Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/116/1 - June - September 1918 - Part 10

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a decisive result. The year after that the Americans would be
able to crush Germany. But if an end were wanted next year it
would have to be brought about by the politician. For example -
he did not know what the politician could do towards breaking
up the German people and getting them to overthrow their present
Government and adopt a more democratic form -(White doesnt like
the term democratic - "One"he corrected" in which the people
have control over their foreign policy") but if they could do that
he did not think there was any justification then for our
holding out for a lot of the terms which we were bound to make
with an autocr atic government - for example there was no reason
why we should keep their colonies in the Pacific - indeed the
more white people in the Pacific the better for us.
Hughes,Wh ite says, (as I knew) is set on conserving
the forces and carrying on the war with aeroplanes and so on as
far as possible - Hughes says that the A.I.F. is not to be in
any more offensives xx xxx if he can help it. Wilson - Sir H.
Wilson - s aid that at axx meeting of the war cabinet it was
announced that the Australians and Canadians had taken part in
this great offensive and that it was going ahead splendidly -
Hugh es (according to Wilson) had jumped up and thumped his
fist on the table:"Offensive", he said "I never heard of any 

offensive - why was I not told about this? I never was aked if
the Australians could be used in an offensive..."
Wilson (W hite says) is a very adroit fellow at turning
aside, any opposition - he took no notice of what Hughes said but
simply went on to describe how the Canadians pushed out so far
- too this objective and that - and the Australians said they
were not going to let the Canadians get further than they - and
so they pushed out beyond them..... and Hughes muttered:"Oh
if it is a case of going as far as the Canadians, the Australians
would go as far every time - I should think they would!"
("Of course Wilson is-an awful liar", White said","You can
never trust that he is telling the truth - but I should say there
must have been something at the back of it.
White would not talk of the matter of the G.O.C.,A.I.F.
I opened it, but it did not flourish - a long awkward silence ad
Mu rdoch turned the subject. Murdoch tackled Dodds straight
about it, and Dodds Murdoch; and Murdoch had a quarter of an
hour with Birdwood, devoted-to the subject. But with White, it
was a subject which he clearly showed he did not wish to
discuss. He is the only one of all these generals who is not
prepared to argue it with you, and very few people would dare
broach it to him.
It turns out that Hughes has offered to Birdwood the
choice of positions - either the army or the A.I.F.administrative
command. The little man is undecided which to adopt. As it is
being offered to him in the hope that he will refuse, this is an
awkward position.Birdwood has not the first idea of organisation
- he could stand up for the digger but he could not provide
for him. His army however has been a disappointment - here is
Monash now the victorious commander of 7 divisions in a great
battle - and Birdwoo ds army only consists of 5 rather inactive
ones. The letter from Hughes is marked "secret" - and Birdwood
cannot answer it until he has leave to consult Gen Haig. He will
do whatever Haig thinks to be best. But if this means remaining
G.O.C.,A.I.F., what is to become of White? Murdoch is a very
strong determined man - he has done a thing that I never could
have done. H e has written to B irdwood pointing out what will
be the consequences if he accepts the A.I.F.Command - with a
view to ensuring that he shall not accept it.
Birdwood too, Murdoch tells me, has a very depressing
account of the B ritish troops who are under him.At the same time,
if they continually go on using dominion troops and explain that
the fighting has been done by the British, (as appears likely)
they will get trouble in the dominion troops. Rosenthal told
Murdoch that a nu mber of men of the 4 th Bde went to the 3rd
Divn and tried to get the men there to agree with them to sit
down where they were when next asked to go into some show - it
came to nothing.B rand took it to Monash to prove how overworked
his men were.Peck says that in any trouble the young officers wd
 

85
side with the men.
T hese dominion, troops, just as they are the
most decided and therefore the best in action would also be
the most decided and ready to act if they thought that the war
was being uselessly prolonged. xxxx There may be a considerable
difference between the terms which they would think it fair to
accept and the terms which the Americans would accept - the
question is now , whether , if France and Britain wanted to stop,
America would consent to stop. White thinks that she would not.
At the same time these men cannot be worked indefinitely. The
xxxxxxxxx positions which Monash takes up is that he has now 2
d ivisions which he is ready to throw in to the fight at any
time; it was the 4th and 5 th - now it is the 1st and 2nd. He
cannot do this indefinitely. At that rate the place would become
too hot for him in a nonth or two. It will be a curious change
when he becomes G"O.C.A.I.F., and suddenly finds that his job lies
not in using up Australian divisions but in saving them. Johns
great preo ccup ation then will be to save the men in every
way he can.
John believes that it pays a field commander to have
his best men at the base - so he tells Murdoch ; the thing is
to have the less valuable-men at the very front and the more valuable 

further back.
We went from 5th Army to our two flying squadrons -
No 2 and No 4, and Recklinghem.
They are a strange pair. Like twoins they seem to be
always kept together, always camping side by side: but there is
a considerable rivalry between the two although as opposed to
the rest of the world they are most jealously united.
They have just mad two very fine raidds on German
aerodromes on either side of LILLE. The first was the day before
yesterday - the second yesterday.
They were asked by their wing commander (colonel) to
choose an aerodrome to raid; and for a raid on the 16 th they
chose Haubourdin xxxx a southern suburb of LILLE because there
the Germans had their Hangars close together. Often they have them
far apart and scattered - so that they are more difficult to hit.
They started at 12.5 from theor ownaerodrome and took about 40
minutes gett ing their height. T here were the 2 Australian
squadrons each with 1 9 machines, and they had 2 British squadrons
escorting them high up. They anticipated getting pretty heavily
"archied" by some German AA batteries on the line, so they arranged
with the artillery to have these shelled just as they were crossing 

the line, and this was done. They crossed the line at 7000
feet, and almost as soon as they saw Lille they could make out
the aerodrome on the southern edge of it. They shut off their
engines and began to plane down for the aerodrome exactly as if
they were G erman planes coming home.
An old German bus which happened to be up was at this
moment flying almost alongside of them, possibly not realising
that they were enemy planes. One of the 2nd Sqn tackled him and
sent him down in a crash.
The 4th Sqn headed down first. They xxxx planed down too
anything from 5 0 to 250 feet xxx with Cobbie (who has now
28 Germans to his credit) leading. They dropped their bombs fair
on the hangars and on the machines - (2), which were standing
outside them. Thr ee hangars were missed at the western end of
the row, but the rest caught fiercely and the wind must have
carried the flames along the whole length. They photographed it
at the same time and we saw the photographs.
While No 4 was dropping its bombs No 2 was circling about
over the drome at 3 000 feet .. an unheard of thing - for 10

minutes. T hen they planed down too. Meanwhile no 4 was chasing
the Germans who had been standing round the drome. The Germans made
off towards a hospital on the other side of the aerodrome. The
machines chased after them shooting at them. (They had put 2 hangars.
on fire at once) Baker chased a motor car and shot at and over-turned

it. Both of the machines on the ground were hit and one of
them was in flames. The job was to bomb the hangars but the pilots
began to chase anything they saw. The machinegunned a tram and it
 

86
began to go off in the opposite direction. They chased horses
and carts and caused a terrible scatter. They machinegunned the
railway station and made a scatter there. They had intended to
be about 5  minutes on the drome but it was impossible to get
the pilots together. They were 35 minutes over the place. Then

they rose, all resumed formation, and went home in formation

without losing a man.

It took them 40 mins to get their height: 15 mins to

cross the line near Bethune (Cobby leading and Capt NcCloughry
deputising)and get to the drome: 35 mins there; and they were back
by 1.45.

No 2 had hit the officers mess - it was their lunch
time - and burnt it - it was in a building with a square court
near the drome. T he leader this day (Jones) had a leave ticket in
his pocket he could have gone off to London before the show,
but he flew over and went through the scrap with the leave ticket
in his pocket and went on leave aftwerwards.
The next day (17th) they were given the aerodrome at
Lomme northof Lille. This day Cole was leading No 2, and both
squadrons dived together - no 4 for the hangars and no2 for the
workshops. No 2 say that-the workshops were smouldering when
they left but it is uncertain. The hangars again were burnt.
On the previous occasion a few machineguns were at them from the
ground; but this time all the guns of the LILLE forss seemed to
be tuuned on. T here was a regular storm of shell, of all sorts
of guns - they were flying very low so that the fort guns could
burst on them. T here was not a German to be seen on the ground.
The hangars were closed, but they were full of planes - the pilots
flying low could see this. No 4 took out 19 machines again but
No 2 only 14.
This time they left the ground at 7am and got over the
aerodrome at abour 8am. T here ought to have been Germans about
by then - generally a fairly busy time. The suqadrons dived onto
the drome and dropped their bombs from 50 to 100 feet, - these
hangars were of wood - doors closed, everything perfectly quiet.
T he G ermans have trenches about these dromes that they can
get in to. Th ey got a fire going straight away - 4 hangars were
burning and there were several smaller fires. The wind was blowing 

the flames along the hangars. Then M.Gs opened up from the o-
forts. In the forts they were also using fieldguns and throwing
up flaming onions. (Even now our flying people dont know what
these things really are - they are to set planes afire.)
They only stayed 1/4 h r to 20 mins this time. xxxxxxx
Cole shot a German machinegunner and saw him crumple xxxxxx
behind his gun; McCleary was shot down by a m.g. from the ground.
He seemed to crash and be killed. So the Germans know who made
the raid. Two Germans crashed this time in their endeavour to
land in their excitement. One of them went to pieces on the ground.
Either this raid or (I think) the one before, No 4 saw
a man on a motor by ke and chased him; about 50 cavalry in a tr oop.
- on horsebeck - galloping - a number of troops in the village -
and shot them up.
They told me some interesting things. Whenever there is a fine
day the Germans come over at 22,000 to 25,000 feet photographing
and their lenses are so good that at that height you can see a
motor lorry on the ground, in the prints. Generally one plane comes
over by himself. We have in some aarmies a plane up all day to
look out for these Huns, and the archies put our plane on to him
by directing shots - at that height they are only meant as pointers
The Germans on the other hand have burst shots right under a planes
wing at 1 8,000 ft. The 2nd Army generally has a high plane
watching like that because their wing colonel was hurt in a scrap
with a German at 18,000 ft and has never forgotten it. Messages
are also sometimes sent for a squadron to get its height before
the approach of a German squadron - once the Germans are on
the aerodrome it is no good - they would shoot you as you left hhe
ground.
Our long distance bombing squadrons go over very high and
seldom meet with interference. But they drop their bombs from
18,000 ft o n places like Bruges. At the height at which German
planes drop their bombs it is pure chance whether they hit a xxx
hangar or a dump.
 

86a
chance whether they hit a hangar or a dump.

No 4 works with Camels , and No 2 with SE5 s. No 3 thay

say has RE8s.

Of the pilots in No4 , Cobby leads the way with 28 German

machines and balloons;He is a Melbourne,(Elsternwick) chap. The

next is Capt McCloughry (brother of the C.O. of 

no 4 ) who has 19.

Last month McCloughry brought down 10 planes and 2 balloons

                       Cobb     3        "     "       "      "      4        "         "   2       "
                       Rest                                             16                       3

making a total of 30 machines and 7 balloons in the month.

They only lost two pilots in the month of whom one has since been heard of as a prisoner and the other is still missing.

Since it was started no 4 Sqn has brought down (in 7 months

in France) 147 Germans. It has only lost 25 including accidents

Of those 25 I think they said 8 had been killed in accidents - 

they had 2 collisions in one of which they lost 3 machines.

Cobbys work had been done mostly in the last 2 months.

Thehsquadron xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx last month

sighted 318 German machines; it dropped 7 tons odd of bombs;

It has been 4 days engaged in the present battle, flying down

in the morning to Amiens and going over patrols to prevent

the German crossing our lines. There were any amount of Germans
seen, but they will not come near a patrol of ours in 

formation ( I mean if our patrol is in formation.) McLaoughry

told me that a formation of 4 or 5 Germans will not attack 2

of our machines unless t hese are right below them - they will

only come for single machines.

T he days when our squadrons were down here were 13th

14th and 15 th August. They brought down one German.Both

squadrons were down together.

Monash told Murdoch that it was ^uncertain at the moment if the 

German was retreating or not. The idea is that he is likely

to retreat if he is pushed, not otherwise. He will probably 

put the Somme river between us and him in order to protect

himself against our  tanks. Monash doesnt think the German

will retire if not pushed. He is therefore to be attacked by

us on xx August 22nd. This attack, Murdoch thinks is very
likely to come off and he is coming back for it. He crosses

to London tomorrow.

Gilmour stays on here for a day or two. They are staying with me.

August 19th Monday.  Our 2nd Divn handed over to the

32nd Divn last nig ht. The Germans attacked the 32nd this 

morning and got in to their line at three or four places. The 

32nd Divn pushed them out.

T he 6th Bde, in the course of advacing our line

on  the night (I think) of the 18th, or at dawn, under a heavy

barrage in a regular attack, got its objectives at most places;

but the company of the 22nd Bn which attacked opposite Herlevile

had a bad time.They were working up the road S.W. of Herleville ,
being very weak (only about 50 strong if so much)

when t he G e rman came at them from both flanks and from the 

front down the road itself with machineguns. xxxxxxx He also

got two of their posts on the flank of this and one post of

the 24th. About 50 men were missing and it was not known what 

had become of them. Of one post only one wounded man turned up.

It was a new division opposite to them - put in during the night

and it fought very well.

The 32nd Divn also lost about 50 men prisoners. They aay

 it is a pretty good division, including some Scots.

I see that there is an order for the 3rd Canadian division 

to move round onto the N.side of us - somewhere up Albert

way.

87.
August 20th - Tuesday. Yesterday was cloudy, and colder; a nd
today broke the same - indeed there was a speck or two of rain
yesterday and last night.
I had no idea that the dental work at the front
was so exceedingly well and carefully done. The dental officer
at Corps stopped a tooth for me yesterday - with porcelain -
most careful and good work - quite as good as any you would
have donein Sydney or Melbourne. He is a Major Day, a South
Australian who like many of our dentsiss has studied for four
years at the Unive rsity of Pennsylvania.
This morning Morrell told me that the attack was
coming off - two different ones on two consecutive days. Today
while I was up at the General staff office a train passed be hind
the hedge simply crowded with tanks - one great thing after
another. (The Canadians are moving largely by what the order
calls tactical trains. Certainly these moves are far more
secret and sudden than any we w re accustomed to before.)
The liaison division has broken up - today. The
staff all say that the Americans got on splendidly with oar
people. T he 3rd Divn has moved North of the Somme and the
5th Divn is now next to it. The 13th Bde has gone in behind
its own division at Lihons.
It looks to me as if John were going to put in
at least 3 of our divisions again straight away. Everyone says
it cannot go on - Robertson whom I saw today (Gen.Robertson,
late of the 9th Bn) said: "Hadnt we better chuck it if it com es
to this t hat the other people cant go on." A lot of speculation 

as to how long the war will last and if it can be over
this year. T he soldier, with few exceptions, thinks and hopes
that it will. But, unless the soldiers force the statesmen in
Germany as well as here I dont think it will.
 

87a
'Phone Message from Major CONNELLY to G.S.O.L 47th Div. 6.15 p.m.
22-8-18.
I want to fix apoint definitely for the liaison of our
Left and your Right Flank on the Jumping Off line. I would like
to fix it just South of the CHALK PIT.
(G.S.O. I 47th Div.). The Boche has broken through our
Right and we have had to evacuate, as far as we know, the GREEN
LINE. We are back on the BROWN LINE, as far as we know.
(Major C). Can you tell me where the Boche attacked?
(G.S.O.I 47th Div). The high ground in F.20.
(Major C). Have you evacuated F.27.
(G.S.O.I,47th Div). Yes, as far as we know.
(Call switched on to Gen. GELLIBRAND).
( Gen. G). Are you pushing anyone forward?
(G.S.O.I 47th Div). Yes our Reserve Bde.
(Gen G). I have just had a message from my own Left Bn. to say
that their Left has been uncovered; that your people have gone
back. That is all I could get through. What time do you expect
your Brigade to start out.
(G.S.O.I 47th). They are up in K.11 and now on move to F.25
and 26 to reinforce BROWN LINE. We are not going to push forward
to the GREEN LINE; only going to reinforce the BROWN LINE.
(Gen. G). I wish you would let me have that class of news early
as regards your intentions, as my Left Bn, is out there uncovered.
(Taken by S/Sgt. CRICHTON).
 

88
Wednes day August 21st
Gilmour and I went up this morning to see Monash
and find out whether he could give us xxxxx an explanation
on the coming fighting as he has done before. He gave us a n
outline of it and arranged to give us more in the evening.
He told us that this morning the 3rd Army had attacked and
was apparently we ll on its way towards Achiet - the first
objectives had been gained and the leapfrogging divisions
were goind through and encountering very little opposition.
Gilmour works for the NZ press as well as Australian
and so he wanted to go up there. I went up with him.
We gu essed the NZealanders wd be in it as they
were at Pu isieux. We found the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade Hqrs
just on the far side of Hebuterne, just before you get out
of the scrub which surrounds the village; and there were
about 20 German prisoners sitting on the top of the old
trenches in the bushes there.
The General (Hart - whom I used to know in the We ll-
i ngtons xxxx at the Apex) was up the line, but his staff
captain was most hosp itable. He insisted on us having some
lunch. He said that they had not had the opposition that we
had had down south. The G ermans were certainly going back
in fr ont of them up there, leaving rearguards.They had only
about 200 prisoners - and had had very few casualties indee d -
one of the two battalions - (they only had 2 in) - had got
to its objective with only 6 casualties - and the other
had 30 or 40.
They were the centr e of the advance, he said; an d
they were to be gradually squeezed out by the British
divisions on either side of them. The xxx 42nd and 37th or
35th (I forget which) I think he said were the divisions
taking part. They had xxxx not expected that these divisions
would do anything, because they had always found them most
unenterp rising. They had more than once taken their objective
for them and on one occasion the British would not take over
the post which N.Z. had captured for them.
They had been quite surprised however by the way in
which the British went over that morning. They advanced wel
on both flanks - One battalion of the 2 N.Z.ones was cut out
as intended, at the first objective - just beyond PUISIEUX
and the other had gone on exploiting to Achiet le Petit where
it too was cut out. The Division then was out of the fight,
- but it was to have been employed in breaking through if
any breach in the German lines had been made.But apparently
it had not been made. I spoke on the telephone to Hart
who happened to ring up; and he told me that he was simply
sitting there and doing nothing - that he was sure if they
had allowed him he could have gone on 5 or even 7 miles -
but at present he was quite passive and was chafing at it.
The staff, captain told us they laughed when they
got thir first news of the offensive of August 8th:- "By
midday the Australians had gone 9 1/2 miles". He said that the
185th Divn, which was the one that fought us pretty well at
Herlevil le the other day, had been taken away f om the NZ
front ju st before the push, and thatthe troops they then
had in front of them were rubbish.
I always find these N.Zealanders exceedingly friendly
towards us.
Gilmour and I took old Boddy on along the road
fr om H ebuterne past Gommecourt towards Puisieux. It was
being u sed, as roads often are, quite close to the front
on battle days - by lorries and cars. We lay up the car
on the south side of Rossignol wood and walked over the old
battlefield thr ough Puisi eux. The debris of the old battle
of March and February 1917 was still there. The old trenches
had the regular Somme stamp of 1916 - wide deep winding
alleys heavily pou nded in the Somme time. One noticed an
old battered British tin had hat which had clearly been there
 

89
before the G ermans retook the place - probably a relic of
Feb.1917.
We took too southerly a course through Puisieux and
came out on the S.side of it, instead of E as I intended.
But as we looked down the valley, which runs towards the Germans 

fr om the S of the village - if you can call this rockery
of scrub and fal len bricks and beams a village - I saw a
wood on the hill which blocks the view at the distant end of
the valey - a wood which one will not forget. It was certainly
Loupart Wood, (Afterwards I saw it from the Hebuterne
Foncqu evillers Road where the 4th Bde Hqrs used to be). It is
wonderful how that plateau overlooks the landscape. Far
ahead on the left of the valley the German shell were dusting
the slo pe this side of a bunch of trees which was clearly
Ac hiet le Pelit . Through the glasses we could see our own
men walking on the edge of the nearer country - about on a
level with th is village. We had been told that patrols were
outexploiting further. Bu t though we looked a good while
I saw no one beyond, on the slope up to Biefvillers, or
Bihucou rt or Grevillers or Loupart. We could see the far
trees behind Loupart which I knew must be BAPAUME, and the
trees of G revillers - where we lived last year; and a machine-
gunner in the first N.Z.objective to which we went told us
that xxxx he himself, with glasses taken from a German
officer, had seen G ermans running in Loupart Wood - running
away , he said.
Our p eople must have been threatening most
imminently the Bapaume road, Yet there were Germans pretty
close on the xxxx right, we were sure. Reports had come in
of patrols being through Miraumont - and Monash was almost
angry when I told him that our right was held up, this evening.
But there was a gun on our right firing into the road S fromm
Puisieu x with a most uncomfortably swift shell - so swift
that I thought at first it must be a sniping whizzbang. We went
over toward the right - I intending to see if we could get
a glimpse of P ozieres over the next fold. Bur there was a
machinegun firing from the back of that slope in our direction
not very close but not far behind the slope.The Briti sh
were supposed also to have Irles - but one doubted it entirely
- probably a tank was seen to get there - or patrols. Certainly
there was still a lively German straight between us and
there. He fired at the planes; and we noticed that the carrying
parties kept on our side of the rise, and that two men on the
rise were sheltering behind a mangoldworzel heap. So we took
our view of the down slope towards Le sars from the little
peep we could get of it over the edge of the rise - one could
see the tops of the ragged old trees I fancy of Courcelette-
and the rever s e sl ope of the Pozieres ridge - and possibly
the high ground near Gu illemont. It was wonderful getting
back to these bleak old scenes.
We walked back - and I photographed some of the
graves which the Germans had placed for their men beside
ours. At one place there was a grave of an Englsh soldier
-Warwicks I fan cy- killed on July1st 1916 in that awful
charge fro m Hebu terne; the graves of several men
kil led on F eb 2 7th 191 7; and the grave of Lieut V.
Hall, 14th Bn and some men killed on March 30th 1918,
all side by side. It was a most gloriously fine day. The
Germans turned on their artillery fairly heavily at times
 - they were certainly keeping it back out of range. German
prisoners told the N.Z.Staff captain that we should not get
to Bapaume that night. They were quite confident about it.
We found N.Z. advanced Hqrs in Brands old HQrs
at Foncquy- as they call it.Johnson the artillery general
told me t hat the Germans were still in Beauregard Farm within
500 yards of where his guns were, and that it made the barrage
for the next day - they were going on - very awkward. He di dnt
want M.G.bullets amongst hist gunners when they were working . 
John Monash gave us an explanation of his arrangements
 

90
for tomorr ow. It was as interesting as usual but he was in a
bad temper - or at least pretty grumpy with me, because there
had been in the "T imes" in the morning a reporduction of 
Rawlinsons message of than ks to the Canadians, and no word
of his message to the Australians. The Canadian message was
put in by Livesay, the Canadian press representative, and
I was really responsible for the absence of the Australian
message. He said that he was ceasing to appeal to the
Australians on the ground of patriotism - he was not asking
them to fight for patriotism or public interest. Theappeal
which he was g oing to make and was making to them was on
grounds of prestige - that they would increase their reputation
as fighting men. ( "I told G en.Rawlinson", he said to us on
Aug 27- when I am writing this -"that the Australian was above
all things a sportsman, and that no sportsman would go on
playing or making runs if he thought noone was recording
xxxx his scores".B oth Murdoch and I think that this is the
wrong appeal to make to the men - the appeal to make is the
str aigh t and tr u e and high one).

Murdoch returned this evening. The 3rd Division is to
the attack tommorrow, north of the SOMME. The 1st and
32nd British Divisions will attack the next day south of the
river - wh at they do on the left will depend very much on
what the 3rd Divn do n or th of the river near BRAY.

The N.Zealand staff captain told us that he only heard
about 2 days before that they were going to make thesr attack
at Puisieux. Monash told us tonight that he did not kbow
how many divisions were engaged in tomorrowas attack. He knew
that the 47th Divn was attacking to the north of us and he
thought one division north of that. But he had no information
as to the rest and he had come to realise that it was conside red
bad form to ask.T he New Zealand staff captain, and I thi nk
Gen Russell himself asked us how far to the north we tought
the attack of that day extended - so the secret had been well
kept.

Thu rsday August 22ndx Wrote the morning message at
Gellibrands headquarters in the gully behind Sailly le Sec. We
all w nt up together - Murdoch, Gilmour and I, with Boddy. On
the way after Corbie we picked up an elderly Australian infantryman carrying a pack of great size and looking rather
tired. We asked him if he would care for a lift. He said he would.
He said that he was of the 41st Bn; they had a longish march
the day before and the heat and the pack were rather too much
for him. He had got left behind (a wonder went through my
mind if this could be a man of those who intentionally drop
out but the next words settled it). "Did you have a good rest?"
"Oh yes", he amswered, "I had a jolly good sleep"."And a good
feed?""Oh yes, rather, very good tucker". He was not the sort who
shirk. As we went along he said "Its interesting to see all this
when youre not used to it". xxxxxxx This your first time up? we
asked. Y es- he was a new chum, he said, from Brisbane - fine
old chap - one of those who had enlisted I suppose because the
younger men were falling behindhand. We took him to Divl.
Headquarters, and Jess said he sould stay there and go up the next
day. He was a man with a grey head and wrinkled good natured
face - 45 if a day.
We he ard that t he B ritish were on their green(second)
obj ective and our people too - 33rd on left 35th on rig ht.
The 47th had been a little out of touch but our people had
taken a chalk pit for t h em and handed it over to them - with
a 4.2 howitz er in it.G elly had several German prisoners at
the door of his shelter and was interrogating one inside. I
get him t o let me stay with him. xxxxxxxxxxxx The prisoner
said that they had heard xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx that we were
going to attack; they had heard of the tanks. They had been
warned the night before and told that their artillery was going
to bring back its barrage very quickly when they retired from
the f ont line. Their instructions we e that if the English
 

91

attacked only with patrols theye were to hold their ground;
but if a regularly organised stack were made on them they must
retire onto their supports and fight there. They said that our
attack was too quick for them ( we afterwards found that our
r egimental officers found it far too slow)- and they had not
time t o retire. One prisoner said that they knew that our
3rd Divisio n was in front of them - they had been told it by
a prisoner. xxxxx Another said that they had caught an Australian
of ficer and a private - I dont know how far this is true.
Certainly they captured some Australian who told them the 3dd
divn was in front of them. G ellibrand was very sick about this
- but it is practically impossible for a prisoner to hide his
division.
We left there to go up to Bde nnd Bn headquarters.
Brigade were in the gully behind Bois de Gressaire. Young
Pain and Goddard were down in the dugout - Pain runs the brigade
- G elly was anxio us for them to exploit their success and
push on round BRAY which they were overlooking; Pain, in
vi ew of the position, with the town overlooking their right
and a number of machineguns in it didnt like xxxxxxxxxxxx the
plan - I heard him tell Goddard that he would not like to put
his name at the bottom of the order. Eventually Gelly let them
do as they wished, put it off and make a separate operation.
We walked up to he neck ovrlooking Etinhem; and after
having a bit of a look though our telescopes walked on along
the road on top to 35th Bn Headquarters. The road runs near
the edge of the Somme bank or cliff. There is a short open
gras sed space, and then the woods. Our guns were in the edge
of the woods - or rather the British guns were. They were
camouflaged and silent. The Germans were only putting shell
over into the gully behind near the Bray Corbie rd.
The intelligence officer of the 9th Bde (andengineer)
had told me that Moorsheads headquarters was a very little way
behind the front line - down one of the narrow valleys leading
down to the main valley north of BRAY. You had to look out
for shells at"the crucifix" crossroads, on the way to it -
keep round the right of them; and you had to run a bit to avoid
German machineguns and snipers just before you gt there. I
decidedthat the Headquarters of the 35th would be far enough
up for us to go - in a bank just this side of the old front
line on the slope above Etinhem.
We soon saw the banks which he meant - we taking a
track a litt le right of the road and passing the old white
battered remains of the mill. The flag of the aid post against
the bank showed where H qrs was - a tiny scrap of wite and red - 
on a stick- There were about fifteen Germans around it under
the bank; and another four or five under the further bank where
Bn Hqrs was.
We found only the signal lieutenant there -th e colonel
had gone on and established a headquarters forward; but orders
had just come from Bde that he was not to put his Hqrs forward
contradiciting a previous permission - and they were trying to
get onto him and bring him back.
Musr doch and Gilmour lay down there. Some signallers
came in after repairing the t elephone line to the forward
Hqrs - but it was very hard to keep the line unbroken for ten
minutes apparently - German shells on the other side of the
hill had broken it so many times.
I noticed two of our men leading two German stretcher
parties across fr om the aid post to the little cemetery on
the hill above us.A pho to of this would be good - theywere
burying the German dead in a cemetery immediately after
their death- so I went up the hill to catch them up. On the
way, I noticed, coming fr om the top of the hill overlooking
BRAY, two men, one of them carrying a camera. It was Wilkins