Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/243B/1 - 1916 - 1926 - Part 7

COPY.
59 Brighton Rd.,
St. Kilda, Vic.
6th June 1926.
Dear Bean,
Your letter of 20th May has duly come to my hands.
The facts relating to the very temporary armistice to which you
refer, are these:
(1) G.H.Q. orders, and all subordinate orders, were
extremely definite to the effect that no negotiations
of any kind, and on any subject, were to be made with
the enemy.
(2) It was duly reported to my Divisional H.Q. - the date
I do not recall - that some arrangement had been made
apparently at first between a captain in my trenches and
a German officer, for a temporary "armistice" for picking
up wounded.
(3) In view of the definiteness of G.H.Q. orders, as soon
as my H.Q. became aware of the tentative arrangement,
orders were at once sent to put an end to the "truce",
and this was done.
(4) I did not refer it officially to Corps H.Q., G.H.Q.
orders being too explicit to justify any such action,
but I afterwards told the Corps Commander and the Army
Commander about it, and they approved of the action
taken.
White has spoken to me also about the march to Moascar
of two of the 5th Div. brigades, which some people have spoken of
as being a "test" march, and I enclose a note on that point also.
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
(sgd) J.W. M'Cay. 

COPY.
The March of the two 5th Div. Bdes. (14th and 15th)
to Moascar, Egypt.
(1) Orders came from Corps H.Q. (Gen. Godley's command) that
the infy. bdes. of the 5th Division were to march to
Moascar.
(2) I objected to this verbally at Corps H.Q., but was told
the order had come from G.H.Q., Egypt.
(3) I then went to G.H.Q., and was told it was an order, and
that train transport was not available. Nothing was said
about "tests".
(4) I then issued orders accordingly.
(5) The 15th Bde. did the march all right, but the 14th had
a bad time.
(6) Then the 8th Bde. was brought by train.
(7) G.H.Q., despite the matter being raised by me, were
wholly responsible.
(8) I am aware that it has been said in the "yellow press"
that I ordered the march, or asked for it, as a "test":
that is a malicious untruth. The facts are as set out
above.
(intd) J.W.M.
6.6.26.

COPY.
1143. 25 June 1926.
Major-General the Hon. Sir J.W. M'cay, K.C.M.G., K.B.E.,
59, Brighton Road,
St. Kilda. Vic.
Dear M'Cay,
I have to thank you for your courtesy in replying to
my letter, and for sending me precisely the information which
was required. I always thought the desert march was ordered
by G.H.Q., but there was no evidence in the records.
I should be grateful if you could assist me concerning
two further points.-
(1) Your suggestions for the formation of the four waves
At Fromelles seemed to be based upon an extension of
one man to one and three-quarterx yards in each wave.
Do you remember if this was your estimate?
(2) A raid was to have been undertaken by the 5th Division
as soon as it entered the line. Do you recollect
whether this was abandoned because of the brigadiers'
objections that the troops were too new, or because
the orders for the main attack were received (I think
the raid was to have come off before these orders were
received), or for some other reason?
Yours sincerely,
(sgd) C.E.W. Bean. 

COPY.
1215. 10 July 1926.
Major-General Hon. J.W. M'cay.
Dear M'Cay,
With reference to my previous letter about the plan
for Fromelles, I see that the extension in each line works out to
about 1½ men per yard, counting 800 to the battalion. Could you
tell me whether something like that was the basis of the
calculation?
I also meant to ask you the meaning of a phrase in one
of King's telegrams, sent after he had visited the front line at
10.55. He ends by asking for a car, and adds - "Must see you".
Do you remember whether there was anything important, of which you
could inform me, implied in this phrase?
The story of the battle is finished except for such
corrections as these. It has been a most difficult job.
Yours sincerely,
(sgd) C.E.W. Bean.

COPY.
59 Brighton Road,
St. Kilda, Vic.,
12 July 1926.
Dear Bean,
I have your two letters of 25 June and 10 July. My
apology for delaying a reply to the earlier of the two is that I
was asking McGlinn and others to help, or verify my recollections.
As to your questions:
(1) Re the waves at Fromelles, the intended interval for each
wave was 2 yards per man: it may have worked out at a
little less or a little more in individual cases.
(2) No intended raid was abandoned through any objection by
brigadiers or others. I knew of the intention to make an
attack some days before any orders were issued to me. This
I knew of course confidentially, and therefore quietly postponed
any minor plans, such as a xxx raid &c. That is why
any raiding intention "ceased to be".
(3) I am not quite clear about your phrase that "the extension
in each line works out to about 1½ men per yard, counting
800 to the battalion". I have no copy of the orders, and
so speak wholly from memory. If you mean that the sum of
the waves gave about 12 men to the yard, that would, I
imagine, be about right, the idea being that after allowing
for casualties in crossing No-Man's Land, the final push
through the enemy's trenches would be by a fairly thick
line in extended order. But, as I say, I am not writing "by
the card", having no documents.
(4) About the words in King's message, "must see you", I have
no recollection whatever. Nor can I recall anything of
importance to which it could have referred. King was
doing liaison for me for the left flank, I think. Wagstaff
must have shown me the message, but though I have taxed my
memory all day, it is in vain.
I can well believe that the story of the battle has been
a difficult job. How you, or anyone, can compile a consecutive
narrative of all the battles is a mystery to me. You must possess
a photographic memory for written statements, apart from personal
observation, to see these things in a definite order.
Yours sincerely,
(sgd) J.W. M'Cay.

FROMELLES.
Gen. Elliott: The message from 184 Brigade asking for his
assistance at 9 p.m. 19/7/16 came through
Divisional Headquarters, not direct. If we had
organised, as we did later, for direct liaison,
the attack by the 58th Bn. would have been
avoided.
Gen. Tivey: The 31 and 32 Battalions were sent in first
at Fromelles because they were older harder men.
The 32nd was especially fine. 

COPY. 13 May 1926.
1030.
Lieut.-Colonel F.W. Toll, D.S.O, V.D.,
Yeerongpilly,
Brisbane, Q'land.
Dear Toll,
In writing the account of Fromelles, I have found it
rather difficult to place some of the battalions; but, if I can
fix the line of your advance about 6.30 p.m. on July 19, it
will greatly help me in settling the positions of the other
units. In particular, I am anxious to know what part of the
road you reached before withdrawing your men to the place
where they eventually dug in. In an account given to me long
ago you mentioned that you withdrew along a line of trees.
There are two such lines of trees, which are marked in the
tracing sent herewith. I should be much obliged if you could
insert your track, as far as you remember it, in this tracing
and let me have it at your earliest convenience.
Many thanks for the loan of thetypewritten report.
I have now finished with it and return it herewith.
Yours sincerely,
(sgd) C.E.W. Bean. 

COPY.
Yeerongpilly.
18th May 1926.
Historian,
Victoria Barracks, Sydney.
Dear Sir,
Your request of the 13th instant re approx. position of
31st Bn., A.I.F., at Fromelles at about 6.30 p.m. on the 19th
July 1916.
See Sketch. The point marked M.G. (to right of arrow) was
about the position that Sgt. Major Law and party of right flankers
captured machine gun. "E" represents Major Eckersley's position
with his men and the arrow is the line of trees by which Lieut. G.
Still, myself, and runner returned. We had advanced up to the
road - X. On getting back to the old German front line I found
some of the 54th Bn. moving up towards us using the second line of
trees for direction. "M" is about the place Captain Mills was
located at the end of a small trench. Eckersley's men fell back
about 100 yards and dug in just about where the heavy line is
shewn in ink, this was about 7.30 p.m.
Trusting this information will be of use. The only point
I have any doubts about is the exact position of the road I struck
when making investigation of front.
Yours faithfully,
(sgd) Fred W. Toll. 

Diagram - see original document

COPY.
1050. 22 May 1926.
Lieut.-Colonel F.W. Toll, D.S.O., V.D.
Dear Colonel Toll,
Many thanks for your note, which throws a good deal
of light on the question. Can you tell me whether either you
or any of our men were firing from or near the most advanced
point reached by you? My reason for asking is that the Germans
say we penetrated even farther. This may have been a story
brought back by frightened German soldiers, but the German
records are generally fairly accurate.
Yours sincerely,
(sgd) C.E.W. Bean.