Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/234/1 - 1919 - Part 2

This finished / reserve.

The ^only troops left were the 7^th

in the N by Gallipoli, resting;

& the 11^th Divn. These had bn

ordered to march but they were

coming to Anafarta.

The situation ws understood.

So they wanted to check / Austlns

by making a manoeuvre &

pushing in these troops by /

shortest possible route. The Commdr

of these troops from / N. a Staff

Offr. Feyzi Bey, had bn ordered

(? later military attache in Austria).

Feyzi Bey reported tt his troops

were tired & a long way from / front

& tt they wouldnt make a c/attack.
Accordingly Liman ordered M. Kemal

Pasha to hand over his Divn to the C.O.

27 Regt, & go to Anafarta & take

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charge of the troops arriving

there. 8^th & 11^th Divs This ws Aug 8^th.

The follg day 9^th Aug. an 

attack ws made agst Asma 

Dere w 7^th Divn on left w 3 Regts

(whole Divn) & probly 11^th (? 12^th) Divn

on / right.

This attack ws not a great victory

- It didnt pushd back our line but

didnt send put us (by outmanoeuvring)

off Chunuk B as had bn intended.

M. Kemal Pasha had lost C.O.s of

20^th & 21^st Regts, & very heavily in men

(they 2 C.O.s lie side by side under

the cypresses at Anafarta).

In / mean time at Chunuk

Bair nothing impt. had bn done.

M. Kemal Pasha who had bn

gn control there ws directing /

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Anafarta attack in these days.

The situatn at Chunuk ws

very critical bec. Essad Pasha

had no more troops.

In these days shots from

Chunuk B. hit the stores,

kitchens, & waggons & pack 

animals behind Mortar Ridge

& Dik Dere. Some of the

transport ws prepared to withdraw

under this fire & there ws

disorganisatn esp. amongst /

transport. Possibly these shots were

indirect - Zeki Bey cdnt say whether

they were aimed or not but they

showed how impt & anxious / time was.

Noone knew what to do - even

the Army Corps staff had lost its

influence thro having used its reserve.

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Alirza Pasha ^(G.O.C. 8^th Divn at Chunuk) asked Kemal

: What are we going to do?

Kemal ansd. It isnt as

impt a question as you think.

I will come there & we will

settle everything. Dont be anxious.

Kemal gave this answer as if

everything were in a settled state.

The staff offr who told Zeki Bey of

this ws always speaking of Kemals

sang froid at this moment.

Kemal then came to Chunuk B.

The evg tt he arrived he studied /

situatn; & ^afterwds ordered tt next morng,

at dawn, without firing a shot,

they shd make a gt attack w /

bayonet. The troops he already had there

were to take part

1	23	8 Divn	Took part. The
1	24
1	25	9 Divn
1	26

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23rd had not previously

taken part & was strongest.

24th had lost ^pretty heavily ^a few days before.

This attack ws made

w / bayonet & / line ws

pushed back to / point where

it remained to / end.

(The order of battle is 

uncertain).

The ^staff didnt know what ws

/ other side o / crest - a precipice

or what, bec. it hadnt bn

possible to reconnoitre; but

they sent / men over it in spite

of this bec. they had to.

Follg this attack when

the light grew, the shells from

our ^Anzac guns fell behind Chunuk

Bair, & naval arty in front.

Also heavy m.g. fire.

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The start o / attack ws

not costly - because the soldiers

in our trenches - the Australians - 

seeing this wall of soldiers

w bayonets coming over / hill

& down on them, Zeki Bey

says, lost their heads & took

to flight. But the fire of arty

& m.gs. prevented the Turkish infy

from taking advantage of this

success - / Ts. lost their heads

under it.

After this M. Kemal Pasha

had his Hqrs a Chamla Teke

(or Chambeli - Pine Hill-

or the Pine Ridge). The armies

were called the Anafarta

Group.

Essads group ws known as

Shimal Grubn (N. Group).

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Kemal's work on / Peninsula

is unforgettable, Z Bey says.

He knew exactly where to attack

in / first instance - up to /

Armistice; & at Chunuk Bair

he kept his head.

The L. Pine Demonstratn

cost v. heavily - abt 5000. But

not only tt; it drew in all the 

troops in / immediate reserve (5^th Divn.)

it drew reserves from the South;

& it prevented troops from being

on Chunuk Bair when / N.Z. arrd.

If we had got to / top of Chunuk

Bair, Z Bey thinks, they cd never

have got there. They wd have

lost / Peninsula.

On Aug 21, 22 we attacked

at Hill 60. Kemal Pasha saw

what ws wrong w the troops there.

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They had lost their Regtl 

Commdr. & were commd

by a Bn Commdr. He asked

Essad P. to send at least 2

offrs whom he (K.) knew.

He sd: my ^your front is not normal

but mine is not - it is 

urgent."

So Essad P. sent Zeki

Bey (to the 21^st Regt); & Haidi Bey

(of 3/57) who ws in/c of 57 Regt - Essad wdnt

send him. It ws Haidi Bey who had

sent the quiet reports from the Nek

on / evg of Ap. 25. Essad wdnt send

away both / offrs who knew Quinns & G.O.T & 

[*Quinns

ws then 

v. complicated.*]

Kemal sd to G.O.C. 7 Divn: Im sending

you an offr. You can put him

in / most dangerous part of

your front. (Joking as if it were a 

D.C.M. Judgment). This ws 20 Aug.

This 21 Regt was at Hill 60

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At this time everything showd

tt there ws going to be a further

push by us.

4 days later, when Zeki

Bey had left his Regt thro 

Malaria, another attack ws

made agst a Coy of Gendarmerie

with 2 m.gs. This wd be the

attack of Aug 27/28. There ws a 

big bombt first and the English

took these two m.gs. at

Bomba Tepe (Hill 60).
From then bomb & mine

fighting went on to / end.

After this the papers & news

agencies began to talk of

Evacuatn. There ws a doubt

in / air. Suspe Some thought

we were going, some tt we

wd attack; some tt we wd

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go on (as ^they saw we did) digging

digging for / winter.

The general view ws

tt we wd leave / Peninsula.

Orders were gn to

observers to watch / ships etc.

& cannt . It ws reported 

(1) That / no. of tents ws

decreasing.

(2) That the guns were firing

less & tt their fire ws being

undertaken by ships instead.

(3) There were some days of

silence. It ws thought tt we

were leaving some o /

advanced trenches & orders were

gn to make strong reconnaissances.

The report ws tt everywhere we

were holding / front line.

The Turks, in spite of the

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