General, Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 20, 15 August - 8 September 1918 - Part 15

5/9/18

 

5/9/18 OFFICERS ‘JOINED AND GONE’ DURING WEEK ENDED 31/8/18 EXTRACTS FROM RETURNS OF
JOINED.
DIV.	UNIT	RANK AND NAME	DATE	REMARKS
1	D.H.Q.	Capt A.M.Maxwell DSO. MC.	20/8/18	From 51st Bn. as A.D.C.
1	D.H.Q.	Capt C.Abey MC.	29/8/18	From 1st Div. Train as a/D.A.A.G. vice HARDIE on leave.
1	D.H.Q.	Lt. G.F. PRIESTLY (Intell-Officer)	28/8/18	From detached to Liaison Force.
1	Div. Art	Lt-Col E.T.DEAN, DSO.	29/8/18	From hospital
3	34thBn	Major W.A.LeR.FRY	26/8/18	From wounded
4	46thBn	Major J.M.EDGLEY DSO	1/8/18	From Supy. List
5	8thBde	Major John A.CHAPMAN (30th BN)	26/8/18	From Staff Trainee to act as Bde Major
GONE
1	D.H.Q.	Major F.W. PAGE (A.&I.Staff)	27/8/18	To Admin H.Q.London for Ordnance duty
1	D.H.Q.	Capt R.C.WERTHIEM (Intell)	20/08/18	Rejoined Aust Corps H.Q.
1	D.H.Q.	LT H.BRUCE (Staff Trainee)	21/8/18	Resumed Regtl duty with 13th A.L.H.Regt.
1	Div Art	Major J.W.SEXTON	28/8/18	Wounded
1	12th Bn	Major G.D.SHAW (temp. cmmdg)	25/8/18	Wounded
2	21stBn	Capt (T/Maj) A.R.MacNEIL MC	29/8/18	Wounded
3	Div Art	Major S.J.WALKER DSO	25/8/18	Wounded
3	35th Bn	Capt A.S.tJ.PEARCE (Duntroon)	28/8/18	Wounded
3	40th Bn	Major L.F.GIBLIN DSO MC	24/8/18	Wounded
5	Div Art	Major H.H.HULTON DSO RFA (Brigade Major)	26/8/18	Resumed duty with Imp. Army.
5	D.H.Q.	Lt-Col J.H.PECK CMG DSO (GSO.1)	28/8/18	Invalided
5	D.H.Q.	Major E.J.F.LANGLEY DSO (DAPM)	25/8/18	Invalided

 

Signature 

7/9/18

Notes for Orders

Our general advance will halt, until

further orders, when ^ as soon as our main guards have

reached the blue line. The country between

the blue and the brown line is to be recon-

noitred with a view to ascertaining ^ without serious fighting whether

the enc

and where the enemy proposes to make a 

stand west of the brown line. No attack

on any prepared position between the blue 

and brown lines is to be undertaken without

orders form Corps.- Advantage will be

taken of this halt on the blue line, (which

will last at least 24 hours) to rest

the advanced guard troops (except patrols) 

to brin gup the remainder of the Infantry

to support & reserve positions, to 

emplace the artillery for a future attack

on the high ground Hargicourt - Le Verfiner

- Bois Hamon, and generally to organise

the Divisional areas ^ all Headquarters communications,

and lines of supply.-

		Time Table
Sept 7	S	Reach blue line. – 2 Bgdes of I & IV Divs. arrive
"    8	M	Rest on blue line I & IV Divs. complete in forward areas.
"    9	T	) I & IV Divs. relieve ) III & V Divs relief to be complete by 10a.m. on 10th
"    10	W
"    11	Th	Preparations for capture of brown line when ordered. -
"    12	F
"    13	S

SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY

By FIELD-MARSHAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG

K.T., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E

Commander-in-Chief, British Armies in France.

 

One month has now passed since the British Armies, having successfully withstood all attacks

of the enemy, once more took the offensive in their turns. In that short space of time, by a series of 

Armies whose vastly superior numbers compelled our retreat last Spring.

What has happened on the British front has happened also on the front of our Allies. Less

than six months after the launching of the great Germ offensive, which was to have cut the Allied

front in two, the Allied Armies are everywhere to-day advancing victoriously side by side over the 

same battlefields on which, by the courage and steadfastness of their defence, they broke the enemy's 

assaults. 

Yetmore has bene dones. Already we have pressed byond our old battle lines of 1917, and

have made a wide breach in the enemy's strongest defences.

In this glorious accomplishment, all ranks of all arms and services of the British Armies in

France have borne their part in the most worthy and honourable manner. The capture of 75,000

prisoners and 750 guns in the course of four weeks' fighting speaks for the magnitude of your effort

and the magnificence of your achievement.

Many thanks are due to all ranks of the fighting forces for their indomitable spirit in defence and

their boldness in attack; to all Commanders and their Staff Officers, under whose able direction such

great results have been attained; and also to all those whose unsparing labours behind the actual

fighting line have contributed essentially to our common success. 

To have commanded this splendid Army, which at a time of grave crisis has so nobly done its

duty, fills me with pride.

We have passed through many dark days together. Please God, these will never return. The 

enemy has now spent his effort, and I rely confidently upon each of you to turn to full advantage

the opportunity which your skill, courage and resolution have created. 

D. Haig. Flu.

General Headquarters Commander-In-Chief,

September 7th, 1918  British Armies in France.

PRINTED IN FRANCE BY ARMY PRINTING AND STATIONERY SERVICES

PRESS A-9/18.

7/9/18

A.I.F.

Attached Fifth Army

Letter concerning proposed reorganisation

dispatched to you today aaa Monash

Australian Corps.

 

ADC. 66

Timed 3.30pm

7/9/18

8/9/18 GOC

F O L I O   I

G.H.Q.No. 1a/54674.

4th Amy 1. No.IG.103/5.

 

(Translation of a German document).

TACTICAL APPRECIATION OF THE VARIOUS SECTORS OF THE SIEGRIED LINE.

DIVISIONAL SECTOR NO. 1.

SHORT SKETCH OF THE TACTICAL PECULARITIES OF THE SECTOR.

The deciding factor in selecting this position was the

circumstances that the canal could be made use of as a front

line obstacle before the position. This is the case from the

southern end of the canal tunnel south of BELLICOURT as far 

as the southern divisional boundary line. West of BELLI-

COURT, the position has been sited on the reverse slope.

It was not possible to site it farther forward at this 

point, as the junction with the neighbouring Army had to be

secured.

It thus happens that the series of ridges, COLOGNE FERME-

LA HAUTE BRUYERE FERME - 1 1/2 km. south of BELLINGLISE, limits

our ownground observation towards the west, but affords 

the enemy a view into and behind our position as well as

the possibility of constructing covered positions for his

artillery close to our lines. 

For this reason, until the enemy brings up consider-

able forces, these ridges must be held by outposts. The 

projecting ridge close to the canal, north-west of LA 

BARAQUE, offers the enemy a particularly good view at very

close range into and behind our position. 

NOTES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE INFANTRY.

West of BELLCOURT, the position is not protected by 

natural obstacles. The deep canal cutting, from the

southern end of the canal tunnel as far as the left divis-

ional boundary line, with its high, steep banks, consti-

tues a strong obstacle. The enemy will hardly attack here.

But in this case also, should it occur, this section of the

line may be defended with comparatively few troops. 

The proposed distribution of the infantry is therefore +

Regimental Sector No. 1 : From the right divisional 

boundary to about 800 metres south of it.

Regimental Sector No. 2 : Adjoining on the left and

extending as far as the entrance to the tunnel (inclusive)

Regimental Sector No. 3 : Adjoining on the left and

extending as far as the left divsional boundary; cover-

ing the whole 2 1/2 Km. of that stretch of the canal. 

NOTES FOR THECONDUCT OF THE INFANTRY BATTLE.

Keeping the supports close up with a view to ejectin gthe

enemy by an immediate counter-attack, should he penetrate our

line, is everywhere essential. In the Northern sector this is considerably simmplified by the subterranean canal, in which 

barges to accommodate the troops can be moored safe from shell

fire. The construction of as many exits as possible from the tunnel/

-2-

tunnel must be constantly carried on. It is very important to

protect these exits from enemy observation. In the case of 

an enemy attack, it is to be expected that the entire area

between the front lines and BELLICOURT, including the village

itself, will be under the heaviest artillery fire. In order 

that the reserves, in spite of this, may be able to advance

from the tunnel, the construction of numerous approach

trenches from the ridge between BELLICOURT and the southern

end of the canal tunnel to the front line position must be

commenced immediately. The preparations for the obstinate all round defence of BELLICOURT village must be taken in hand early. 

In the Southern Sector - the strong front line obstacle

precludes the possibility of the over-running the front lines. 

The open ground, destitute of cover, which rises from 

the canal to the ridge near and south of NAUROY, presents 

difficulties both for the accommodation and for the bringing 

forward of the reserves.

The skilful use of machine guns - from the eastern bank of 

the canal and also from the high ground to the east of it - is 

of considerable importance in this sector. 

The establishment of enemy forces on the West bank of 

the canal, and themining operations under the west slope

of this bank whihc would probably follow soon after, must be

hindered by the employment of additional trench mortars on 

the east bank. 

DIVISIONAL SECTOR NO. 2

SHORT SKETCH OF THE TACTICAL PECULIARITIES OF THE SECTOR.

The deciding factor in selecting this position was the 

circumstance that the canal would be made use of as a front

line obstacle. This is the case from the right divisional

boundary as far as the tunnel entrace at LE TRONQUOY. In o

order that the canal, in case the banks were destroyed by artil-

lery fire, should not be emptied for its entire length,

thus losing considerable value as an obstacle, concreate dams

have been built at intervals in the canal, which confine the stretches of water lying between them, as if they were

bulk heads. In addition, an endeavour has been made to inundate

the country south-west of BELLENGLISE. Owing to the position

of the line along the canal, it happens that the important

ridge from LA HAUTE BRUYERE Ferme to Ferme, 11/2 km. south- west

of BELLENGLISE, and further, the high ground south-east of 

PONTRUET as far as THORIGNY limit our own observation to the 

west and south, but afford the enemy a view into and behind our

position. 

For this reason, until the the enemy brings up considerable

forces, the ridge must be held by outposts. 

Following the withdrawal of our outposts, anadvance of

the enemy's artillery behind the ridge to the north-west, west

and/

NOTES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE INFANTRY.

It is possible that the enemy will immediately recog-

nise the advantage of this cross fire and will make use of

it in an attack on the BELLENGLISE sector. Moreover, at 

this point the canal cutting is not deep, as it is south of 

LEHAUCOURT. The BELLENGLISE salient, therefore, is the most 

dangerous part of the divisional sector, and requires strong

forces for its defence. 

The proposed distribution of the infantry is therefore :-

Regimental Sector No. 1 : From the right divisional

boundary to the south-west point of BELLENGLISE. 

Regimental Sector No. 2 : Adjoining on the left 

and as far as about 300 metres east of BELLICOURT - 

ST. QUENTIN main road. 

Regimental Sector No. 3 : Adjoining n the left and

as far as the left divisional boundary. 

NOTES FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE INFANTRY BATTLE.

Keeping the supports close up with a view to ejecting 

the enemy by an immediate counter-attack, should he pene-

trate our line, is everywhere essential. In the important

BELLENGLISE sector, the necessity for this is still further

increased by the fact that the bringing up of reinforcements

from the rear over the bare high ground east of BELLINENGLISE,

which is entire exposed to view, under the heavy enemy 

artillery fire to be expected during an attack, would be a 

very difficult task.

The accommodation, too, of a large number of troops in

the BELLENGLISE sector presents difficulties. This accommo-

dation must everywhere be shell-proof. For this reason,

the infantry must work at the completion of a partially-

built dug-outs with all the forces at its disposal.

The tunnel which has been begun to the east of BELLEN-

GLISE will, when completed, serve excellently for bring up

and accommodating battle reserves. The construction of as 

many tunnel exits as possible must be undertaken without

delay.

There must be no firing from the concrete machine gun

emplacements constructed along the canal prior to an attack

by the enemy's infantry. Every kind of traffic to them which

is not absolutely necessary must be forbidden, and the con-

struction of communication trenches in their vicinity must 

be avoided. If the emplacements remain undetected and the

crews take due precautions, any enemy attack in their

vicinity must be repulsed. The commanding ground east

BELLENGLISE/