General, Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 20, 31 July - 15 August - 1918 - Part 1

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Awaiting approval
Accession number:
RCDIG000635
Difficulty:
2

Page 1 / 10

1918. -2---- OFFICERS JOINED AND CONE DURING WEEK ENDED 27 7. 1918. -0- Extracts from Returns of JOINED - Date REMARKS Unit Rank & Name Div. ---1 ---- ---------- ----- ------- -------------------- 19. 7.18 lst Rejoined from Hospital. 2nd Bn. Major A.E.B. GILDER 22. 7. 18 From England -12th Bn. lst D.H.G. Major F. W. PAGE (A. & I S.) Sec. for duty with AAOC. Lt-Col. CH. ELLIOTT. lst 3/BH 25. 7.18 From 12th Bn. - to act in CMG. DSO. ond. vice Brig. on leave Major C.F. St. P.ROSS, 9th Bn. 26. 7.18 Rejoined from Hospital. MC. 2nd 23rd Bn. 17. 7.18 Major 1.T.0. PEDLER Rejoined from Supy. List From Havre- attached for 2nd [23rd Bn. Lt-Col. W.K.S.MACKENZIE, trial view Bn. command 23. 7. 18 DSO. From England - temporary 21. Jrd 7. 18 Capt. J.L.COIMAN, MBE. D.H.G. duty as Staff Trainee. 3rd 33rd Bn. 19. 7.18 Capt. C.E. PRIOR (Intrn) From Seconded list. From reinforcements. Ath114th Br. 7. 18 26. 1.. W.W. Crellin (Dntrn) e L4th Bn. 7. 18 l. J.W. JORDAN 26. From reinforcements. (Dntrn) 7. 18 24. From Hospital. a Major R. HARWOOD. 15O. 16th Bn. 7. 18 4th 4Sth Bn. Major D.V. HANNAY 25. From wounded. 25. 4th 46th Bn. It. K.A. HALL (Intro). From reinforcements. 7.18 OONE 23. 7.18 To 12th Bn. temporarily. lst D.H.8. Major F.W. PACE (A.&I.St.) 7th Bn. 26. 7, 18 ist Lieut, J. FOWLER. St.Tnee -resmd.regtl.duty lst lst D.T. Capt. C. ABEY, MC. 21. 7.18 24. 7. 18 ist lst D.A. To London for Med.Board. Major L.K. CUNNINGHAK. lst lst D.T. 21. 7.18 To command A.A.S.C.Tng. Major E. J. MUNRO, DSO. Depot, England. 2nd 25th Bn. 24. 7. 18 Sick. Méjor H.H. PAGE 43rd Bn. 3. 7.18 To Aust. Corps School. Major W.J. KINNISH. Capt. E.H.G. KEMMMIS P.R.R. 22. 7.18 Killed accidentally. (ADC)
her ene A anout i5 fulg a Bus an steane S0 Bl Konsnrift 5 hul. - Siurtol lat o50 Nd Luuudh Süiser Tmonet 10hele x Bug len Atttes ond ih 5a Tragen gsanorn Stl Tonondte Thuly Wi onter -Bronnort Hrep Gutbe Rustre BuBaß Tonant u Srapn I S2 Bengnens TBAAI Mnaut T ulr. 7 Prgp A lan Hlalg mlts deli mäinh adinebedt Prapor Caur Carle hrl soth ley ) mnae 22 Tt onnt dätntzt PetmndlangllGlnt) adwrgd Srajov ont itet Gel. Rereggen Au -4 Stlrt. Hoslarck
Ahrrt Re Sren e en ee Ri er ate Qaundul Comslunnhrjon8. The total frontage allotted to this Corps is approximately 7,000 yards. The extent of penetration to the final objective on the right 6so. 85v is-Xyé00 yards and on the left é,ooo yards. Beyond this objective it is hoped to penetrate for a further distance of about 2,600 yards in exploitation of the success. The average distance of penetration to the intermediate objective is 3,600 yards. The extent of frontage for the HAMEL operations was about 6,000 yards and the maximum depth of penetration was 2,500 yards. The total number of Battalions employed, including those allotted to definite localities, was ten, or two and a half Brigades. It would appear that the proper strength for the seizure of the first objective in the operation under consideration would be three or four Brigades. Bryond this intermediate objective the distance to the second ). objective varies from about 1,500 yards in the north to 5,000 yards in the south near the railway, and it is hoped to exploit beyond this a further 2,000 or 2,500 yards. This is to be carried out on a frontage of about 7,000 yards and it would appear that for this frontage a total of four Brigades would not be excessive for the capture of the second objective, in view of the depth of the penetration To give sufficient strength for the exploitation beyond this it is considered that two additional Brigades are necessary. For the actual operation it would appear that the necessary
. strength ofminfantry would be three or four Brigades for the first objective and two Divisions for the second objective and for exploiting the success. DISTRlBUTION. It is a question as to whether two complete Divisions are necessary for the first objective since the actual task in hand would appear to require the employment of only four Brigades. Four complete Divisions are available. Of the line divisions at least one brigade of each will be required to hold the line up to the last moment. The result is that for the actual attack only two brigades of the line divisions will be available immediately as it will take some time to collect the distributed line brigades. The zero hour will be probably at dawn and the frontage of each of the line brigades will be about 3,500 yards. These brigades cannot begin to assemble until the troops detailed to the ost objective have passed through them. Their assembly may be considerably interfered with by hostile fire. It would be unduly optimistic to anticipate that these brigades will be assembled in suitable formation to advance in less than li hours, and it would be safer to allow 2 hours. It may be estimated, on the principle that the tail of a column always loses ground, that they would lose half an hour before reaching the first objective. It is essential that two full divisions should be available for
the final objective and for the subsequent exploitation. Iwräwunf FLAN. In broad terms the choice of method of the infantry advance lies between three alternatives, viz. (a) The capture of the first objective by the divisions in the line, the division in rear passing through them at the firstolgeet (b) The capture of the first objective by divisions from the rear, the line divisions passing through them to the final objective. (c) A re-distribution prior to zero day as follows :- (i) On "WMnight a re-distribution to hold each divisional sector;with only one brigade in line; (ii)on "Night the divisions told off to the final objective to take over command of the front in each divisional sector relieving two brigades in support and reserve with three brigades and taking command of the brigades holding the line. This would ensure a disposition as follows from "/ (night onward : -------------------------- --------------------------------------- RIGHT DIVISION. LEFT DIVISION. --------------------------------- --------- -------- "A" Bde. of "C" Divn. "A" Bde. of "D" Divn. In Line. [5" Bde. "A" Bde. "A Bde, In Support. s Bde. .Be Dit A Dirn. 76" Sde. In rear. 4of Bde. "B" Bde se Bde,,... pirn. " Bde. of Bde. In back p Diy Area. -------------------- ----------------------------------------------
(iii) Prior to zero on 2" night "B" and "c" Bdes. of "c" and "D Divisions move up to the taped starting line. "A" and "B" Divisions would be formed up in artillery for¬ mation at an hour to be laid down. At zero all four Divisions advance except the two brigades holding the line. These brigades would assemble as soon as all attack formations had passed through them and would act as ordered by their own divisions. Plan (a) is open to the objection that the troops detailed would be required to march a total distance of approximately twelve (12) miles, heavily loaded, before reaching the final objective. They could hardly be expected to be fresh enough to resist determined counter attacks if these were launched early. It is essential to reduce the fatigue of the troops detailed to the final objective to a minimum. Plan (b) presents grave difficulties of staff co-ordination. It amounts in effect to a double leap frog and is rather a dangerous method. Plan (c) appears to be best since it includes all essentials. It gives a proper distribution of troops to objectives and ensures a minimum of fatigue to the troops under ordinary conditions. Alloranwr. Divisions allotted to tasks will be known as:- "A" Division, Right Division - Second and final objective;
"B" Division, Left Division - Second and final objective; "c" Division, Right Division - First objective; "D" Division, Left Division - First objective. The situation as regards the Divisions in the Corps on zero day will be - 2nd or 4th Australian Division in the line in the Right Divisional sector; 3rd Australian Division in the line in Left Divisional sector; 2nd or 4th Australian Division in the southern reserve Divisional area; 5th Australian Division in the northern reserve Divisional area. The lst Australian Division arriving from the north and probably located in the BELLOY area. The organization, therefore, for the attack will be "A" Division, 2nd or 4th Division; "C" Division, 2nd or 4th Division; "B" Division, 5th Division; "D" Division, 3rd Division. The question as to whether the 2nd or 4th Australian Division will be in the line will depend on the date selected for zero day. HEADQUARTERS. Divisional Headquarters for the operation will be established as follows: "A" Division - Dugouts in Sq. O.25.c.; "B" Division - CORBY; "c" Division, BLANGY; "D" Division - BUSSY. RoUwDaRias. There is no defined line which will form a complete boundary
A0 between the Divisions detailed for each objective. This, however, will be largely a matter of allotment to localities. As regards the first objective the Right ("C") Division will be detailed to capture CARD COPSE, LABASTITE MILL, WARFUSEE, ABANCOURT, LA MOTTE-en-SANTERIE and DOG WOOD. The Left ("D") Division will capture the BOIS TAILLOUX, ARQUAIRE WOOD, HAZEL WOOD, RAT WOOD, KATE WOOD. FORBES, HAMILTON, REGINALD and LENA WOODS will not be included in the first objective. It will be an easy matter for Divisions to distribute these tasks definitely to Brigades. The dividing line between Divisions will be a line from the southern end of ARQUAIRE WOOD, northern end of DOG WOOD and the point of junction on the first objective will be at the CROSS ROADS at about Sq. 0.19.d.5.0. This is an easily distinguishable point. The point of junction at the final objectives of "A" and "B" Divisions would be on the main VILLERS-BRETONNEUX road where the MORCOURT-HARBONMERES road crosses it.
V. A RTILLERY. The proposed depth of penetration to the first objective averages approximately 3,600 yards. The situation here is such that guns can be emplaced to cover the whole of this advance by barrage fire without themselves advancing. This is, however, the limit at which Field Artillery can be asked to carry out their shoot without an advance. It becomes essential, there fore, for the artillery to advance to protect the operation of "A" and "B" Divisions. As, however, the objectives of "C" and "D" Divisions include all known enemy field artillery positions it is anticipated that the artillery opposition to the advance c "A" and "B" Divisions will not be very great. Moreover, the enemy's defensive system will have been pierced by this advance and it is unlikely that such rear defences as exist will be manned in sufficient strength in infantry or machine guns as to require the protection of an artillery barrage. This profoundodly affects the whole of the organization of the advance on the final objectives which will be more of a character of an advance in open warfare. Infantry will advance in artillery formation. The place of the protective barrage will be taken by tanks and the advance will be supported by artillery. The troops carrying out the advance will be organized in Brigade Groups. It is proposed, therefore, to allot each Infantry Brigade of "A" and "B" Divisions a proportion of tanks, Engineers and Pioneers as
.. may be determined, one Field Artillery Brigade and a proportion of a Field Ambulance. The extent of the Corps frontage for the operation is approximately 7,000 yards. In order to cover this effectively by a barrage eighteen Field Artillery Brigades will be required. There are at present available at the Corps fifteen brigades - one battery of this is absent at thexArmy School but can probably be made available. There are in addition three Australian Brigades in the Second Army consisting of the 1st Australian Divisional Artillery and the 12th Australian Army Field Artillery Brigade. These are all employed at present with the lst Australian Division. It is particularly desirable that, if possible, these Brigades should be made available. This brings the total up to eighteen Brigades. In the event of the Corps being relieved north of the SOMME it, would be desirable to relieve the five Field Artillery Brigades now employed in that Sector by five other Brigades and to bring these Brigades down to the south side of the SOMME. It would excite less comment if these guns were relieved at the same time as the Infantry who held the line Qnd brought opd, than if five new Brigades were brought into the Corps area. This leaves one aditional Field Artillery Brigade te beprovided from Army Reserve. There are nine Heavy Brigade: covering the Corps front. As intense counter battery work would be essential for carrying out the operation with a minimum of infantry

31.7.1918.
OFFICERS JOINED AND GONE DURING WEEK ENDED 27.7.1918
Extracts from Return of -
 

JOINED

Div. Unit Rank & Name Date Remarks
1st 2nd Bn. Major A.E.B. GILDER 19.7.18 Rejoined from Hospital
1st D.H.Q. Major F.W. PAGE (A.& I St.) 22.7.18 From England - 12th Bn. Sec. for duty with AAOC.
1st 3/BHQ

Lt-Col. C.H.Eillott

CMG. DSO.                       

25.7.18 From 12th Bm.- to act in cmd. vice Brig on leave
1st 9th Bn.

Major C.F. St. P. ROSS,                     

MC.

26.7.18 Rejoined from Hospital
2nd 23rd Bn. Major L.T.O. PEDLER 17.7.18 Rejoined from Supy. List
2nd 23rd Bn. Lt- Col W.K.S. MACKENZIE,                   DSO.    23.7.18

From Havre- attached for

trial view Bn. command

3rd D.H.Q. Capt J.L. COIMAN ,MBE. 21.7.18

From England - tempory

duty as Staff Trainee.

3rd 33rd Bn Capt. C.E. PRIOR (Dntrn) 19.7.18 From Seconded list.
4th 14th Bn Lt. W.W. Crellin (Dntrn) 26.7.18 From reinforcements.
4th    14th lt.J.W. JORDAN (Dntrn)                        26.7.18      From reinforcements.                                         
4th 16th Bn. Major R.HARWOOD DSO. 24.7.18 From Hospital.
4th  45th Bn. Major D.V. HANNAY 25.7.18 From wounded.
4th 46th Bn. lt. K.A. HALL (Dntrn) 25.7.18 From reinforcements

GONE

1st      D.H.Q     . Major F.W. PAGE   (A.&I .St.)         23.7.18      To 12th Bn. temporarily            
1st 7th Bn. Lieut. J. FOWLER  26.7.18 St. Tnee- resmd.regtl.duty
1st 1st D.T. Capt. C. ABEY, MC 21.7.18 ''     ''       -  ''            ''       ''
1st 1st D.A. Major L.K. CUNNINGHAM 24.7.18 To London for Med. Board
1st 1st D.T. Major E.J. MUNRO DSO. 21.7.18

To command A.A.S.C. Tng.

Depot, England.

2nd  25th Bn. Major H.H. PAGE 24.7.18 Sick
3rd 43rd Bn. Major W.J. KINNISH 3.7.18 To Aust. Coprs School.
[[ ]] D.H.Q.

Capt E.H.G. KEMMIS 

(ADC)

22.7.18 Killed accidentally.
   

 

Brig General Rosenthal   Wounded

Brig Gen Leane 12th A I Bde 1 month 13th July
Lieut Col JP Clark DSO 44thBn 1 month 6th July
X Brig Gen HE Elliott 15th AI Bde 1 month 10th July
  Lt Col JA Maguire ADMS 3rd Aust Div 1 month 9th July
X Major W Fowler-Brownsworth DAAL 4th An Div 1 month 11th July
X Major R W Hore 10th Bty AFA 1 month 11th July
X Major J H Berryman 14th Bty AFA 1 month 11th July
X Major RB Carr 13th Fld Coy AE 1 month date not yet advised
X Capt Cable M.C. 59 Lhr Coy 1 month 28th July
  Major JE Hindlaigh (Cyclist) 1 month date not yet advised
Brig Genl Burgess   1 month 24th July
Lt Col Woolcock      
 

August 1918

ALLOTMENT OF INFANTRY TO OBJECTIVES.

 

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

The total frontage allotted to this Corps is approximately 7,000

yards. The extent of penetration to the final objective on the right

is 7,500^ 8500 yards and on the left 6,000 6500 yards. Beyond this objective it

is hoped to penetrate for a further distance of about 2,600 yards in

exploitation of the success. The average distance of penetration to

the intermediate objective is 3,600 yards.

The extent of frontage for the HAMEL operations was about 6,000

and the maximum depth of penetration was 2,500 yards. The total

number of Battalions employed, including those allotted to definite

localities, was ten, or two and a half Brigades. It would appear that

the proper strength for the seizure of the first objective in the

operation under consideration would be three or four Brigades.

Beyond this intermediate objective the distance to the second

 varies from about 2,500 yards in the north to 5,000 yards

in the south near the railway, and it is hoped to exploit beyond this

a further 2,000 or 2,500 yards. This is to be carried out on a

frontage of about 7,000 yards and it would appear that for this

frontage a total of four Brigades would not be excessive for the

capture of the second objective, in view of the depth of the penetration.

To give sufficient strength for the exploitation beyond this it is

considered that two additional Brigades are necessary. 

For the actual operation it would appear that the necessary

 

 

-2-

strength ofminfantry would be three or four Brigades for the first 

objective and two Divisions for the second objective and for exploiting

the success.

DISTRIBUTION.

It is a question as to whether two complete Divisions are

necessary for the first objective since the actual task in hand would

appear to require the employment of only four Brigades.

Four complete Divisions are available. Of the line divisions

at least one brigade of each will be required to hold the line up to

the last moment. The result is that for the actual attack only two

brigades of the line divisions will be available immediately as it

will take some time to collect the distributed line brigades.

The zero hour will be probably at dawn and the frontage of each of

the line brigades will be about 3,500 yards. These brigades cannot

begin to assemble until the troops detailed to the first final objective

have passed through them. Their assembly may be considerably

interfered with by hostile fire. It would be unduly optimistic to

anticipate that these brigades will be assembled in suitable formation

to advance in less that 1½ hours, and it would be safer to allow

2 hours.

It may be estimated, on the principle that the tail of a column

always loses ground, that they would lose half an hour before reaching 

the first objective.

It is essential that two full divisions should be available for 

 

-3-

the final objective and for the subsequent exploitation.INFANTRY PLAN.

In broad terms the choice of method of the infantry advance lies 

between three alternatives, viz.

(a) The capture of the first objective by the divisions in the line,

the division in rear passing through them at the first objective.

(b) The capture of the first objective by divisions from the rear,

the line divisions passing through them to the final objective.

(c) A re-distribution prior to zero day as follows :-

(i) On "W/X night a re-distribution to hold each divisional

sector; with only one brigade in line;

(ii) On "X/Y night the divisions told off to the final objective

to take over command of the front in each divisional sector

relieving two brigades in support and reserve with three

brigades and taking command of the brigades holding the line.

This would ensure a disposition as follows from "X/Y night
onward:

  Left Division. Right Division.
In Line. ''A'' Bde.  of  ''D'' Divn. ''A'' Bde.  of ''C'' Divn.
In Support ''B'' Bde. ''A'' Bde. ''B'' Div. ''B'' Bde.  ''A'' Bde. ''A'' Divn.
In Rear       ''C'' Bde.       ''C'' Bde.

In back 

Area

''C'' Bde.  ''B'' Bde.  ''D'' Div. ''C'' Bde.  ''B'' Bde  ''C'' Div.
 

-4-

(iii) Prior to zero on Y/Z" night "B" and "C" Bdes. of "C" and "D"

 Divisions move up to the taped starting line.

"A" and "B" Divisions would be formed up in artillery formation

at an hour to be laid down.

At zero all four Divisions advance except the two brigades

holding the line. These brigades would assemble as soon

as all attack formations had passed through them and would

act as ordered by their own divisions.

Plan (a) is open to the objection that the troops detailed would 

be required to march a total distance of approximately twelve (12)

miles, heavily loaded, before reaching the final objective. They

could hardly be expected to be fresh enough to resist determined counter

attacks if these were launched early.

It is essential to reduce the fatigue of the troops detailed to 

the final objective to a minimum.

Plan (b) presents grave difficulties of staff co-ordination. It

amounts in effect to a double leap frog and is rather a dangerous

method.

Plan (c) appears to be best since it includes all essentials. It

gives a proper distribution of troops to objectives and ensures a

minimum of fatigue to the troops under ordinary conditions.

ALLOTMENT.

Divisions allotted to tasks will be known as :-

"A" Division, Right Division - Second and final objective;

 

-5-

"B" Division, Left Division - Second and final objective;

"C" Division, Right Division - First objective;

"D" Division, Left Division - First objective.

The situation as regards the Divisions in the Corps on zero day

will be -

2nd or 4th Australian Division in the line in the Right Divisional

sector; 3rd Australian Division in the line in Left Divisional sector;

2nd or 4th Australian Division in the southern reserve Divisional area;

5th Australian Division in the northern reserve Divisional area. The

1st Australian Division arriving from the north and probably located 

in the BELLOY area.

The organizations, therefore, for the attack will be "A" Division,

2nd or 4th Division; "C" Division, 2nd or 4th Division; "B" Division,

5th Division; "D" Division, 3rd Division. The question as to whether

the 2nd or 4th Australian Division will be in the line will depend on

the date selected for zero day.

HEADQUARTERS.  Divisional Headquarters for the operation will be

 established as follows :-

"A" Division - Dugouts in Sq. 0.25.c.;

"B" Division - CORBY;

"C" Division - ¾ BLANGY;

"D" Division - BUSSY.

 

BOUNDARIES.

There is no defined line which will form a complete boundary 

 

-6-

between the Divisions detailed for each objective. This, however,

will be largely a matter of allotment to localities.

As regards the first objective the Right ("C") Division will be

detailed to capture CARD COPSE, LABASTITE MILL, WARFUSEE, ABANCOURT,

LA MOTTE-en-SANTERIE and DOG WOOD.

The Left ("D") Division will capture the BOIS TAILLOUX, ARQUAIRE

WOOD, HAZEL WOOD, RAT WOOD, KATE WOOD.

FORBES, HAMILTON, REGINALD and LENA WOODS will not be included in

the first objective.

It will be an easy matter for Divisions to distribute these tasks

definitely to Brigades.

The dividing line between Divisions will be a line from the

southern end of ARQUAIRE WOOD, northern end of DOG WOOD and the point

of junction on the first objective will be at the CROSS ROADS at about

Sq. Q.19.d.5.0. This is an easily distinguishable point. The point

of junction at the final objectives of "A" and "B" Divisions would be

on the main VILLERS-BRETONNEUX road where the MORCOURT-HARBONMERES

road crosses it.

 

-7-

A R T I L L E R Y.

The proposed depth of penetration to the first objective averages

approximately 3,600 yards. The situation here is such that guns can

be emplaced to cover the whole of this advance by barrage fire without

themselves advancing. This is, however, the limit at which Field

Artillery can be asked to carry out their shoot without an advance.

It becomes essential, therefore, for the artillery to advance to 

protect the operation of "A" and "B" Divisions. As, however, the

objectives of "C" and "D" Divisions include all known enemy field

artillery positions it is anticipated that the artillery opposition

to the advance of "A" and "B" Divisions will not be very great.

Moreover, the enemy's defensive system will have been pierced by

this advance and it is unlikely that such rear defences as exist will

be manned in sufficient strength in infantry or machine guns as to

require the protection of an artillery barrage. This profoundedly

affects the whole of the organization of the advance on the final

objectives which will be more of a character of an advance in open

warfare. Infantry will advance in artillery formation. The place

of the protective barrage will be taken by tanks and the advance will

 be supported by artillery.

The troops carrying out the advance will be organized in Brigade

Groups. It is proposed, therefore, to allot each Infantry Brigade of

"A" and "B" Divisions a proportion of tanks, Engineers and Pioneers as

 

-8-

may be detarmined, one Field Artillery Brigade and a proportion of a

Field Ambulance.

The extent of the Corps frontage for the operation is approximately

7,000 yards. In order to cover this effectively by a barrage eighteen

Field Artillery Brigades will be required. There are at present 

available at^in the Corps fifteen brigades - one battery of this is absent

at thexArmy School but can probably be made available. There are in

addition three Australian Brigades in the Second Army consisting of the

1st Australian Divisional Artillery and the 12th Australian Army Field

Artillery Brigade.These are all employed at present with the 1st 

Australian Division. It is particularly desirable that, if possible,

these Brigades should be made available. This brings the total up

to eighteen Brigades.

In the event of the Corps being relieved north of the SOMME it.

would be desirable to relieve the five Field Artillery Brigades now

employed in that Sector by five other Brigades and to bring these

Brigades down to the south side of the SOMME. It would excite less 

comment if these guns were relieved ^and brought out, at the same time as the Infantry

who held the line, than if five new Brigades were

brought into the Corps area. This leaves one additional Field Artillery 

Brigade to be provided from Army Reserve. There are nine Heavy Brigades

covering the Corps front. As intense counter battery work would be

essential for carrying out the operation with a minimum of infantry

 

 


   

 

 

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