Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/233/1 - 1919 - 1920 - Part 7

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Zeki Bey heard in hospital
of the attacks at Bomba Sirt
(Bomb Slope - i.e. Quinns Post).
He heard tt we were bombed
from either side by numbers
of bombs & cdnt get out
bec. of enfilade fire.
The C.O. 18^th Regt. was the officer who
ws sniped abt 12 June - a
distinguished & brave offr who
came from Constantinople.
This regt later made the attack
on June 29th - It ws a fine regt & a
find C.O. & Kemal thought that
the state of this regt & the state
of its C.O. justified the expectatn
tt it wd do great things.
On 29 June the Turks had
prepared an attack a tunnel for getting
their men into the trenches near
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59

attack were not well timed
- probably.
From then to 19^th May they
made no genl attack - attacks
were made (but not on a big scale)
on local initiative to gain
particular places.
The right suffered a lot
in / earliest days owing to
the direct observatn from / sea
- but more in morale than in
actual losses. Later they understood
that les canons des vaiseaux
ne faisaient pas grand choses.
The m.gs. presented the attack
by day.
The Gaba Tepe guns or those
round abt weren't hurt by /
first few days naval bombt. 
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60

their dead lay there afterwds -
probably it ws their first Bns
arriving wh attacked here. 
(Owing to Kemal Pasha's
keeping his head & / calm
reports of the 3rd Bn.
the 7^th Divl Bns wh became
came to Maidos were able
to be sent straight on to
Helles - where they now knew
the real danger was; & the
first reinfts for anzac were
a few Bns of 5^th Divn wh
arrived night of Ap 26 or
mg. of Ap. 27. Kemal knew his
troops were tired but wdnt
ask for reinfts.)
At the start the telephonic
communications were not
good & the various parts o /
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61

Kemal Pasha didnt lose
his head. By the first evg
tho things were obscure he
knew they were not imdly
dangerous at Anzac;
On the 3rd day he made
an attack. (7)
On Ap 27 Kemal attacked:
the regts had organised the
2nd day & a few Bns (possibly
of 5 Divn) added - there were 4
Regts already there. They
wanted to prevent the Austlns
getting a foot hold & tho they
knew the troops they had were
not sufficient for a c/attack
they had to c/attack. This
was a general attack.
The attack ws probly in / early
morning. It ws the 5^th Divn
probably wh attacked up Mule Gully -
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62

regt was thus all lost.
There remained two Regts
of wh 3 Bns were
2 at Sarafim ^Chiflik, 1 along / coast
in garrison; further S. 2
Bns along the beach & 
one at Helles.
Diagram - see original document
This shows the importance of
Gaba Tepe - 4 Bns of reserve
within reach of it - the 2 at Sarafim cd be sent to Helles also. 
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63

& Liman ws better satisfied.
There were complications
at Anzac but / situatn
wsnt dangerous there.
On / other hand in / south
there ws a great danger.
There were very few troops.
The O.C. there ws sending
to Essad for troops saying
he cdnt hold - & they cdnt
send him troops - Essad told
him he must hold. Yet
he had only 2 the 9^th Divn
had sent 2 Bns (of 27 Regt) agst Anzac
& there were very few
troops in the S. The 9^th
Divn ws / only one at /
foot o / Peninsula. One Bn
of this Regt had also been
the garrison at Anzac & this
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64
x One night some of our men were
reported captured. Constantinople wanted
(abt the 3rd day) to know when these prisoners
were coming along. We fo It ws
then reported tt it ws a mistake -
There had bn some misunderstanding.
The Turks thought some of our men were
going to surrender – we thought /
same – some troops had surrendered
but some other troops came up
meanwhile - there ws a
complication & an inquiry
afterwds.
 

were Arabs. They were
sent towds B'ship hill to
reinf. 2nd Bn wh ws by now
pretty weak. x
The first day no reinfts
came from Gallipoli bec.
Liman Pasha thought 5 Divn
wd be needed at Bulair.
They however prepared ships
to bring troops if necy.
Essad came to Mal Tepe the
first day. All the troops ^ at Anzac were
under Mustafa Kemal Pasha
& Essad merely helped him
tt day. 
Ap. 26 Bns began to arrive at
Anzac. Liman also came
south - it ws known now
tt / ships ^ wh had gone up N. were empty
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65

The 77^th Regt began firing
before it reached the front
line; & the 27^th Regt coming
under this fire was all
night crying out to the 57^th
Regt not to fire; & the 57^th
Regt 3rd Bn in / same way
calling to the 27^th. The Arabs
understood neither. For
this reason there ws a
panic & a lot of disorganisatn
& the 77^th Regt ws later
sent to / Kaba Tepe end
bec. tt ws quiet & /
regt had not much value.
The first day near the
evg. there ws sent up another
rt flank the 72^nd Regt
of the 19^th Divn. These also
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66

he needed all the reinforcements..
Things were fairly quiet, he sd, abt there.
Accordingly reinfts were sent
him. All the 2nd day
they sent to him all /
stragglers who cd be
found in the valleys in
order to reinf. his line.
[It ws understood tt the C.O. of
2nd Bn had lost his head,
while C.O. 3rd Bn had kept 
his]. The Regt^l Hqrs ws in
Usun Dere wh forks to the
right off Chatal Dere into
B'Ship Hill [means Long Valley].
This same night the
77^th (Arab) Regt came in
between the 57^th & the 27^th
Diagram - see original document
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67

far as Fishermans huts
or near them but didnt
come back. It ws attacking
on the seawd side. The C.O.
of this Bn himself went up
to the Nek during / night &
brought back a report tt there
were only English there - his
own men all gone. The
Regimental sclxxx C.O. ws rather
upset - but at tt moment
there came in also a report
from the C.O. of the 3rd Bn
who sd he ws up well ahead
w his troops - abt 80 or 90
men; that they were weak
& he ws a bit anxious lest,
if attacked, they might not
be able to hold their positn - &
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