, this should be moved forward to the neighbourhood of the regimental
battle headquarters.
Instruction as to the general situation and as to when it is permissible to call for annihilating and barrage
fire; practice with light-pistols, signal rockets, and sound signals; arrangements for obtaining intersections
on points where barrage fire is required; instruction as to conduct if taken prisoner; inspection and instruction
in anti-gas measures.
For the construction of defences. - Construction of deep dug outs (every man must have put up at least
one frame); drainage of trenches; construction of portable entanglements.
The division will drainage for instruction in light-signalling (especially 1916 pattern medium signalling 
apparatus), the employment of carrier pigeons, telephone and wireless.
Communication between infantry and aeroplanes is to be carried out practically.
For this, a short code
is necessary, which comprises all phrases which are necessary for tactical messages.
2. Distribution of forces. With the increasing specialization in the infantry (light machine guns
light Minenwerfer, bombing squads, light-signallers, &c.), it is essential for a company commander to detail
carefully all his men for duty in the trenches and allot to each man his particular task.
General. - Formation of a fourth platoon as carriers and to act as a reserve; only sturdy, energetic men
should be selected for this and placed under good commanders. Detailing of men as runners and messengers.
3. Distribution of the personnel- Uniform distribution of the young drafts; in every group
one experienced soldier, if possible, to support the group commander; detail a reserve of subordinate 
commanders to the transport; reserve of telephonists.
The following to be detailed to each company: — 1 company commander, 1 company officer, 2 
acting-officers or vice-serjeant-majors. The remainder as reserve in rest billets or with the recruit depot.
Special duties.— Regimental supply officer for bringing up stores and food supplies (commands carrying
parties and arrange for transporting stores to the regimental pioneer park with the regimental baggage
wagons).
Superintendent of the regimental pioneer park. - Supervision of engineer stores and demands on the
supply officer.
One orderly officer (reserve of company commanders) to each battalion and regimental headquarters.
A second orderly officer in the office (reserve of adjutants); regimental machine gun officer with the
support battalion. Two officers' patrols for infantry brigade headquarters. Officer in charge of trench
construction, so that the trenches of the sector may be constructed in a uniform manner by the three
battalions.
Regimental observation officer, with a relief.
4. Equipment and clothing. — Assault kit; sand bags for carrying hand grenades and iron rations to
be carried slung round the neck; fitting of steel helmets; second water bottle; large entrenching tool for
every man; working dress (for working parties of the battalions in rear); improvised puttee for use over
boot and calf of leg in wet and muddy trenches; protective coverings for breech and muzzle of rifle to
be carried; as large a number as possible of food carriers, improvised food carriers, knapsacks to hold
food and water; white cloths for signalling to aeroplanes to be carried. For machine gun units, improvised
mountings.
 

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II-Cavalry.
Training of officers and intelligent non-commissioned officers as observers, with a view to employing
them at a divisional observation station. Patrol detachment for every infantry sector, whose task will be: 
To gain information regarding the general situation in the front line trench. Transmission of requests
of the infantry in front line. Accurate knowledge of the position of divisional headquarters. Knowledge
of the fall of the enemy's fire and of the approaches in the sector which are consequently the most suitable,
so that they will be able to lead up reinforcements during the battle.
Detailing and instruction of men for police duties. Formation of one or more parties' for work in
connection with the telephone service. Their duties are to ride daily along the lines in the back areas, to
put up poles and take measures to prevent break-downs.
The supervision of the whole question of horsed transport in the divisional sector (the driving of columns
and trains to be properly regulated) to be handed over to the squadron commander.
III - Artillery.
Training, inspection and further training of the gunners (layers). Instruction in barrage fire, error of
the day, handling and care of the gun, the various natures of ammunition, care of ammunition. Instruction
of observers. Instruction in entrenching, special attention being paid to cover from aeroplanes. Advance
officers to be sent forward in good time, if possible, to gain a knowledge of the target sectors and of the battery
positions. Officers and N.C.Os. for transport purposes (communications to the position, ammunition,
engineer stores).
IV. - "Minenwerfer"
To be detailed in good time into three Minenwerfer groups, one group for every infantry sector. Training
of the heavy and medium" platoons in the use of the light Minenwerfer, as this is the only one which
can be used in a long drawn out battle. Preparatory measures for the supply of ammunition (a difficult
matter), formation and allotment of ammunition carrying parties by the divisional staff. Equipment,
clothing and distribution of personnel as in the infantry.
V. - Pioneers.
As in the infantry.
VI. - Divisional Telephone Detachment.
Early reinforcement of the detachment. Training in light-signalling, telephone, wireless. Composition 
of a code for the transmission of the most important tactical messages (this code, which is also used
between aeroplanes and infantry, must be issued in good time, and the troops must be perfectly familiar
with it).
(Signed)
VON BELOW,
General der Infanterie.

C.EWBean
S.S 553A.
Extracts from a German Document
ENTITLED
THE EXPERIENCES OF THE GERMAN
1st ARMY IN THE SOMME BATTLE.
I-INFANTRY AND MACHINE GUNS.
General- "The duty of every infantry commander is, firstly, to train and educate the
infantry soldier for hand-to-hand fighting (which should not be a privilege reserved for assault
units, but should be a universal one); next, and more difficult, to keep him physically and
mentally ft to fight both before and during an engagement; and, lastly, the most difficult of
all, to get the men out of their shelters and dug outs in time and launch them against the
enemy.
"In this war, which is apparently dominated by science and numbers, individual will-power
is, nevertheless, the ultimate deciding factor.
"The defence of a position depends more than it ever did before on the unshakeable
determination of the subordinate commander and of each individual man to hold his position."
Training. - The importance of the following is emphasized:
(a) Individual training.
(b) Every man being thoroughly expert with all hand grenades, both his own
and ours.
(c) Every infantry officer being able to fire a machine gun and keep it in action.
The standard set is 30 seconds to come into action from the bottom of a dug out.
(d) Patrol work.
(e) Immediate counter attack over the top, as well as along the trenches.
(f) The quick organization of a methodical counter-attack.
(g) Constant practice in passing through or round hostile artillery barrages.
(h) Co-operation of infantry with artillery and aeroplanes.
(i) The rapid organization of a position in shell-holes.
(j) Regimental exercises.
(k) The communication troops taking part in the above training, and the use of
all means of communication, including light and sound signals, being practised.
"It is a sound principle to keep troops, intended for use on a certain battle front, behind
this front for about 14 days, to enable them to complete their training. In this manner,
immediate advantage can be taken of the lessons of the most recent fighting, while at the same
time commanders can familiarize themselves with the ground on which they are to be employed
and with the special features of operations in that locality.
Construction of positions. - "The front infantry trenches are well placed if they are
situated on a reverse slope out of sight of the ground observation of the enemy's artillery, and
are overlooked directly by their own artillery observers from a position at least 550 yards in
rear.
"The deeper the dug outs the more important are a good wide entanglement, continuous
observation of the foreground, and reliable alarms. Dug outs without these precautions are
mere man traps."
Conduct of the defence. Much stress is laid on front lines not being thickly held and
troops being distributed in depth on a narrow front. In front lines, one man for every 4 to 6
yards, on a frontage of 880 yards for a brigade, is reckoned sufficient.
Distribution in depth is arranged with a view to immediate counter-attacks; the necessity
for these on the part of subordinate commanders is continually insisted on. In spite of the
defended areas in rear, fighting must be for the possession of the foremost line. Should the
immediate counter attack not be successful, a methodical counter-attack must be organized as
soon as possible.
From 8 to 10 hours should be allowed for orders to reach the front from divisional
headquarters.
"The necessary preliminary for the repulse of a hostile attack is that our own infantry,
distributed in depth, shall be kept fit for fighting in spite of effective and intense bombardment
for days by the enemy's artillery. Continual work on the positions, and a good organization of
the supply of rations and ammunition, are the most important points in maintaining their
fighting strength.
Counter-attacks. - In methodical counter-attacks 1,000 yards of front is regarded as a
fair allotment to a brigade in the attack.
Counter attacks should not be arranged to take place shortly before or after day-break, on
account of the difficulties of artillery registration.
AQ Mal
C.M. 80 LJSJ
C.a. HWW
Capt Bean
A&Snece
 

Commanders of certain machine gun sections are detailed to go forward with infantry
assaulting lines in order to reconnoitre positions for their guns in the captured position.
Small infantry escorts are told of to machine guns, to act as covering, working and carrying
parties.
In every attack, rearward positions, strong points and flanking positions must be held by
emergency garrisons as a precaution against possible failure.
For the infantry, 150 rounds S.A.A. per man is considered an adequate allowance.
Reliefs. - Staff Officers of Corps or Divisions about to carry out a relief in the front line
should go ahead some days in advance, in order to make themselves acquainted with full details
of the line they are about to take over.
Advanced parties of incoming troops should go into the line a considerable time before
their main bodies. Rear parties of outgoing troops should remain 24 hours after their main
bodies have left.
Troops should not be left too long in the line. Worn-out troops take many months to
recuperate. The normal tour of duty for a brigade in a defensive battle is reckoned as 14 days
After a successful assault or counter-attack, troops should not be immediately relieved.
Successful troops consolidate and hold on to what they have gained better than fresh troops
who are not so well acquainted with the situation.
"Fresh troops will be led by the most reliable guides of the outgoing garrison. Delays,
crossings and blocks occasion unnecessary losses and have a depressing influence on the troops.
"The nerves and endurance even of the best troops have their limits, so that timely reliefs
are absolutely essential. The utter exhaustion of troops in action usually culminates in the
loss of the position. Worn-out troops are incapable of strenuous effort for months afterwards.
"The experience of the Somme Battle teaches that an infantry regiment, which has one
battalion in front line, one in support and one in reserve, can hold a front of about 880 yards
for some l4 days in a defensive battle. After this period, relief is generally necessary."
Equipment. - "Orderlies, runners and carrying parties are best armed with pistols, as
rifles get in the mens' way as they dash from one shell hole to another.
Rations. - "The widely spread idea that troops in the foremost line do not care for hot
food and prefer cold rations which they take up with them is erroneous. It is true that the
troops do not care for cooked food when it reaches them as a cold and greasy mess. On the
other hand, it is absolutely essential for the maintenance of the health and spirits of the
troops, especially in wet and cold weather, to do everything possible to bring up something
hot to eat and drink to the mien in the front trenches at least once a day.
II. - ARTILLERY.
"A systematic engagement of the enemy's artillery, of the enemy's points of departure
and of the enemy's troops waiting for the assault, could not in most cases take place.
Continual barrage fire, and nothing else, was regarded by the troops as the only salvation when
on the defensive.
"At the beginning of the battle, the troops had not been made to see that barrage is
simply a protective measure, to hinder the enemy entering a certain strip of country in front
of our own line, but that it does not do the enemy any damage if he does not run into this strip
or is not surprised there. Thus, by continual barrage fire, with its huge expenditure of
ammunition, material and human energy, no real damage to the enemy is ensured.
"Owing to the noticeable lack of long range flat-trajectory guns, there was, from the
outset, no possibility of a well thought out and systematic interference with the enemy's
organizations behind his front of attack."
Attention is called to the following points as the most important in the organization of the
artillery, which came to light during the battle: -
Equipment of field and heavy artillery with good maps and reliable battery boards.
Most careful supervision of the handling by the troops of material and
ammunition.
"The most comprehensive engagement of the enemy's artillery and continual
attacks on the enemy's rearward communications and billets.
"The results of these measures were soon shown by the fact that the troops recognized
that barrage fire diminishes in importance if the enemy can be systematically engaged with
artillery; that is, if proper attention is given to the engagement of the enemy's artillery and
to destructive and annihilating fire.
"It has been proved advisable, for purposes of command during the battle, to concentrate
the command posts of the divisional commander, the artillery commander and the commander
of the heavy artillery at the same place.
"If it is in any way possible, the fighting sectors of the field artillery groups should
coincide with those of the infantry regiments.
"The closest co-operation with the infantry will be obtained if the command posts are as
close together as possible; this gives an opportunity for the two commanders (artillery group
commander and infantry regimental commander) to confer together.
"Heavy artillery, especially when armed with flat-trajectory guns, must not be led away by
its greater range into choosing battery positions farther in rear. The object in providing long
range guns is not to enable such batteries to avoid the enemy's fire more easily, but to make
their effect felt far behind the enemy's line.
 

It does not, therefore, seem justifiable to use long-range guns for shooting from the map,
when their short length of life and their expensive ammunition are taken into consideration.
It is worthy of remark that our enemy's guns apparently have a much smaller zone of
dispersion than our own. He also appears to have better and more accurate data for shooting
from the map than we have. This seems to be proved by the fact that, in weather that
excludes all possibility of observation, and under conditions very different from those prevailing
during previous shoots, he obtains hits on small targets with great accuracy.
III. - AIRCRAFT.
Allotment— The following proportion of aircraft was found sufficient on the Somme:-
One artillery fight with protective flight for each division.
One infantry flight for each Corps.
Two or three reconnaissance fights, including one for photographic reconnaissance, for
every Group of 8 or 4 divisions.
Employment "The main object of fighting in the air is to enable artillery registration
and photographic reconnaissance to be carried out, and at the same time prevent that of the
enemy.
"All other tasks, such as bombing raids, machine gun attacks on troops, and even distant
reconnaissance in trench warfare, must be secondary to this main object. So long as the
execution of the main task is not ensured, all available forces must be employed for this purpose.
Al subsidiary tasks must be abandoned, even when the enemy's attacks in the air are causing
us considerable annoyance."
IV. SURVEY.
"The Survey Detachment, owing the wide extent of the battle, is no longer in the position
to sift all the information sufficiently quickly and disseminate it to the troops in the form of a
map. It is essential that each Corps Headquarters should establish a topographical section,
which will undertake the sifting of the information received and print maps for a particular
sector both in front of and behind the Corps front."
V. - "MORAL".
"Moral". -  It is claimed that the German infantry is superior to the British (!)
The value of assault platoons is discounted. It is considered that every man must be able
to assault.
Much stress is laid on moral and on the initiative of subordinate commanders.
Von Below says:
"The fighting value of troops depends on the standard of training attained by the
men and on the military efficiency of the subordinate commanders.
GENERAL STAFF,
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.
15th May, 1917.
ARMY PRINTING AND STATIONERY SERVICES A.5/17-S1001-6,500