Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/111/1 - May 1918 - Part 4

102
102
CHANGES IN A.I.F. COMMAND. (CONFIDENTIAL NOTES). 

We wish that it had been possible to continue the historic relation of
Gen. Birdwood with the Australian Force till the end of the war. We recognise
the great debt Australia owes to his splendid integrity and high
qualities of leadership, our great fortune in obtaibing the advantage of
them, and the serious loss sustained by the transfer of so fine a leader
to another position; at the same time, that transfer seems to us to
make clear the following conclusions in our coubtry's interest:-  
(1)- The command of our coubtry's army cannot suitably be held by the
tactical commander of one of the five British armies. He must necessarily
be occupied with other affairs. The A.I.F. needs its commanders whole
preoccupation. The placing of the Australian Corps in Gen.Birdwoods army
is an imperfect expedient and an/imperfect expedient is not needed.

(2) Now that Gen.Birdwood has left the Corps the chief administrative
command should be exercised by an Australian. It could be better carried
out by Gen. Monash giving his whole time to it than by any commander
attempting to carry it out concurrently with the work of his army.  

(3) All else being equal it is a disadvantage for the head of the A.I.F.
to be subordinate to G.H.Q. The system though imperfect has been continued, 
in Gen.Birdwoods case because of his exceptional authority as
founder of the Corps and the qualities of leadership based upon his
peculiar ability to exercise control and influence over our men by
personal contact. It is against the interests of Australia to continuer 
it now that Gen. Birdwood goes to an outside command subordinate to G.H.Q.  

(4) If urgent need of an external commander, or extreme objections to
any alternative, existed, such an arrangement might be expedient in
spite of its drawbacks. but there is no urgency to justify a stopgap
or imperfect scheme for the control of that great national instrument of
Australia, the A.I.F. On the contrary a perfect arrangement, can be very
clearly seen, and one which would command the confidence of the whole AlF.- 
Such an expedient as that now temporarily adopted presupposes, if made
permanent, that no Australian exists to whom the administration of the
A.l.F. can safely be given, now that Gen. Birdwood has been transferred
to an extraneous command. This is not the case- several Australians are
perfectly capable of successfully filling this post with independence.  
 

(5) The choice in Gen. Birdwoods recommendation has clearly lain between
Gen. White and Gen. Monash. Gen. Monash is throughout the force and outside
of it recognised as having very great administrative ability. Gen. White
has been more responsible for the control of the A.I.F. (and often actually
in command of it) since its organisation, He is practically universally
recognised as the greatest soldier in it, and his services in the
A.l.F. are too valuable to be lost to our country even if he desired it,
It is in the interest of Australia that his abilities should be made
known by the assumption of command, and no longer be (as is necessary
in a chief of staff) subordinated and to some extent obscured as a staff
officers must be, despite the constant effort of his chief to bring them
to the notice of the Government. It would be felt as a blow, by the A.I.F.
and not in the interests of Australia to part with Gen. Whites services.

(6) The universal opinion of the force is that Gen. White is the best
field commander of operations in the A.I.F., and that Gen. Monash’s
greatest power is his administrative capacity. This is a commonplace which
was probably as much in Gen. Birdwoods mind as in that of all other members
of the force. The present arrangement has been put forward in accordance
with British army tradition - out of regard to the claim of seniority -  
Gen. Monash being senior, and not having shown any want of capacity which 
would justify (in the British tradition) justify his being passed over
for the command of the Corps. Therefore he becomes commander Aust. Corps,
and White though recognised as more brilliant in active command is passed
out of the service of the A.I.F. into a subordinate post in the British
Army. 

(7) The course which is obviously best for the AI.F. and which would
have the full and immediate approval and confidence of the whole command
would be for Gen. Monash to have the supreme administrative command and 
Gen White the supreme active command. I therefore suggest that the following telegram
be sent:          

(2)
For Rt. Hon. W.M. Hughes and
A/ Prime Minister.
Howse XXXX Murdoch Bean wish urge
utmost strength that suggested reorganisation command A.I.F. and
Australian Corps should unagreed by Government or modified first
opportunity. There certain be general opinion that command of A.I.F.
cannot best exercised by officer even with Birdwoods great ability
 when uptaken extraneous command aaa xxxxxxxxxxxxx
[*Appears unneed for patchwork ^ expedient or imperfect
scheme for control our great
national institution A.I.F *]
 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Certain be
argued that this implies that no Australian exists capable safely
filling this high position aaa xxxxxxxxxx Throughout Australian
force estimate of Monash is that his ability all lies in this
direction his administrative capacity being outstandingly great
certainly equal that any heads British war administration aaa
White xxxx possesses xxxxxxxxxxxx administrative capacity which won
him admiration throughout force but xxxxxxxxx recognised xxxxxxxxx
a as greatest field soldier Force possesses indeed has constantly  
xxxxx virtually commanded force and during Birdwoods absences  
actually commanded his position since inauguration of force having been
that of second in command rather than chief of staff aaa It recognised  
throughout force that Australia possesses xxx these two officers  
one administrative commander one active commander xxxx each of outstanding
capacity and xx arrangement which would have far greatest support  
through force would xx have complete confidence all men officers would  
xxxxxx ensure their gretest comfort and greatest efficiency in handling  
would be xxx Monash senior G.O.C. A.I.F. White G.O.C. Corps aaa Australian
force cannot unlikely contemplate losing xxxxxxxxxxxxx services bar brilliantest
officer aaa It also long been considered by force disadvantage for 
G.O.C. A.I.F. be holding command under G.H.Q. aaa This was necessary 
order avail ourselves Birdwoods outstanding qualities leadership aaa
But now when Birdwood will out touch men it urgently desirable have  
as G.O.C. A.I.F. Australian officer independent of G.H.Q. aaa Suggest  
for this Monash outstandingly fitted especially if given senior rank  
Arrangement above suggested would give greaterX satisfaction
throughout force than any other ^as perfect efficient
scheme control A.I.F. aaa Suggested Present arrangement will our 
opinion do reverse                                                     

102     28
May 20^th Monday The Germans raided
London last night while I ws finishing the
memo. When I got back to Howse's flat
(Howse still away but Maj. Willcox, the fine youngster
on his staff very hospitably asked me to stay)
I had a message from Murdoch saying
tt he wd  be back _^next morning tomorrow _^ (i.e. today) and ws
anxious to see me. So they managed to deliver
that telegram in Scotland on a Sunday. 
I had a long yarn with Murdoch.
Birdwood has recently written to him several 

102     29                                                                  
times explaining tt he cannot have him
at Corps Hqrs. The letters always start
"Dear Keith", & in them Birdwood says
"White assured me tt we had no car
available" - "White pointed out to me
that..." etc. Murdoch says: "Birdwood
"makes it quite clear where the objection
"comes from - it is White who has done it.
"The Australian element on Corps Hqrs - the
"very one which ought to have fought for more 

102     30
"representation for the Australian papers -
"Birdwood go specially states tt it is
"White who had raised this objection to
"our being there." White had only one
object in view, as I know & as Birdwood
knows - he put this point of view to Birdwood
because he knew tt Birdwood ws being
slandered by outsiders, Generals & others w the
statement tt he asked for advertisement by
getting the Press to his Hqrs - tt he liked to
make a friend of Murdoch because he 

102     31
ws a powerful man - which as a
matter of fact is more than half true. And
now Birdwood, inst. of taking the responsibility
for accepting tt advice, writes to Murdoch
saying "White did tempt me " as it were.
The consequence is tt Murdoch is not
very enthusiastic about White - apt to think
he is anti-Australian or lukewarm- However
I left him half persuaded. [Dyson, to whom I
wired to see him about the same thing, saw him later
& left him quite convinced]. Murdoch pointed 

102     32
out at once the difficulty wh I found later 
had struck everyone else - Coleman, Dodds,
Birdwood, no doubt Griffiths,  White all sd the same:
"if the G.O.C-ship of the A.I.F is divorced from the Corps,
"M'Cay will get it – he will be after it, by every undergrd
"channel open to him, & he is a friend of Watt,
"Acting Premier of Australia. " I know that
'M'Cay has sd to Birdwood - "Now dont you think tt
"you ought to make good certain my claim to be G.O.C. if
"you give up" - & Birdwood told him tt any idea 
of his being G.O.C. of the Corps was out of the question.
Hobbs told Birdwood he wd resign at once
if it occurred. It seems to me tt the mere fear of one mans
personal efforts ought not to drive Australia from the right track.
Returned to France by midday train. The news
ws in the papers tt Australians had capture Ville sur Ancre
& 360 Prisoners.
My car has bn laid up by some men of the 2nd AGH
joy riding - 

 102     102
used as a sort of local barrage for these little
stunts.)
{    23s are the old stret rod grenade  [*Diagram - see original*]
{    No 5 is Mills bomb as hand thrown.
{    36 is the 200yds Mills bomb w a disc, fired
{    from a cup by a blan strong blank cartridge.
{    35 is the Hales percussion. (little used by us).
{    36 & 23 can be used as hand bombs.
{    [34 is New Egg bomb CEWB 17.8.37]  
(Rest of this book, is
Diary ___________________)
 

102     101
not too many men to dig, & / nights are
short.
By daylight ^ (20 May Monday) / positn ws strongly held
& in touch on both flanks.
The 21Bn ws relieved at 11p.m. on night
of 20/21 just as it ws preparing to
cut off some German posts on / left in
/ very line of trees where Macn. had
had his positn / previous morning E of
Ville. (The rifle grenade is mostly

102     100
or two later (1. a.m.) & sd / other two were
lying wd. Another patrol ws sent out
to get them & found Sergt Lyons, already
wd, carrying in / other man on his
back as he crawled. He sd / Germs
after firing at him had moved off N
behind / hill - He heard them digging behind
& later they were seen digg
/ hill. If only a pln cd have bn
spared from digging they cd have bn
mopped up at / first - but there were