General Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 17, 1 November 1917 - 13 January 1918, Part 2

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Open to contributions
Accession number:
RCDIG0000625
Difficulty:

Page 1 / 11

nachine Suns The guns in the hands of the D.M.G.O. were formed into twe barrages, each barrage grouped into 8-gun batteries, each pair of batteries commanded by the senior officer. These guns were organised as followe : - .th A.M.G.Coy. eguns No. 1 Barrage do 10th a is do 23rd 16 guns 1Ith A.M.G.Coy No. 3 Barrage ie ao 23rd The guns were to be placed in positions as follows : D.16.d.2.6 (1) One Battery D.16.4.70.25 ao D.15.b. 70.40 ao D.15.b.50.50. One Battery at about D.S.d..2 (2) 1lth A.M.G. Coy. D.12.s.10.85 a D.12.c.35.15 a z3rd 4o. do ao D.12...4.7. The o.c. of the 1lth A.M.G. Coy. arranged to move his guns The 23rd A.M.G.Coy. had forward clese behind the Infantry. instructions to cease fire in first barrage at ZKRO plus 3 hre and move forward to the second barrage position. Engineere. Engineers, less those used by Erigades for construetion of strong pointe, were in the hande of the C.R.E. and were to be engaged on the construction and making of tracks and the improvo- ment of roads. Pioneere. Two Coys. of Pioncers were allotted to the C.R.A. for the construction and maintenance of artillery roads; the remainder worked with the Engineers under the orders of the C.R.E. orndirjoss. Synchronisation of Watches. Watches were synchronised twice daily with CORPS and with Brigades by an Officer from Divisional Headquartere, who took The watches of the his watch around to Headquarters of Units. Battalions taking part in the attack were also synchronised by a staff Officer from Divisional Headquarters just prior to their moving off on the approsch march. LERO ZXRO was ordered for 5.25 a.m. on the 12th October. Approach March and Assombly In accordance with instruotions issued, Brigadiers made their own arrangements for the approach march. Rigkt Brigede. The first Battalion of the 9th Brigade left CAVALRY FARM at é.o p.m. on the Ilth. The operation was successfully car ried out, though rain fell throughout the night rendering the track cast of POTSDAM very difficult. In addition, the Rail¬ way line was heavily shelled and the tape line had disappeared in places. A considerable number of casualties were suffered
suffered on this portion of the trock, as well as on the right of the Assembly position, noar the CEMETERY. Gas shells also were being used, but no casualties wore reported for this period. The 9th Brigade reported all Battalions in position at 3.0 a.m. Left Brigade. The I0th Brigade commenced its approach march at 10.0 p.m. The vieinity of the track was intermittently shelled with gas shells and H.E., but few casualties were suffered, except at D.16.b. where one Battalion was seriously effected. The track was in good order, so that this Brigade was not so seriously affected by the weather as was the Right Brigade. At 4.0 a.m. the assembly was complete. uns irtok. Right Brigade Throughout the advance to the RED line, heavy machine gun fire was encountered from the direetion of BELLEVJE and MEET CHEELE on the left flank, and from TIBER and TIBER COPSE on the right. The enemy put down a heavy 5." barrage from the CEMETERY through the centre of AUCUSTUS wOOD at ZER0 plus 8. Twe machine gune were firing from DECLINE COPSE on the right of the railway embankment. This position was mepped up as the Battalion advanced. While digging in on the KED LINE, the Battalion was greatly harassed by machine gun fire from the railway on the right flank. A party detailed captured this position. Casualties were very heavy, especially in Officers. this account the advance to the BLUE line was carried out by the remainder of the two asssult Battalions, reinforced later by the Battalion from the RED LINE. During this advanee, the left flank was badly out up by machine gun fire from PASSCHEN- DAELE and the ground about CREST FARM. Consolidation was commenced, but it was rendered almost impossible by machine gun fire from the immediate front and from the direction of PASSCHENDAELE. The line was also ex- posed to direct fire from artillery firing at e range of 500 yards and upwards. From ZERO hour, touch with the Brigades on the left and right was loet and could not be re-established. In view of the faet that the assaulting Battalions were being rapidly dissipated, the Recerve Battalion of this Brigade was ordered to dig in en e line slightly in advance of our original line. On the approach of darkness, the remainder of the assaulting troope, who had cucceeded in reachirg the forward objectives, gradually drifted back to the line so prepared. Left Brigade. On account of the codden and broken nature of the ground, the geing wae very heavy. The first objective was gained by 7.O a.m. in spite of heavy machine gun fire from BELLEVUE SPUR on the left flank. All Battalions had suffered so heavily from this enfilade fire that it was found impossible to go on. The remaining portions of the three assaulting Battalions there- fore carried on with the work of consolidation.
As the Division on their left had not advanced, touch could not be obtained, and when later in the day the enemy appeared to be working in behind their left flank, along BELLEVUE SPUR, the surviving Officers, after consultation, decided that the position then reached, which had no field of fire, could not be maintained. A line was therefore seleoted, somewhat in advance of the original line, to which the remeinder of the assaulting troops were sys- tematically withdrawn in small parties and set to work to con- solidate. Touch was thereby regained with the Left Flank Divi- sion. SAbpk TES. 2o Asssulting Brigades 9th A. I. Ede 3 do. 1053 loth 13 Reserve Brigade 11th a 526 Total Casualties for Division 126 3182. for peried Ilth-Zlst. October ralsonake Total prisoners captured by the Division were lé Officers and 335 other ranks. The enemy troops captured belonged to the 233rd R.I.R. (357th and 358th Pioneer Coye. attached to 233rd R.I.R.). 449th I.R., Sth JAGER Regiment, including l6th and 2eth JAcER Battalions, and 5th BAVARLAN Reserve Division. eEMER AL. Following are the main features which militated against the complete suocess of the operation : The approach march was carried out under most trying 1. conditions, with the result that the strain told on the troops even before they reached the Tape line. The initial rato of the barrage, due to the necessary 2. local adjust proviously mentioned, was too fast considering the marshy broken state of the ground and the inclement weather. The troope were therefore not able to keep up to the barrage, with the result that the enemy had time to bring his machine guns to bear after the barrage had passed over. The barrage was reported by both the Infantry taking part and by an Aeroplane Observer to be very weak. The failure of the Division on our left to take BELLE 4. VUE sPUR caused almost the whole of our advancing troops to be exposed to very heavy enfilading machine gun fire from this flaak. To maintain advantages gained under such conditions, 5. Both Brigades suffered very a great deal depended on leaders. heavy casualties in Officers and N.C.Os. from the outset. (sgd) s. H. JACKsON. Captain for Lieut.-Colonel, General staff Pür
Bin Art Gar Se a 33 Sa Ofaurntwad Dar to Vo Dsa Idgr Gy 7. Bde 3n o 3n ded 3n - Bn aBw Bu MG.Cary Allotment fromlops DCO ! 4o ! 26 A deloher 19! 2wt Ba V e em eo o 7 13 2 17 2 10 7 1o 7 "1 9 43 "! 10 4 34 4 4 4 4 7 19 143 75 200
SBCR BT. THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISLON. Divisional Headquartere, November Znd. Oatche, 1917. A.0. C.R.A. C.R.E. üUART 3rd Aust.Div.Sig.Ooy. 9th Aust. Inf. Bde S.G. 26/576. -do- 10th -do- 1th GS te teus 3rd Aust. Pioncer Bn. D.M.G.O. 23rd A.M.G. Coy. Training Gireulaf. As it is very probable that the Division will, at an early date, be ordered to take over a seotion of the line, and hold same defensively, all training and preparations must be at onoe undertaken and energetically pushed on. The training of newly appointed Officers and N.C.Os. in leadership and to create in them the power of command and a sense of responsibility is the most pressing outstanding ques- tion, to which all Commanders should address themselves, taking every opportunity, by means of lectures, classes and practice in handling bodies of troops, to give them the necessary confi- dence in themselves. The following are some of the principal subjects of train¬ ing for the troops which should be at once inaugurated; also all organization, within the units, necessary for successful defensive warfare should be at once completed: (a) Instrustion in trench defenee. 1b) Trench Standing ordere. Trench Routine; trench inspeotions; care of (d) arme & equipment: S.A.A. £ bomb stores, 4o. observation and Sniping. - Personnel to be d) selected and organized and all special equipment to be gathered together. Patrolling; also preparations for patrolling (.) in snow. Wiring. inl Construction of Vickers & Lewis Gun emplacemente. 18) Ih) Use of periscopes; and anti-sniping devioes. 1i) Construction and revetting of trenches; repairs. i A 84
10. 11. Construction of kitohene, letginascand dogoua () in trenchas. Anti-gas organization. ik) Care of feet. ) Prevention of leskage of information. (m) In every unit, N.C.Os. and men likely to be competent to sot as foremen of working parties for the construction of de- fensive works of all deseriptions should be selected; so as to supplement the numbers of skilled supervisors which can be provided by the technical troops of the Division. Company Officers should be trained in the principle that all defensive construotion is primarily a Company responsi- bility, the technical troops, if any, being provided merely to give technical advioe and supply skilled supervisors. Company Officers should be able to draw up Working rarty tables, and know how to organize and turn out Working Parties for a tour of duty. The C.R.E. will place at the disposal of each Brigade instructors in Wiring, and Wiring expedients, including trip wires and rapid wiring. Machine Gun Officers and N.C.Os. should be instruoted in the dispositien of wire entanglements in relation to the defen- sive employment of Vickers Guns.- preperstions The Pioneer Battalion will make for the removal of the workshop to a forward area at short notice, and will organize so as to be in e position to under- take for units in the line portable constructional work, both for fighting and for maintenance purposes. - Apart from this function, the Pioneer Battalion will be employed principally on the making and meintenance of communicatione, e.g., duok- walke, tramways, &o. £o., The Engineers will be primarily responsible for main - drainage and for bridging streams and morasses. Close liaison between Artillery and Infantry will be es¬ Infantry Officers tablished at the earliest possible moment. - should receive refresher instruotion in the principles of call¬ ing for Artillery support, in realtion both to S.O.S. action, retaliation, counter-battery work, neutralising fire and harassing fire. Special attention must be given to anti-aircraft Lewis gun defence. - At least one Lewis gun team in every Company of all Infantry and Pioneer Battalions should receive special training in Anti-airoraft measures. Mit irh Major. General Staff. PWP
G.1/386. THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION. TIRD PHASE - YPRES BATTLE - COMMENCING 4/10/1917. NARRATIVE OF OFERATIONS. 1/40,000, Sheet 28 Reference Maps: Sheet 28 N.W. 1/20,000. Sheet 28 N.E.1 1/10,000. 1/10,000, Special Sheet, GRAVENSTAFEL. DISTRIBUTION OF UNITS OF DIVISION. 1. On the 28th. September, units of the Division were located as follows: Reserve Area with H.Q. at Artillery RENINGHELST. Field Coys. with Brigade Groups. Engineers ... YPRES South Pioneers INNEZEELE sth. A. I. Bd. WINNEZEELE 10th-do- ... 1lth -do- ... BRANDHOEK No. 3 With Brigades. Field Ambulances. TAKING OVER OF LINE à ASSEMSLING OF UNITS IN 2. DIVISIORAL I9RR. The Division was ordered to tako over from the Third Division by 10.0 a.m. on the lst October, under arrangements The portion of the to be made by the Divisions concerned. line south of ROULERS Railway was then to pass over to the Second Australian Division. The task of taking over and adjusting the front line was allotted to the 9th. A. I. Brigade. The 10th A. I. Brigade was to go into reserve in YPRES South Area and VLAMERTINCHE No. 3 Area. The 9th A. M. G. Coy. and the 23rd A.M.G. Coy. were al¬ lotted to the 9th Brigade and were to be disposed by the D.M.G.O. after consultation with the G.O.C., oth Brigade. The Brigade Group moved up by bus and took over the line on the night of 29/30th September and 30th Sept/lst October. ie 9th Field Coy. moving up on the 30th September, re- mained in the YPRES South area. The portion of the line south of the Railway was handed over to the Second Australian Division on the lst. October. On the same date, Headquarters of this Division took over and established itself at the Ramparts, YPRES; command of the sector passing over to the G.O.C., at 10.0 a.m. )
On the lst October, the 1Oth Brigade moved by bus to YPRES South and VLAMERTINCHE No. 3 area (H.9,10,15 and 16). Field Ambulances. Field Ambulances moved into the line and took over on the 29th and 30th September. Divisional Artillery moved in and took over Artillery from the New Zealand Divisional Artillery on the 30th Sept., PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMNNTS FOR THE OFFENSIVE Headquarters of Units. Advanced - Ramparts, YPRES. Divisional Headquarters Rear - BRANDHOEK No.2 area H.7.c.5.5 Headquarters of Brigades were arranged as follows:- Railway, D.26.c.1.3 ... eth Aust. Inf. Bde BORRY FARM, D.25.b.6.9 -do- ... 10th D. 26.d.7.5. (KIXX CORNER). 11th -do- ... By the night of the 2nd October, Divi- Communications. sional Headquarters were connected with Brigades by buried Communication forward of Brigades consisted of cable. ground lines, visual, pigeons and power buzzers. Supplies. drs & 4.5 Hows. This was drawn Ammunition - 1 from the dump at I.5.a.30.70 and carried by pack mule to gun positions. Dumps were established as S.A.A., Grenades, etc., Rear Divisional Dump at H.7.d.7.0 - Advanced dump follows: - at POTIJZE, I.4.e.Z.8. R.E., Material. Main dump at I.7.b.2.6. Water filling points were taken over in YPRES, Water. I.8.b.1.3, and CAMBRIDGE ROAD, I.5.c.5.9. A Divisional Water Patrol Officer was appointed to supervise all the water arrangements for men and animals in the Divisional ares. Rations. In addition to the rations carried on men, one A dump of spec¬ day's ration was held in the wagon lines. ially prepared barrage rations was held in YPRES at I.8.a.4.8. Medical. D.25.b. 7.8; D.26.b.2.2 Regimental Aid Posts FROST HOUSE, D.25.a.6.1 Relay Posts BAVARLA HOUSE, C.30.c.6.5 POTIJZE, I.4.a.8.2 Advanced Dressing Stations Prison, YPRES, I.7.b.2.1. Divisional Walking Wounded MILL COT, I.5.a.1.7. Collecting Post Routes of evacuation. Stretcher cases were to be evacua Stretcher Gases. ted from Regimental Aid Posts through Relay Posts to FROST here they were to be placed on Ford HOUSE and BAVARLA HOUSE: Motor ambulances or horsed ambulances and conveyed to advanced dressing station, POTIJZE, thence by M.A.C. transport to CORPS mein dressing station.
Walking eases were to be direeted Walking Cases. to MILL cOT Walking Wounded Colleeting Post, I.5.a.1.7: from here they were to be entrained and taken by DECAUVILLE Railway to CORPS Walking Wounded Collecting Station et The MILL, VLAMERTINCHE, H.8.a.9.9. If trains were not available, they were to be sent by bus to VLAMERTINGHE. In the event of the A.D.s. POTlJZE, being destroyed, cases were to be sent to Advanced Dressing station, YPRES. Straggler Poste. I.5.a.2.7, North end of CAMBRIDGE ROAD. First Line .. I.11.b. 3.6, Railway, CAMBRIDGE ROAD. I.7.a.6.3, Bridge 9; I.7.c.4.7, Bridge 10 Second Line, YPRES 13; I.8.b.1.1,MENIN ROAD I.13.a.7.3. I.8.b.1.8.THOUROUT; I.8.a.4.8,NORTH GA Straggler Colleeting I.7.b. 2.1, Prison, YPRES. Station. Prisoners of War. Colleeting stations were established at MILL COT and RAILWAY WOOD, from which places prisoners were transferred to Divisional Cage at Prison, YPRES: at this place the prisoners were examined for purposes of identifieation. Details Camps. Transport Lines and Details Camps of Brigades were established as follows: sth. Aust. Inf. Bde G.12.d.4.2 -do- 10th H.16.central -do- 11th H.8.d.1.8 ORGANISATION OF UNITS FOR THE OFFENSIVE. Brigades were organised with the following approximate fighting strength- 9th. Aust. Inf. Bde 89 off: 2430 0/Ranks .. -do- 79 " 10th 2100 95 " 2280 " 1lth-do- Trench Mortar Batteries were left at the disposal of the Brigade Commanders. Sixtyfour machine guns were available. Eight guns were allotted to each of the lOth and 11th Brigades for purposes of consolidation - the remainder being left in the hands of the D.M.G.O. for barrage work. Engineers. One hundred men from the Infantry were at tached to cach Field Coy. A total of 60 Infantrymen were attached to A.A.M.O. the A.A.M.C. as extra streteher bearers. OCCUPATION OF BATTLE POSITIONS. 5. On the 2nd October, "A" and "B" Battalions of the lOth. Brigade moved through YPRES to bivouae in the ares I.4.c., and on the afternoon of the 3rd. were joined by the remainder of the Brigade.
mavchact The 11th Brigade moved by train from BRANDHOEK No. 3 area to the Asylum, West of YPRES, and from there'through YPRES to "A" and "B" Battalions moving on the the area I.9.a. and e. - 2nd. and "C" and "D" on the 3rd. On the morning of the 3rd., the Field Ambulances had taken up battle positions. Field Coys. and the Pioncer Battalion remained in YPRES and YPRES South area. REVIEW OF SITUATION AT 6.0 p.m. ON 3rd OCTOBER. Both Brigades, by moving earlier through YPRES, had secured a clear passage for the approach march. Two tracks for the Ilth Brigade and one for the lOth. had been prepared and marked by the Pioneers from their Ässembly areas up to the Tape line. The Tape line had been laid out from D.21.d.20.10 to road A careful reconnaissance of the interseetion at D.20.b.80.95. area and the tracks up to the Tape line had been carried out by a large number of Officers and N.C.Os. of both attacking Brigades. All arrangements were now complete, and Brigades were ready to move. IANOmMMANIOR. 7. Enemy Shell Fire. Observation during the few previous days had shown that the enemy was in the habit of shelling the ZONNEBEKE, which was practically impassable, except where it was bridged; it was thought that he might put down a barrage in this vicinity at the commencement of the operations. The enemy appeared to be System of holding the line. holding a seriesx of strong points (mainly "pill-boxes" con¬ taining machine guns), with a shell-hole crater defence be- The strongest of these seemed to be WINDMILL CABARET tween. with JACOBS COTTAGES, Zl.a. central, ALMA, SPRINGFIELD, BOR- DEAUX FARM, BEECHAM, HAMBURG and DAB TRENCH. On account of their proximity to our front line, the buildings near the station at D.21.d.55.45 had not been dealt with by "Heavies" In addition, it was considered probable that the enemy had made use of the embankments and euttings on the railway in order to build emplacements. Good protection for the construction of dugouts was open to the enemy on the road running N.W. and s.E. through DASH CROSSING. The ground about D.15.d. was very wet a heavy. Rerrsin. The remainder of the ground This was also the case in D.22.b. to be covered, though badly cut up, was not considered a diffi- cult obstacle. It was not anticipated that wire in any great Wire. quantity would be met with, except, possibly, immediately West of DAB TRENCH.
DIVISIONAL TASK. The Division was to capture the area up to the BLUE Line, D.10.d.30.00; D.16.b. 60.70; D.17.4.00.18; D.17.a.15.00; D.17.c.70.00; D.22.a.68.78. - which was to be consolidated with a view to a further advance. The flanks of our advance were :- on the right, D.21.d.00.00 D. 22.0. 70.95, cross-roads D.23.a.40.65 - and on the left D. 21.a.00.80; D.15.b.80.00; D.16.b.00.80. The railway line was made inclusive to this Division. The Second Australian Division was Flank Divisions. operating on our right flank, and the New Zealand Division on our left. PLAN OF OPERATIONS. .. It was decided to carry out the attack with the Ilth. Brigade on the right, and the 10th Brigade on the left; the A line, from D.21.a.56.00 9th Brigade being in reserve. through point D.17.0.20.93 on the final objective, was made the dividing line between Brigades. Two lines were to be consolidated, viz., the BLUE Line and a Suppert Line through D.16.a.65.55, D.16.b.00.25 D.16.b. 32.00. D.17.e.00.45. D.17.4.50.00 and D.23.a.58.72. Latitude with regard to the exaet siting of these lines was allowed in order that the best field of fire might be obtained, but at the same time regularity of trace was re¬ quired in order that a good jumping-off position for a fur- ther advance might be obtained. Strong points were to be construeted by parties of the On the Engineers for use by Infantry and Machine Guns. Right Brigade sector it was arranged that these strong points should be constructed on the top of the BROODSEINDE odge of the PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE, and one at the Railway Crossing in The G.O.C. lOth Brigade was to arrange for strong D.17.e. pointe, as necessary, in the Left Brigade seetor. One Company of the Pioncer Battalion was detailed to dig communication trenches from the BLUE Line to the rear of the RIDGE. If the front line were broken at any point, the troops in the support line were to be prepared to move forward and Troops further back were to be pre- re-establish the line. pared to replace those from the support line who had gone forward. It was arranged that two Battalions only of each Brigade should move at ZERO, the remaining two taking advantage of any slackening of the enemy barrage to move as ordered by the Care was to be taken that they were Brigadier concerned. up in time to leap-frog through at the long halt of the barrage. Barrages. Five barrages, 200 yards apart, were erranged:- siv Barrzge 18-pdre 4.5 Hows. and 18-pdrs. ... "" Machine Guns ... ape 6" Hows. "E" 8", 9.2" and 60-pdrs. ...

-7 -

Machine Guns.

The guns in the hands of the D.M.G.O. were formed into

two barrages, each barrage grouped into 8-gun batteries, each

pair of batteries commanded by the senior officer.

These guns were organised as follows :-

No. 1 Barrage  - 9th A.M.G.Coy. 8 guns
  10th      do 8  do
  23rd      do 16 do
No. 2 Barrage -  11th A.M.G.Coy. 16 guns
  23rd       do 16  do

The guns were to be placed in positions as follows :-

(1) One Battery - D.16.d.2.6

              do          - D.16.a.70.25

              do          - D.15.b.70.40

              do          - D.15.b.50.50.

(2) 11th A.M.G. Coy. One Battery at about D.5.d.9.2

                                            do              do         D.12.a.10.85

      23rd           do.             do              do         D.12.c.35.15

                                            do              do         D.12.c.4.7

The O.C. of the 11th A.M.G. Coy. arranged to move his guns

forward close behind the Infantry. The 23rd A.M.G.Coy. had

instructions to cease fire in first barrage at ZERO plus 3 hrs

and move forward to the second barrage position.

Engineers.

Engineers, less those used by Brigades for construction of

strong points, were in the hands of the C.R.E. and were to be 

engaged on the construction and making of tracks and the improvement

of roads.

Pioneers.

Two Coys. of Pioneers were allotted to the C.R.A. for the 

construction and maintenance of artillery roads; the remainder

worked with the Engineers under the orders of the C.R.E.

OPERATIONS.

Synchronisation of Watches.

Watches were synchronised twice daily with CORPS and with

Brigades by an Officer from Divisional Headquarters, who took

his watch around to Headquarters of Units. The watches of the

Battalions taking part in the attack were also synchronised by

a Staff Officer from Divisional Headquarters just prior to their

moving off on the approach march.

ZERO.

ZERO was ordered for 5.25 a.m. on the 12th October.

Approach March and Assembly.

In accordance with instructions issued, Brigadiers made

their own arrangements for the approach march.

Right Brigade.

The first Battalion of the 9th Brigade left CAVALRY FARM

at 6.0 p.m. on the 11th. The operation was successfully carried

out, though rain fell throughout the night rendering the

track east of POTSDAM very difficult. In addition, the Railway

line was heavily shelled and the tape line had disappeared

in places. A considerable number of casualties were suffered.

 

- 8-

suffered on this portion of the track, as well as on the right 

of the Assembly position, near the CEMETERY.  Gas shells also 

were being used, but no casualties were reported for this period. 

The 9th Brigade reported all Battalions in position at 3.0 a.m.

 

Left Brigade

The 10th Brigade commenced its approach march at 10.0 p.m.

The vicinity of the track was intermittently shelled with gas

shells and H.E., but few casualties were suffered, except at

D.16.b. where one Battalion was seriously affected. The track

was in good order, so that this Brigade was not so seriously 

affected by the weather as was the Right Brigade. At 4.0 a.m.

the assembly was complete

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

      

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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