General Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 17, 1 November 1917 - 13 January 1918, Part 2

Conflict:

First World War, 1914–18

Subject:

Documents and letters

Status:

Awaiting approval

Accession number:

RCDIG0000625

Difficulty:

-7 -

Machine Guns.

The guns in the hands of the D.M.G.O. were formed into

two barrages, each barrage grouped into 8-gun batteries, each

pair of batteries commanded by the senior officer.

These guns were organised as follows :-

No. 1 Barrage -	9th A.M.G.Coy.	8 guns
	10th do	8 do
	23rd do	16 do
No. 2 Barrage -	11th A.M.G.Coy.	16 guns
	23rd do	16 do

The guns were to be placed in positions as follows :-

(1) One Battery - D.16.d.2.6

do - D.16.a.70.25

do - D.15.b.70.40

do - D.15.b.50.50.

(2) 11th A.M.G. Coy. One Battery at about D.5.d.9.2

do do D.12.a.10.85

23rd do. do do D.12.c.35.15

do do D.12.c.4.7

The O.C. of the 11th A.M.G. Coy. arranged to move his guns

forward close behind the Infantry. The 23rd A.M.G.Coy. had

instructions to cease fire in first barrage at ZERO plus 3 hrs

and move forward to the second barrage position.

Engineers.

Engineers, less those used by Brigades for construction of

strong points, were in the hands of the C.R.E. and were to be

engaged on the construction and making of tracks and the improvement

of roads.

Pioneers.

Two Coys. of Pioneers were allotted to the C.R.A. for the

construction and maintenance of artillery roads; the remainder

worked with the Engineers under the orders of the C.R.E.

OPERATIONS.

Synchronisation of Watches.

Watches were synchronised twice daily with CORPS and with

Brigades by an Officer from Divisional Headquarters, who took

his watch around to Headquarters of Units. The watches of the

Battalions taking part in the attack were also synchronised by

a Staff Officer from Divisional Headquarters just prior to their

moving off on the approach march.

ZERO.

ZERO was ordered for 5.25 a.m. on the 12th October.

Approach March and Assembly.

In accordance with instructions issued, Brigadiers made

their own arrangements for the approach march.

Right Brigade.

The first Battalion of the 9th Brigade left CAVALRY FARM

at 6.0 p.m. on the 11th. The operation was successfully carried

out, though rain fell throughout the night rendering the

track east of POTSDAM very difficult. In addition, the Railway

line was heavily shelled and the tape line had disappeared

in places. A considerable number of casualties were suffered.

- 8-

suffered on this portion of the track, as well as on the right

of the Assembly position, near the CEMETERY. Gas shells also

were being used, but no casualties were reported for this period.

The 9th Brigade reported all Battalions in position at 3.0 a.m.

Left Brigade.

The 10th Brigade commenced its approach march at 10.0 p.m.

The vicinity of the track was intermittently shelled with gas

shells and H.E., but few casualties were suffered, except at

D.16.b. where one Battalion was seriously affected. The track

was in good order, so that this Brigade was not so seriously

affected by the weather as was the Right Brigade. At 4.0 a.m.

the assembly was complete.

THE ATTACK.

Right Brigade.

Throughout the advance to the RED line, heavy machine gun

fire was encountered from the the direction of BELLVUE and MEETCHEELE

on the left flank, and from TIBER and TIBER COPSE on the

right.

The enemy put down a heavy 5.9 barrage from the CEMETERY

through the centre of AUGUSTUS WOOD at ZERO plus 8.

Two machine guns were firing from DECLINE COPSE on the

right of the railway embankment. This position was mopped up

as the Battalion advanced.

While digging in on the RED LINE, the Battalion was greatly

harassed by machine gun fire from the railway on the right flank.

A party detailed captured this position.

Casualties were very heavy, especially in Officers. On

this account the advance to the BLUE line was carried out by the

remainder of the two assault Battalions, reinforced later by

the Battalion from the RED LINE. During this advance, the

left flank was badly cut up by machine gun fire from PASSCHENDAELE

and the ground about CREST FARM.

Consolidation was commenced, but it was rendered almost

impossible by machine gun fire from the immediate front and

from the direction of PASSCHENDAELE. The line was also exposed

to direct fire from artillery firing at a range of 500

yards and upwards.

From ZERO hour, touch with the Brigades on the left and

right was lost and could not be re-established. In view of

the fact that the assaulting Battalions were being rapidly

dissipated, the Reserve Battalion of this Brigade was ordered

to dig in on a line slightly in advance of our original line.

On the approach of darkness, the remainder of the assaulting

troops, who had succeeded in reaching the forward objectives,

gradually drifted back to the line so prepared.

Left Brigade.

On account of the sodden and broken nature of the ground,

the going was very heavy. The first objective was gained by

7.0 a.m. in spite of heavy machine gun fire from BELLVUE SPUR

on the left flank. All Battalions had suffered so heavily

from this enfilade fire that it was found impossible to go on.

The remaining portions of the three assaulting Battalions therefore

carried on with the work of consolidation.

-9 -

As the Division on their left had not advanced, touch could

not be obtained, and when later in the day the enemy appeared to

be working in behind their left flank, along BELLEVUE SPUR, the

surviving Officers, after consultation, decided that the position

then reached, which had no field of fire, could not be maintained.

A line was therefore selected, somewhat in advance of the original

line, to which the remainder of the assaulting troops were systematically

withdrawn in small parties and set to work to consolidate.

Touch was thereby regained with the Left Flank Division.

CASUALTIES.

		Off:	O/R.
Assaulting Brigades -	9th A.I. Bde 10th do.	60 41	1308 1053
Reserve Brigade - -	11th do	13	526
Total Casualties for Division, for period 11th-21st. October . .		126	3182.

PRISONERS.

Total prisoners captured by the Division were 16 Officers

and 335 other ranks. The enemy troops captured belonged to the

233rd R.I.R (357th and 358th Pioneer Coys. attached to 233rd

R.I.R.), 449th I.R., 8th JAGER Regiment, including 16th and 24th

JAGER Battalions, and 5th BAVARIAN Reserve Division.

G E N E R A L.

Following are the main features which militated against the

complete success of the operation :-

The approach march was carried out under most trying

conditions, with the result that the strain told on the troops

even before they reached the Tape line.

2. The initial rate of the barrage, due to the necessary

local adjust previously mentioned, was too fast considering the

marshy broken state of the ground and the inclement weather.

The troops were therefore not able to keep up to the barrage,

with the result that the enemy had time to bring his machine

guns to bear after the barrage had passed over.

3. The barrage was reported by both the Infantry taking

part and by an Aeroplane Observer to be very weak.

4. The failure of the Division on our left to take BELLEVUE

SPUR caused almost the whole of our advancing troops to be

exposed to very enfilading machine gun fire from this

flank.

5. To maintain advantages gained under such conditions,

a great deal depended on leaders. Both Brigades suffered very

heavy casualities in Officers and N.C.Os. from the outset.

(Sgd) S. H. JACKSON, Captain

for Lieut.-Colonel, General Staff

PWF

Operations. 12th October 1917

	V.C.	Bar to D.S.O.	D.S.O.	M.C.	Bar to DCM	DCM	Bar to MM	MM.
Divisional Hdqrs				1
Artillery						2		5
Engineers				1		1		8
Signal Coy								5
Pioneer Bn.				2		2		13
A.A.M.C.	1		2	5	1	2		12
23rd M.G. Coy				1				1
Salvage Coy.								1
9th Inf. Bde.
33^rd Bn.				2		1		10
34^thBn	1			2		2		10
35^thBn			1	2		2		11
36^th Bn				3		1		10
9^th M G Coy								2
	1		1	9		6		43
10^th Inf. Bde.
37^thBn				1		1		8
38^th Bn				1		1		11
39^th Bn			1	2		1		10
40^thBn			1	2		1		9
			2	6		4		38
11^th Inf. Bde
41^stBn		1						4
42^nd Bn				1		1		4
43^rdBn								4
44^th Bn			1			1	1	4
11^thM.G. Coy								1
		1	1	1		2	1	17
	2	1	6	26	1	19	1	143
Allotment from Corps		{	40	}	{	25}	{	200}

[[?initials]]

1/11/17

GOC

S E C R E T.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Divisional Headquarters ,

2nd. ~~October~~^November, 1917.

HEADQUARTERS
S.G. 26/576.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

A.Q.,

C.R.A.

C.R.E.

3rd Aust.Div.Sig.Coy.

9th Aust.Inf.Bde

10th -do-

11th -do-

3rd Aust.Pioneer Bn.

D.M.G.O.

23rd A.M.G. Coy.

Training Circular.

As it is very probable that the Division will, at an early

date, be ordered to take over a section of the line, and hold

same defensively, all training and preparations must be at once

undertaken and energetically pushed on. -

2. The training of newly appointed Officers and N.C.Os. in

leadership and to create in them the power of command and a

sense of responsibility is the most pressing outstanding question,

to which all Commanders should address themselves, taking

every opportunity, by means of lectures, classes and practice

in handling bodies of troops, to give them the necesary confidence

in themselves. -

3. The following are some of the principal subjects of training

for the troops which should be at once inaugurated; also

all organisation, within the units, necessary for successful

defensive warfare should be at once completed. -

(a) Instruction in trench defence.

(b) Trench Standing Orders.

arms & equipment; S.A.A. & bomb stores, &c.

(d) Observation and Sniping. - Personnel to be

selected and organized and all special

equipment to be gathered together.

(e) Patrolling; also preparations for patrolling

in snow.

(f) Wiring.

(g) Construction of Vickers & Lewis Gun emplacements.

(h) Use of periscopes; and anti-sniping devices.

(i) Construction and revetting of trenches; repairs.

(*This is GOCs

Copy therefore return to

him.*)

4/11/17 GW

-2-

(j) Construction of kitchens, latrines and dugouts

in trenches.

(k) Anti-gas organization.

(l) Care of feet.

(m) Prevention of leakage of information.

4. In every unit, N.C.Os. and men likely to be competent to

act as foremen of working parties for the construction of defensive

works of all descriptions should be selected; so as

to supplement the numbers of skilled supervisors which can be

provided by the technical troops of the Division.

5. Company Officers should be trained in the principle that

all defensive construction is primarily a Company responsibility,

the technical troops, if any, being provided merely

to give technical advice and supply skilled supervisors. -

Company Officers should be able to draw up Working Party tables,

and know how to organize and turn out Working Parties for a

tour of duty. -

6. The C.R.E. will place at the disposal of each Brigade

instructors in Wiring, and Wiring expedients, including trip

wires and rapid wiring. -

7. Machine Gun Officers and N.C.Os. should be instructed in

the disposition of wire entanglements in relation to the defensive

employment of Vickers Guns. -

8. The Pioneer Battalion will make preparations

for the removal of the workshop to a forward area at short

notice, and will organize so as to be in a position to undertake

for units in the line portable construction work, both

for fighting and for maintenance purposes. - Apart from this

function, the Pioneer Battalion will be employed principally

on the making and maintenance of communications, e.g., duckwalks,

tramways, &c. &c., -

9. The Engineers will be primarily responsible for main -

drainage and for bridging streams and morasses.

10. Close liaison between Artillery and Infantry will be establihsed

at the earliest possible moment. - Infantry Officers

should receive refresher instruction in the principles of calling

for Artillery support, in realtion both to S.O.S. action,

retaliation, counter-battery work, neutralising fire and

harassing fire. -

11. Special attention must be given to anti-aircraft Lewis gun

defence. - At least one Lewis gun team in every Company of all

Infantry and Pioneer Battalions should receive special training

in Anti-aircraft measures.

Geo F. Wieck

Major.

General Staff.

PWP

G.1/386.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

THIRD PHASE - YPRES BATTLE - COMMENCING 4/10/1917.

- - - - - - - -

NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

Reference Maps: 1/40,000, Sheet 28

1/20,000, Sheet 28 N.W.

1/10,000, Sheet 28 N.E.1

1/10,000, Special Sheet, GRAVENSTAFEL.

- - - - - - - -

DISTRIBUTION OF UNITS OF DIVISION.

On the 28 th. September, units of the Division were located

as follows :-

Artillery . . . Reserve Area with H.Q. at

RENINGHELST.

Engineers . . . Field Coys. with Brigade Groups.
Pioneers . . . YPRES South
9th. A. I. Bde . . . WINNEZEELE
10th -do- . . . WINNEZEELE
11th -do- . . . BRANDHOEK No. 3
Field Ambulances . . . With Brigades.

2. TAKING OVER OF LINE & ASSEMBLING OF UNITS IN
DIVISIONAL AREA.
The Division was ordered to take over from the Third
Division by 10.0 a.m. on the 1st October, under arrangements
to be made by the Divisions concerned. The portion of the
line south of ROULERS Railway was then to pass over to the
Second Australian Division.
The task of taking over and adjusting the front line was
allotted to the 9th. A. I. Brigade.
The 10th A. I. Brigade was to go into reserve in YPRES
South Area and VLAMERTINGHE No. 3 Area.
The 9th A. M. G. Coy. and the 23rd A.M.G.Coy. were allotted
to the 9th Brigade and were to be disposed by the
D.M.G.O. after consultation with the G.O.C., 9th Brigade.
The Brigade Group moved up by bus and took over the line
on the night of 29/30th September and 30th Sept/1st October.
The 9th Field Coy. moving up on the 30th September,
remained in the YPRES South area.
The portion of the line south of the Railway was handed
over to the Second Australian Division on the 1st. October.
On the same date, Headquarters of this Division took over
and established itself at the Ramparts, YPRES; command of
the
sector passing over to the G.O.C., at 10.0 a.m.
( 1 )

-2 -
On the 1st October, the 10th Brigade moved by bus to
YPRES South and VLAMERTINGHE No. 3 area (N.9.10.15 and 16 ).
Field Ambulances. Field Ambulances moved into the line
and took over on the 29th and 30th September.
Artillery. Divisional Artillery moved in and took over
from the New Zealand Divisional Artillery on the 30th Sept.

3. PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE OFFENSIVE.
Headquarters of Units.
Divisional Headquarters Advanced - Ramparts, YPRES.

Rear - BRANDHOEK No.2 area.
N.7.c.9.5

Headquarters of Brigades were arranged as follows:-

9th Aust.Inf.Bde Railway, D.26.c.1.3
10th -do- BORRY FARM, D.25.b.6.9
11th -do- D.26.a.7.5. ( KINK CORNER ).

Communications. By the night of the 2nd October,
Divisional Headquarters were connected with Brigades by
buried
cable. Communication forward of Brigades consisted of
ground lines, visual, pigeons and power buzzers.
Supplies.
Ammunition - 18-pdrs & 4.5 Hows. This was drawn
from the dump at I.5.a.30.70 and carried by pack mule to
gun
positions.
S.A.A., Grenades, etc., Dumps were established as
follows: - Rear Divisional Dump at H.7.d.7.0 - Advanced dump
at POTIJZE, I.4.c.2.8.

R.E., Material. Main dump at I.7.b.2.6.

Water. Water filling points were taken over in YPRES.
I.8.b.1.9. and CAMBRIDGE ROAD, I.5.c.5.9. A Divisional
Water Patrol Officer was appointed to supervise all the
water arrangements for men and animals in the Divisional
area.

Rations. In addition to the rations carried on men, one
day's ration was held in the wagon lines. A dump of
specially prepared barrage rations was held in YPRES at
I.8.a.4.8.

Medical.
Regimental Aid Posts . . D.25.b.7.8; D.26.b.2.2
Relay Posts . . . . FROST HOUSE, D.25.a.6.1
BAVARIA HOUSE, C.30.c.6.5.
Advanced Dressing Stations POTIJZE, I.4.a.8.2.
Prison, YPRES, I.7.b..2.1.
Divisional Walking Wounded
Collecting Post . . MILL COT, I.5.a.1.7.

Routes of evacuation.
Stretcher Cases. Stretcher cases were to be evacuated
from Regimental Aid Posts through Relay Posts to FROST
HOUSE and BAVARIA HOUSE: here they were to be placed
on Ford
Motor ambulances or horsed ambulances and conveyed to
advanced
dressing station, POTIJZE, thence by M.A.C. transport to CORPS
main dressing station.

-3-

Walking Cases. Walking cases were to be directed
to MILL COT Walking Wounded Collecting Post, I.5.a.1.7: from
here they were to be entrained and taken by DECAUVILLE
Railway
to CORPS Walking Wounded Collecting Station at The MILL,
VLAMERTINGHE, H.8.a.9.9. If trains were not available, they
were to be sent by bus to VLAMERTINGHE.

In the event of the A.D.S. POTIJZE, being destroyed,
cases were to be sent to Advanced Dressing Station, YPRES.

Straggler Posts.
First Line . . I.5.a.2.7. North end of CAMBRIDGE ROAD.
I.11.b.3.6. Railway, CAMBRIDGE ROAD.

Second Line, . . I.7.a.6.3. Bridge 9: I.7.c.4.7. Bridge 10
YPRES I.13.a.7.3. " 13: I.8.b.1.1. MENIN ROAD
I.8.b.1.8. THOUROUT: I.8.a.4.8. NORTH GATE.

Straggler Collecting I.7.b.2.1. Prison, YPRES.
Station.

Prisoners of War. Collecting stations were established
at MILL COT and RAILWAY ROAD, from which places
prisoners were
transferred to Divisional Cage at Prison, YPRES, at this place
the prisoners were examined for purposes of identification.

Details Camps. Transport Lines and Details Camps of
Brigades were established as follows :-

9th. Aust. Inf. Bde. . . C.12.d.4.2
10th -do- . . H.16.central
11th -do- . . H.8.d.1.8

4. ORGANISATION OF UNITS FOR THE OFFENSIVE.
Brigades were organised with the following approximate
fighting strength -

9th. Aust. Inf. Bde. . . 89 Off: 2430 O/Ranks
10th -do- . . 79 " 2100 "
11th -do- . . 95 " 2280 "

Trench Mortar Batteries were left at the disposal of the
Brigade Commanders.

Sixty four machine guns were available. Eight guns were
allotted to each of the 10th and 11th Brigades for purposes
of consolidation - the remainder being left in the hands of
the D.M.G.O. for barrage work.

Engineers. One hundred men from the Infantry were
attached to each Field Coy.

A.A.M.C. A total of 60 Infantrymen were attached to
the A.A.M.C. as extra stretcher bearers.

5. OCCUPATION OF BATTLE POSITIONS.
On the 2nd October, "A" and "B" Battalions of the 10th.
Brigade moved through YPRES to bivouac in the area I.4.c.,
and on the afternoon of the 3rd. were joined by the remainder
of the Brigade.

-4-
The 11th Brigade moved by train from BRANDHOEK No. 3 area
to the Asylum, West of YPRES, and from there ^∧marched
through YPRES to
the area I.9.a. and c. - "A" and "B" Battalions moving on the
2nd. and "C" on the 3rd.

On the morning of the 3rd., the Field Ambulance had taken
up battle positions.

Field Coys. and the Pioneer Battalion remained in YPRES
and YPRES South area.

6. REVIEW OF SITUATION AT 6.0 p.m. ON 3rd OCTOBER.
Both Brigades, by moving earlier through YPRES, had secured
a clear passage for the approach march.

Two tracks for the 11th Brigade and one for the 10th. had
been prepared and marked by the Pioneers from their
Assembly
areas up to the Tape line.

The Tape line had been laid out from D.21.d.20.10 to read
intersection at D.20.b.80.95. A careful reconnaissance of
the
area and the tracks up to the Tape line had been carried out
by a large number of Officers and N.C.Os. of both attacking
Brigades.

All arrangements were now complete, and Brigades were
ready to move.

7. INFORMATION.
Enemy Shell Fire. Observation during the few previous days
had shown that the enemy was in the habit of shelling the -
ZONNEBEKE, which was practically impassable, except where
it
was thought that he might put down a barrage
in this vicinity at the commencement of the operations.

System of holding the line. The enemy appeared to be
holding a seriesx of strong points (mainly "pill-boxes"
containing machine guns), with a shell-hole crater defence
between. The strongest of these seemed to be WINDMILL
CABARET
with JACOBS COTTAGES, 21.a.central, ALMA, SPRINGFIELD,
BORDEAUX FARM, BEECHAM, HAMBURG and DAB TRENCH.

On account of their ~~vicinity~~ proximity to our front line,
the buildings near the station at D.21.d.55.45 had not been
dealt with by "Heavies".

In addition, it was considered probable that the enemy
had made use of the embankments and cuttings on the
railway
in order to build emplacements.

Good protection for the construction of dugouts was open
to the enemy on the road running N.W. and S.E. through
DASH
CROSSING.

Terrain. The ground about D.15.d. was very wet & heavy.
This was also the case in D.22.b. The remainder of the ground
to be covered, though badly cut up, was not considered a
difficult obstacle.

Wire. It was not anticipated that wire in any great
quantity would be would be met with, except, possibly,
immediately
West of DAB TRENCH.

-5-

8. DIVISIONAL TASK.
The Division was to capture the area up to the BLUE Line,
D.10.d.30.00; D.16.b.60.70; D.17.a.00.18; D.17.a.15.00;
D.17.c.70.00; D.22.a.58.78. - which was to be consolidated
with a view to a further advance.

The flanks of our advance were :- on the right D.21.d.00.00
D.22.c.70.95. cross-roads D.23.a.4065 - and on the left -
D.21.a.00.80; D.15.b.80.00; D.16.b.00.80.

The railway line was made inclusive to this Division.

Flank Divisions. The Second Australian Division was
operating on our right flank, and the New Zealand Division
on our left.

9. PLAN OF OPERATIONS.
It was decided to carry out the attack with the 11th.
Brigade on the right, and the 10th Brigade on the left; the
9th Brigade being in reserve. A line, from D.21.a.56.00
through point D.17.c.20,93 on the final objective, was made
the dividing line between Brigades.

Two lines were to be consolidated, viz., the BLUE Line
and a Support Line through D.16.a.65.55. D.16.b.00.25. D.16.b.32.00. D.17.c.00.45. D.17.d.50.00 and D.23.a.58.72.

Latitude with regard to the exact siting of these lines
was allowed in order that the best field of fire might be
obtained, but at the same time regularity of trace was
required in order that a good jumping-off position for a
further advance might be obtained.

Strong points were to be constructed by parties of the
Engineers for use by Infantry and Machine Guns. On the
Right Brigade sector it was arranged that these strong points
should be constructed on the top of the BROODSEINDE edge
of
the PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE, and one at the Railway Crossing
in
D.17.c. The G.O.C. 10th Brigade was to arrange for strong
points, as necessary, in the Left Brigade sector.

One Company of the Pioneer Battalion was detailed to dig
a communication trenches from the BLUE Line to the rear of
the RIDGE.

If the front line were broken at any point, the troops
in the support line were to be prepared to move forward and
re-establish the line. Troops further back were to be
prepared to replace those from the support line who had gone
forward.

It was arranged that two Battalions only of each Brigade
should move at ZERO, the remaining two taking advantage
of
any slackening of the enemy barrage to move as ordered by
the
Brigadier concerned. Care was to be taken that they were
up in time to leap-frog through at the long halt of the barrage.

Barrages. Five barrages, 200 yards apart, were arranged:-

"A" Barrage . . . 18-pdrs
"B" " . . . 4.5 Hows. and 15-pdrs.
"C" " . . . Machine Guns
"D" " . . . 6" Hows.
"E" " . . . 8", 9.2" and 60-pdrs.

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