General, Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 20, 15 August - 8 September 1918 - Part 16

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Open to contributions
Accession number:
RCDIG0000636
Difficulty:
4

Page 1 / 11

AUS 4 - BELLENGLISE, from which there is a gocd field of fire aoross the canal, calls for the employment of machine gune from points in rear. Our own infantry will be raterially assisted if the descent of the enemy'e infantry from the high ground to the west and south of BELLENGLISE, and ite establishment along the canal, is hindered as far as possible by our artillery fire. The bare hills on the other eide of the Canal must be kept under as olcse cbservation as the ground along the oast bank. The enemy hae nothing to assist him in the way of cover, and will be obliged to ocnstruot everything undor cur fire. This advantage must be made use of and the smalleet attempt at digging must be kept under fire. The infantry will also have to assiet from the cutset in keeping the enemy at a distance, partioularly by means of haraseing fire at night. In oase the enemy ehculd suoceed in orcesing the oanal at any pint, the preparation of BELLENGLISE village for obetinate all-round defence is of special importance. Should we euoceed in bringing the enemy to a stand olcse to the canal, it will be extremely diffioult for him to advanoe further with this cbetacle olcse behind him. DIVISTOMAL SSOTOR NO. 3. SHORT SKETOH OF THE TAOTICAL PECULIARITIES OF TEE SECTOR. The SMME canal is carried under the LE TRONQUOY Ridge through e tunnel. At this point, therefore, it is only neoessary to oonsider it from the point of view of provid¬ ing ehelter. The want of a natural obstacle must be compen- sated for by the ocnetructicn of etrong defencee. The ridge between THORIGNY and LE TRCNQUOY, if not held by us, wculd afford the enemy a good view inte a great part of Seotor 3. For thie reason, until the enemy bringe up considerable foroes, the ridge muet be held by outposte.I For the adjoin- ing etretoh from the LE TRONQUOY Ridge (exol.) to LESDINS (inol.), the only natural obetacle is the canal (withcut any marshy border). South-east of LE TRONQUOY the canal cutting is desp. Its weet bank commande the east at many pointe, so that any enemy approach work could be protected againet our infantry fire. Theee high banke on the weetern side, mcreover, afford good observation pointe over cur defences, whioh, with a view to sweeping the canal effectively, are pushed forward olcee to the east bank at many pointe. The occupaticn of this high ground by the enemy muet therefcre be hindered as long as possible, in the first plaoe by our outpcets, and later by systematic bembardment of every enemy approach work by cur artillery, which vill find faveurable conditions for thie purpose in the gocd observation to be had from the high ground north-east and ecuth-east of LES- DINS and in oross fire from both these directions. The southern half of the secter, from LESDINS, (exol.) to ROUVROY (exol.), is proteoted by the front line obstacles of the SOhE Canal and the low grcund of the SOMME Valley. The latter oan be regarded as an effective obstaole in the neighbeurhoed of ROUVROY only. The rest of it, however, offera/
- 5 - offers the advantage, that it is easy to sweep with fire, and that the high level of the water table will hamper the pushing forward of enemy entrenchments within assaulting distance. The water level may be raised by damming. 7 part of the sectcr. that belonge to the ST. QUENTIN bridge¬ head position is a reverse slope pceition. The right flank reste en the lew ground of the SOhlE Valley. The foregrcund of the position can be taken in flank by artillery fire from the neighbcurheed of TILLOY Farm. The town of ST. QUENTIN, which lies close behind tho position, offers spitable artillery pceitions. The greund behind the entire divisional front rises in an easterly and north-easterly directicn. The rear lines of the lat line position are thus expcsed to enery obser- vation to a very large extent. For bringing up trocps under cover, approach trenches are necessary, extending far into the back area. ............... NOTES FCR THE DISTRIBUTION OF TEE INFANTRY. The northern half of the sector is the more dangerous. The scuthern porticn of the peaition, east of the Canal, is proteoted hy the marshy grcund. The northern front of the town defences is effectively protocted by the flanking artillery support from the TILLOY Farm area. When distri¬ buting the troops to hold Sector 3, therefcre, it is advie¬ able, for a divisicn coneisting of 3 regiments, to allct ? to the northern and 1 to the scuthern sector (see map). In the scuthern sector, the relatively extended nature of the positicn renders it neoessary to employ the 3 avail. able battalione side by side: about half of these may be drawn upon to garrisen the portion of the town defences which belongs to seotor 3. .. NOTES F(A THE TCONDUCT OF THE INFANTRY BATT.E. For the ognduot of the infantry battle the grcund offers no diffioulty or special peouliarity. The defence of the northern sector will be principally effected by the con¬ struction of strong defences. The support cf a number of inconspicuous machine gune will be necessary for sweeping the marshy ground. It ia of great impertance that the enemy ehould be prevented from pushing forward his lines over the slopes running down tothe canal, which are easy to observe from our side. DIVISIONAL SEOTOR NO. 4. Of THE TAOTIOAL PECULIARITIES CF THE SEOTOR. SHORT SKETOI (see also plan of the Seotor frem the Stadium to the Roman Road ("Rêmerstrasse) ("Römerstrasse" ie the name of the whole of the straight road/
- 8 - road from ST. QUENTIN tO HCLNON). From the Stadium (map equare 39el, to the north of the point where tho track leading to THCRIGNY branchee off from the ST. QUENTIN - LESDINS road) to the Roman read (oentre of rap square 4159), the ground falla along the western edge of the town in a depression which draine under the town in a southerly direction inte the SOMLE. West of this low ground, the ccuntry rises in narrew ridges to the heighte north-east of FAYET. East of the depression, it rises scwewhat steeply to the actual town ofsT. QUEFTIN. Tho let line of the pceition lies on the eastern slopee of the ridges to the west and constitutes a reverse elope position. Ite field of fire, generally speaking, is very restrioted, owing to the rounded contcors of the slopes; the narrow depressicre, however, whioh lie botween the ridges can be ewept with fire from tho let line. Long stretches of the line oan be seen into from the high ground west of the Orphelinat (map squares 4257 and 58)- The 2nd line in this part of the praition lies 200 or 300 metres behind the front line, for the mest part in the low ground itself. It can be seen into almost threughcut ite length from the high greund west of the Orphelinat. he 3rd line - not choen on the ap haa been recon¬ noitred and will lie on the outskirte ef the town on the west- ward slopes of the high ground on which stande the town of sT. QUENTIN. Although thie alcpe alec can be cbserved from the heighte west of the Orphelinat aa woll as from the FAYET heighte, large porticns of the line, being situated in gardere, are invisible to the énemy. The communication trenches between the three lince, and the intermediate zone in particular, oan, for the most part, be seen into from the oppgeite heighte. Sector frem the Roman Road to the ScMME. The area betveen the Roman Rcad and the lew grcund of the SOMME Valley is filled by a ridge which falls gradbally from tho Orphelinat to the town. The ST. QUENTIN- railay, which runs over the ridge in a curve, forrs alternately high embankmente and deep outtinge. The Orphelinat lies rathereto the east of the higheet (most easterly) point of the ridge, which afforde a wide view cver the frreground as far as the Stadium, te the Fayet Park, and to the heighte above the Somhs Valley to the South. In this sector, the let line first of all follews the narrew gauge railway, torne off from it te the acuth-west through a hollow, rising to the highest point west of the Orphelinat, which it enclcees as a forward slope pceition, and terminates at the canal, west of the ROCOURT Factcry. North of the SAVY road, it can be seen inte from the high grcund to the north of the Rowan road; south of the SAVY rcad, from the ridges 1 km. north-west of OESTRES and from the high grcund of the scuth bank of the SOhrE. With the cbject of previding a evitch line for the lst line, which prejeots westwarde like an advinced work, an intermediate line, running through the Orphelinat Garden, has been ocnstrboted as a reverse slope pcsition, The 2nd line orcesee the Roman road east of the narrow gauge railway, screened by the very high railway embankmont, then/
7- then rises acrces undulating ocuntry and disused clay pits to the SAVY rcad, follews the light railway a little way and terminates in the western half of ROOOURT factery. Only a small part of it can be seen into by the enemy. A 3rd line, intended as an artillery protective line, (net shown on the 1 : 25,000 map), runs through houees and elay pite to the park east of RoocURT factery: it i almet entirely under ocver. .......... The Somüs Valley and somæm . windmill Seotor. The low ground of the SOhkE Valley comprises a ewampy stretch of country abcut 500 metres wide, ocvered with wocde and undergrowth, intersected by numerous dykes in addition to the canal. The rcade acress thie area are built along low embankments, the railway embankment is several metres bigh. In the dry season, the ground off the rcade is practioable for emall detaohments. The lst, 2nd and 3rd lines are con¬ structed en embankmonts; there are no appreach trenches. Scuth ofthe SOMME, the eugar factory at LA BIETTE constitutes a projecting strong peint of the pceition,which then rises to the windmill hill. Whereae hece the lst line, which ie a reverse slope position, can only be seen inte from the Fayet Park and the high grcund north of the SOMME, the 2nd line at this point is sc far unfavourably mituated that it is open to observation from the ridge to the east of. GAUCHY: The örd line - artillery protective line - liee far in the rear at the exit from ST. QUENTIN. As yet, no part of the 3rd line has been constructed. The troops moving in will commence ite construction immeciately as also that of further lines in the town with a view to ite defence by sectors. .......... NOTES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE INFANTRY. The forces required en the entire divisicnal front are appreximately the same everywhere. Consequently, the divisicnal seoter has been divided into 3 regimental sectcre of appreximately equal width. (see map). ......... NOTES FOR THE CCNDUOT OF THE INFANTRY BATTLE. In the secter north of the sT. QUENTIN - SELENOY road, the dominating position of the 3rd line points to the massing of the greater part of the machine gons in ite neighbcurhcod; from the gardens and houses on the outskirte of the town they can/
- 8 - ean fire cver tho two front linoe and thus form an effective barrage. Isclated machine guna between the 2nd and 3rd lines can command and enfilade the lcw grcund to the west of the town. In the let and ond lines light machine gune will suffice. The importance of the eecter frem the ST. QUENTIN SELENCY road tohthe SOMME depende on the poeseseion of the high ground west of the Orphelinat. This is the cnly point from which the hollwe tonthe scuth of FAYEr can be seen into, which aro of importanoe for the deployment of the enemy's artillery and reserves. This height muet be held at all costs, and the units (battalicne) fighting there must be dietriboted in consid- erable depth. Ae a continucue machine gun barrage from rear positicne cannot be put dewn in front of the height, the. employgent in the front line of numercus light machine guns ie necessitated. Plans for methodical recapture of the heighte muet be prapared befcrehand in caee the immediate oounter-attack following enemy penetration ehcold fail in ite objeot. The lev grtund of the soMiE Valley need only be pro- tected by picquets and patrols. The troopa,te the north and south of this area must prctect their flanke against enemy reids in the SOMME Valley. The eeoter ecuth of the somkE constitutes the right wing of the defences of Windmill Hill, which is of importanoe for our cbeervation en account of its commanding view. The aiting of mechine guns in the vicinity of the 2nd line will render a flanking barrage pcseible in front of the pceitions on the northern elope of Windmill Hill. For etrengthening the barrage in front of the LA BIETTE atrong point, trench mortars will be required. Plane fer the methodical recapture of the pceition, inclu ive of the strong point, muet be pre¬ pared befcrehand. Fourth Army (Intolligence), September BUn, 1915. (5) Er
100 APPENDIX "A" TC FCLIO I. G.H.d.No. Ia/54874. Foorth Army, I. N. I9.103/5. RT NOTES CN THE DAMS AND THE UTILIZATION OF WATERCOUISES AS A FRCNT LINE CBSTACLE FOR THE IST SIEGFRIED LINE. FROM BSLLICOURT TO SCUTH CF ST. QUENTIN. The highest level of the canal lies between the locks LEBOUSQUET (Firet Army) and LESDINS. The Canal is fed by the "Canal d'alimentation" (Rigole) at LESDINS (1,000 sl.). In order to preserve the canal as a front line obstacle, i.e., to prevent water draining away, the follow- ing works were carried out :- The lecks at MORCOURT and LESDINS were blocked (a) up with oement and saoks of sand. Any further obetruotion of the canal by sunken veesels, sandbags, and concrete can be arranged for later, in case of neceesity, by the Corps H.Q. at ST. QUENTIN. For the time being, the canal between MORCOURT and ROOOURT ehculd be used behind the bridgehead position as a waterway for bargee. Vessels and barges ready to be sunk are lying beside the main road bridge in ST. QUENTIN. (b) In each of the tunnele at BELLIOCURT and LE TRONQUOY two dams should be conetructed, with 4 others on edoh side of BELLENGLISE, in order to shut off the water and prevent the whole Canal being emptied, ehculd it be destreyed at BELLENGLISE where its level is higher than the level of the surrounding country. Artificial flecding on the west side of the canal, south of BELLENGLISE, soon draine away end cannot therefcre be regarded as a permanent obstacle. Flat, low-lying areas (west side of canal at (o) Oad BROCOURT, should be inundated so that the Canal shall not be entirely emptied if the dam is des¬ troyed. The water-level of the oanal will then only subside to the level of the inundations. (d) Damming of the canal at ROOOURT. All dams and lecks only hold back the water up to its normal height and allcw any additicnal water to cvew. In addition to the cnnal, the lew grcund of the SOMME valley, east of the canal, can alac be ptilized as a good front line cbstacle. The naturally marche grcund will be rendered mere swampy by constructing dams with suitable sluioes. This can be done between LESDINS and LA LIE.TE, at and north of MCRCOURT, MCULIN BRULE, R(UVROY, ST. QUENTIN bridge, railway bridge at ROCOURT, and LA BIETTE. The water level of these inundated areas can be regulated by sluices in the canal just north of the ST. QUENTIN bridgo. For information as to the propesed con¬ atruotions for the maintenanoe of the canal level and for the inundations, see 1.5,000 Map Part III, Enclosure 1 of this Memorandum. Fourth Army (Intelligence), September 8th, 1918.
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AMIENS, Sth September, 1918. Ey trothers, Before seeking comfort for our souls in celebrating the mystery of the Virgin's birth,on this her natal day, let me pay a special tribute to the Australian Divisions which, by their vic¬ tories on the heights of LE HAMEL, have led the way to the splen- did triumphs of the present offensive and the liberation of our native PICARDY. To the Australians we owe the recapture of ALBERT; and to crown their work they have added to the debt we owe them by bringing back the Statue of NOTRE DAME de BREBIERES from NORMANDY, so that it may be placed in our Cathedral. Further, to grace their action,we see them rendering military honours to this miraculous statue which they have redeemed hich from exile - this statue, in our eyes is symbolical of the faith, the traditions, and the future of our race. With them, let us salute the Army of His Majesty the King of England. This Army, young as it is, has risen to the highest rank by the incomparable victories it has recently won; whilst the British Navy, true to its ancient traditions by securing for us the liberties of the Seas, has made it possible for us to wage successfully this war of giants, which we could not have carried on without its aid. The British Navy is perhaps writing the most glorious, though the most obscure, page in the history of its country, at a time when the heroes of her Army on land provoke before our very eyes our most profound admiration.

-4-

BELLENGLISE, from which there is a good field of fire

across the canal, calls for the employment of machine 

guns from points in rear.

Our own infantry will be materially assisted if the

descent of the enemy's infantry from the high ground to the

west and south of BELLENGLISE, and its establishment along

the canal, is hindered as far as possible by our artillery

fire. The bare hills on the other side of the Canal

must be kept under as close observation as the ground along

the east bank. The enemy has nothing to assist him in the

way of cover, and will be obliged to construct everything

under our fire. This advantage must be made use of and

the smallest attempt at digging must be kept under fire,

keeping the enemy at a distance, particularly by some

of the harassing fire at night.

In case the enemy should succeed in crossing the

canal at any point, the preparation of BELLEGLISE village

for obstinate all-round defence is of special importance.

Should we succeed in bringing the enemy to a stand close

to the canal, it will be extremely difficult for him to

advance further with this obstacle close behind him.

DIVISIONAL SECTOR NO. 3.

SHORT SKETCH OF THE TACTICAL PECULIARITIES OF THE SERVICE.

The SOMME canal is carried under the LE TRONQUCY Ridge

through a tunnel. At this point, therefore, it is only

necessary to consider it from the point of view of providing 
shelter. The want of a natural obstacle must be compensated

for by the obstruction of strong defences. The ridge

between THORIGNY and LE TRONQUOY, if not held by us,  would

afford the enemy a good view into a great part of Sector 3.

For this reason, until the enemy brings up considerable

forces, the ridge must be held by outposts. For the adjoining

stretch from LE TRONQUOY Ridge (excl.) to LESDINS

(Incl.), the only natural obstacle is the canal (without any 

marshy border). South-east of LE TRONQUOY the canal cutting

is deep. Its west bank commands the east at many points,

so that any enemy approach work could be protected against

our infantry fire. These high banks on the western side

moreover, afford good observation points over our defences,

which, with a view to sweeping the canal effectively, are 
pushed forward close to the east bank at many points.  The

occupation of this high ground by the enemy must therefore

be hindered as long as possible, in the first place by our

outposts, and later by systematic bombardment of every enemy

approach work by our artillery, which will find favourable

conditions for this purpose in the good observation to be

had from the high ground north-east and south-east of LESDINS 
and in cross fire from both these directions.

The southern half of the sector, from LESDINS, (excl.)

to ROUVROY (excl.), it is protected by the front line obstacles

of the SOMME Canal and the low ground of the SOMME Valley.

The latter can be regarded as an effective obstacle in the

neighbourhood of ROUVROY only. The rest of it, however,

offers/

 

-5-

offers the advantage, that it is easy to sweep with fire,

and that the high level of the water table will hamper the

pushing forward of enemy entrenchments within assaulting

distance. The water level may be raised by damming. The 

part of the sector that belongs to the ST. QUENTIN bridgehead

position is a reverse slope position. The right flank

rests on the low ground of the SOMME Valley. The foreground

of the position can be taken in flank by artillery fire from
the neighbourhood of TILLOY Farm. The town of ST. QUENTIN,

which lies along behind the position, offers suitable

artillery positions.

The ground behind the entire divisional front rises

in an easterly and north-easterly direction. The rear lines

of the 1st line position are thus exposed to enemy observation

to a very large extent, For bringing up troops under 

cover, approach trenches are necessary, extending far into 

the back area.

NOTES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE INFANTRY.

The northern half of the sector is the more dangerous.

the southern portion of the position, east of the Canal, is 

protected by marshy ground. The northern front of the

town defences is effectively protected by the flanking

artillery support from the TILLOY Farm area. When distributing

the troops to hold Sector 3, therefore, it is advisable,

for a division consisting of 3 regiments, to allot 2

to the northern and 1 to the southern sector (see map).

In the southern sector, the relatively external nature

of the position renders it necessary to employ the 3 available

battalions side by side; about half of these may be

drawn upon to garrison the portion of the town defences

which belongs to sector 3.

NOTES FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE INFANTRY BATTLE.

For the conduct of the infantry battle the ground offers

no difficulty or special peculiarity. The defence of the

northern sector will be principally effected by the construction

of strong defences. The support of a number of

inconspicuous machine guns will be necessary for sweeping 
the marshy ground.

It is of great importance that the enemy should be

prevented from pushing forward his lines over the slopes

running down to the canal, which are easy to observe from 

our side.
DIVISIONAL SECTOR NO. 4.

SHORT SKETCH OF THE TACTICAL PECULIARITIES OF THE SECTOR.
(see also plan of the town).
Sector from the Stadium to the Roman Road ("Römerstrasse")
("Römerstrasse" is the name of the whole of the straight
road/

 

-6-

road from ST. QUENTIN to HOLNON).

From the Stadium (map square 3961, to the north of the

point where the track leading to THORIGNY branches off from the

ST. QUENTIN - LESDINS road) to the Roman road (centre of map

square 4159), the ground falls along the western edge of the

town in a depression which drains under the town in a southerly

direction into the SOMME. West of this low ground, the country

rises in narrow ridges to the heights north-east of FAYET.

East of the depression, it rises somewhat steeply to the

actual town of ST. QUENTIN. The 1st line of the position lies

on the eastern slopes of the ridges to the west and constitutes

a reverse slope position. Its field of fire, generally

speaking, is very restricted, owing to the rounded contours

of  the slopes; the narrow depressions, however, which lie

between the ridges can be swept with fire from the 1st line.

Long stretches of the line can be seen into from the high ground

west of the Orphelinat (map squares 4257 and 58)-

The 2nd line in this part of the position line 200 or 300

metres behind the front line, for the most part in the low

ground itself. It can be seen into almost throughout its

length from the high ground west of the Orphelinat.

The 3rd line - not shown on the map - has been reconnoitred

and will lie on the outskirts of the town on the westward

slopes of the high ground on which stands the town of ST.

QUENTIN. Although this slope also can be observed from the

heights west of the Orphelinat as well as from the FAYET heights,

large portions of the line, being situated in gardens, are

invisible to the enemy. The communication trenches between

the three lines, and the intermediate zone in particular,

can, for the most part, be seen into from the opposite heights.

Sector from the Roman Road to the SOMME.

The area between the Roman Road and the low ground of

the SOMME Valley is filled by a ridge which falls gradually

from the Orphelinat to the town. The ST. QUENTIN - HAM railway,

which runs over the ridge in a curve, forms alternately

high embankments and deep cuttings. The Orphelinat lies

rather to the east of the highest (most easterly) point of the

ridge, which affords a wide view over the foreground as far as

the Stadium, to the Fayet Park, and to the heights above the

SOMME Valley to the south.

In this sector, the 1st line first of all follows the 

narrow gauge railway, turns off from it to the south-west

through a hollow, rising to the highest point west of the

Orphelinat, which it encloses as a forward slope position, and

terminates at the canal, west of the ROCOURT Factory. North of

the SAVY road, it can be seen into from the high ground to the

north of the Roman road: south of the SAVY road, from the ridges

1 km. north-west of OESTRES and from the high ground of the

south bank of the SOMME.

With the object of providing a switch line for the 1st

line, which projects westwards like and advanced work, an

intermediate line, running through the Orphelinat Garden, has

been constructed as a reverse slope position.

The 2nd line crosses the Roman road east of the narrow

gauge railway, screened by the very high railway embankment,

then/

 

-7-

then rises across undulating country and disused clay pits to

the SAVY road, follows the light railway a little way and 

terminates in the western half of ROCOURT factory. Only a

small part of it can be seen into by the enemy.

A 3rd line, intended as an artillery protective line,

(not shown on the 1 : 25,000 map), runs through houses and

clay pits to the park east of ROCOURT factory; it is almost

entirely under cover.

The SOMME Valley and SOMME  - Windmill Sector.

The low ground of the SOMME Valley comprises a swampy

stretch of country about 500 metres wide, covered with woods

and undergrowth, intersected by numerous dykes in addition to

the canal. The roads across this area are built along low

embankments, the railway embankment is several metres high.

In the dry season, the ground off the roads is practicable for

small detachments. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd lines are constructed 

on embankments; there are no approach trenches.

South of the SOMME, the sugar factory at LA BIETTE

constitutes a projecting strong point of the position, which

then rises to the windmill hill. Whereas here the 1st line,

which is a reverse slope position, can only be seen into from

the Fayet Park and the high ground north of the SOMME, the 2nd 
line at this point is so far unfavourably situated that it is

open to observation from the ridge to the east of GAUCHY. The

3rd line - artillery protective line - lies far in the rear

at the exit from ST. QUENTIN.

As yet, no part of the 3rd line has been constructed.

The troops moving in will commence its construction immediately

as also that of further lines in the town with a view to its

defence by sectors.

NOTES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE INFANTRY.

The forces required on the entire divisional front are

approximately the same everywhere. Consequently, the

divisional sector has been divided into 3 regimental sectors of

approximately equal width. (see map).

NOTES FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE INFANTRY BATTLE.

In the sector north of the ST. QUENTIN - SELENCY road,

the dominating position of the 3rd line points to the massing

of the greater part of the machine guns in its neighbourhood;

from the gardens and houses on the outskirts of the town they

can/

 

-8-

can fire over the two front lines and thus form an effective

barrage. Isolated machine guns between the 2nd and 3rd lines

can command and enfilade the low ground to the west of the

town. In the 1st and 2nd lines light machine guns will suffice.

The importance of the sector from the ST. QUENTIN - 

SELENCY road to the SOMME depends on the possession of the

high ground west of the Orphelinat. This is the only point from

which the hollows to the south of FAYET can be seen into, which

are of importance for the deployment of the enemy's artillery

and reserves. This height must be held at all costs, and the

units (battalions) fighting there must be distributed in considerable 
depth. As a continuous machine gun barrage from rear

positions cannot be put down in front of the height, the

employment in the front line of numerous light machine guns

is necessitated. Plans of methodical recapture of the

heights must be prepared beforehand in case the immediate

counter-attack following enemy penetration should fail in

its object. 

The low ground of the SOMME Valley need only be protected

by picquets and patrols. The troops to the north and

south of this area must protect their flanks against enemy

raids in the SOMME Valley.

The sector south of the SOMME constitutes the right

wing of the defences of the Windmill Hill, which is of importance

for our observation on account of its commanding view. The 

siting of machine guns in the vicinity of the 2nd line will

render a flanking barrage possible in front of the positions

on the northern slope of the Windmill Hill. For strengthening

the barrage in front of the LA BIETTE strong point, trench

mortars will be required. Plans for the methodical recapture

of the position, inclusive of the strong point, must be prepared

beforehand.      

Fourth Army (Intelligence),

September 8th, 1918.

(E)

 

[*GOC*]

APPENDIX "A" TO FOLIO 1.

G.H.Q. No. 1a/54874.

Fourth Army, I. No. IG.103/5.

SHORT NOTES ON DAMS AND THE UTILIZATION OF WATERCOURSES AS

A FRONT LINE OBSTACLE FOR THE 1ST SIEGFRIED LINE.

FROM BELLICOURT TO SOUTH OF ST. QUENTIN.

The highest level of the canal lies between the locks

LEBOUSQUET (First Army) and LESDINS. The Canal is fed by

the "Canal d'alimentation" (Rigole) at LESDINS (1,000 sl.).

In order to preserve the canal as a front line

obstacle, i.e., to prevent water draining away, the following

works were carried out :-

(a) The locks at MORCOURT and LESDINS were blocked

up with cement and sacks of sand. Any further obstruction

of the canal by sunken vessels, sandbags, and concrete

can be arranged for later, in case of necessity, by the

Corps H.Q. at ST. QUENTIN. For the time being, the canal

between MORCOURT and ROCOURT should be used behind the

bridgehead position as a waterway for barges. Vessels

and barges ready to be sunk are lying beside the main

road bridge in ST. QUENTIN.

(b) In each of the tunnels at BELLICOURT and LE 

TRONQUOY two dams should be constructed, with 4 others

on each side of BELLENGLISE, in order to shut off the

water and prevent the whole Canal being emptied, should

it be destroyed at BELLENGLISE where its level is higher

than the level of the surrounding country. Artificial

flooding on the west side of the canal, south of 

BELLENGLISE, soon drains away and cannot therefore be

regarded as a permanent obstacle.

(c) Flat, low-lying areas (west side of canal at 

OMISSY and BROCOURT) should be inundated so that the 

Canal shall not be entirely emptied if the dam is destroyed.

The water-level of the canal will then only

subside to the level of the inundations.

(d) Damming of the canal at ROCOURT.

All dams and locks only hold back water up to its

normal height and allow any additional water to overflow.

In addition to the canal, the low ground of the SOMME

valley, east of the canal, can also be utilized as a good

front line obstacle. The naturally marshy ground will be

rendered more swampy by constructing dams with suitable

sluices. This can be done between LESDINS and LA BIETTE,

at and north of MORCOURT, MOULIN BRULE, ROUVROY, ST.

QUENTIN bridge, railway bridge at ROCOURT, and LA BIETTE.

The water level of these inundated areas can be

regulated by sluices in the canal just north of the ST. 

QUENTIN bridge. For information as to the proposed constructions 
for the maintenance of the canal level and

for the inundations, see 1.5,000 Map Part III, Enclosure 1

of this Memorandum.

Fourth Army (intelligence),

September 8th, 1918.

 

8/9/18

B.G.G.S.

(a) Birdwood covering

(b) no leave.

1.   Replacement of Connelly, GII of III Div.

(Major Norman 12th Bde)

2.   A Bgde & 1st Div. Gellibrand to have a call on,

pending relief. -

3.  Lt Col. Mason - Corps School - hand over & leave

Hobbs wishes to see.

4.  Lt Scuttie - Corps School - wanted as Adjutant, by Elliott

5th Div. may be able to give another man.

5.   C.E. to see n. bridge at ATHIES, repaired.

6.   When does 1st Div. arrive

7.    Inter divisional Boundary.

8.   Conference of 1st & 4th Divs.  re capture of

Brown Line - define it more precisely.-

 

Bishop of Amiens
Evêché   
d'Amiens

Annieur le 8 Sept 1918

Mes Frères

Avant de tirer du
mystère de ce jour de la nativité
de Marie la legou qui conneut
d' ur ãmes,  permettez-moi
He rendre un particulier
hommage aux Divisions Australiennes
qui, par leurs victoires
sur ler hauteurs du Hamel
ont prilude aux magnifique

 

 

 

 

more french !!!!

 

 

 

more french !!!!
 

 

AMIENS, 8th September, 1918.
My Brothers,
Before seeking comfort for our souls in celebrating the
mystery of the Virgin's birth, on this her natal day, let us pay a
special tribute to the Australian Divisions which, by their victories

on the heights of LE HAMEL, have led the way to the splendid 
triumphs of the present offensive and the liberation of our

native PICARDY.

To the Australians we owe the recapture of ALBERT; and 
to crown their work they have added to the debt we owe them by
bringing back the Statue of NOTRE DAME de BREBIÈRES from NORMANDY,

so that it may be placed in our Cathedral.
Further, to grace their action, we see them rendering
military honours to this miraculous statue which they have redeemed
from exile - this statue ^which in our eyes is symbolical of the faith,
the traditions, and the future of our race.
With them, let us salute the Army of His Majesty the King
of England. This army, as young as it is, has risen to the highest
rank by the incomparable victories it has recently won; whilst the
British Navy, true to its ancient traditions by securing for us
the liberties of the Seas, has made it possible for us to wage
successfully this war of giants, which we could not have carried on
without its aid.
The British Navy is perhaps writing the most glorious, 
though the most obscure, page in the history of its country, at a 
time when the heroes of her Army on land provoke before our very
eyes our most profound admiration.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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