Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/234/1 - 1919 - Part 1

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Open for review
Accession number:
RCDIG1066594
Difficulty:
5

Page 1 / 10

AWM3S Official History, 1974-18 War: Records of CE W Bean, Official Historian. Diaries and Notebooks Hem number: 3DR1606/23417 Title: Notebook, 1979 includes information from Maj Zek Bey on Gallipoli. AWMISS-3DRI606/23411
88 0 30RL 606 IRM 334 AWM38 ITTTMIVIIIVMIIIAAMUAINNINN JMMIIIOO MA AIVIIIIIVVVVVVIIL DIARLES AND NOTES OF C. E. W. BEAN CONCERNING THE WAR OF 1914-1918 --4 HE use of these diaries and notes is subject to conditions laid down in the terms of gift to the Australian War Memorial. But, apart from those terms, I wish the following circumstances and considerations to be brought to the notice of every reader and writer who may use them. These writings represent only what at the moment of making them I believed to be true. The diaries were jotted down almost daily with the object of recording what was then in the writer's mind. Often he wrote them when very tired and half asleep; also, not infrequently, what he believed to be true was not so —but it does not follow that he always discovered this, or remembered to correct the mistakes when discevered. Indeed, he could not always remember that he had written them. These records should, therefore, be used with great caution, as relating only what their author, at the time of writing, believed. Further, he cannot, of course, vouch for the accuracy of statements made to him by others and here recorded. But he did try to ensure such accuracy by consuiting, as far as possible, those who had seen or otherwise taken part in the events. The constant falsity of second-hand evidence (on which a large proportion of war stories are founded) was impressed upon him by the second or third day of the Gallipoli campaign, notwithstanding that those who passed on such stories usually themselves believed them to be true. All second-hand evidence herein should be read with this in mind. AUSTREL 16 Sept, 1946. C. E. W. BEAN. ACCESS STATUS EELLKEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEKEKKKEKEKEEELEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEETTYIMEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEESSELL Recee OAE
68 The remfts came - one Coy, 2 coys and bent in pist as they arrd. on Aug7. The attacks were cop. from K-F. In 1 evg-they bried EK but 2sp K-F. The 3rd day they trid the diging of Y S.T. Before pot there had on a partiall begun C.T. at ST - & probly the art on Rassells Top. stoppis it. The troops + C now there were new t 1 place - & they tried it. (sn other book) At &. there were austhus directly vesible from 1valley. Their observatio valley in ade it most difficult to putap sandbags or make any improvenents there
After Re failure of ST. Zelie Bey ordered att 8 men under a cosperal & Kent. to attack over 1 top (6or7 yds). They were to know bombs & then ruch it - & the snipers from a posite where they cd snipe over I headss I attack to some risk. As soon as te got out a shell from the little gun (th stell case) hit the trent direct & bady wd him & the megs at got out the pty at once & only one ws unwod. Tey then understood a all Teacares wee aseless. Ether to nifit or next day (Ang9 15 0r 20 Turkish Coldiers were put in from abt Q. Before this attack Tefik Bey who commanded
the 4715 Regt ws k. in leading some sicles allipt whe did not succeed T.B saw I Coubs & them some Young Turks get in w (bayonet. They sd they had not several young Austtor w their rifes broken & I men dead in the C.T. they bayonets cd be seen avanciy 10012 yds from the head of valley. That, to Endof things as (situation. After the check B. Bey retired to b & got together be relies of his regt. Alirza Bey who ws commdy at head of velly ofter this always came to him for advice thinking to he knew more abt it then any o (others. The positee as now better in
the Pine & it ws well known to (danger ws elsewhere A final order ws gu to give ap Gattack on (Pie & hake is there 1157 as reasumbled neer &as gn this part (Owens gull) to defend. They stayed there abt 2 days. When it ws clear A allws safe Major Zetei Bey wired to Ryt Commdr. If you want this Br Ole catirely wor out & finished, keep as in 12 There had be No tis nor place to eat. On Au 951/57 ws withdrawn behind sdink sist ogain From I to a a junction had then on made with the 3/47 at Q. 12,B, & 15 mixed up were in between
this & Owns Gully, Alirza Bey, C.O. 13t Rest, commanded them. 6 Aug. L. Pine 7 Aug. Adv. Apt Churnk Bais & the 14a Tis. Regt ws retiring & meeting Pattecks As best it cd w I helpot Et flank of Mustate Kinel Peks igh. Early this mg. the F.O.C. GkDion, Kalinkisser (a ferman) had recd 1 order to go to Churuk Bair. He had first buordered to L. Pine - at Evg. 6tly he had bu E of L. Pine Comny fom the Souther Group. with 2 ogt be arrived this day at Chunnk Bair - before arriving there the [OC ws wounded Another off a appted - one who knew to part. These 2 regts
from is possibly a mistake of mine for on"; or gike i pave throught Churk Br Kat day Beg m H io knowledge, however, wa resually is complety that I tink must be mine take me the (En B 2/2/47 that day took (25 & 64) partin I fighting at Churick Bair. They couldo anything but only face t troops who were advancing from Chennk Bair (topkesw pagments of 14 Reft & some other small bits). Ang D. Eg: when HAIBde attacked the Mg. Coy of 11t Regt, to some parts of 14th Regt, very by ) met this (14 Rep had a attack adefeated. There wd be 4 mogs. in the Cogg. There might have be some other mys. also. His day St Divn, w 2 Regts, arrd at Chunak Bais. This evg. with one of its Regts it made a c/attack butfaitus. (24th Rest). In this way Chuanke B.
& its surroundings were recifd. 11t Rest also as ander the commd of 19th Din. It was Enployed on 1 rt flanko B Dwn under Mustefe Kenal Bay. (11th ws probly behind Banle sirt - poble came w 12,13175. But only its my. Coy hadln in posite. Tis is not allogittn certiin Chunick Bair +f troops there were pat under the G0C St Divn. His Dion had been to Terusation & had comeback but leaving one of its Refts behind 22nd went to Persia N Somewhere, & W2 Rets 8 Dun came back ap to Gallipoti where it hed be at Rodosts before (lending) but not at 1landin
Before this 24t arrived, a Ba. o 642 Rep Coh bed ba. Army Corps Reserve under Essad Pashe) ws sent to Chusak Bair under a sf off - to be tre apx all hance Lappenings. As 24t Rept dinl succeed they remained on I defensive. The Southern group (wh as being attacked) sent all its recerses norteod (& wan I adnoration of all by doing so. Vehif Pasha (bother of Essed P.) commd. in the South (Leman Pashes G.H.D. ws at Yalova). As the whole of the Aoi Burnie force ws exployed at Pine Essad had sent his only reserve to Churck Bair (1Bn 64 Regt) as 9th Dion hedn't succeeded

AWM38

Official History,

1914-18 War: Records of C E W Bean,

Official Historian.

Diaries and Notebooks

Item number: 3DRL606/234/1

Title: Notebook, 1919

Includes information from Maj Zeki Bey on

Gallipoli.
 AWM38-3DRL606/234/1

 

[*Zeki Beys

Notes

No II*]

AWM38  3DRL 606 ITEM 234 [1]

DIARIES AND NOTES OF C. E. W. BEAN

CONCERNING THE WAR OF 1914-1918        234

THE use of these diaries and notes is subject to conditions laid down in the terms

of gift to the Australian War Memorial. But, apart from those terms, I wish the

following circumstances and considerations to be brought to the notice of every

reader and writer who may use them. 

These writings represent only what at the moment of making them I believed to be

true. The diaries were jotted down almost daily with the object of recording what

was then in the writer's mind. Often he wrote them when very tired and half asleep;

also, not infrequently, what he believed to be true was not so - but it does not

follow that he always discovered this, or remembered to correct the mistakes when

discovered. Indeed, he could not always remember that he had written them.

These records should, therefore, be used with great caution, as relating only what

their author, at the time of writing, believed. Further, he cannot, of course, vouch

for the accuracy of statements made to him by others and here recorded. But he

did try to ensure such accuracy by consulting, as far as possible, those who had

seen or otherwise taken part in the events. The constant falsity of second-hand

evidence (on which a large proportion of war stories are founded) was impressed

upon him by the second or third day of the Gallipoli campaign, notwithstanding that

those who passed on such stories usually themselves believed them to be true. All

second-hand evidence herein should be read with this in mind.

16 Sept., 1946.     C. E. W. BEAN.
AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL
ACCESS STATUS
OPEN

 

18

The reinfts came - one coy, 2

coys and went in just as

they arrd. on Aug 7.

The attacks were esp. from K -F.

In / evg. they tried ZK but esp

K-F.

The 3rd day they tried the

digging o / trench S.T. Before probly

there had bn a partially begun

C.T. at ST - & probly the arty

on Russells Top stopped it.

The troops & C.O.s were now there

were new to / place - & they

tried it. (see other book) At F.

there were Austlns directly visible

from / valley. Their observatn

o / valley made it most

difficult to put up sandbags or x

make any improvements there.

 

2

After the failure of ST. Zeki 

Bey ordered abt 8 men under

a corporal & Lieut. to attack

over / top (6 or 7 yds). They

were to throw bombs & then

rush it - & the snipers from a

positn where they cd snipe

over / heads o / attack w some

risk. As soon as they got out

a shell from the little gun (the

shell case) hit the Lieut direct

& badly wd him & the m.gs. at

B got onto the pty at once &

only one ws unwd.

They then understood tt all

measures were useless.

Either tt night or next day (Aug 9).

15 or 20 Turkish soldiers were put

in from abt Q. Before this

attack Tefik Bey who commanded

 

3

the 47th Regt ws k. in leading

some similar attempt wh did not

succeed.

Z.B. saw / bombs & then some

young Turks get in w / bayonet.

They sd they had met several

young Austlns w their rifles

broken & / men dead in the

C.T. They bayonets cd be seen

advancing 10 or 12 yds from the

head o / valley. That, to /

end of things ws / situation.

After the check Z. Bey retired

to L, & got together the relics of his

regt. Alirza Bey who ws commdg

at / head o / valley after this

always came to him for advice, 

thinking tt he knew more abt

it than any o / others.

The positn ws now better in

 

4

the Pine & it ws well known

tt / danger ws elsewhere.

A final order ws gn to give

up / c/attack on / Pine &

make trenches there.

1/57 ws reassembled near

Z & ws gn this part (Owens

Gully) to defend. They stayed

there abt 2 days. When it ws

clear tt all ws safe Major Zeki

Bey wired to Regtl Commdr. If you

want this Bn to be entirely worn

out & finished, keep us in / trenches.

There had bn no time nor place

to eat.

On Aug 9th 1/57 ws withdrawn

behind Edina Sirt again.

From F to Q a junction had then

bn made with the 3/47 at Q.

12, 13, & 15 mixed up were in between

 

5

this & Owens Gully; Alirza Bey,

C.O. 13th Regt. commanded them.

6 Aug. L. Pine

7 Aug. Adv. agst Chunuk Bair &

the 14th xxxxx Regt ws

retiring & meeting / attacks

as best it cd w / help o /

rt flank of Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

Night 7/8 Aug. Early this mg. the

G.O.C. 9th Divn, Kalinkisser

(a German) had recd / order to go to

Chunuk Bair. He had first bn ordered

to L. Pine - at Evg. 6th Aug he had

bn E of L. Pine coming from the

Southern Group.

With 2 rgts he arrived this 

day at Chunuk Bair - before

arriving there the GOC ws wounded.

Another offr ws appted - one

who knew tt part. These 2 regts

 

x "From" is possibly a mistake 

of mine for "on"; or Zeki

Bey may have thought we

reached Chunuk Bair that day.

His knowledge, however, was

usually so complete that I think

the mistake might be mine.

CEWB. 31/3/47.
6

(25 & 64) that day took

part in / fighting at Chunuk 

Bair. They cdnt do anything

but only face / troops

who were advancing fromX

Chunuk Bair (together w /

fragments of 14 Rgt & some other

small bits).

Aug 8. mg: when 4 AI Bde

attacked the m.g. Coy of 11th

Regt, w some parts of 14th Regt,

(14 Regt had a xxx ^very large zone) met this

attack & defeated. There wd be

4 mgs. in the Coy. There might

have bn some other mgs. also.

This day 8th Divn, w 2 Regts,

arrd at Chunuk Bair.

This evg. with one of its Regts

it made a c/attack but failed.

(24th Regt). In this way Chunuk B.

 

7

& its surroundings were reinfd.

11th Regt also ws under the

commd of 19th Divn. It was

employed on / rt flank o

19 Divn under Mustafa Kemal

Bay. (11th ws probly behind Kanli

Sirt - probly came w 12, 13 & 15.

But only its mg. coy. had bn in

positn. This is not altogether

certain).

Chunuk Bair & / troops there

were put under the GOC 8th

Divn. This Divn had been to

Jerusalem & had come back

(but leaving one of its Regts behind

- 22nd went to Persia or somewhere, &

8 Divn ^w 2 Regts came back agn to Gallipoli

where it had bn at Rodosto before

/ landing (but not at / landing).

 

8

Before this regt arrived, a Bn.

of 64th Regt (wh had bn. Army Corps

Reserve under Essad Pasha) ws

sent to Chunuk Bair under a

staff offr - to be there agst all

chances happenings.

As 24th Regt didnt succeed

they remained on / defensive. 

The Southern Group (wh ws being

attacked) sent all its reserves

northwd (& won / admiration of

all by doing so. Vehif Pasha 
(brother of Essad P.) commd. in the

South (Liman Pashas G.H.Q. ws

at Yalova).

As the whole of the Ari Burnu

force ws employed at / Pine,

Essad had sent his only reserves

to Chunuk Bair (1 Bn 64 Regt) as

9th Divn hadnt succeeded.

 

 

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