Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/243A/1 - 1916 - 1934 - Part 12

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Awaiting approval
Accession number:
RCDIG1066604
Difficulty:
5

Page 1 / 10

ide Dut The march of two 5 th t wonscar, Egift C14th o 15 orders came from Corps He Gen. Godley commend) That the cat ? Ioes of the 5th Dw were to murch to invascer. 2. I objected to this verbally at Corps H.D. but was told the order had come from G.H.W. Esq. 3. I then went DGHp, & was told it was ar order, & that train transport was not avarlable. Nothy was said about tests. 4. then issued orders accordingl th 11th did the march all right 5 The 15 th but the 14th had a bad tie th i 6. Then the 8 was brought by train . 7 G.H.W, despite the matter being raised by we, were wholly repossible. & I am aware that t has been said in the yellow pres that I ordered the march, or That is a maticous asked for it, as a test: worthath The facts are as set out above. furn 6.6.26
A0. P.4151 1143. 25 June 1926. Major-General the Hon. Sir J.W. McCay, K.C.M.G., K.B.E., 59, Brighton Road Ste Kilda, Victorin. Dear McCay. I have to thank you for your courtesy in replying to my letter, and for sending me precisely the information which was required. I always thought the desert march was ordered by CoHeRo, but there was no evidence in the records. I should be gratefal if you could assist me concerning two further points - (1) Your suggestions for the formation of the four waves at Fromelles seemed to be based upon an extension of one man to one and three-quarter yards in each wave. D you remember if this was your estimate) (2) A raid was to have been undertaken by the 5th Mvision as soon as it entered the line. B you recollect whether this was abandoned because of the brigadiers’ objections that the troops were too new or because the orders for the main attack were received (I think the raid was to have come off before these orders were receivedl, or for some other reasons Yours sincerely,
4151 aine mORI BTts aen e eo eerion conemeeeecnmenme peronb eq of Lyoyiny Teg0 t0 sp TI Aed. 1215. 10 Jul) 1926. Major -enaral Hon. Cay. K.C.M.G.,K.B.K., Brighton Read 59 Mlda. Via the 2e Dear McCay, with referense to by provicus letter grent the plan for Fromelles, I see that the extension in each line (works out to about 1½ men per yart counting 80 to the battalion. Could you tell me whether something like that was the basis of the calculationr I also megnt to ask you the maning of a phrase in one of King's talegrems, (sent after he had visited the front line at 10.55. He ands by adking for a ear, and addn - Must see) yeur to you remember whether there was anything important, of phich you could inform me, Ingiied in this phraser The story (of the battle is Knished, except fof such corrections as these? It has been a most difficult job. Yours sineerely, CE BEAN Duy 70 M Srn pur’ YISuans Surgoeye eyys snonard moyj seSury Suioys Top pomesep pefordue nonngursi SOSiyosip sueusue epnjoar o PUBIIIIO0 Ho SoTEnS SISHE SooMod peyoune STDNVH RIAI
59 Brighton R Vic St Kilda 12 July, 1926 W Dear Dear, I have your two letter of 25 June and 10 July. My apology for delaying a reply to the Coby of the two is that I was asking in Glean and others to help, or verify my recollections. As to your questeons. 1. Re the wave at Trowelle the intended intival for each wave was 2 yords pet man: it was have worked out at a little less or a little more in individual cases. 2. No intended said was abandored through any objection by brigadies or others. I knew of the entention to make as attack some days before any orders were issued to me. Thes I knew of cuose confidentially, & therefre guiety putpored any minor plans, such as a raid, &c. That is why aay saiding intertion ceased to be 3. I am not quite cear about you phoase that The extension in Each line works out to about 1/ men per gaod, counting 500 to the battalwn. I have of the orders, & so speak wholly from memory. no c
If you mean that the sum of the waves gave about 1/½ men t the yard, that would, I imigine, be about right, the idea being that after allowing for casualties in coossing it-Maas Laid, the pral push through the enemy tocuches would be by a fairt thick line in slended order. But, is I sa am not writing by the card, having no documents. o. About the words in Kings everage, must see you, I have as recollection whatever, not can I recall anything of importance to which it could have referred. King was doing liaison for me to the left fladt, I think. Wassteff must have shown me the message, but thoyth I have taxed iy memorry all day, it is in vain I can well believe that the story of the battle has been a difficult job. How you, or anyone can compile a conssntive narrative of all the bathes, is a nystery to me. You must possers a pholographic memory for written statements, opart from personal observation, to see these things in a dspeack order. Yours sincerely furnca C.E.W. Dean Es Euth Histore Sydoe IXIX
H.N. fen EMott. Te message fom 1824 Bdle asking for his assistance at Ap. 1917/16 came from this Diob H.Q. not direct. If tll had organised, as we did lehs for direct baison, the att. by 58 Bn wd have been avoided. Te 31532 Bus were sent in first at Fovellles because tey were ower fen Twey. harder suen. The 32 Bn ws especinl five.
405 wlle Foll Capt. Hiffo 27 Englishman tak w06 of 31Bn w two of the spoints on k& in going across
1030. 13 hay 1926. Lient.-Colonal F.r. Toll, D.S.D., V.D., Yeerongoilly, Brisbans, land. Dear Toll, in writing the account of Fromelles, I have found it rather difficult to place some of the battalions; but, 1f I can fix the line of your advance about 6.30 p.m. on July 19 will greatly help me in settling the positions of the other units. In particular, I am anxious to know what part of the road you reached before withdrawing your men to the place where they eventually dug in. In an account given to me long ago you mentioned that you withdrew along a line of trees. There are two such lines of trees, which are marked in the tracing sent herewith. I should be much obliged if you could insert your track, as far as you remember it, in this tracing and let me have it at your earliest convenience. kany thanks for the loan of the typewritten report. I have now finished with it and return it herewith. Yours sinearely. C.E.N.JBEAN MORI
Yeersnopelly 18th May 1926 Historian Retoria Barracks Sydney. Dear Sir Your request of 13th nt re approx position of 31st Bn At.J. at Fromelles at about 6.30 pm on the 19 h July 1916. See Sketch. The point marked M.R. ( right of arrow was about the position that Sgt Major Law & party of Right flankers caphired nachie ✓r gun. E. represents Major Sckersley's pouition, with his men and the arrow H.G Stiel is the line of trees by which myself + runner returned. He had advanced up to the road x. On getting back to the old German front line I found save of the 54th Bn morning up towards us using the second live of trees for direction M is about the place lapt Mills was located. at the end of a small trench. Eckersleys men fell back about 1ooyds & dug in just about where the heary line this was about 7-30pm is shewn in ink. this information will be grusting 10
of use, the only part I have any about is, the exact position doubts when making road I strick of the investigation of front. Yours faithfully Spedw Tall

The march of two 5th Divn Bdes
(14th & 15th) to Moascar, Egypt.
1. Orders came from Corps HQ (Gen.
Godley's command) that the infy Bdes
of the 5th Div were to March to Moascar.
2. I objected to this verbally at Corps H.Q.,
but was told the order had gxxx come from
G.H.Q. Egypt.
3. I then went to GHQ, & was told it
was an order, & that train transport was
not available.  Nothing was said about “tests”.
4. I then issued orders accordingly
5 The 15th Bde did the march all night,
but the 14th had a bad time.
6. Then the 8th Bde  was brought by train.
7  G.H.Q, despite the matter being raised by
me, were wholly responsible.
8 I am aware that it has been said in the
“yellow press” that I ordered the march, or
asked for it, as a “test”: That is a malicious
untruth. The facts are as set out above.
J.W.M
6.6.26

 

F.4151

xxxxxx
1143.
25 June 1926.
Major-General the Hon. Sir J.W. M'Cay, K.C.M.G., K.B.E.,
59, Brighton Road,
St. Kilda. Victoria.
Dear McCay,
I have to thank you for your courtesy in replying to
my letter, and for sending me precisely the information which
was required. I always thought the desert march was ordered by
G.H.Q., but there was no evidence in the records.
I should be grateful if you could assist me concerning
two further points -

(1) Your suggestions for the formation of the four
waves at Fromelles seemed to be based upon an
extension of one man to one and three-quarter
yards in each wave. Do you remember if this was
your estimate?
(2) A raid was to have been undertaken by the 5th
Division as soon as it entered the line. Do you
recollect whether this was abandoned because of the
brigadiers’ objections that the troops were too new,
or because the orders for the main attack were received
(I think the raid was to have come off before these
orders were received), or for some other reason?
Yours sincerely,
C. E. W. Bean

 

F.4151

xxxxxx

1215.
10 July 1926.

Major - General Hon J.W. M'Cay, K.C.M.G., K.B.E.,
59, Brighton Road,

 St. Kilda. Victoria.
Dear M'Cay,
With reference to my previous letter about the plan for
Fromelles, I see that the extension in each line works out to
about 1½ men per yard, counting 800 to the battalion. Could you
tell me whether something like that was the basis of the
calculations?
I also meant to ask you the meaning of a phrase in one
of King’s telegrams, sent after he had visited the front line at
10.55. He ends by asking for a car, and adds - “Must see you”.
Do you remember whether there was anything important, of which you 
could inform me, implied in this phrase?

The story of the battle is finished, except for such
corrections as these? It has been a most difficult job.
Yours sincerely
C. E. W. BEAN

 


[*HN
2 Yds*]
59 Brighton Rd
St Kilda, Vic

12 July, 1926
Dear Bean,

I have your two letters of 25 June and
10 July. My apology for delaying a reply to the
earlier of the two is that I was asking McGlinn
and others to help, or verify my recollections. As to 
your questions:
1. Re the wave at Fromelle the intended

xxxx interval for each wave was 2 yards per
man: it may have worked out a little less
or a little more in individual cases.
2. No intended raid was abandoned through any
objection by brigadiers or others. I knew of the
intention to make an attack some days before
any orders were issued to me. This I knew of
course confidentially, & therefore quietly postponed
any minor plans, such as a raid, &c. That is
why any raiding intention “ceased to be”
3. I am not quite clear about your phrase that
“the extension in each line works out to about 1½ men
per yard, counting 800 to the battalion”. I have
no copy of the orders, & so speak wholly from memory.

 

If you mean that the sum of the waves, gave about
1½ men to the yard, that would, I imagine, be about

right, the idea being that after allowing for
casualties in crossing No-Man’s Land, the final
push through the enemy trenches would be by a fairly
thick line in extended order. But, as I say, I
am not writing “by the card”, having no documents -
4. About the words in King’s message, “must see
you”, I have no recollection whatever, nor can I
recall anything of importance to which it could have
referred. King was doing liaison for me on for the left
flank, I think. Wagstaff must have shown me the
message, but though I have taxed my memory all
day, it is in vain.
I can well believe that the story of the

battle has been a difficult job. How you, or anyone,

can compile a consecutive narrative of all the

battles, is a mystery to me. You must possess a
photographic memory for written statements, apart
from personal observation, to see these things in a
definite order.
Yours sincerely
J W McCay
C.E.W. Bean Esq
C’wth Historian, Sydney

 

H.N.
Gen Elliott: the message from 18th Bde
asking for his assistance at 9pm. 19/7/16
came from thro’ Divl H.Q., not direct.
If we had organised, as we did later,
for direct liaison, the att. by 58 Bn wd
have been avoided.

Gen Tivey: The 31 & 32 Bns were sent in first
at Fromelles because they were older
harder men. The 32 Bn ws especially
fine.

 

Fromelles: Tivey [*HN*]
Capt Higgon (friend whom Godley
had got into Bde) Englishman - 
of 31 Bn - who ws to take 

two of the stpoints on left ws
K. in going across CP.

 

1030.
13 May 1926.
Lieut.-Colonel F.W. Toll, D.S.O., V.D.,
Yeerongpilly,
Brisbane, Q’land.
Dear Toll,
In writing the account of Fromelles, I have found it
rather difficult to place some of the battalions; but if I can
fix the line of your advance about 6.30 p.m. on July 19, it
will greatly help me in settling the positions of the other

units. In particular, I am anxious to know what part of the
road you reached before withdrawing your men to the place
where they eventually dug in. In an account given to me long
ago you mentioned that you withdrew along a line of trees.
There are two such lines of trees, which are marked in the
tracing sent herewith. I should be much obliged if you could
Insert your track, as far as you remember it, in this tracing
and let me have it at your earliest convenience.

Many thanks for the loan of the typewritten report.
I have now finished with it and return it herewith.
Yours sincerely,
C. E. W. BEAN

 

[*HN*]
Yeerongpilly
18th May 1926
Historian
Victoria Barracks
Sydney.
Dear Sir
Your request of 13th inst. re approx’
position of 31st Bn A.I.F. at Fromelles at
about 6.30 pm on the 19 th July 1916.
See Sketch. The point marked M.G. (to right of arrow)
was about the position that Sgt Major Law
& party of Right flankers captured machine
gun. "E." represents Major Eckersley’s
position, with his men and the arrow
is the line of trees by which ^Lt G Shiel myself
& runner returned. We had advanced
up to the road .x. On getting back to
the old German front line I found some
of the 54th Bn moving up towards us
using the second line of trees for direction.
M. is about the place Capt Mills
was located. at the end of a small trench.
Eckersley's men fell back about 100 yds
& dug in just about where the heavy line
is shown in ink. This was about 7.30 pm 
Trusting this information will be

 

of use, the only part I have any
doubt about is, the exact position
of the road I struck when making 
investigation of front.
Yours faithfully
Fred. W. Toll.

 
Last edited by:
Deb ParkinsonDeb Parkinson
Last edited on:

Last updated: