Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/116/1 - June - September 1918 - Part 14

122.
SEPTEMBER 8th (Sunday)
While we were looking at an old German dressing station
in Barleux as a possible camp. a heavy rainstorm came down. There
was a much heavier rainstorm with thunder on the evening of September 

5 as Murodch and I returned to Mericourt.
I worked late and completed notes as well as diary

SEPTEMBER 9th (Monday) It has been urgent for me to get to
England and arrange the new system of distributing and financing our
photographs, and the new organisation by which our official artists
shall be officers in the A.I.F. doing this work for their country
like everyone else - it is far more economical and it appeals to
them more. Also the Government will not answer the cables asking
it to authorise pictures and the artists are getting disappointed
 and disillusioned. They have given us a splendid deal - Lambert
especially, who is honest to a fault and has turned in, instead of
his 25 sketches, about 100 - everything that he had - wonderful work .
I accordingly persuaded Gilmour to go to London so that I too could
leave, and we crossed today. More rainstorms with bright intervals,
verly like last October.

SEPTEMBER 10, (Tuesday)

Arrived, in London late last night - Mrs. Almon had a room
for me. Saw Smart ∧& afterwards Box and they agreed to the whole programme
- Box very logical and helpful ; a fine administrator, I
should say. To see High Commissioner tomorrow. George Lambert
happened to be here with his wonderful work - a most picturesque
figure, with his keen sharp face, clear eyes, pointed yellow beard,
and smart turned up Australian hat. He likes being a bit of a soldier
- serving as he is ordered.

SEPTEMBER 11, (Wednesday)
Saw Fisher and Smart together today and arrange the whole
scheme. Hughes is taking a party to France with him tomorrow - the
first of a series of parties of distinguished-press and publicity men,
for the Australian front. Hughes is convinced that the Australian
has this year won the war - that the German simply runs at sight
of him. He is thought to be anxious to prevent the Australians from
being used in any further offensives. He has (besides political
leanings) an immense admiration for the digger - the admiration of
and wonder of a small and weak man for anyone big, brave and strong.
The men whom he has entertained at his house, in the garden at tea
and so on, have been talking to him - and their attitude is: There
will be no A.I.F. left if they go on using us like this. Hughes
thinks that we ought to let the Americans and the Air Force take a
larger share - and Murdoch says he would favour Japan's being thoroughly
committed to a big struggle in Siberia. Hughes wants to get
Australia's work thoroughly known - so - (on Murdoch and Box's advice)
 he is sending out a number of parties of English editors and newspaper
owners to see the men themselves. As there is an idea that
Monash will simply impress his own work upon them if they go to Corps
(where Monash asked them) they want a separate chateau - but Corps
says it cannot be provided.
I had George Lambert to dinner at the Royal Society's
Club (where we are guests) tonight. At dinner I asked him if he
would agree that the best way to use our artists was to get them to
give their services, as everyone else is doing. He was warmly in
favour of it. He is (as Dyson says) a man of a very high standard -
egoistic, vain probably, loving the military air which he can give
himself, but a man who will give you, as far as his work goes, full
measure pressed down and running over out of the highest possible
ideal of his work.
 

123
Thursday, September 12th
Sent away a very warm cable to Pearce, supporting one
from the High Commissioner in favour of our new system of artists -
suggesting a corps of 10 artists, drew up details of arrangements
with the High Commissioner as to the whole publicity side of the
A.I.F. Then met Hughes and his party -Marlowe Editor of the

Daily Mail, a sturdy, square, clean shaven Englishman of 50 or 53,
Lord Burnham, a rather talkative, smooth, diplomatic but capable
Jew - very anxious to talk to our men in a speech at the same time
as Hughes; (owner of Daily Telegraph); Edward Price Bell, a quiet
nice chap, one of the great Americal correspondents in London;
and old Robert Blatchford, with a big black moustache, a big eagle
nose and an eye like a hawk - the slowest and oldest man of the
party - an old soldier, a rebellious spirited socialist - and now a
natural elderly man, very quietly - dragging along at the tail of th
the party with his overcoat trailing behind him.
Stayed the night at Boulogne.

Friday. September 13th 

I went on to Corps ahead of the party - in the wood near 

Assevillers. I told Monash that the idea was that he was unsympathetic
to these visits - and that a tithe of the trouble which
brought all those guns to Headquarters for the King's visit would
have made Mericourt Chateau fit to live in. He was very angry
 with me. Party visited Corps and 2nd Division. Monash says a
big fight was this morning decided on.
Saturday. September 14th
Party visited Peronne and Mt.St.Quentin.  Young officers
explained them.
Sunday September 15
To 1st, 3rd and 4th Divisions. Hughes spoke to 33rd
Battalion at a footbal match at Peronne. He went as far as the
Reserve Brigade of 4th Division.
Monday. September 16th 
Pretty well done up when I saw the last of the Hughes
party. Writing letters in our little camp at Barleux all day -
a sweltering hot day - one of the hottest of the year. A heavy
thunderstorm at the moment.
I have just come in form from a talk with Blamey. I asked
him as to the origin of the battle of October August 8, - whose idea was it?
He said he rather thought it was his - anway it arose over afternoon
tea cups. It was becoming clear, after Hamel. that the
Germans opposite our front were so deteriorated as to offer a prospect
of breaking through. Blamey and Monash each spoke to the
Army Staff and managed to persuade Rawlinson after a time. At
G.H.Q., Dill and one other were in favour of it and Haig and Lawrence
rather against it. When they were won over Foch was not
by any means all out for it. But Debeney had independently suggested
another push by his army and Foch in a manner combined the
two and worked  Debeney's scheme off in this battle. The two
British divisions were just to make a flank.
Blamey says that the British Divisions of the next
Corps have been more used than we - "But that is Godley - and of
course he always would - that proves nothing" (as to the proper
use of our troops.)
He says Monash has absolutely refused to use the Australians
in any sort of offensive after this next one. Blamey says
that Lawrence before the August show, sometime in July, forecasted
a probability of the Canadians relieving our Corps on or about
August 4th.
 

124.
Sept. 16 (Contd)
Blamey also told me he had sent for me as he would ne
very sorry to see any sort of a feud develop between J. Monash and
myself.  He told me the circumstances under which Mericourt Chateau
was not retained for the party. and I think he is right and
that Monash did not put them in Amiens out of pique but because it
was a bigger party than he expected and the Hotel de la Paix was
the easiest place to provide.
Tuesday Sept. 17th
I saw John Monash this morning and told him I thought I
was mistaken in thinking he was out of sympathy with the Australian
policy of having these visitors here. John explained to me than,
and tonight more fully, the details of the attack which  we are to
make tomorrow - I will transcribe the explanation when I get time.
It is an extensive ambitious plan for troops as worn as these
(the 4th is fresher than the 1st Division) and I think that he can
scarcely hope that the exploitation phase will succeed.
The day before Hughes left I had a talk with him. The 

cars were late in getting petrol, and so we went to see the Cathedral
to pass the time. Hughes told me that he had come to hold that
the important quality to possess in such dealings as he had with
the British Government, and the War Office, was that of not being
nobbled or put off - if you stuck to your point and persisted
they gave way. He had stuck to his point in the matter of demanding
home leave for our 1914 men- those who have been fighting
since the beginning of the war, without ever getting home. All
otjer countries' armies have home leave - even the French soldiers
in the Pacific get it. I Know Canadians get a good sick leave at
any rate. The War Office said it was absolutely impossible to
give it to us - everyone else would want it ( I suppose Canada, New
Zealand and South Africa would want the same allotment, whatever
it was).  "Pearce allowed himself to be put off", Hughes said. 
He is as weak as water - so is Cook - so are they all"- they allowed
themselves to be persuaded. The Transport people said there were
no ships - and so we were put off. But I insisted that the ships
had to be provided - and I got them - and I am afriad even now to
tell some of these generals - I haven't even told Monash what I am
going tonight to tell the men (I had asked them to arrange for him
to meet some of the 1914 men - and he is doing so at Bray) tonight -
because I don t know what the generals would do - I want you to send
it along to Murdoch and get him to make all he can of it" He gave
me the speech in the morning tho' he was not delivering it till the
evening, in order that it might get into the Australian Press first
from Murdoch and me, and that the generals should not have time to
cable out defeating it. (I don't think he need have feared this)
He went on to speak of the rest due to the Corps "I am
determined that they shall have it - I will not leave England until
they get it, even if it means my staying on here," he said, "I said 
to Wilson - Sir Henry Wilson - "Look here, if you want to have these
troops to use in the Spring - and I suppose you do for that is the
way to use them - you will have to take them out of the line for the
winter. If you go on keeping them where they are, there will not 
be any left fit for the work"
Wilson said that he thought it was very possible that
it might be arranged if Hughes would see Haig. "You see him when
you are over in France" he said, "you know the considerations that
come into it - it might not be fair to the British troops" -
Wilson either said this or said it was suggested by others.
"I'm not going to see Haig" Hughes said - "I am not
going to ask Haig. If the Belgians want their troops out of the line,
they don't ask leave - if the Canadians want their divisions to be
rested, the don't send and consult G.H.Q.- they say that it must be
done,and it is done. I am not going to leave England until the Australian
Corps comes out of the line. And if it doesn't come out, then I shan't
leave England - that's all."
 

125
WEDNESDAY, 19  I8th SEPTEMBER
We had arranged to get up at 6 o'clock this morning -
Murdoch, Gilmore, Dyson and I and go up to see what we could
of the second phase of the big attack which was taking place today.
Wilkins was getting up at the same time. The second
phase of the attack would not be complete until 10 a.m. It was
hopeless to see anything much before 8 o'clock and one has watched
these early morning bombardments so often, sitting up all night
to do so that the interest almost fades out of them, though it
never quite does so. It is not a bad plan to get up by the
time that it is full daylight to some point from which you can
really see the troops and this should have been quite possible
to-day. However, t 6 o'clock - or was it half past 5? - when
we woke, the rain was pouring steadily down. It had begun to
rain, I fancy, at about 3.30. It was dark and very depressing
when Herbert came in and called us. One got out of bed - we
were all five camped in the one apartment of a big hut - One's
head was full of the idea of what the men were going forward, as
they must be by now, under this soaking rain, over the very slippery
ground, after having been drenched through in their lying
out positions. It seemed as if the luck of the day was once
more completely against us. The only cheering factor was that
the country in which we were now fighting is by no means badly
cut up - not comparable in any way to the muddy wilderness
in which we were struggling last year at Ypres, nor to that of
Flers.
Wilkins naturally got away first - he always does.
By the time we had our breakfast the rain was stopping and when
the cars set out there was a blue break in the sky and it looked
as if the day might brighten up. We went through Peronne and
Doignt to Catelet, near Cartigny, where the 4th Divisional
Headquarters were, and by the time we neared this place, the
landscape, although it had been newly washed down, was looking
fresh and bright.
 

126
What was our delight when in the General Staff Office,
when "Babe" Criag told us that everything was going perfectly
well, the troops were on their first objective; they had taken
already 500 prisoners, and the 16th Battalion had captured Le
Verguier. The 13th Battalion had had some pretty stiff fighting
just south of the remains of the village, but the troops
had just gone forward to the second objective ( red line) and
everything seemed to be first rate. MacLagan laughed like anything
w hen he saw me. "Well you old bird of ill-omen" he said
"I knew you would be here: you always are when anything's doing".
We went on from there across the valley at Bouchy and Tincourt,
passing a good many huts and the sites of huts, all newly burned
out by the Germans, and turned through Hamel down the road to
Royisel. There was a fair amount of traffic on it. The Germans
were throwing a single high velocity shell once every few minutes
at the road west of Marquaix - we heard the scream of it as
we came up, but we were well past before the next one fell.
I saw no damage near the road so the shooting was probably
pretty blind. We passed several devastated railway yards at
Royisel, and through this three-quartere ruined village up along
the road to Templeux. Where this crosses the high ground at
the cross-road to Hesbecourt, we turned sharp right and stopped
the cars. The little crossroad was full of detail of our lst
Brigade Headquarters - men cooking in the little shelters in
the road bank, others standing about around some German prisoners,
and a little group up on the hill top, evidently watching the figt-
fight. On our left we had passed two [[?]] sham tanks. One of these
was exceedingly lifelike except that its tail was cocked up
in the air off the ground in a way that would be quite impossible
for a heavy battle tank. The other had had a shell hole in the
side of it. We heard afterwards that a mule that was dragging
it had bolted - or according to another story, a mule took fright
at it as it passed, and contemptuously kicked it to bits.
These sham tanks were intended solely to draw the enemie enemy's
fire. The pioneers who made them were to drag them up, six
 

127
men inside them, to the first stage of the advance and leave them
there to be shelled at. But I don't think it was a very popular
job. We saw one or two of them fairly far forward, but none
as far as the hopping off seint line. The inmate of one of them
told Gilmour that its axle broke on the way to the front. "I
jolly well saw that it did" he said.
I had brought Bennett, the despatch rider as far as
1st Brigade Headquarters in order to take back the morning's despatch
to G.H.Q. from there. From 1st Brigade Headquarters we
heard that the 74th Division on the left had got the difficult
quarries at Templeux slope on the right left of our 1st Brigade. The
troops were held up a bit in front of Villeret and at the time
when I sent my despatch, it was not certain that they had taken
this. The whole of the first objective however had been won and
the troops had started for the second objective. They had taken
another couple of hundred prisoners, and they had seen a number
being sent back by the Tommies on their left. Whilst I was writing
my despatch in a shelter belonging to some artillerymen, Murdoch,
Gilmour and Dyson walked on to the high land in 8 Central
about a mile ahead just south of the western end of Templeux and
I was to join them there.
It must have been nearly 12 o'clock before I had cleared
my despatch and walked up towards them. As I was going along the
top of the road above Hesbecourt with a couple of stretcher-bearers
an English officer and his orderly passed us. The orderly whistled
and I stepped across to him. "There's a wounded German in the farm
over the hillside", he said, he is conscious but he wants help: I
thought I would just tell you in case you could arrange to have
him taken in." A little further forward was the Advance Signal
Station of the 1st Brigade about where the line had jumped off from
this morning. I told them there about the German and then pushed
on to join Dyson and the others over the hill. On the way I passed
near some of our old wire, an officer of the 1st Brigade Headquarters,
dead. I don't know who he was. The wire throughout all this
district is most excellent and quite uncut, except in a few places
where some solitary shell has dropped on to it, or certain places
 

128.
where it has been cut by wire cutters. Indeed all through today
one thing that we noticed was the excellence of the defensive
works. I am not enough of a tactician to say whether they were
well sited, but they were certainly elaborate and strongly built
We came upon many portions of wire which would take a considerable
time to cross if you were under fire and would be a very nasty
obstacle. They seem to run in diverse directions, one long
belt of wire being stretched out most of the length of the top
of this particular ridge at right angles to the general trend
of the front. Some of the forward trenches had only been outlined
and were a few inches deep but most of the trenches seemed
to be cut quite deep. In the forward area there were not many
deep dugouts;in the actual British front line, I did not see any,
but close behind the front there were a certain number of dugouts
and in the second or main lines these were deep, and, though not
as comfortable as German dugouts were fairly roomy. The impression
which we obtained from the whole day's walk was that this section
of the line had certainly not been lost by the British on account
of any defective fortification so far as depth and strength of the
fortification went. The arrangement may have been defective.
The actual works were strong and good. Afterwards we went to the
front line, especially in order to see what the effects of the
German bombardment of March 21st had been. Appearance are, of
course, often very deceptive, and we did see a few lengths of
trench which seemed to have been pretty badly battered at some
time in the past. The main part of the front system had never
suffered any really heavy bombardment - certainly nothing approaching
the bombardment of the Somme battle. They may have
been subjected to a bad two or three hours, but they had never been
in any way blown out by shellfire - unless appearances are very
deceptive they had certainly not been more heavily, if as heavily,
shelled as our trenches on the day of Dernancourt.
This brings one to the conclusion that the German did
not launch his attack all along the line and that the point where
we saw it near Lamb Post and Ewe Post was not a point that had
ever been strongly attacked at all. It is quite possible that
there may be other parts of the line near Cologne Farm or Villeret
which may have been badly battered about. This almost proves to
my mind that the Germansattacked on March 21st, not all along the
line, but at certain chosen points, and then when they had penetrated,
 ^[[?teed out,]] and got in behind the troops at the other points where they
had been attacked. The reserves must have been very weak or else
wastefully used or disorganised, for the wire all over the British
position was very strong and the Germans should certainly have been
held up from the reserve positions even when they got through the
fron and main British lines.
I found Dyson, Gilmour and Murdoch on the forward slope
of the hill south of Templeux. They had been watching men move
over the summit E.N.E. of them near Cologne Farm. Here you could
see a sortl of moorland on the skyline, which seemed humped up in
this direction. A line of telegraph posts runs across the horizon.
There is a biggish dump or some sort of earth, probably clay or chalk,
on the nearer side of the hill; below that in the valley is the
village of Hargicourt. This valley branches to the south and
in the southern fork of it is the village of Villeret which
stretches right up the valley and comes out on the hilltop on the
southern end of the valley. Due north of us, behind Hargicourt
and on the northern side of the valley, where were the great dumps which
overlook Templeux Le [[Guerevd?]]. This is the towering feature of the
whole landscape here with the exception of the hump near Cologne
Farm. The big Fosse, as it is called, at Templeux stands out like
the first two steps of the pyramid of Sakhara near Cairo, like one
great pedestal on top of another. The 74th Division had this for
their objective and their Staff were very nervious about it. They
decided to go at it from the southwest with one battalion, while another 

went at it from the northwest, and eventually, I believe, it
 

129.
it was taken with comparatively little trouble. Our 1st
Brigade was asked to help by getting round in the rear of it
if the 74th Division were held up there and some of our troops
were mixed in with the 74th during this attack. The fosse
was taken fairly early and the British were well away beyond it.
All the same it did not seem to me that they were as far forward as
our own men because the shelling was distinctly more active in our
left rear in the area of the 74th Division than in our front.
Whilst we were sittingon the hill watching ,a battery of whizzbangs 

which must have been quite close by the sound, was pecking
constantly into the valley by Templeux, and probably into Templeux
village. This seemed to mean that the Tommies had not got far
 enough to capture this battery, while as far as one could make out,
our own men were well up on the skyline, by Cologne Farm. It was
very occasionally that we saw a man moving up there, but I think
I can remember seeing a few who appeared to be our men walking on
the skyline above the Farm. The Farm we identified, with a few
battered red foundations on the hill-side somewhat beyond the
smaller fosse east of Hargicourt.
We turned to the right down from a valley in which the
white English notice boards were still standing exactly as they had
stood on the morning of the 21st March, without any sign of interference.
The country showed very little signs of shellfire.
Here and there was a Tommy's helmet which had evidently lain in
the rain and sun since March 21st. We walked up over the hill to
the southeast and saw a crowd of men on the skyline digging near
a particular point. Just before we passed through some very deep
trenches with the wire more or less intact. This was Fervaque
Trench and Cole Trench on the reverse slope of the hill. On the
top of the hill near where a communication trench joined a far
trench, overlooking the further side, we found the Headquarters of
 the 11th and 9th Battalions in some deep old British dugouts.
All this system had been the British main line system. We left
Dyson and Benson, who had come with us from 4th Divisional Headquarters,
- up on the surface in the sunshine which was now very pleasant;
and groped our way down the dark, winding stairs to the very deep
chamber, where we found Major Darnell now commanding the 11th
Battalion with Belford and the adjutant.
The 11th Bn. said that they had gone about 1000 yards
from the start before the Germans began to resist them. When the
resistance began it mainly came from the brown line. The Germans
whom they met all seemed to run. The 11th Battalion said t cut
their way through the wire with wirecutters. When they were held
up on their front, the made use of the enveloping tactics which are
now the form of attack which is taught to them. The flank which was
held up would lie still, while the men who were not held up would
 advance. The same thing happened on the other side of the obstacle
and then the Germans finding men moving past their flank, and the
9th Battalion which was following in support, coming up straight
at them, held up their hands or ran. Smoke and the mist made it
very difficult to keep their direction in the morning and they were
on top of the enemy in most cases almost before he knew of their
approach. About 30 to 40 Germans, Darnell thought, had been
killed on that front by the barrage - certainly the artillery
seemss to have killed a good many in this day's fighting. (We ourselves
only saw 2 or 3 dead Germans during the whole of our walk)
The Germans mostly seem to have run back and to have
taken their guns out, according to the 11th Battalion. The 11th
Battalion captured two field guns. These guns were in front of
a line of our wire which prevented the Germans from getting them 
away. The Germans were firing, I think, over the sights direct,
but it is doubtful if they knew how close our men were owing to
the smoke and mist. Our men came on the guns very suddenly and
the gunners put up their hands; some of them were shot. (The
tanks went through the line all right and had come back by the time
that we reached there) The 11th Battalion lost in this advance
Capt. Halahan, M.C.,M.M. Halahan was an old 1915 man and was one
 

130
one of the finest officers in the Battalion - they themselves say 

the very best. I had met him constantly at Pozieres, at Mouquet 

Farm, at Ypres and elsewhere. He seemed to be always with them

and was the officer I had known longest with this battalion.

He was one of those to be selected to go back to Australia on 

transport duty under the first arrangement as to leave, but being 

unmarried. had to give way to married officers. His turn would 

have come to go back with the next batch. He was killed this 

morning by a shell on the brown line. His father used to write 

for the Sydney Bulletin. Halahan was a tall, thin. gentle 

looking chap with a refined face - a gallant man with a quiet manner 

and always, to my mind, a very attractive character.

The 11th Battalion told us that their line was in front

of the remains of Villeret, viz on the western side of it.

After the barrage lifted for the second advance the 9th Battalion 

went in and mopped Villeret up. From the 11th Bn, we decided to 

push on towards the English outpost line, which was still somewhere 

ahead - across another valley on a further ridge. As we 

started we found Colonel Mullen of the 9th Battalion with his 
 Headquarters in the trench quite close to the 11th Battalion. 

[* I'm not sure this is so - it was an early impression
CEWB*]

They were apparently not in a dugout. Mullen is always a man
whose accounts have to be taken with a little caution where other
units are concerned and it is always possible that he claims for 
his Battalion guns and prisoners who have been captured by other
Battalions.working past the same objective. Still in spite of this
the captures by the 9th Bn. must have been splendid. He told us
that it got six 77 mm. guns, seven 5.9 Howitzers, and one 8 inch
Howitzer. Whilst we were talking to Colonel Mullen a note came
up to him from the front line saying that in square G l4a in front
of the outposts there were three guns of 4.5 (4.2 ?) calibre.
A fourth gun had managed to get away, but No. 9 Platoon had prevented
the Germans from removing these with Lewis gun fire. They
reported that in G.l5a there were horses in limbers. These had
they had stopped from getting their guns. They also reported
seeing two motor lorries getting along the roads opposite them.
They said that they were now actually in their third objective -
Mullen marked on my barrage map the points where his furthest
outposts were, which were well beyond the Hindenburg Line just
north and south of Quarry Wood and practically on the furthest
objective line for the day. We had never imagined, and I don't
believe Monash did either, that our men would reach this line.
We seemed to hold the outpost trenches of the Hindenburg Line
opposite Bellicourt. Bellicourt itself, the 9th Battalion posts
reported to be very strongly held. Mullen said that the wire in
the Hindenburg wire (which General Monash had told us had not been
cut before was not properly cut the day before) had been cut by
guns; the trenches were well duck-boarded and well revetted, so
the outposts reported. The prisoners told him that the Hindenburg
Line was not strongly held and that they had never expected this
attack; but there was also a statement that the main Hindenburg
Line was held by troops who had rested.
It was certainly a puzzle to us that the bombardment that
everybody had expected in this advance had not taken place. We
all expected that the German would have his men behind the Hindenburg
Line already in position; that he would know the positions
likely to be taken up by our guns and the ground which our Infantry
would occupy, and that although his Infantry might not cause them
 much trouble, they would receive on reaching their objectives a
drenching shellfire which would cause them very serious loss.
That was a contingency that was deliberately faced in order to get
near to the Hindenburg line. On the contrary, we saw very little
German shellfire this day. But what there was,was mainly scattered
and ineffective. By far the most vicious was that of the
Battery which was continually pecking into the valley near Templeux.
But where the Australians had advanced, and the Germans evidently
been forced to withdraw their batteries, there was practically no
shellfire to bother about.
 

131
Mullens told us that the Company of the 9th Battalion
which mopped up Villeret had only 9 casualties, and that so far as
he knew, there were only 25 casualties in the whole of the 9th
Battalion. The Germans used to run when our lines came upon them;
sometimes they started shooting with their machine guns, but in
most cases, ran as soon as we started firing at them. In several
trenches on our way back, we saw German machine guns still lining
the parapet exactly as they had been left, and in one case near
Villeret there was wire in front of them which should have made
 an attack a most deadly, if not impossible matter. The prisoners
taken by the 9th Bn. were said to come from the 21st Regiment of the
5th Bavarian Division; from the 1st Reserve Division, and from the
180th Division. (I don't know that this last is to be trusted
It may be a mistake for the 185th) The positions taken up by the
9th Bn. overlooks the whole country (so Mullens said) It was on
the far side of the next ridge. (Away to the right of us, over
the hilltops, we could see a long low roof, with a big tower, which
we only realised presently to be St. Quentin Cathedral.) Mullens
said that the 2nd Bn. had, he believed, met machine gun fire and
had some casualties. He thinks that the 1st Brigade helped the
Tommies to take the fosse, but he is not sure of this. (Wilkins
said that everywhere he went, the taking of the fosse was attributed
to the 74th xxxxx  xxxxxxx   Division, and I think this is
correct.
We started to go down the hill to the next valley and on
the way passed/in another trench close by the Headquarters of the
10th Bn. We did not go down as it was about 1 o'clock but had a
yarn with the Adjutant at the top of the dugout stairs. He told
us that C. Company of the 10th Bn. in the wood near Villeret, had
taken 100 prisoners, 12 machine guns and 77 m.m. guns. The Company
worked round the wood and of the casualties were about 35 for
this Company and 70 to 80 for the whole battalion. As soon as
the barrage lifted from the brown line, the 10th and 9th Battalions
had gone forward. They had met considerable opposition from the
little woods immediately in front of the 140 metre contour. This
was all machine guns. The 10th Battalion had taken 4 field guns
in all. The 10th Battalion had its posts /∧not in the old British line
but ahead of it. The whole theory of the objective lines was
to get beyond the German line and xxxxxxx dig in a line of our
own, so as to avoid shellfire.
As we went down the hill from the 10th Bn. Headquarters,
we found ourselves passing two scrubby woods, either cut down, or
consisting of new undergrowth, on the hill slope facing the opposite
side of the valley. In this was an old British field gun position -
a shelf cut out of the hillside facing towards the enemy and
screened only by the opposite hillslope. In the sides of this
emplacement there was still stuck about 100 English Field gun
shells which the Germans had evidently not taken the trouble to
remove. I was rather struck with this as it seems to to show
that the use to them of our field guns is comparatively limited;
but one remembers that that it is the same in the case of German
Field guns taken by us. We make very little use of them.
The Battalion Headquarters was near the Farm of Fervague.
We passed through the wood below this and up the opposite hillslope
which whie comes like a tongue from the north until ∧into the fork of
the valley behind our other outpost line. Down that valley runs
the road from the hilltop at Villeret, past Le Grand Priel Farm.
We passed south of this tongue near the fork of the valley and were
we struck by the number of boys of the 10th Battalion who were
lying dead on the lines where you began to get over the crest of
this tongue. There was a little wood on the opposite hillside
north of Le Grand Priel farm - just a bit of a hedgerow, or quarry
with trees in it, and the 12th Battalion who were attacking in
a line around the western slopes of the valley, told us that the
10th Battalion had had caught it rather heavily from machine guns
in this wood, as they crossed the crest. On the road xxxx,also,