Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/207/1 - 1915 - 1918 - Part 7

was going to push out & dig
in on top of the promontory
between the two gullies. They
couldn't dig in there because of
4 German [[?howitzers]] half way down
the slope firing up at them -
& they on the skyline. Lt.
Craven was forward trying to do this
& 2 killed & some wounded. They
took up a position across the
arc instead. The Germans
worked down S. into the
Southern gully & attached
Livesey down there, & from the
road below. Both parties
put these Germans down at 150
to 200. Mackenzie got a [[?]]
& a T.M. & Livesey 16 prisoners
(he had 15 men) & 2 [[?]].
 

He fought his way back
- brought in his 2 guns, & the
16 prisoners. Cpl Macpherson
stayed down there till the morning
in the N. gully. He cd see
guns above firing at our
people up the slope. He tried
with his men several times
to get at these Germans but couldn't
get his bombs up at them.
He was very young, but wouldn't
come in till he had a message
from May Fowler who brought him
in when he heard that Livesay had
failed.
This clearly frightened the
Germans away during the balance
of the night (as often happens).
On the morning of Aug 13 a
 

a weary staff (1 a.m. till
6 a.m. was put in to the
Quarry.
On next night (Aug 13/14)
Livesey went out again this
time taking no kit but bare
rifles & a lot of bombs incl.
phosphorous bombs - & from the
top of the S. tip of the S. Gully
2 Stokes mortars fired into the
bank (this had been too steep
for the artillery to get its shells into).
The Stokes fired about 47 rounds in one
minute. L. then rushed along
& threw bombs into the dugouts as
he passed - but the Germans had
already gone & the posts were
put out across the road.
The Amerians would not
 

take it over when they
relieved 50 (& 1 Coy of 49) on
the night of 14/15. It was too
solitary. The Americans
had left no rations.

One platoon came to relieve
a Coy of ours – they had struck
a gas barrage at Etinheim.
The Germans put down a really very

heavy barrage at 3 a.m. and

the Americans lost a number of

men.
Our 50 Bn was 300 strong & one
Coy of Americans was to relieve
it. This Coy turned up 130 strong.
The relieving Company Commander
only arrived at midnight to
reconnoitre his front -
By 2 am. only 3 platoonss were in
 

when a message came from
an American NCO on the
phone a few hundred yds from
the Germans. He sd: One platoon
of ours is here, & he does not
know whom he has to relieve
all your men are out.
The O.C. didnt have a map.
Maj Fowler took him all around,
where to put his guns, & his
strength - & placed his guns
for him. When Fowler got back
he sent of his two last platoons
a few signallers, & offered to stay.
But the American, tho he knew
nothing, wouldn't allow of this.
As our people got
went out down came the barrage.
This was probably  counter preparation -.

 

64a

Hand drawn diagram/map - see original document
 

64
Every morning abt 3 am.
it came down very heavily
The American only has
4 Lewis guns with him there -
& one gun only had 3 magazines
- one of them with its team
was flown up before the relief
was complete. They must have
had 40 or 50 casualties that
morning. The Coy. Commander
was in a complete whirl - but
a fine chap.
 

B3 Brigade. Etinheim.
On Aug 10. Gen Herring was sent for
to see  Gen. Monash personally – the
car took him down to Dion by 11-30 am.
It came as a bit of a surprise that
the attack was to be to night - the
50th was tired & thus would have liked
the next and they night much better. However
Gen Monash said it must be done
to night.
He wants the tanks up & the
attack started before it was too
dark  - at the same time he did not
want the tanks seen. So 9.30 p.m.
was the time he chose. There was just
time to get the Battalions there by then
& so he agreed to do the attack
at that hour.
The C.O. of the Tank Battalion
 

was sent up by division to Brigade

Headquarters - & got there about 4 p.m.
He said: "I don't know if I can

do it. His tanks had had a
very heavy time at Gressaire
Wood. He would try & get 4
tanks up but could only guarantee
two. He was told all he needed
to was to move up & down the Bray
Rd a couple of times & fire grape
shot down it – it being night he
did not want to get off the road -
Tanks are very blind - but it was
a good well defined road.
That night when the tanks
came up Arrol let them to go
down the road straight ahead &
come back - they were fine chaps
- just wanted to know what was

wanted. They did Later This was when they came

back & asked Arrol what

he wants them to do. He told

them they had done it ^already & they

were very surprised & pleased - & went off home.

 

July31/Aug8. When Gen. Maclagan

saw Gen. Herring & told him

what was wanted of 13 Brigade &

that the attack was going to be

made, he said that he would

do it but what guarantee

what if they were raided.

Maclagen said they did not

want any men lost - he said

that he couldn't guarantee that so great

a front could be held without men
 

being captured.

He gave orders that there

were to be nothing less than

platoons together so disposed

that at least a platoon would be 

involved in any action.

The original arrangement

was that 13 Bde was to support

4 Divn in the attack of Aug 8.

It was to hold part of the French

line till Aug 5. On Aug 5/6 

it would relieve the whole 4th Divn

including a portion which the

4th Bde had taken over on

Aug 4 from the 2nd Divn so

as to reach 600 yds further

up to the railway line (to be

the boundary between the two

corps). This meant 8000 yds