General Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 17, 1 November 1917 - 13 January 1918, Part 3
-6-
Maintenance of Touch. Touch was to be maintained with
formations on our flanks throughout the whole advance - small
parties were to be detailed to move with the adjoining formations.
Those parties moving with the New Zealand Division
were to establish touch at each halt and on reaching the final
objective.
It was arranged with the Second Australian Division that
similar parties should establish touch on the eastern side
of THAMES WOOD and at 22.b.20.18, 23.a.40.65, and on the
final objective.
Arrangements for touch between Brigades was to be made
by the Brigades concerned.
Maintenance of direction. Compass bearings were to be
taken and Officers specially detailed, with one or two men to
keep direction. The approximate compass bearings of the sun
at sunrise was to be noted on a day prior to ZERO and communicated
to the troops, in order to assist in maintaining
direction.
S.O.S. S.O.S. Signal was to be inoperative between ZER0
hour and ZER0 minus 10 minutes. Counter-battery, however,
was to be available up to and after ZERO.
Machine Guns. Machine guns in the hands of the D.M.G.O.
were formed into two barrages, each barrage grouped into 8-gun
batteries, each pair of batteries commanded by senior officer.
These guns were organised as follows :-
First Barrage... 10th A.M.G.Coy. 8 guns
23rd do 16 guns
Second Barrage... 9th A.M.G.Coy. 16 guns
10th do 8"
23rd do 8"
The guns were to be placed in positions as follows :
First Barrage - About D.26.a.72.90
D.20.c.30.45
D.20.c.20.80
Second Barrage D. 21.d.20.90
D. 21.b. 10.10
D. 21.a.25.35
D. 21.a.00.57
Engineers. Engineers were to be used on the construction
of strong points previously mentioned, the construction
and maintenance of tracks and the improvement of roads.
Pioneers. Two Coys. of Pioneers were allotted to the
C.R.A. for the construction and maintenance of Artillery
roads. The remainder worked under the orders of the C.R.E.
Liaison. One Senior R.A.Officer, and one Intelligence
Officer, R.A., were attached to each Infantry Brigade on
"S" day.
In addition to the above, two F.O.Os. per Artillery
Group, of which there were three, were to go forward with
the Infantry. Of these six F.O.Os., three were to establish
O.Ps. forward. The other three were attached to the "D"
Battalions, two to the "D "Battalion of the 11th Brigade and
one to the "D "Battalion of the 10th Brigade.
-7-
Thus there were to be three Artillery Liaison Officers
with the Battalions capturing the final objective, and two
of these were to be with the Battalion on the high ground
on our right.
A Divisional Staff Officer was to visit CORPS Head-
quarters and Infantry Brigade Headquarters, when required,
for the interchange of information.
An Officer detailed by the Heavy Artillery was to be
at Divisional Headquarters. Officers were also detailed
for Liaison work with each of the Flank Divisions.
Arrangements for the interchange of Liaison personnel
within the Brigades, and with the Brigades on their flanks,
was left in the hands of the Brigadiers.
10. OPERATIONS.
Synchronisation of Watches. Watches were synchronised
twice daily with CORPS and with Brigades by an Officer from
Divisional Headquarters, who took his watch round to Headquarters
of units. The watches of Battalions taking part
in the attack were also synchronised by a Staff Officer from
Divisional Headquarters just prior to their moving off on
the approach march.
Approach March and Assembly. In accordance with instructions
issued, Brigadiers made their own arrangements for the
approach march.
Right Brigade (llth.) The First Battalion of the
11th Brigade moved off on the approach march at about 9.0 pm.
The tracks were well marked and little trouble was experienced
from shelling. The dangerous area about the ZONNEBEKE was
crossed without incident.
Left Brigade (10th.) The first Battalion of this
Brigade moved off from the Assembly area at about 9.45 p.m.
A greater number of casualties by shell fire were suffered
by this Brigade than was the case with the Right Brigade.
After crossing the ZONNEBEKE, Battalions deployed into
Assembly positions - rear battalions moving further forward
than was first intended in order to be clear of the ZONNEBEKE
area.
Both Brigades had reported all Battalions in position
at 4.0 a.m. on the 4th.
Enemy action prior to ZERO. At about 5.30 a.m. put
down a barrage which fell on the rear battalions. These
were moved forward, with the result that heavy casualties
were averted.
11. THE ATTACK.
Right Brigade. At ZERO the Brigade moved off in good
order. The barrage was very strong and apparently very
effective, for though large numbers of the enemy were met
with, especially along the railway line about THAMES WOOD,
they surrendered freely.
No break was made in the advance right up to the BLUE
Line, which was captured on time, and touch with the Brigade
on the right ensured.
-8-
This was largely due to the support lent to the advancing
troops by those in the rear rapidly filling up gaps, and xx
in one case by one support company, finding that the line
ahead of it was dropping back from the barrage on account of
the difficulties of the ground, pushing through and taking
over its task.
Left Brigade. This Brigade also reported the barrage
to be very strong and effective. Large numbers of the enemy
were met with, but little opposition was offered, except by
machine guns from ABRAHAMS HEIGHTS and from the vicinity of
the BLUE Line. By hard fighting these positions were cap¬
tured. A break due to the machine gun fire was quickly
filled up by troops in rear.
Large numbers of prisoners were taken in this area,
mainly from "pill-boxes".
The leading battalion captured the BLUE Line to time
and carried on with consolidation.
Counter-attacks. The enemy counter-attacked our right
flank, ^also and again at 6.30 p.m. On both occasions these
attempts on the part of the enemy to regain lost ground were
completely broken up by our Artillery fire.
Later on, an attempt against our right flank was also
broken up. Throughout the night the enemy made several
smaller unsuccessful attacks against our front.
Strong points were successfully established, as arranged,
in rear of each Brigade front, and the work of digging communication
trenches was proceeding satisfactorily.
Casualties.
Assaulting Brigades Off: O/Ranks
10th A. I. Bde 24 830
11th do 31 610
Reserve Brigade.
9th. A. I. Bde 6 220
Prisoners. The total prisoners that passed through
our Cages were 24 Officers and 1014 Other ranks. These belonged
to the 77th and 79th Regts. of the 20th Division;
the 5th Gren: Guards Regt. and 5th Foot Guards Regt. of the
4th Guards Division, and the 212th R.I.R. of 45th Division.
Material. We captured 2 Granatenwerfer, 4 Trench Mortars
and 70 Machine Guns.
12. G E N E R A L.
Following are some of the outstanding features of the
operation:
(1) Statements from prisoners showed that the 212th R.I.R.
were assembled for attack, but were forestalled by our
offensive. This would account largely for the number of
prisoners taken.
-9-
(2) The success of the operation was largely due to
careful and systematic preparation, together with the excellent
leadership and initiative displayed by Officers and N.C.Os.
in all units.
(3). Our barrage was very effective, and the fact that it
did great execution is borne out by the statements of officers
taking part in the attack as to the large number of enemy dead
lying in the captured territory.
(4) The enemy's Artillery, during the latter part of
the day, was reported to be very weak and erratic.
(5). Visibility was poor, so the aeroplanes were able to
render little service.
(6). The closing up of Battalions after crossing the
ZONNEBEKE undoubtedly saved many casualties.
(7). The prompt manner in which gape in the line were
consistently filled up by rear troops reflects credit on all
taking part in the offensive.
Captain
for Lieut.-Colonel, General staff
Divisional Headquarters
3rd. November, 1917.
PWP.
From Homeland
To
War Land
COO - EE
the 3rd Aust Div CO-EE'S
to the
3rd Aust Div. PIONEER BAND
and are glad to see
THE OFFICERS SISTERS & PATIENTS
of the 25 GENERAL HOSITPAL B.E.P
3rd November 1917
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
CASUALTIES FOR MONTH OF OCTOBER, 1 917.
KILLED WOUNDED MISSING DIED OF SELF I. ACCIDENT.
DATE WOUNDS WOUNDS WOUNDED
TOTAL
Off.OR. Off.OR. OFF.OR. Off.OR. Off.OR Off.OR. Off.OR.
21 "
/ NOTES E MAJOR PHILLIPS - 3RD. AUSTRALIAN PIONEER
BATTALION.
---------------
Promoted Captain C.M.F.
16-10-1913.
Passed for Majority C.M.F.
August, 1915.
Qualifying at completion of Field Officers School of 17 days.
Contemporaries at this School,
Lieut.-Colonel.
ALLSOP, D.S.O.
Lieut.-Colonel.
BOARD.
Lieut.-Colonel.
WOOLCOCK.
Lieut.-Colonel.
ANNAND - 2nd. Pioneer Battalion.
Major PHILLIPS was selected by the Selection Board
to command one of the 9 Field Companies to be formed in
AUSTRALIA.
When the Military District Field Company was cut
out he joined the Pioneer Battalion.
He was senior in the C.M.F. to both Major W. W.
BERRY, second-in-command, and the late Major W. ADAMS, D.S.O.
No other opening for him was available so he came
away with the Pioneer Battalion.
[ Major MATHER
- Lieutenant R.A.E. 16-2-1912.
Joined A.I.F.
- 25-8-1914 - probably as Captain.
Major A.I.F.
- 13-12-1915.
Pioneer Battalion is officered by a number of
experienced Engineers, holding big positions in AUSTRALIA,
senior in years.
The youth of Major MATHER should be considered in
view of the number of officers so much older than himself in
the Unit.
2v
D.R.4..
4/11/17.
(REJ/PL).
AU
o
5ROV.I914-
130t
A esteten
Dirislom.
Apsrpällis
THIED
Divisional Headquarters,
5th. November, 1917.
A.D.O. for G.O.C., II Anzae Corpe
A.D.C. fer G.O.C., 3rd. Aust. Division,
ege staff,
C..R. A.,
C. R. E.,
örd. Aust. Div. Signal Co.,
Machine Gun Company,
23rd. Aust.
Sth. Aust. Infantry Brigade,
do.
10th.
do.
Ilth.
3rd. Aust. Pioneer Battalion,
Divisional Train,
3rd. Aust.
D.A.D.V.S.,
A.D.M.S.,
Div. Salvage 0o.,
3rd. Aust.
Camp Commandant.
is the Third Australian Division will shortly be transferred
from II Anzac Corps to I Anzao Corys, the Corps Commander II Anzac,
Lieutenant-General Sir A.J. GOnLEY, K.O.B., K.O.M.G., p.s.o., wishes to
meet and say goodbye to the senior offioers of the Division, at Chatoan
All offioers of
Hervarre, at 12 noon, en Thursday, Norombor 8th.
the Division of the following er equivalont greiesewill attend, viz:-
Brigade-Commandars,
Brigade Stat(s,
Battalion Commandars,
Battalion Staffs.
All other officers for whom tronsport oem be proviled may
also attend.
The following transport will be available :-
a.m. at each 9th., lOth. and 11th. Brigade
One Car 11
to convey Brigade Commanders and Brigade Staffs.
Headquarters,
Battalion Commanders and staffs.
One Lorry to call at WISMES 9:30 e.m.
Sth. Aust. Ipfantry Brigade.
thene to VAUDRIIGE, LEDINGHEM,
CAMPASSB-lez-BOULOEEAIS to CHATEAU
HERVAEdE.
Ons Lorry to call at Z0TrUX 9:30 a.m.
LSth. Aust. Infantry Brigeds
EOCUES, BLDOUI
thenoa to BI
to CHATEIC HERVARRE.
One Lorry to call at St. PlEPRE 9:30
1lth. Aust. Infantry Brigade,
am. thence to WAVRAS, ASSINGHrM,
and Ploneer Battalion.
FEMIILY WIRGUIN, AVROUIT to CHATEEU
HERVAREE.
All Officers will be on the ground by 11:45 a.m.
Aui reken
Oa
Lieut-Colonel.
A.A. & 9.M.G., Third Australian Livision.
(RE/DDI
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