Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 6, 10 June - 12 July 1915, Part 7

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Finalised
Accession number:
RCDIG0000590
Difficulty:
3

Page 1 / 10

AU. .Te Aeanmness and Eidiness of the trenonss Learss a Great seal to be desired in many cases. Because we are on Active Serme and fighting, there is no reason for any relaxation in these matters, and, from both a sanitary and disciplinary point of view, Trench Discipline is most importaht. It is just as easy for a man to fold his overcoat, waterproof sheet, and other gear, etc., and put it somewhere where it is out of the way, as to leave it kicking about somewhere in the trench, as is so often the case. Rifles and accoutrements are frequently kicking about in the botton of the trench, and this must be stopped at once. The necessity for niches, or improvised racks, for the rifles has already been brought to notice, and they must be provided. A strict order must be given against any accoutrements, or clothing of any kind, being left lying on the floor of the trench. 6. In some rases, where no enfilade fire is to be expected, the trenches might be slightly widened, just enough to allow two men to pass. This should hx only be done with the greatest caution, and must be accompanied with ample depth in proportion, and the General Officer Commanding only wishes to see it in cases where it can quite safely be done. 7. All mines and maps should be given consequtive numbers in each post, and a good-sized notice board, with the number clearly and tidily painted on it in large letters - not scrawled on anyhow, in pencil - should be placed on the mouth of it. 8. Each Post Commander should always have a plan of all trenches, works, saps, etc., of his post with him, and a fresh plan should be prepared whenever necessary, and additions shown nnnryxday by day, so that anybody visiting the post can see at a glance from I the progress of all work, and what is being done. The enemy’'s trenches should always be shown on this as far as possible. 9. A very good idea which the General Officer Commanding has seen in some of the trenches of the Australlan Division, is to have the various posts occupied during the day in the trenches marked as sentry posts. If this system is carried out, orders for the sentt ries are required.
10 in come posts the Ceneral Officer, Commanding has found that Ketlaite alem aignale here not been arrenget. 11. The exact garrison for each section of a trench has not always been laid down. 12. Though there is a marked improvement in the interest taken by subordinate commanders in their trenches, the General Officer still Commanding has) found that in some cases platoon commanders have not been given a definite respensibility for definite sections of the trench, and have not understood that their business is not only to put their men into the trench, but also to be perpetually repairing and impreving it. 13. Reports from the trenches are not as frequent as they should be, and platoon and company commanders do not take all the opportun- ity they might, of acquiring information about the enemy and their front, and the direction of his saps and other works. 14. The written records which should be kept by picked observers are generally conspicuous by their absence. 15. Pickets are not sufficiently used in all cases in front of the trenches, and in the cullytes. 16. Nore notice boards, cjearjy prifted and painted, are required, to show the direction of all trenches, and where they lead to, and these should have a permanent direction on them, and not the name of some unit which will probably be relieved in the course of a few days. Anyone should be able to visit the trenches and walk abo ut them, by means of the signboards, without having to ask the way from anybody. 17. The General Officer Commanding is very slad to find that the bomb throwing is se much on the impreve, and that in this respect, as well as in the sniping, we are in a fair way to acquire a definit ascendancy ever the enemy. It should be a golden rule that for every bonb thrown by the enemy, at least two, or, 1f possible, three should be sent in reply- not at, but into, his trench. This should be quite possible of attaiment by means of regular practice, bomb throwing competitions, and the use of trained bomb throwers; bombs are scarce, and we cannot afford to waste any on bad shots. mune Naser. General Staff New Zealand and Australian Division
0N ME PONN Army Form C. EI2L. 10. Of MCCARE MESSAGES AND SIGNALS. ChaSE Norte Recd. a1. This message is on a/c of: OeNSIT S SeHISE MSEO SOrE Date DorviCe At I. From To. By SATTNEOI FPMIINS ORIIT B anndemn T0 Dr N.2JA FSertetsHinber LaTest to Niner AAA 28 Major DN. Edmunds 13-Battalion has reported to CON.3 Section in purin ance of W.2.A. 966, to tmporarily com- mand the mining parties. It is hoped owever that this arrangement will be very emporary & that thi orficer can soon be relieved to retur to ti Battalion, as he s the Senior Company Commanter of the Battslion, & only young and nefferi- sucad officer ard left with his Company Dounmonash Col aneine e ne C 241 Ano Eny. Bde 100 Monach (4/ Aust 2f. Bye) m Mace Reserve fully Time 7658 The above may be forwarded as now corrected. (2) SETTTTE-TTRTHIEMVIOI NIETK MIISTHES DISFF MK WLSVINE CoOI This line should be erased if not required.
T. POR Army Form C. 2121. MESSAGES AND SIGNALS. No. of Message. Words PreHN Code Charge This message is on a/c of: Recd. at. Office of Origin & Service Instructions. Sent. Date Service From By (Signature of Franking Officer) 70 Heenash Cob sender's Number. Day of Month. - AAA 21/6/15 Sen Godly hes directed we to forward this cake you made by Lety Godley cmunnantdmmundmn Aesxandria From Place Time The above may be forwarded as now corrected. Sandersont AD.C. Censor. Signature of Addressor or person authorized to telegraph in his name. This line should be crased if not required.
JATH BATT. AUST. IMPERIAL FORCE ORA ET LASORAN The Commanding Officer + officers of the 14th Battalion, AI, & desire to congratalate you on the anniersary of your birth- day Our earnest wish is that you may be spared to the Brigade which you now have the honor to command and that your future may be a happy one. Reseove Gully 26x 6915. Pallipoli Senincala
olonee Monash OD Bngadier & InfBde JDAOT LAIRAGMLTUA TTAS ATD GAnOGAS TY ANO
nad 20162 Dear Col Monash The bear & M. Manhews is well known to me, a sfellore "Civil servant I know his father well. If you can assist him to get or Commission in your Krfade I would take it as a Nersonal favor - Transkor thai - bould sot him hert Kind refads Marhell KcHe OC104 EMOF
2/6/15 3 Bede Hrm Col. A.M.S. W.F. Wathew Rosenthesl from S. Anat Auto reavod 15 Ki Fo Jr Fild Art sre to A.M.S. 34th Wathe tS.A.
Rendserver Fourth Australian Infantry Erigade, Dot Ct to sand, 1sis. Noo soaland & Australian Mvision, ORGANIEATION OF BOND OFTRYSIVE, wth reference to N.E.A. 103 of s0/8/1s, directing . report on a series ofs questions set out, on above subject, 1 beg to submit the folloting renarks: It would, in ry opinion, be as undesirable to lay acon in taie natter, any risid or stareetyned procedure, as it ne been found undessrable to de in other forms of offensive or defensive action. The influences upon this question of the surrounding conditions of time, place, nature of ground or military situation, size, and scope, of the operation, and numerous, other factors, are just po rotent as in the case of the employment of fire action, ame blancheer other forms of offence and defence, The nain consideration is to train a good number of expart Dombatnrowers and to lay down a a suggested and quitestentaliy organisation for their enployment and for a syaten of supply to the of the requisite bonbs, but to leave to each comsander a great neasure of latitude in their enployment. The funaanental question upon which the whole subject turns is the number of bombathrewers required for any eiven frontage, In the absence of practical exparience, and without a definite know- Lodge of the conditions, 1t is inpossible to lay down any reliable rule but having regard to the range (vitnin linits of reasonable accuracy of an expert bembatnrower - and allowing for the lesses in an assault, a userul basis would be to allow each bomb-thrower a frentage of, say, 0 rarue, this being the frentage which he should be able to command readily, from any position, wnether lying or running, or from a trench with a range in depth of from 15 to 80 Jaras,MAREara. such a sasts would provide 1s or is expert beabethrevers for each 100 raras frontage, If each uarever be served by two trained boncearriers, this vill require a personnel of three traine non per s paras frentage, or ony ton per 100 paras of frentage bolay the nunver now in acsual training per batsalion of sis Brigace, on anis basis, a vattalion vill nave audliciens trained personnel to cover a frent of 100 yards. If the battalion nas to attaek (as is probat Docsiale) on a wreaaes frent tas this, the apacing of the benetaro -ins parties vill have to ae correstendingly enlarged. Feremost POT an attack across the epan - as in an assault upon enenyt, trenches - the first Lise would consist of a tain line of secutan to aisoeven the loeatiex of the trencnes and the density of the enquyts dispositions. The sccuts would be fellowed by the ponbing partics distributed at the outsct at the selected intervals along the frent, but alert to concentrate upon the points shere the enonyts trenches are nest densely held. For following up the attack - after the enenys frent trenches have been gained s the best procedure would ebviously be to work along the enenys connunication treaches and so into his second and later his third lime. The number of such communication trenches and their spacing wouks determine the number of bonting parties that could be employed, ss ebvicusly only one party could work along any sives treach at one and the same time.
the nomal erganisation of a benoing party sussested One expert bomb-threwer, two bomb-earriers, three nen with bayonets, all in enarge of a N.G.6., but the particular order a formation in which they would nove anawerk should be left to be docised in accordance with the nature of the ground and of the taak, The bombathrever (with rifle alung) can carry 15 bonbe in special havorsack nade for the purpose, onen Lonbcarmer (with rifle alung) can earry so seabe in two such Laversacks. This would dive 75 bonds with the jarey. As soen as the Hirat bonb-oarme had delivered his two haversacks of tenbs to the threwer, he would return to a battalion depot for a further supply. Taie battalion derot must be pussed forward as close as possible to the frent, as the The bonbs could be packed in cases of say 100, action proceeds. carmed by two nen, othervise lightly burdened, as to the type of tonb, 1 as of opinion that for seneral nobile offeasive such gs is contenplated in E.G.G.AAs, toovers hand grenade (Jan tin) With ruse, is, upon the whole, the nest ad- cvantageous to enpley. it as sanay, casily tarewn with accuracy, and more certain in its offeets than the Martin-Hale trpe. 0 Lotbiniere comb, I have no pructieal experience, but it seens heavier and clunsier than the hand grenade, The best nethod of ignition of the hand grenace is by 10. peane of a under lignter, failing unie, by means of a lignted cig. -erectoy of course liants are objectionable at nignt, and in as case there would be no aine to imnite by striking natches in suecessian mile I consider taat there should be a Brigace instructor in tono tarowing, 1 do not trink trat any circunstances would arise in such aloce country as we have here requiring all toaving detacnnents to to drigsaed under one officer. 12. Adsault by Combethrowing is, in ny epinion, calculated to be very successful ever a conparitively liniced frentage, as conoentrated leoal offort, but only if the flanks of the assault are protected from enfilade rifle and machine gun fire, I a n semai of its success if enployed aiaultanecusly ever a bread freat, because there would be little epportunity for covering fire, and no chance of Protecting the flanks of the advancing lines of inrowers, M Colosel Consanding Fourch Australian Inf, Dec.

5.  The cleanliness and tidiness of the trenches leaves a great
deal to be desired in many cases. Because we are on Active Service
and fighting, there is no reason for any relaxation in these
matters, and, from both a sanitary and disciplinary point of view,
"Trench Discipline" is most important. It is just as easy for a 
man to fold his overcoat, waterproof sheet, and other gear, etc.,
and put it somewhere where it is out of the way, as to leave it
kicking about somewhere in the trench, as is so often the case.
Rifles and accoutrements are frequently kicking about in the bottom
of the trench, and this must be stopped at once. The necessity
for niches, or improved racks, for the rifles has already been
brought to notice, and they must be provided. A strict order
must be given against any accoutrements, or clothing of any kind,
being left lying on the floor of the trench.
6.  In some xases, where no enfilade fire is to be expected, the
trenches might be slightly widened, just enough to allow two men
to pass.  This should be only be done with the greatest caution,
and must be accompanied with ample depth in proportion, and the
General Officer Commanding only wishes to see it in cases where it
can quite safely be done.
7.  All mines and maps should be given consecutive numbers in each
post, and a good-sized notice board, with the number clearly and
tidily painted on it in large letters - not scrawled on anyhow, in
pencil - should be placed on the mouth of it.
8.  Each Post Commander should always have a plan of all trenches,
works, saps, etc., of his post with him, and a fresh plan should
be prepared whenever necessary, and additions shown everyday by
day, so that anybody visiting the post can see at a glance from it
the progress of all work, and what is being done.  The enemy's
trenches should always be shown on this as far as possible.
9.  A very good idea which the General Officer Commanding has seen
in some of the trenches of the Australian Division, is to have the
various posts occupied during the day in the trenches marked as
sentry posts.  If this system is carried out, orders for the sentries
are required,

 

10.  In some posts the General Officer Commanding has found that
definite alarm signals have not been arranged.
11.  The exact garrison for each section of a trench has not
always been laid down.
12.  Though there is a marked improvement in the interest taken 
by subordinate commanders in their trenches, the General Officer
Commanding has still found that in some cases platoon commanders have
not been given a definite responsibility for definite sections of
the trench, and have not understood that their business is not only
to put their men into the trench, but also to be perpetually
repairing and improving it.
13.  Reports from the trenches are not as frequent as they should 
be, and platoon and company commanders do not take all the opportunities
they might, of acquiring information about the enemy and their
front, and the direction of his saps and other works.
14.  The written reports which should be kept by picked observers
are generally conspicuous by their absence.
15.  Pickets are not sufficiently used in all cases in front of
the trenches, and in the gullyies.
16.  More notice boards, clearly printed and painted, are required,
to show the direction of all trenches, and where they lead to, and
these should have a permanent direction on them, and not the name
of some unit which will probably be relieved in the course of a few
days.  Anyone should be able to visit the trenches and walk about
them, by means of the signboards, without having to ask the way
from anybody.
17.  The General Officer Commanding is very glad to find that the
bomb throwing is so much on the improve, and that in this respect
as well as in the sniping, we are in a fair way to acquire a definite 
ascendancy over the enemy.  It should be a golden rule that for
every bomb thrown by the enemy, at least two, or if possible, three
should be sent in reply - not at, but into his trench.  This should 
be quite possible of attainment by means of regular practice, bomb
throwing competitions, and the use of trained bomb throwers; bombs
are scarce, and we cannot to waste any on bad shots.
N.R. [[Prince?]] 
Major,
General Staff
New Zealand and Australian Division

 

"A" Form.
Army Form C. 2121.
No. of Message 

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.
Prefix    Code    m.  Words   Charge
Office of Origin & Service Instructions.
This message is on a/c of :
.....  Service.
(Signature of "Franking Officer")
Recd. at .... m.
Date  ....
From ....
By ...
Sent.
At .... m.
To .... 
By ....

TO N.Z & A. Div

* Sender's Number.  Day of Month.      In reply to Number.     A A A
                                            20th/6/15
Major J.N. Edmunds 13th Battalion has
reported to C.O. No 3 Section in pursuance
of N.Z.A. 166, to temporarily command
the mining parties. - It is hoped
however that this arrangement will be very
temporary & that this officer can soon be
relieved to return to his Battalion, as he
is the Senior Company Commander of the
Battalion, & only young and inexperienced
officers are left with his Company.
John Monash
Col.
C.O. 4th (Aust) Inf. Bde
From  Monash (4th Aust Inf. Bde)
Place  Reserve Gully
Time  1655
The above may be forwarded as now corrected.
.... Censor.
(Z)
Signature of Addressor or person authorized to telegraph in his name.
*This line should be erased if not required.

 

"A" Form.
Army Form C. 2121.
No. of Message 

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.
Prefix    Code    m.  Words   Charge
Office of Origin & Service Instructions.
This message is on a/c of :
.....  Service.
(Signature of "Franking Officer")
Recd. at .... m.
Date  ....
From ....
By ...
Sent.
At .... m.
To .... 
By ....

TO Col. Monash
* Sender's Number.  Day of Month.      In reply to Number.     A A A
                                            21/6/15

Gen Godley has directed me
to forward you this cake
made by Lady Godley in
Alexandria.

From  
Place  
Time  
The above may be forwarded as now corrected.
.... Censor.
(Z)
L Anderson Lt A.W.C.
Signature of Addressor or person authorized to telegraph in his name.
*This line should be erased if not required.

 

AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH
MILITARY FORCES
14TH BATT. AUST. IMPERIAL FORCE
"ORA ET LABORA"

The Commanding Officer & Officers of the
14th Battalion, A.I.F. desire to congratulate
you on the anniversary of your birthday.
Our earnest wish is that you may be
spared to the Brigade which you now
have the honor to command, and that
your future may be a happy one.
21/6/15 .
Reserve Gully
Gallipoli Peninsula

 

Colonel Monash V D 
Brigadier
4th Inf Bde 

 

Anzac
22/6/15
Dear Col Monash
The bearer S M. Matthews
is well known to me, a
fellow Civil Servant & I know
his father well. If you can
assist him to get a
Commission in your Brigade
I would take it as a
personal favor _ Transport
Officer _ would suit him best
Kind regards
Yrs faithfully
S McWeir
Col
OC 10th _____

 

22/6/15
Q.M.S. W.F. Mathews  3d Bgde Am Col.
(Rosenthal)
from.
S. Aust. 

Austr. record:-
15 mths A.M.C.
9 yrs 9 mths Field Arty - rose
to Q.M.S. 34th Battery
in S.A.

 

Headquarters.
Fourth Australian Infantry Brigade,
Reserve Gully, 
June 22nd, 1915.
New Zealand & Australian Division, 

ORGANIZATION OF BOMB OFFENSIVE.

With reference to N.Z.G. 193 of 20/6/15, directing a
report on a series of 8 questions set out, on above subject, I beg
to submit the following remarks:

1.  It would, in my opinion, be as undesirable to lay down
in this matter, any rigid or stereotyped procedure, as it has been
found undesirable to do in other forms of offensive or defensive
action. The influences upon this question of the surrounding
conditions of time, place, nature of ground or military situation,
size, and scope of the operation, and numerous other factors, are
just as potent as in the case of the employment of fire action, arme
blanche or other forms of offence and defence.

2.  The main consideration is to train a good number of expert
bomb-throwers and to lay down a a suggested and quite tentative
organization for their employment and for a system of supply to them
of the requisite bombs, but to leave to each commander a great measure
of latitude in their employment.

3.  The fundamental question upon which the whole subject
turns is the number of bomb-throwers required for any given frontage.
In the absence of practical experience, and without a definite knowledge
of the conditions, it is impossible to lay down any reliable rule,
but having regard to the range (within limits of reasonable accuracy)
of an expert bomb-thrower - and allowing for the losses in ^during an assault,
a useful basis would be to allow each bomb-thrower a frontage of, say,
8 yards, from any position, whether lying or running, or from a trench
with a range in depth of from 15 to 20 yards. xxxxxxxxx.

4.  Such a basis would provide 12 or 13 expert bomb-throwers
for each 100 yards frontage. If such a thrower be served by two
trained bomb-carriers, this will require a personnel of three trained
men per 8 yards frontage, or say 40 men per 100 yards of frontage-
using the number now in actual training per battalion of this Brigade.
On this basis, a battalion will have sufficient trained personnel to
cover a front of 100 yards. If the battalion has to attack (as is
probable possible) on a broader front than this, the spacing of the bomb-throwing
parties will have to be correspondingly enlarged.

5. For an attack across the open - as in an assault upon the
enemy's ^foremost trenches - the first line would consist of a thin line of
scouts to discover the location of the trenches and the density of
the enemy's dispositions. The scouts would be followed by the
bombing parties distributed at the outset at the selected intervals
along the front, but alert to concentrate upon the points where the
enemy's trenches are most densely held.

6.  For following up the attack - after the enemy's front
trenches have been gained - the best procedure would obviously be
to work along the enemy's communication trenches and so into his
second and later his third line. The number of such communication
trenches and their spacing would determine the number of bombing
parties that could be employed, as obviously only one party could
work along any given trench at one and the same time. 

 

7.  The normal organization of a bombing party suggested
is;-
One expert bomb-thrower, two bomb-carriers, three men
with bayonets, all in charge of a N.C.O., but the particular order or
formation in which they would move andwork should be left to be
decided in accordance with the nature of the ground and of the task.

8.  The bomb-thrower (with rifle slung) can carry 15 bombs
in special haversack made for the purpose, each bomb-carrier (with
rifle slung) can carry 30 bombs in two such haversacks. This would
give 75 bombs with the party. As soon as the first bomb-carrier
has delivered his two haversacks of bombs to the thrower, he would
return to a battalion depot for a further supply. This battalion
depot must be pushed forward as close as possible to the front, as the
action proceeds. The bombs could be packed in cases of say 100,
carried by two men, otherwise lightly burdened.
 
9. As to the type of bomb, I am of the opinion that for general
mobile offensive such as is contemplated in N.Z.G. 193, the ordinary
hand grenade (jam tin) ^type with fuse, is, upon the whole, the most advantageous
to employ. It is handy, easily thrown with accuracy,
and more certain in its effects than the Martin-Hale type. Of the
Letbiniere bomb, I have no practical experience, but it seems heavier
and clumsier than the hand grenade.  

10.  The best method of ignition of the hand grenade is by
means of a tinder lighter, failing this, by means of a lighted cigarette.
Of course lights are objectionable at night, and in any
case there would be no time to ignite by striking matches in succession.

11.  While I consider that there should be a Brigade
instructor in bomb-throwing, I do not think that any circumstance
would arise in such close country as we have here requiring all
bombing detachments to be brigaded under one officer.

12.  Assault by bomb-throwing is, in my opinion, calculated
to be very successful over a comparatively limited frontage, as a
concentrated local effort, but only if the flanks of the assault are
protected from enfilade rifle and machine gun fire. I am not sanguine
of its success if employed simultaneously over a broad front, because
there would be little opportunity for covering fire, and no chance of
protecting the flanks of the advancing line of throwers.

J.M.
Colonel
Commanding Fourth Australian Inf. Bde.  

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