Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/207/1 - 1915 - 1918 - Part 7

ws going to push out & dig
in on top of the promontory
between the two gullies. They
cdnt dig in there bec. of
4 Germ m.gs half way down
/ slope firing up at them -
& they on / skyline. L^t.
Craven ws wd trying to do this
& 2 killed & some wd. They
took up a positn across the
arc instead. The Germans
worked down S. into the
Southern gully & attacked
Livesey down there, & from /
road below. Both parties
put these Germs down at 150
to 200. Macbridge got a m.g.
& a T.M. & Livesey 16 prisoners
(he had 15 men) & 2 m.gs.
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He fought his way back
- brought in his 2 guns, & the
16 prisoners. Sergt Cpl Mengerson
stayed down there till / morning
in / N. gully. He cd see /
guns above firing at our
people up / slope. He tried
w his men several times
to get at these Germs but cdn't
get his bombs up at them.
He ws very young, but wdn't
come in till he had a message
from Maj Fowler who brought him
in when he heard tt Livesay had
failed.
This clearly frightened /
Germs away during / balance
of / night (as often happens).
On / morning of Aug 13 a
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a heavy straf (1 a.m. till
6 a.m. was put onto the
Quarry.
On next night (Aug 13/14)
Livesey went out again this
time taking no kit but bare
rifles & a lot of bombs incl.
phosphorous bombs - & from /
top of / S. tip of the S. Gully
2 Stokes mortars fired into the
bank (this had bn too steep
for the arty to get its shells into).
The Stokes fired abt 47 rds in one
minute. L. then rushed along
& threw bombs into / dugouts as
he passed - but / Germs had
already gone & / posts were
put out across the road.
The Americans wd not
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take it over when they
relieved 50 (& 1 Coy of 49) on
the night of 14/15. It ws too
solitary. The Americans
had had no rations.

One pln came to relieve
a Coy of ours – they had struck
a gas barrage at Etinheim.
The German put down a ^really very

heavy barrage at 3 a.m. and

the Americans lost a number of

men.
Our ^50 Bn ws 300 strong & one
Coy of Americans ws to relieve
it. This Coy turned up 100 strong.
The relieving Company Commander
only arrived at midnight to
reconnoitre his front -
By 2 am. only 3 plns were in
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when a message came from
an American NCO on the
phone a few hundred yds from
/ Germans. He sd: "One pln
of ours is here, & he does not
know whom he has to relieve.
All your men are out!"
The O.C. didnt have a map.
Maj. Fowler took him all around,
where to put his guns, & his
strength - & placed his guns
for him. When Fowler got back
he sent of his two last plns
a few signallers, & offered to stay.
But / American, tho he knew
nothing, wdnt allow of this.
As our people got
went out down came / barrage.
This was probably counter preparatn -
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64a

Hand drawn diagram - see original document 

Every morning abt 3 am.
it came down very heavily -
The American only had
4 Lewis guns with him there -
& one gun only had 3 magazines
- one of them w its team
ws blown up before the relief
ws complete. They must have
had 40 or 50 casualties tt
morning. The Coy. Commndr
was in a complete whirl - but
a fine chap.
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13 Brigade. Etinheim.
On Aug 10. Gen Herring was sent for
to see Gen. Monash personally – the
car took H. down to Dion by 11.30 am.
It came as a bit of a surprise tt
/ attack was to be tt night - the
50^th ws tired & H wd have liked
and they the next night much better. However
Gen Monash sd it must be done
tt night.
H. wanted / tanks up & /
attack started before it ws too
dark - at / same time he did not
want / tanks seen. So 9.30 p.m.
ws / time he chose. There ws just
time to get / Bns there by then
& so he agreed to do / attack
at tt hour.
The C.O. of the Tank Bn
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was sent up by division to Bde

Hqrs - & got there abt 4 p.m.
"He said: I dont know if I can

do it. His tanks had had a
very heavy time at Gressaire
Wood. He wd try & get 4
tanks up but cd only guarantee
two. He ws told all he need
to ws to move up & down / Bray
Rd a couple of times & fire grape
shot down it – it being night he
did not want to get off / road -
Tanks are very blind - but it ws
a good well defined road.
That night when / tanks
came up Arrol let them to go
down / road straight ahead &
come back - they were fine chaps
- just wanted to know what was
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wanted. Later ^They did this & when they came

back & asked Arrol what

he wanted them to do. He told

them they had done it ^already & they

were very surprised & pleased
- & went off home.

July31/Aug8. When Gn. Maclagan

saw Gen. Herring & told him

what ws wanted of 13 Brigade &

tt / xxxxx attack ws going to be

made, H sd tt he wd

do it but what guarantee

what if they were raided.

Maclagen sd they did not

want any men lost - H. sd

tt he couldn't guarantee tt so great

a front cd be held without men
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being captd.

He gave orders tt there

were to be nothing less than

platoons together so disposed

tt at least a pln wd be 

involved in any action.

The original arrangement

was tt 13 Bde ws to support

4 Divn in / attack of Aug 8.

It ws to hold part o / French

line till Aug 5. On Aug 5/6 

it wd relieve the whole 4th Divn

xxxxxxx including a portion wh the

4th Bde had taken over on

Aug 4 from the 2nd Divn so

as to reach 600 yds further

up to / railway line (xxxxx to be

/ boundary between / two

corps). This meant 8000 yds
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