General, Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 20, 31 July - 15 August - 1918 - Part 18

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Awaiting approval
Accession number:
RCDIG000635
Difficulty:
1
Simdarly sectons with eir artilery tr nometrical should be can never to be afraid o Tae It is better that this uld happen The artüllery meteorological seroice mnust also be rearranged in good timne. rious queston s paragraph maus given very special attent great extent on ct solution. of artilery y wl be reduced to ineffective sweeping fre and wil to fre without sufncient its targe Divisions in rear must be allotted a sufnicient quantity of Lght and heavy artillery, in ime, before they are engaged. INFANTRY. 14. Thefo be of the infon e part of the on a uide fe S tes he e neto e e ichineid be summarized as: waves of mr most umportant dum should be to make en 16. Tne føsk pemerendor ol gept forvard in betwen the amsaukt dekaehnents, 6o maintan here khkn hnes od ndand, dhe eneny s lnes wasachievedbyourasaut delachments Rere As the cction depeloped, ground upto the ys Mne of resistance, the ch prove g successt panies deploy roups, th uing an energetie control over his nnen at points of assemnbly decided on beforehand,mander MISCELLANEOUS REMARKS. 17. There is nothi teg, segdon, dd Pardemdar to say wi to the p a, auiation troops, signal ain thing at in conr en with these troops is to on thei technical training. (See para. ? Great progre has been made, i th previous ofensives, n de srrange. de cleer towardst ding unnecessary concent woplane observation. Command and supply were much faciitated by! 19. The services for the epacuation of the wounded hadless demands made on them thist asures taken were ncient. The motor ambulance detachments, however, should, ule, remain with the divisions and only be called upon by the Corps under exceptiona suan. 20. The results show that everyone has worked with great zeal and understanding to improve the treining. Where it proved wanting, the fault lay, as a rule, in the short time avallable But even in a short tin ssible to g done i the time avalable is fully utilized. Forthis,itisabove ry totin rried out in rdance with the orders oft Command (especial No. 792 op. dated 29418) v ich we have seized from the enemy, and n the tad and strategical s msn further g ccesses. (Sd) LUDENDORFF. GENERAL STAFF (INTELLIGENOE), GENERAL HEADQUARTE 15th August, 1918 Aoh8 7gos xxdRae

Similarly, the mobile survey sections with the artillery trigonometrical observers should be

brought up early. Their place is with the divisions and not with the Corps reserve. They can never
begin reconnoitring and organizing their survey stations too soon. There is no reason to be afraid
of not having finished the preparations before being moved farther forward. It is better that this

should happen than that the work should begin too late.
The artillery meteorological service must also be rearranged in good time.
The various questions raised in this paragraph must be given very special attention; the
effectiveness of artillery depends to a very great extent on their rapid and correct solution. Otherwise,

the artillery will be reduced to ineffective sweeping fire, and will have to fire without sufficient
data regarding its targets.
13. Divisions in rear must be allotted a sufficient quantity of light and heavy artillery, in
good time, before they are engaged.

 

INFANTRY.
14. The forward drive of the infantry, its marching power, its endurance and spirit of self-

sacrifice, especially on the part of the officers, are indispensable factors in obtaining far-reaching

successes. A rapid thrust carried out even by a battalion or company commander may have the

effect of dislodging the enemy on a wide front or of keeping him on the run. (See paras. 1 and 2.)

15. The new system of infantry training - which may be summarized as fewer waves of riflemen,

fewer massed attacks, many more assaults carried out by scattered machine gun groups

supported by rifle fire, light and heavy machine guns, rifle grenades, Minenwerfer and the artillery

accompanying the infantry - gives our infantry certain superiority over the enemy. It has brought

us successes and saved us losses. Our most important aim should be to make these tactics, as

hitherto, the basis of our training.

16. The first penetration of the enemy's lines was achieved by our assault detachments. Here

and there, thin lines of infantry crept forward in between the assault detachments, to maintain

touch.

As the action developed, in order to cross the ground up to the enemy's line of resistance, the

tactics which proved successful were those of companies deployed by groups, the commander

regaining an energetic control over his men at points of assembly decided on beforehand.

 

MISCELLANEOUS REMARKS.

17. There is nothing particular to say with regard to the pioneers, aviation troops, signal

troops, survey sections, etc. The main thing to be worked at in connection with these troops is to

push on their technical training.  (See para. 20.)

18. Great progress has been made, in comparison with previous offensives, in the arrangements

for keeping the roads clear towards the rear, in avoiding unnecessary concentrations, and in

seeking cover from aeroplane observation. Command and supply were much facilitated by these

improved arrangements.

19. The services for the evacuation of the wounded had less demands made on them this time.

The measures taken were sufficient. The motor ambulance detachments, however, should, as a

general rule, remain with the divisions and only be called upon by the Corps under exceptional

circumstances.

 

SUMMARY.

20. The results show that everyone has worked with great zeal and understanding to improve

the training. Where it proved wanting, the fault lay, as a rule, in the short time available.

But even in a short time, it is possible to get good work done if the time available is fully

utilized. For this, it is above all necessary to train in small units.

If work is always carried out in accordance with the orders of the Higher Command (especially

Ia, II, No. 7745, Secret op. dated 17-4-18, and Ia/Ic/II, No. 7925, Secret op. dated 29-4-18) we

shall maintain the tactical and strategical superiority which we have seized from the enemy, and

march on to further great successes.

 

(Sd.) LUDENDORFF

 

 

GENERAL STAFF (INTELLIGENCE),

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

15th August, 1918.

PRESS A--9/18--7563--2X2Rae.

 

 

 

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