Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/244/1 - 1916 - 1933 - Part 27
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which the attack is to be made. and thence to the captured trenches, demands thorough reconnaissance and
clear orders as to time, route, objective and duties.
It is advisable to detail a few infantrymen to the machine guns, to act under the order of the section
commander. Their duties are:- to protect the machine gun, to defend it in hand-to-hand fighting (hand
grenades), to help in digging in the gun in the captured trench, and to dig connecting trenches in shell hole
positions.
73. The basis for the preparations for the attack is thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's position
by patrols, observers and aeroplane photographs. The nature of the ground, the trace of the enemy’s
trenches. the condition and nature of his entanglements, the situation of dug-outs, machine guns and trench
guns, the degree of the enemy’s vigilance, are factors which demand thorough reconnaissance and must
be taken into consideration in deciding on the manner in which the attack is to be carried out.
The well considered employment of all technical means, and close co-operation of the artillery with the
infantry and of the airmen with the artillery and infantry require the nicest adjustment of arrangement as regards both time and space. If a hostile position has been conquered by technical means, all the
infantry has to do is to occupy it. It is advisable to issue good maps (1 : 5,000), specially prepared for
the operations and containing all the information gained by reconnaissance, and to distribute them down to
group commanders.
74. While the troops in the front line are preparing the starting point for the attack (which
is absolutely essential and should consist, if possible, of several trenches with dug-outs), the troops who
are to deliver the attack should be kept in rear, with good rations and quarters, and trained on a practice
defence work which resembles the actual position to be attacked as closely as possible. The detailing of
special assault detachments, which are to deal entirely with machine guns which have not been put out of action, has proved to be very effective. It is necessary to practise the individual detachments - even
the individual men - in the tasks allotted to them, again and again.
Feint preparations for an attack in the neighbourhood of the front which is to be attacked, the
employment of gas or smoke bombs, machine gun and Flammenwerfer activity in combination with bursts
of artillery fire and unusual aerial activity, leave the enemy in doubt as to the actual point to be attacked
and cause him to distribute his artillery fire.
75. The attack should not go beyond the objective unless a complete understanding has been arrived
at with the artillery.
At the moment for the attack, which, if possible, should not be made evident by increased intensity
of artillery fire, the most important point is for all detachments and waves of assault to leave the trenches
simultaneously, and sufficiently rapidly to avoid the enemy's barrage fire and to prevent any of the enemy's
machine guns which have not been put out of action from opening fire. Once the waves of assault have
forced their way into the enemy’s first line, they have nothing to fear from the enemy's destructive or
barrage fire, but can deal with the enemy's infantry without interference.
76. Counter-thrusts and counter-attacks are still too seldom employed as a means of escaping from
the enemy's fire for effect and taking advantage of the moral superiority of our own infantry. Troops who
have lain passivelv under intense artillery fire leave the first line with a greater loss of moral than a unit
which has carried out a counter-attack, even if this is only partially successful.
(h.) Equipment.
77. The steel helmet has proved thoroughly satisfactory and is very popular. To diminish the polish
of the helmet, which remains bright in spite of the grey paint, it has been found useful to smear the helmet
with clay and earth.
78. Assault kit must be supplemented by sand bags carried like a rucksack, which serve to carry
up rations and ammunition in place of the pack, which is too heavy. It is always advisable to take
greatcoats and waterproof sheets. Blankets are only necessary in cold weather.
150 cartridges per man are enough. Before the men go into action, it is necessary to issue large numbers
of hand grenades in sand bags, and to equip every man with a large spade (every section with a pick-axe,
pioneer and building material) as well as with cold rations for three or four days.
79. On days when there is heavy fighting, the demand for food is not so great as that for something
to drink. It is necessary to equip the men with two water bottles full of tea or coffee, and to issue several
bottles of mineral water, as well as to avoid all food which causes thirst (no salted or smoked meat). Bacon,
sausage which will keep, bread, rusks, biscuits, chocolate, tinned meat and tinned fat are recommended.
No rations must be issued in larger packages than half-packages, so as to make each man independent of
the others. Tobacco and cigars in fairly large quantities are a very welcome supplement, as also is alcohol
in wet, cold weather. To avoid the misuse of concentrated alcohol, it is advisable to mix rum or red wine
with the tea. It has proved very useful to issue solidified methylated spirits to warm up tinned food and
the food sent up from the travelling kitchens. It is absolutely necessary issue illuminating materials such as candles, carbide and electric lamps with spare batteries.
80. To keep the rifle from getting dirty, it is a good plan to wrap waterproof cloth round the breech.
Orderlies, runners and carrying parties are best armed with pistols, as the rifle gets in the men's way
as they dash from one shell hole to another.
81. The issue of light-pistols on the establishment scale is not sufficient for the requirements during a battle. It is necessary to increase the number of pistols and the amount of light-pistol ammunition before
heavy fighting begins.
82. For machine gun personnel, the following equipment has proved useful in addition to the sand bag
which is used for carrying stores:-
(a) Gun teams of the strength of 1 non-commissioned officer and 7 men.
Gun commander.– 1 water can, telescope attached to the belt, 1 reserve barrel in a roughly
made wooden box or wrapped up in cloth or the waterproot sheet, I condenser tube, I spare lock in his trouser pocket, I folding cleaning rod and a pair of pliers in his sand bag.
No. 1.– 1 auxiliary mounting, 1 light-pistol and cartridges
No. 2.– The machine gun itself wrapped up in a tent square, tool bag attached to his
belt, 1 spare lock in his trouser pocket.
Nos. 3 and 4. 1 – ammunition box each containing 500 rounds; oil, grease and tow in their
sand bags.
Nos. 5, 6 and 7.– 1 ammunition box each containing 500 rounds; hand grenades in their
sand bags.
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(b) 3 section commanders with 2 orderlies each.
Section commander. – Light pistol and cartridges, 1 water can.
1st orderly. – 1 water can and an oil can in his sand bag.
2nd orderly. – 1 water can, a belt filler in his sand bag.
(e) Company commander.
Ist orderly with a belt filler in his sand bag.
2nd orderly. – 1 oil can in his sand bag.
3rd orderly. –Tow and a belt filler in his sandbag.
1 assistant armourer with a No. 11 tool box in his sand bag.
(i.) Supply.
83. The supply of rations, ammunition and pioneer material must be organized down to the smallest
details and controlled by officers. It is extraordinary how far forward wagons (and also travelling
kitchens) can go under skilful and smart leadership, without casualties, even on days when the artillery
fire is intense. It has proved very useful to form 4th platoons and divide them up into carrying parties. All
ammunition and rations which have to be brought up must be packed up by the carrying parties beforehand
in their quarters in packages which can be easily handled and distributed. It is a good plan to pack the
stores for each group in a few sand bags.
84. The widely spread idea that the troops in the foremost line do not care for hot food and prefer
the cold rations which they take up with them is erroneous. It is true that the troops do not care for
cooked food when it reaches them as a cold and greasy mess. On the other hand, it is absolutely necessary
for the maintenance of the health and spirits of the troops, especially in wet and cold weather, to do
everything possible to bring up something hot to eat and drink to the men in the front trenches at least
once a day. In places where the travelling kitchens cannot come up close enough, cooking places must
be provided in the reserve and support trenches in which the food can be warmed up again en route. From
these points the food should be sent on in handy light mess tins which retain heat well, and with which
the carrier can throw himself down, in case the enemy opens fire. without spilling the food. Tightly
closing receptacles, shaped like a vintner's tub and carried like a pack, are strongly recommended.
85. To make the supply easier, it is advisable to establish depôts and intermediate depôts of ammunition
and rations in the second and third trenches and with the supports and reserves; these should be
established beforehand, while things are quiet. It is also advisable to establish advanced clothing stores
from which the troops can draw the most necessary articles of clothing and equipment, such as water bottles,
stockings, foot bandages and boots as quickly as possible, and to incorporate the company tradesmen in
the 4th platoons (mentioned above).
86. The machine gun officer on the regimental staff is responsible for the supply for the whole of
the machine gun units of an infantry regiment. He must arrange for the replacement and bringing up
of equipment and ammunition, and controls the supply of rations for the machine gun detachments which,
for this purpose, are best incorporated in the infantry companies with which they are working.
E . PIONEERS, SEARCHLIGHTS. "FLAMMENWERFER" AND TRENCH MORTARS.
87. The experience of the Somme battle shows that the following staffs and troops are necessary : -
Staffs.
Pioneer General at Army Headquarters with 1 adjutant, 1 officer for pioneer services, 1 officer for
Minenwerfer services, and 1 senior officer with 3 subalterns for the supply of material.
Staff Officer of Pioneers with the Groups (Corps). Pioneer Commander with each division; he also
commands the pioneer battalions of the division, and is the technical adviser of the Divisional Commander on
all questions of the construction of defences, Minenwerfer and the employment of pioneers and Minenwerfer.
A senior, permanent pioneer officer with each division. He should be employed for the most part, under
the Pioneer Commander, on the supply of engineer stores and weapons for the close combat, and, when the
division is relieved, will disseminate all the experience gained.
Troops.
Four pioneer companies for each division, one for each of the three infantry regiments in the position
and one at the disposal of the division for particular tasks. If there is mine warfare in the divisional sector,
one or two pioneer mining companies are also necessary.
One pioneer battalion at the disposal of the Group for the completion of the back lines and for special
tasks. A large number of Landwehr and Landsturm companies (about as many as there are divisional sectors)
at the disposal of the Army for the construction of additional back lines.
A pioneer park company for every pioneer park, and two for the Army pioneer park
88. Divisional pioneer companies will be relieved with their divisions. Just as with the infantry,
thorough instruction and preliminary training are necessary before moving into the position, which must be
carefully handed over, both by means of maps and on the ground. If the commanders have a good knowledge
of the position, the chances of ground being lost during the period immediately following the relief are
minimised. It is, therefore, essential that the Pioneer Commander and the company commanders of the
incoming division should be sent on several days beforehand with small advance parties, and that rear parties of
the out-going division should remain behind in each regimental sector.
89. One searchlight section per division is sufficient. Detachments can be detailed from these sections
for employment under Group or Army Headquarters.
90. The attachment of Flammenwerfer to the assault troops is specIally desirable when methodical
counter-attacks are to be carried out. Consequently, one of the Flammenwerfer battalions allotted
to the Army was combined with an Assault School, and, by means of small detachments, trained those divisions
which were behind the front. waiting to act as reliefs, in the technical use of Flammenwerfer.
91. The requirements of an infantry division in a defensive battle have, on the whole, been met by the
allotment of light Minenwerfer to infantry battalions, in addition to the Divisional Minenwerfer Company,
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as long as the Army also has at its disposal a few Minenwerfer companies which can be engaged at decisive
points. There is hardly likely to be any occasion to engage a Minenwerfer battalion as a complete unit
on the actual battle front, but a vigorous and overwhelming bombardment by Minemerfer on portions of the
Army front where no attack is being made can do considerable injury to the enemy.
92. In previously prepared positions, trench mortars of all kinds can be employed; on the actual battlefield,
when there are no previously prepared positions, heavy and medium Minenwerfer cannot be employed,
owing to the difficulty of ammunition supply.
Light Minenwerfer can only be employed when cover is available. Their main tasks are annihilating and barrage fire.
93. Minenwerfer are best employed in groups of two to four mortars, in order to avoid over-concentration.
The distance behind the front line should be such that they cannot be overrun immediately the enemy
penetrates into the position. Conspicuous points are to be avoided, and every advantage should be taken
of cover provided by the lie of the ground. Alternative emplacements are of value, provided ammunition
supply is feasible and covered communications are available. Co-operation with infantry and artillery must
be effected in accordance with a fixed scheme of targets and barrage fire.
F. ARTILLERY
I. Causes of initial failures.
94. At the beginning of the battle of the Somme, our artillery was far too week in numbers, in calibres,
supply of ammunition and means of observation, to meet the enemy from the outset with the requisite
counter-measures. To this may be added the quite noticeable inferiority of our reconnaissance, especially
aerial reconnaissance, for which the enemy produced a very large number of machines, corresponding to his
artillery equipment, and which doubtless also were well organized and employed.
95. Thus, our infantry lacked the necessary artillery support. The result was a retrograde movement
under pressure from the enemy, which made general supervision and a clear system of command even more
difficult, and caused the artillery also heavy losses in men and material. The ground on which systematic
preparations had been made for the massed employment of reinforcing artillery, especially heavy artillery,
was partly lost to the enemy, so that the rapid and smooth carrying out of reinforcement on a very large
scale, could no longer be ensured. Practically all the reinforcing divisions came without their own artillery;
thus, there was a great mixture of formations, and consequently uniformity of action again suffered.
96. Under these difficult conditions, the artillery reinforcements which were hurriedly brought up, were
thrown into line as they happened to arrive, wherever the situation seemed to be most serious. The batteries
no longer found positions already dug and prepared. Under the enemy's fire, they had to start everything from the beginning. Any fresh headquarters that were allotted, had to be employed as quickly as possible, where-ever
the need was greatest. This produced for a time a confusion of units, which was bound to react on the
command of the artillery in the battle, and necessarily decrease the effective work of the troops. The
artillery was therefore only partially able to carry out its task in the defensive battle.
97. A systematic engagement of the enemy's artillery, of the enemy's points of departure and of the
troops waiting for the assault, could not in most cases, take place. Continual barrage fire, and nothing else,
was regarded by the troops as the only salvation when on the defensive
At the beginning of the battle, the troops had not been made to see that barrage is simply a protective
measure, to hinder the enemy entering a certain strip of country in front of our own line. but that it does not
do the enemy any damage if he does not run into this strip or is not surprised there. Thus, by continual
barrage fire, with its huge expenditure of ammunition and material and human energy, no real damage to
the enemy is ensured.
98. Owing to the noticeable lack of long-range flat-trajectory guns, there was from the outset, no
possibility of a well-thought out and systematic interference with the enemy's organizations behind his front
of attack.
II. Measures by which a gradual improvement was attained.
99. An improvement in the situation only became possible after the arrival of considerable artillery
reinforcements (especially heavy artillery) and of their auxiliaries (aeroplanes and kite balloons); it thus
became possible to give the infantry defence more support. But with the loss of ground still continuing in
spite of these measures, and the necessary shifting of battle-fronts owing to new divisions being engaged and
new Army Groups being formed, it was only gradually possible obtain an effective organization of the
artillery command and intelligence.
100. Attention is called to the following points as the most important in the organization that
arose:
(a) Provision of a separate artillery telephone system.
(b) A large increase of the previously well arranged survey system by forming an artillery survey
section, where all results of reconnaissance could be sifted and issued on a daily artillery
map which served as the basis for artillery fire control. Close liaison with balloons and
aeroplanes by connecting them up with the artillery telephone system.
(c) Equipment of field and heavy artillery with good maps and reliable battery boards.
(d) Expansion of the means of aerial reconnaissance and improvement of the co-operation between
aeroplanes and artillery. Increased barrage protection against the enemy’s aerial observers.
(e) Regulating the ammunition expenditure in accordance with the possibilities of supply, and thus
forming an assured reserve of ammunition.
(f) Employment of the ammunition parks within the Groups to carry out the supply of material as
well as that of ammunition.
(g) More careful supervision of the handling by the troops of material and ammunition. The
erection of efficient repair-workshops within the Groups and of a large workshop for the whole
Army area.
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(h) The following were also aimed at, but were obtained only partially or not at all during the battle,
owing to the unfavourable circumstances:—
The formation of a larger reserve of ammunition. to make the Army more independent
of replenishment from the rear.
The most comprehensive engagement of the enemy's artillery and continual attacks on
the enemy's rearward communications and billets.
The building of field tramways right up to the battery positions in order to ensure a
smooth ammunition supply, to spare the horses and to use fewer motor lorries, thus saving the
roads.
The construction and use of numerous alternative positions.
101. The results of these measures were soon shown by the fact that the troops recognised that barrage
fire diminishes in importance if the enemy can be systematically engaged with artillery; that is, if proper
attention is given to the engagement of the enemy’s artillery and to destructive and annihilating fire.
Thanks to the sharp look-out on the part of our troops, we were generally able to nip the enemy’s attacks
in the bud and thus decreased the number of useless calls for barrage. The more it was supported by the
infantry, especially in exactly determining our own and the enemy's lines, the better were the results
obtained by the artillery. Closer co-operation with the other means of observation, especially with the air
service, produced further improvement in this respect. A considerable decrease in the expenditure of
ammunition and material was attained, and yet our reverses diminished and finally ceased almost entirely
III. Experiences and lessons.
(a.) Preparations for the battle.
102. The employment of artillery reinforcements must be carried out on the basis of a scheme, thought
over and worked out during quiet times, making full use of prepared battery positions, methods of command
and observation, battery boards and lists of targets. For this, a type of armament plan, similar to those
used in a fortress must be prepared: it must include not only the front but also the back lines.
103. In addition, there must be an artillery telephone system which is quite separate from the general
tactical system. Where the complete construction of such a system. which is desirable, does not appear
to be possible or necessary in a quiet sector, the whole of the material must be available to be built in.
Material brought by the newly arrived staffs and batteries is generally quite insufficient, and should only
be used in cases of urgent necessity.
Special safety measures are advisable for the most important communications between command posts
and observation posts; these include placing the wire in special cable trenches, avoiding localities and
prominent points on the ground which are known to be much shelled, and laying the double lines of cable,
which must be placed well apart, in the form of ladder circuits, &c.
104. All troops, as they arrive, should, if possible, be tested as to their fighting capacity. Troops
that have suffered severely and are worn out by their exertions in other theatres of the war, cannot do
what is expected of them. In general, their move into line will be hastened and more efficiently carried
out if officers are sent on in advance. These latter can instruct the troops in the tasks that are allotted to
them (battery positions, condition of the roads, billets), and at the same time hand over the necessary maps
and plans.
105. A sufficient supply of ammunition must be kept ready within Armies, and, if possible, within
Corps (Groups), in order to be able to meet sudden demands quickly.
106. The supply in times of battle must be ensured, even in the case of the roads becoming bad, &c,.
by the construction of a large number of field tramways.
107. It is necessary to erect large repair workshops, which must be able to form branches at short
notice with the Groups, it necessary by making use of favourably situated and suitable armourers workshops
belonging to the troops.
(b.) Command.
108. In face of the frequently changing Groups, a certain permanency in command must be maintained
if all useful experiences, &c., are not to be lost. The longer the command remains in the same
hands the better.
This also applies to artillery commanders; the latter should not be changed in a shorter period than
four weeks, even if their divisions are withdrawn sooner. A simultaneous change of the Divisional
Commanders and the artillery commanders must be avoided in all circumstances.
109. The correct employment of the artillery calls for a well conceived plan of action, in which the
questions of the most suitable directions of fire and ranges, enfilade and oblique fire, increasing the density
of fire and supporting neighbouring sectors, cover and the state of the roads have all been carefully thought
out and property co-ordinated. When the tactical situation changes, all moves and changes of positions must be carried out in accordance with this plan.
It is often advisable to place batteries outside the divisional sector; neighbouring divisions may only refuse their consent if they themselves have urgent need of the position.
110. As far as possible artillery brigades and battalions should only be put into line as complete units.
Splitting up into single batteries doubtless leads, with officers and men of the present type (little experience,
scanty training), to a distinct drop in fighting power in a battle. In addition, splitting up of the units leads
to difficulties in interior economy (preliminary and further training, clothing, equipment, condition of the
horses, &c.).
111. It has proved advisable, for purposes of command during the battle, to concentrate the command posts of the Divisional Commander, the artillery commander and the commander of the heavy artillery at the same place.
The increased length of the telephone wires from the artillery commander to the groups (Abteilungen,
battalions) is of no importance, as experience shows that the lines in the back area can always be maintained
in working order without difficulty.
112. The continual presence of the commander of the troops at battle headquarters which give a good all-round view has very great disadvantages from the point of view of command during the battle. Excluding
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the fact that it is only in very rare cases that battle headquarters will allow of a view over the whole battle-
field, they entail an increased amount of personnel and material in buildings, which are generally quite
inadequate for a properly conducted office organization, as the artillery commanders with their extensive
system of telephone communications must be at battle headquarters with the commander of the troops. The
shorter distance from the fire zone endangers communications and thus also the continuity of command in
the battle; the latter also suffers from the continual moves between billets and battle headquarters. It will,
therefore, as a rule be preferable if commanders of troops and their artillery commanders direct the battle
from their billets, and ensure that they are quickly informed of events in front line, by office observers
specially sent out and provided with independent communications (observing stations).
(c.) Training.
113. The training of the troops, especially in the case of the young officers and battery commanders,
no longer reaches the standard formerly required. In particular, the results obtained in shooting by officers
and acting-officers, some of whom are inexperienced, have been insufficient. It has proved of practical value,
when circumstances have permitted it, to discuss the general idea and execution of an important shoot
beforehand, as well as subsequently to criticize the shoots that have been carried out, on the basis of the rounds recorded.
It is necessary to arrange for further training areas, where formations stationed in readiness as a reserve
in the hands of the Higher Command, can stiffen their training. In these areas, artillery schools and pratice
with live rounds must be arranged for; individuals belonging to troops in line will be detailed to attend
such courses.
114. There must be a considerable improvement in the knowledge of the capabilities of the artillery
amongst infantry officers. Not only the higher commanders, but the subordinate infantry leaders down to
the group* commanders, must know the most important facts about the artillery. Instructions on this subject
must take place during quiet periods, and should consist of lectures on artillery, the methods of fire and their
object, and of actual examples of gun drill and observing station work. Every man will take an interest in this; his interest in the sister-arm will be excited and co-operation between the two arms will consequently
benefit.
115. According to our experience, reinforcements asked for from the depôt units at home are very slow
in arriving, and sometimes come so late that the fighting power of the troops is endangered. To obviate
this, the formation of a special depôt detachment behind the Army front has proved valuable. Its object
is to preserve the fighting efficiency of the troops, in case of casualties occurring, until the reinforcements
from home arrive; at the same time it allows of more opportunity for rest than is possible in battery billets
being given to men who are worn out or who need a rest, and avoids the necessity for sending them back to
Germany. This depot detachment is also fitted, on account of its better equipment with modern guns, to carry
out the further instruction of reinforcements, which according to our experience are often quite insufficiently
trained.
(d.) Organization.
116. If it is in any way possible, the fighting sectors of the field artillery groups should coincide with
those of the infantry regiments. For this, it is necessary for a group to be able to carry out all fighting tasks
independently, and it must, therefore, consist of guns and light field howitzers, mixed. Difficulties of
interior economy must be put up with. A division into flat-trajectory and high-angle fire groups is unsuitable.
The strength of a group must depend on the tactical situation. The formation of too small groups and the
further splitting up into sub-groups makes the issue of orders more difficult and slower.
117. Fire direction by the artillery group commander must be carried out on the actual ground, from
personal observation. Where this is impossible, each group must have at least one auxiliary observer who
can see over the battlefield. It must be left to the decision of the group commander, how he will carry out
the various battle tasks allotted him. and which batteries and guns he will make use of for certain tasks.
This especially applies to the expenditure of ammunition. The artillery group commander must try to
minimize the expenditure, so that he may always have sufficient ammunition at hand for decisive moments.
118. The closest co-operation with the infantry will be obtained if the command posts are as close
together as possible; this gives an opportunity for the two commanders to confer together (artillery group
commander and infantry regimental commander). Such conferences will be supplemented or, in unfavourable
local circumstances, replaced by artillery liaison officers, who must be provided with direct and safe telephone
communications.
This mutual understanding will be increased by a continual exchange of observations, by frequent visitis
of artillery officers to the trenches and by frequent visits of infantry officers to artillery observing stations.
119. The boundaries of infantry battle sectors are weak points in a position. The artillery must observe
past them, and, by the closest liaison to right and left, must prevent them becoming actual dividing lines.
Cross-communications are, therefore, necessary to the neighbouring artillery commanders and group
commanders, and to their observing stations. The possibilities of effective fire from neighbouring sectors
must be known and made use off for increasing the density of fire according to some prepared scheme.
Co-operation with a neighbouring sector is not a favour, but simply a duty, from which only more urgent
tasks on one's own sector can absolve one.
120. The question of how far the artillery line should, as a general rule, be in rear of the most
advanced infantry line needs special attention. The question of the most effective distance for barrage fire
lays down a limit for the field artillery; batteries must not be more than 3,300 yards from the front line.
Special tasks, such as enfilade fire on certain areas, may necessitate placing batteries considerably closer up.
121. Heavy artillery, especially when armed with flat-trajectory guns, must not be led away by its
greater range into choosing battery positions farther in rear. The object in providing long range guns is not
to enable such batteries to avoid the enemy’s fire more easily, but to make their effect felt far behind the
enemy’s line.
122. The same principles hold good for the employment of the very heavy flat-trajectory guns, in so far
as their dependence on the railway lines does not from the outset force them into certain defined positions.
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* A group consists of 8 men under a non-commissioned officer-G.S
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(e.) Construction of battery positions.
123. A suitable choice of a battery position will save much labour in construction. A systematic scheme
of construction is necessary; first cover from aeroplanes, then deep dug-outs for the detachments, ammunition
pits, communication trenches, and, finally, wire entanglements and preparations for infantry defence. Special
attention must be paid to cover for the ammunition, which must be made absolutely proof against the enemy's
fire and the weather. The ammunition dumps, which are some distance from the battery position and have
to hold a second day's supply, will also need sufficient cover.
124. Gun pits require as large an arc of fire as possible. This must be taken into consideration when
they are first built, as subsequent alterations are difficult and take much time.
125. It is important from the point of view of ammunition supply and change of position to keep the
roads of approach in a good state. The possibility of their being replaced or supplemented by means of
field railways or tramways must be taken into consideration as soon as possible. If the ground is bad, they
will have to be worked by men instead of horses to attain necessary standard of efficiency.
126. Continual strengthening of the positions makes it possible for batteries to remain longer in them,
even when they have been located by the enemy and are subjected to heavy fire. A change of position,
with its disadvantages (loss of registration records and experiences gained, the necessity for fresh
communications and registration), can thus be frequently avoided.
127. The construction of dummy and alternative positions is a valuable means of weakening the effect
of the enemy’s fire. The men required for such work can oniy partly be provided by the artillery and must
be reinforced by parties detailed by other troops.
(f.) Fire control.
128. The weaker our infantry position is, and the less observation is possible from the front line, the
more important becomes the watch kept by artillery observation; the latter must be able to view the whole
area of close fighting. Where this cannot be effected by frontal observation, it will have to be supplemented by observation from a flank. The moment the infantry retires on the artillery observing station, observation
usually ceases.
129. The general demand that, as a matter of principle. the observing stations should be near the
battery positions in order to maintain proper communication must be considerably modified under conditions
which actually obtain . In no circumstances must a battery commander be satisfied with a battle station
from which little or nothing can be seen. On the other hand, artillery group commanders must generally
be content with poorer possibilities of observation, especially if their fighting sector is wide. They must.
always seek to ensure their influence on the battle by controlling the observation. A concentration
of observing stations at any one point must be avoided in all circumstances.
130. The laying of telephone lines which are most exposed to destruction by the enemy's fire must be
carried out according to an exact plan. The avoidance of localities and areas that are kept under heavy
fire is not usually sufficiently taken into account. This is often due to the fact that officers with technical
knowledge are not everywhere entrusted with the supervision of telephone communications. These officers,
with their subordinates, should be kept as long as possible at such duty.
Large numbers of wires are often run along the same route, with the result that they mutually affect
each other. Lines no longer required must be removed altogether and as soon as possible.
131. Communication between infantry and artillery is especially important. It must be the aim of
both areas to effect and maintain the closest mutual co-operation. The continual exchange of all observations
about the enemy by means of telephone conversations, liaison officers and personal conferences at battle
headquarters is necessary. Every man in the infantry must he made to understand that his observations
regarding both the enemy and the fall and effect of our own fire provide the artillery with most valuable
supplementary information for fire control. On the other hand, caution is necessary when the infantry
express an opinion as to the fall of our shell, as it is a matter of experience that they very often mistake
our own and the enemy's fire, with the result that a battery that is shooting well is taken off the target by
faulty correction.
132. Changes in the distribution of sectors should only be made if there are urgent reasons for it.
Making the artillery fit in with such changes causes far more friction and upsets matters far more than
it does in the case of infantry, and may in some circumstances interrupt or endanger effective fire at the
right moment.
(g.) Fire activity.
133. In addition to the ammunition allotment, counter-battery work is to a large degree dependent
on possibilities of observation. It is, therefore, the special duty of all artillery commanders to keep the
preliminary arrangements for bombarding the enemy's artillery up to date, so that effective shoots can start
as soon as observation becomes good. Continual active co-operation with artillery aeroplanes, balloons and
survey sections is therefore necessary.
134. Weather conditions will often make the employment of the very heavy flat-trajectory guns against
distant targets a difficult matter. We have, however, learnt from experience that the fire effect of these
guns cannot be made made use of when shooting from the map. In spite of most carefully taking into account
all the influences which are foreseen in the regulations for arranging such shoots, there are generally such
large errors that unobserved shoots are a complete failure. It does not, therefore, seem justifiable to use
these guns for shooting from the map, when their short length of life and their expensive ammunition are
taken into consideration. During battle, however, it must be possible to employ the fire of these guns against targets close in front of our own line. Their fire should then be directed mainly on villages, and
this must be prepared for by the arrangement of the requisite observing stations on the ground.
135. The field artillery, especially with its light field howitzers, can relieve the heavy artillery of
some of the counter-battery work, and should in the main be employed against hostile batteries that have
only recently occupied their positions, and are, therefore, in all probability, provided with less cover.
The former must become accustomed to the fact that all the special means of reconnaissance and observation,
such as balloons and aeroplanes, are at their disposal just as much as at that of the heavy artillery and
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must be made full use of. The necessary communications must be provided from the outset and must be
maintained
136. For the purpose of destructive fire, the most careful observation of the situation and state of
construction of the enemy’s front and rear lines is necessary. Every change in the enemy's positions,
recognised from an infantry report or from a balloon or photographic reconnaissance, will cause an alteration
in the basis for destructive fire. The Divisional Commander, who bears all responsibility for his sector and
under whose command the whole artillery in the sector is placed, must therefore daily issue orders to the
artillery commander as to the targets for destructive fire and the ammunition to be used against them
by the artillery. For this purpose it will generally be necessary for the Divisional Commander to issue daily
two artillery orders (morning or evening) in writing.
Should the conditions change during the course of any day, it will be possible to switch the fire over
quickly. as the command posts of the Divisional Commander and the artillery commander are close together.
137. The best picture of targets for annihilating fire will be obtained if one puts one's self in the
place of the enemy before his attack, and paints in on the map the probable formations which the enemy
would adopt before the attack on account of the peculiarity of the ground and the situation of the enemy’s
trenches. From this it will be at once seen that annihilating fire must not be rigid, but must be flexible,
as it must conform to all changes the enemy’s position, especially such changes as imply preparations
for an offensive.
138. As annihilating fire must be used not only before an assault, but also during an assault, at which
time the field batteries are employed for delivering barrage fire, it will be advisable to distribute the heavy
artillery fire over the most important points in the enemy's' trenches; these trenches will thus be kept under
fire when the field artillery passes from annihilating to barrage fire. For example, it is wrong, during
annihilating fire, only to bombard the enemy’s front line trenches with field artillery, for then these
trenches would not be fired at at all as soon as the field artillery passes to barrage fire, and therefore
drops its fire close in front of our own front line. This front line trench is, however, naturally the starting
point for the assault and also for the enemy’s rear assaulting waves, which up to this point can still make use of their communication trenches.
139. Annihilating and barrage fire must always be registered and the registration checked. Just as
in the case of barrage fire, preparations must be made to concentrate annihilating fire in front of certain
sectors, especially in those parts of the front where signs of any intended attack are increasing. Exact
maps must also be kept for annihilating fire. It will be best opened on the receipt of short code words,
each sector being allotted its own code word.
140. The use of light-signals to call for the opening of barrage fire has proved the best method, as
compared with sound signals which either entirely failed, or, at any rate, made it impossible to recognise
with sufficient certainty the sector which was calling for fire. The wish for a more frequent change of light-signals is always recurring and is quite justified, as the few signals so far provided make it easy for
the enemy to imitate them and thus inveigle us into opening barrage fire with its heavy expenditure of
ammunition.
It is, therefore, advisable to order the artillery not to comply with the light-signal for "lengthen the
range" during barrage fire, in order to stop any attempts at deception by the enemy. Compliance with
such a signal sent up by the enemy may make our whole barrage ineffective and lead to the success of the
enemy’s attack.
141. In addition to light-signals, which are often useless in a fog, all other means (horn signals, klaxons, sirens, trench wireless sets) must be employed for calling for barrage fire.
1 4 2 . A special light signal has recently been introduced in the Army to call for the opening of
annihilating fire. This will only be sent up from the battle headquarters of battalions in front line, and
then only if the telephone breaks down.
143. The selection of a "directing barrage battery," the communications to which from the front
and from other units of the artillery must be especially carefully constructed, has proved of value. This
battery must be known to all other batteries in the divisional sector, and as soon as it opens barrage or
annihilating fire, all other batteries must at once open barrage fire, that is, if barrage or annihilating fire has
not already been called for by some other means. Inquiries must, however, at once be made as to whether the
directing battery is delivering annihilating fire; if so, the other batteries will at once change to this
method of fire,
144. Battery commanders must make every effort to pass as soon as possible to observed fire
from annihilating or barrage fire which has been automatically opened, and is thus at first not being
observed. This is the best means of ensurIng that an enemy, who has broken through, comes under our
fire during his further advance. It is the special duty of the senior artillery commanders to make the
young battery commanders proficient in such duties by means of instructional schemes, which should be
discussed on the ground.
145. The field artillery must take an active part in destructive fire. For this purpose, it will be
advisable to employ certain batteries which, on account of their positions being as far forward as possible
are able to make full use of their maximum range.
The view that the enemy's organizations should only be bombarded if he annoys us in the same way (retaliation fire) is wrong and must be combated emphatically. This applies especially to the rearward
works and billets, where considerable damage can be done to the enemy. In this sphere also the initiative must not be left to him.
(h.) Attacks and counter-attacks.
146. To prepare for attacks and counter-attacks, the artillery must always be given sufficient time
for reconnaissance, registration and fire for effect. Breaches of this rule lead to self-deception and reverses.
It is the duty of artillery commanders to see that this is taken into consideration. It follows from the
above that shortly before or after daybreak is an unsuitable time for an assault. Artillery night firing
can never be described as real fire for effect. It is only a more or less heavy harassing fire according to
the number and calibre of batteries employed and the amount of ammunition expended.
An unsuccessful attack means greater sacrifice than keeping the assaulting troops for a longer period in the assembly position
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147. In a methodical attack, registration must be carried out as unobstrusively as possible and should
be distributed over several days, so that on the actual day of attack it will only be necessary to check
registration. In order to deceive the enemy. it will be advisable to carry out simultaneous registration
against other positions some distance away.
148 . In an assault, the artillery should not lift its fire off the objective until the moment the infantry
enters the enemy’s line, and this must be carried out exactly according to the scheduled time; fire must not lift
the moment the assaulting party goes over the parapet, otherwise the enemy generally finds time
to man his trenches. A certain amount of danger to our own infantry, which can be diminished by the
use of shells with delay action fuzes shortly before the assault, must be put up with. Similarly, the lifts
of the artillery fire during an assault must not be too large. The fire should be immediately in front of
the advancing infantry. This needs very careful arrangement.
(i.) Close-defence.
149. The battery positions must be provided with obstacles; the guns must be able to fire at once at
case-shot distance; to do this, they must be able to be pulled quickly out of their pits; hand grenades must be
placed in readiness and the gun detachments must be trained for defence at close quarters. An ample supply
of small arms ammunition must be dumped in the batteries, in order to be able to supply retiring infantry with
ammunition, and thus make it more easy to hold these strong points until the counter-attack is launched.
In advanced positions, an allotment of machine guns is desirable; the field artillery must know how to use
them.
(k.) Ammunition and material
150. The ammunition supply within Groups (Corps) and divisions must be under central control; a
special officer is necessary for this duty, who must remain permanently in the area. This must be taken into
consideration when staffs are being completed; detailing an officer for this duty from one of the units
permanently weakens the latter to an inadmissible extent. The same holds good as regards material.
Whether one and the same officer can simultaneously control ammunition and material will depend on
circumstances.
151. Ammunition and material must be inspected in the battery positions. For this purpose
artificers and armourers should frequently be sent to the postions. In addition, commanders (including
regimental commanders) must also occasionally carry out inspections as to the treatment of ammunition and
material, in addition to their inspections of battery routine, by means of personal visits to the battery
positions.
152. For ammunition supply, small ammunition depots on roads not very far behind the battery
positions have proved useful. It is a matter of the most urgent importance to keep the roads of approach in
good condition, and to have an active body of road police, especially in villages and at cross roads.
153. It is worthy of remark that our enemy’s guns apparently have a much smaller zone of dispersion
than our own. He also appears to have more accurate data for shooting from the map than we
have. This seems to be proved by the fact that, in weather that excludes all possibility of observation, and
under conditions very different from those prevailing during previous shoots, he obtains hits on small targets
with great accuracy.
G. COMMUNICATIONS AND AIR RECONNAISSANCE.
I.–Causes of initial failures.
The breakdown of the communication service at the beginning of the battle is chiefly attributable
to the inadequate provision of means of communication. These were numerically much inferior to those of
the enemy. Their Increase did not keep pace with the increase in the number of divisions and heavy artillery
units engaged.
155. Further, there was at the outset no organization which could make preparations for the ever
increasing engagement of new formations. If was impossible to control the new formations from Army
Headquarters and there was no organization for this purpose at Corps Headquarters.
The organization had
first to be created, instead of the newly allotted communication troops being able to fit themselves into an
existing organization. A further difficulty was caused by the individual communication units being allotted
one by one, so that the organization was merely patchwork at first.
156. On the 22nd June, the following flights were available, viz., three artillery, five reconnaissance,
13 battle-plane and two pursuit flights. These weak forces were unable to play any part against the enemy,
who was able to prevent long distance reconnaissance entirely and almost completely stop our artillery
observation and photographic work. The situation demanded that Groups (Corps) should have been allotted,
on a scale corresponding to their frontage, number of divisions and strength in artillery, a number of
artillery and reconnaissance flights together with the necessary number of battle-plane flights. For this,
however, the numbers available were insufficient. Several divisions had to manage with one artillery flight
between them, and, at the less important points in the line, this flight was not protected by battle-planes, as
Army Headquarters were obliged to employ these at the most threatened points in order to be able, there at
least, to obtain information.
157. As regards balloon detachments, the Army had at its disposal two detachments with a total of five
balloons, as against 25 to 30 possessed by the enemy. Inadequate anti-aircraft gun protection hampered their
work. It was impossible to make use of balloon observation from neighbouring sectors, as the necessary
telephone system was lacking and each balloon was already unable to cope with its own work. The result
of this complete inferiority in aerial observation was that our artillery was fighting blindfold. No machines
were available for the purpose of communication with the front line, nor were either the troops or the
aeroplanes and balloons prepared for this, as the Army was not yet familiar with the lessons learnt at Verdun.
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158. The establishment of telephone stores normally allotted to Corps and divisions was not nearly
sufficient, and there were but few additional motor lorry sections available. The Army Telephone Detachment
was only formed at the same time as the first Army itself. It was was quite impossible, simultaneously
and as rapidly as desirable, to meet all the requirements due to the movements of numerous headquarters, as
well as to the necessity for new lines for the artillery, aviation, A.A. gun and balloon systems.
The leading and fighting suffered, and it was quite impossible to make full use of even the small available
number of aviation, A.A. gun and balloon units. Owing to the defective organization, the experience and
knowledge of the telephone system was lost when the Corps and divisions changed so rapidly.
159. Field signal sections, power buzzer stations, wireless detachments and carrier pigeon lofts, which
were necessary to supplement the telephone system in the main fire zone, were almost entirely lacking, with
the exception of the signal sections with the divisions and a few pigeon lofts. The small number of pigeons
was insufficient, as “infantry aeroplanes” were not yet available, and runners and light-signals were the
only means left for communication with the front line. It was unavoidable that, after heavy attacks, the
position of the front line should often be unknown to commanders and to the artillery for a considerable time
160. The Survey Section was also only formed at the same time as the 1st Army, and was consequently deficient
in most respects at first. New surveys had to be undertaken, as our own line had in places almost
reached the eastern limit of the mapped area. Owing to the inferiority of our aviators, alr photographs did
not furnish, as quickly as was desirable, the data on which to decide which battery positions and trenches
were still used by the enemy. Our artillery was much handicapped on this account.
II. - Measures by which a gradual improvement was attained
Increase of the means of communication
161. An improvement in these conditions was at once effected, as soon as the means of communication
had been increased to such an extent that they met the most urgent requirements. This increase must be
considered as a decisive factor in the whole course of the battle. Only of secondary importance were the
measures which aimed at securing uniformity of control over the means of reconnaissance, and the
co-operation of all other means of communication, as well as ensuring that the experience gained would be available
if there were changes in command.
162. The whole of aircraft was employed with a view to providing observation for artillery and
obtaining aeroplane photographs. All the special duties of the battle-plane were subordinated to this.
The employment of aeroplanes with a view to obtaining a complete mosaic of aeroplane photographs, and
the collection of information gained by air reconnaissance, were handed over to the aeroplane group (wing)
commanders at Corps Headquarters. The co-operation of these commanders with the General Staff officer
for Intelligence ensured co-ordination of aerial and ground reconnaissance.
As soon as sufficient artillery flights were available they were allotted, together with protective flights,
to the divisional artillery commanders.
After infantry aeroplanes had been introduced by orders of Army Headquarters on special occasions in
the first few weeks of the battle, an infantry flight was detailed for each Group as soon as the number of
reconnaissance flights had been increased.
163. The balloon detachments were connected, by means of a telephone system of their own, with each
other and with a newly formed balloon central station. The latter collected the results of reconnaissances
with a view to their being collated by the survey section, and disseminated all the observations made.This
enabled every battery to fire with observation from the particular balloon which was best able to observe the
target.
164. The telephone system was improved by the allotment of permanent units (communication officers,
traffic and construction sections). This prevented the experience gained and knowledge of the system from
being lost.
The grouping of the various means of communication in "headquarters communication sections”
under a responsible commander ensured a better system of tactical co-operation and mutual assistance.
165. The wireless detachments proved their value. It was found necessary to control the wireless traffic within Groups. For this purpose, Group wireless officers were appointed who controlled the whole of the
wireless traffic, including aeroplane wireless. Arrangements were made to use wireless for calling for
barrage, by employing aeroplane receiving stations (ground stations) for the purpose.
166. The field signal sections, when they were not on the establishment of the subordinate formations
but were Army troops, were relieved from time to time in order to maintain their efficiency. The small
number of sections available in the Army necessitated their being relieved by sections from other Armies.
167. The number of carrier pigeon lofts was increased.
168. In order to increase its usefulness, the survey section was reinforced by a special detachment
under the Staff Officer for Survey of the 5th Army. Entirely new mapping material was obtained. All
results of reconnaissances were centralized, firstly at Group Headquarters and secondly at Army Headquarters,
which ensured that full use was made of all information. The extent of this information and
the necessity for passing it rapidly to the troops led to the formation or expansion of the topographical
sections with each Group (Corps). These sections had also to keep the maps of our own positions up to
date and were made responsible for all Information regarding a definite area in their front.
III.—Experiences and Lessons.
(a) Employment.
169. The defensive battle necessitates the emplovment, on a very large scale, of means of communication
and reconnaissance, which should be proportionate to the number of divisions and the quantity of heavy
artillery engaged. Whereas a newly engaged division is at once effective, communication units require a
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certain amount of time in which to settle down before they can develop their full powers. Consequently
they should be engaged as early as possible, and from the outset on a scale which is based on the number
of troops which will be engaged later on.
170. The following proportion, which was found sufficient on the Somme, may be taken as a basis
on which to allot artillery and reconnaissance flights, viz., one artillery flight with a protective flight for
each division, one infantry flight for every Group (Corps) and two or three reconnaissance flights (including
one for photographic reconnaissance) for every Group of 3 or 4 divisions. Whether this allotment will
suffice in the next defensive battle will depend mainly on whether the number and efficiency of our pursuit
flights will suffice to establish superiority in aerial fighting.
171. Early engagement is also necessary for the balloon detachments if the observers are to obtain
good results early. At the same time, sufficient anti-aircraft protection must be provided. The number
of balloons should amount to about 2 per division (they need not be placed under the orders of the divisions).
A portion can be detailed as infantry balloons. Other troops must keep clear of the anchorages of kite
balloons.
172. When the re-organization has been completed, the telephone units will suffice, as far as can be
seen, for the needs of Corps and divisions. A special allotment of these units will, however, be necessary
in order to construct the extensive artillery, aviation, anti-aircraft and balloon systems which become
necessary at the beginning of the battle. It is absolutely necessary to keep these systems separate from
the tactical lines and from the general telephone system. The sooner they are ready. the sooner will the
weapon concerned be effective. Every economy, especially at the beginning of a battle, decreases the
effectiveness of other branches of the service.
When engaging telephone units, it must be borne in mind that the maintenance of the lines in the
main fire zone cannot be expected, but, on the other hand, the importance of this means of communication
demands that everything possible should be done to repair, at least, the most important lines. With this
in view, the number of lines close up to the fighting line should be strictly limited. They should be laid
in special deep cable trenches or, at any rate, in shallow trenches to protect them against the blast of
the explosion of the enemy’s shells. Numerous cable repair squads should be quartered in shell-proof
dug-outs along the whole line. Roads and villages should be avoided. The enemy's artillery fire should
be continually watched, so that heavily shelled areas may be avoided when constructing new lines; existing
lines should be removed from these areas as soon as possible, as it will be impossible to keep them in
repair.
In the main fire zone the telephone must be supplemented by other means of communication.
173. Shell-proof dug-outs are essential for wireless stations; when these are provided, wireless proves
very useful. As the number of sets available is limited, forward stations should be placed near the
front line, close to battle headquarters (battalion commanders) which have as extended a view as possible
over our own and the enemy's front, so that they will be able to give information regarding neighbouring
sectors. The fear of losing a forward station should in no circumstances act as an inducement to withdraw
it prematurely or to place it in a retired position from the outset. The whole object of wireless stations
would thus be defeated. Forward artillery observers can also employ wireless stations with advantage.
Owing to the small number of stations available, it will generally be advisable to allot several
forward stations to one back station. It is most desirable to employ the aeroplane fighting stations with a view
to using their wireless for ground communication. The employment of wireless and aeroplane wireless
stations for regulating barrage fire is now being experimented with. It is for consideration whether each
field artillery Abteilung should not be equipped with a receiving set (to be manned exclusively by the
artillery) for the receipt of calls for barrage fire.
174. Power buzzer stations have proved their value. In order to prevent their disturbing the telephone
traffic, telephone earths should be placed as far away from them as possible (at least 165 yards).
175. Field signal sections, as well as the medium and small signalling apparatus, have proved their
value. Light-signalling communication necessitates an accurate study of the map and the ground, so
that rearward communication may be established, in cases of necessity, by means of the neighbouring sectors
when direct communication is no longer possible.
176. Carrier pigeon lofts are required in large numbers. Every division should have its own loft.
As it is often impossible to avoid moving Divisional Headquarters, it seems advisable not to place the lofts
at Divisional Headquarters, so as to obviate the difficulty of not being able to use the pigeons when
headquarters are moved, but they should be kept further in rear, at points provided with direct telephone
connection. In order to get the pigeons forward, energetic subordinate commanders are necessary in certain
circumstances.
177. Hitherto, runners have proved the most reliable means of communication in the foremost line.
In order to reduce casualties among the runners, it is necessary to introduce a special bullet to carry
the messages and to be fired from a rifle or Iight-pistol with a view to connecting the front line with
the company commanders and the latter with their battalion commander.
178. The employment of infantry aeroplanes and infantry balloons has proved very valuable. The
infantry aeroplane will, in many cases, bring the quickest and best information regarding the situation of
the front line. Communication between battle headquarters and aeroplanes by means of light-signals is
extremely difficult. It is better to send pre-determined signals by displaying various arrangements of the
linen signals at battle headquarters
Signalling communication with infantry balloons requires thorough practice.
(b.) Organization.
179. Now that means of communication are employed on such a large scale in a defensive battle, it is no
longer possible to control them from Army Headonarters. Consequently. the necessary officers for this control
must be appointed at Corps Headquarters.
180. The command of the aviation units of each Group must be handed over to an ”Aviation Group
Commander," who will arrange for their employment in accordance with orders from Corps Headquarters,
will collect the information obtained and will see that this is supplemented by information obtained by other
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