Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 5, 25 May - 10 June 1915, Part 1
L.H.B. No. 26
No. 3 Section Defence.
MONASH VALLEY,
May 25th, 1915.
Reference L.H.B. No. 25. Distribution of Troops
No. 3 Section, para 2, QUINN'S POST, add xxx 100 all ranks
10th
A.L.H. to Garrison.
C W Williams
Major.
B.M. 1st. A.L.H Brigade.
L.H.B. NO. 23
No. 3 Section Defence.
MONASH VALLEY.
May 25th. 1915
DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS NO. 3 SECTION.
From 11 a.m. to-day .
__________________________________________________________
(1).- COURTNEY'S POST. - Garrison 14th. INF.
Local Reserve - 14th. INF.
(2).- QUINN'S POST. - Garrison - 350 all ranks { 13th. INF.
^ 100all ranks 10th ALH { 16th. INF.
Local Reserve - 15th INF.
(3).- POPE'S POST. - Garrison - 3rd. A.L.H.
Local Reserve - 1st. A.L.H.
(4).- PICQUET between QUINN'S and POPE'S POSTS.
1 Off., 1 Sgt., 1 Cpl., and 10 men from
the Garrison of QUINN'S POST to be in
position at 7 p.m. and remain o on
duty until 5 a.m.
(5).- PICQUET between POPE'S POST and No. 4 SECTION.
1 Off., 1 Sgt., 1 Cpl., and 12 men from
15th. INF. to be in position at 7 p.m.
and remain on duty until 5 a.m.
(6).- INNER DEFENCES. - Observation Posts and Patrols
from 10th.
A.L.H. (less 100 of QUINN'S POST)
(7).- GENERAL RESERVE -2nd A.L.H. 10th. A.L.H.
(remainder of).
13th. INF.
(8).- SIGNAL UNIT ON DUTY. BDE. SECT. 4th. INF. BDE.
C W Williams
Major
B.M 1st. A.L.H. Bde.
Copies as under issued at 11:15 a.m.
COURTNEY'S POST
QUINN'S POST
POPE'S POST
SECTION H.Q.
1st. A.L.H.
2nd. A.L.H.
10th. A.L.H.
4th. INF. BDE. H.Q.
13th. INF.
16th. INF.
SIG. TRP.
L.H.B. No. 30
No. 3 Section Defe ce
MONASH VALL Y
May 25th. 915
DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS NO. 3 SECTION
From 9 a.m. 11 am to-morrow.
__________________________________________________________
(1).- COURTNEY'S POST. - Garrison -14th. INF.
Local Reserve - 14th. INF.
(2).- QUINN'S POST. - Garrison - 350 all ranks {13th.INF
{16th.INF.
100 " " 10th.A.L.H.
Local Reserve - 15th. INF.
(3).- POPE'S POST. - Garrison-300 all ranks 2nd.A.L.H.
100 all ranks 10th A.L.H.
Local Reserve - 1st. A.L.H.
(4).- PICQUET between QUINN'S and POPE'S POSTS.
1 Off., 1 Sgt., 1 Cpl., and 10 men from
the Garrison of QUINN'S POST to be in
position at 7 p.m. and remain on duty
until 5 a.m.
(5).- PICQUET between POPE'S POST and No. 4 SECTION.
1 Off., 1 Sgt., 1 Cpl., and 12 men from
15th. INF. to be in position at 7 p.m.
and remain on duty until 5 a.m.
(6).- INNER DEFENCES. - 3rd. A.L.H.
(7).- GENERAL RESERVE. - 3rd. A.L.H. (less Inner Defence Troops).
10th. A.L.H. (less QUINN'S and POPE'S
parties.),
13th. INF. (less QUINN'S party)
(8).- SIGNAL UNIT ON DUTY. BDE. SECT. 4th. INF. BDE.
(9).- DISTRIBUTION OF MACHINE GUN SECTIONS.
(a).- POPE'S POST. - 1st.A.L.H. M.G.Section - 2 Guns,
2nd. " M.G. " - 2 "
16th. INF. M.G. " - 2 "
RESERVE 9th. A.L.H.M.G ½ " - 1 " (from
7 p.m. to 7a.m. )
(b).- COURTNEY'S POST. 3rd. A.L.H. M.G. Section - 2 guns
8th. A.L.H. M.G. " - 2 “
16th. INF. M.G. " - 2 “
RESERVE 9th. A.L.H. M.G. 1/2 " - 1 " (from
7 p.m. to 7 a.m.
(c).- INNER DEFENCES. 10th. A.L.H. M.G. Section - 2 Guns
13th. INF. M.G. " - 1 "
15th. INF. M.G. " - 2 "
C W Williams
Major
B.M. 1st. A.L.H. Bde.
Issued at 9:45 p.m. to COURTNEY'S POST, QUINN'S POST, POPE'S POST
SECTION H.Q. 1st. A.L.H., 3rd. A.L.H. 10th. A.L.H., 4th. INF. BDE
H.Q., 13th. INF., 15th. INF. and SIG. TRP.
Lt Col. Burnage. -
As it is probable that Lt Col Cannan
will, at short notice, today or tomorrow, be
withdrawn for a couple of days from the
command of Quinn's post, I shall be glad if
you will take the opportunity of visiting & thoroughly
inspecting this post today, in company with
either Lt Col Cannan or Major Tilney, with
a view to you probably being detailed to the
command of the post during Lt Col Cannan's
absence. - Of course this with not affect the regular
rotation of Battalions to man the post. Your Battalion
will today find a portion of the garrison, more [[news]]
will be given you later.
John Monash
Col
Place 25/5/15 C.O. 4th Inf. Bde
NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
SPECIAL ORDER.
G.706 Anzac Cove,
25th May, 1915.
1. The portion of the ANZAC Position held by N.Z. & A.
Division, i.e. Nos 3 and 4 Sections, is in close contact
with the enemy, and the following instructions are issued,
in view of the peculiar nature of the fighting resulting
from this close contact.
2. Commanders of Posts must impress all those serving under
them the fact that the Post is to be held at all costs. The
Anzac position forms a pronounced salient, and the loss of
any Post would seriously imperil nthe whole line, and would
almost certainly lead to a portion of the troops holding it
being cut off: this more particularly applies to COURTNEY'S
POST and POPE'S HILL in No. 3 Section, and to the right of
No. 4 Section.
3. In the event of any particular Post being in danger of
capture, it is essential that the pressure should be taken
off it by bringing cross fire to bear on the attackers, and
by offensive operations from neighbouring Posts. The ground
in the vicinity of Posts is generally so restricted and
intricate, that direct assistance to any particular Post
can rarely be effectively given: in fact, difficulty will
probably be experienced in making use of all the men now at
the disposal of Post Commanders, owing to the narrowness and
intricacy of the communication trenches.
Such offensive operations require to be carefully thought
out beforehand, and Officers of units in reserve should care-
fully reconnoitre the ground over which they will have to
move under various circumstances. Any necessary communications
should be made and clearly marked by sign-posts , etc.
4. Instructions have already been issued as to the design
of fire trenches. A clear distinction must be made between
dealing with enemy sharpshooters and repelling a determined
attack. In the first case, specially selected shots should
be used, shooting through well-designed loopholes, and using
periscope rifles, or any other aid that is available. In case
of serious attack, however, the maximum number of rifles
should be engaged, and shooting should be done over a plain
parapet, i.e., one without loopholes - only by this means can
a sufficient density of fire be ensured. The heads of men
firing over a plain parapet should, however, not appear to
the enemy against a skyline, a suitable background always
being provided.
The question of meeting an assault by means of a counter-
charge should always be kept in view. This entails easy exit
from the trenches from which the counter assault is delivered-
a recess for the foot, and a peg firmly driven in at the top
of the trench should be provided, so that the men may issue
from the trench together, and with the least possible delay.
The personal ascendancy over the enemy which the troops
have established in the use of the bayonet, should be taken
advantage of whenever possible: but every care is to be taken
that a charge is not delivered prematurely, and that, when the
enemy had been met and defeated, our troops return to their
trenches without delay. The conformation of the ground makes
it comparatively easy to bring enfilade, and even reverse,
fire to bear on our troops… in the open, and any unnecessary
delay, or any forward movement carried too far, will almost
certainly entail heavy casualties which can be largely
avoided.
(2)
5. Every opportunity should be taken by Officers and N.C.O.'s
to acquire a knowledge of the ground in front of the enemy's
trenches, not only in the vicinity of their own posts, but
also in front of other Posts and sections. Such knowledge
will enable them to support more efficiently neighbouring
posts - it will also be invaluable when the time arrives for
a general forward movement of the Army Corps.
6. During recent attacks by the enemy, the artillery has
assisted the troops defending the various Posts attacked in
a most efficient manner. This support has entailed a great
expenditure of ammunition. In consequence, orders have been
given to economise as much as possible. While artillery
support will still be given whenever necessary, Os/C Sections
and Posts must realise that certain targets, i.e. , scattered
men digging, sharpshooters, small parties of men moving in
reliefs etc. etc. are better engaged with rifle and machine
gun fire, and that artillery should only be asked to engage
suitable targets.
7. It is of the first importance that the offensive spirit
of our troops should be kept alive. Nightly patrols should
go out and worry the enemy's sharpshooters, and locate his
trenches and guns.
Our sharpshooters should always work in pairs - one
shooting, the other observing. When an enemy sharpshooter
has been detected, every effort should be made to kill him
with the first shot, otherwise he will take alarm and move.
In some instances, in order to avoid alarming him, it may
be possible to fire ranging shots at ground on which the
strike of the bullet can be seen, and to which the range is
the same as to the sharpshooters, before opening fire on the
latter.
Sharpshooting parties and stations must be organised in
all posts, and every endeavour made to keep the enemy under
accurate fire constantly from all possible points: but no
ground must be fired without some definite object - otherwise
waste of ammunition.
The General Officer Commanding notices little sharp
shooting being done, and only this morning was told, in one
case, that none could be done because the men had not
sufficient periscopes. The Turks do not appear to use peris
copes, but we have learnt by experience that their sharp-
shooting is none the less effective.
8. RELIEF OF TRENCHES - The following points in connection with
the occupation and relief of trenches are to be communicated
and explained to all ranks..
(a) The Commanders of troops taking over trenches in relief
must make themselves fully acquainted with the plans of
the Commanders whom they are relieving.
(b) Squadron and Company, and Troop and Platoon Commanders
and Machine Gun Officers must get into communication with the
Officers they are relieving, and make themselves
acquainted beforehand with the exact position of the trenches their units are to occupy.
(c) Each troop or platoon of the outgoing troops will send a
reliable guide to the rendezvous laid down for the ingoing
troops, so as to guide each new troop or platoon to its place.
In the case of detached trenches holding less than a troop or
platoon, a guide must be arranged for, to show the way to
the relieving party. The most important point in relieving
trenches is to ensure that no trenches are overlooked and
left unoccupied by the relieving troops.
(d) The first thing to be done in taking over a trench is to
put every man into his firing position at his own place or
places, and to ensure that he can from them use his rifle to
the best advantage. A clear field of fire and a horizontal
line of fire from a comfortable position are necessary.
(3)
This procedure of making the Troop or Platoon Commander
see every man take up his firing position should be carried
out every night and morning when the men stand to arms.
(e) Trench equipment, consisting of flares, bombs, hand
grenades, etc. will be handed over by the unit which is being
relieved, an inventory being taken, and receipts given, unless
the incoming unit is already provided with these.
(f) As soon as units have taken over the trenches, complete
lists will be made of all tools which have been issued to
them, and these will be collected and carefully checked by
the same lists when the units are relieved.
(g) The position of all reserves of ammunition must be
carefully pointed out to relieving units, and a list made
of the amounts handed over in each position.
(h) The importance of concealment must be impressed on all
ranks. At present the lack of care in this matter is very
marked, and a heavy proportion of the losses suffered is
due to it. Men are seen standing about, fires and smoke are
continually visible, and biscuit tins and other noticeable
objects are scattered about everywhere, with the result that
the enemy is able accurately to locate the whole of our line,
and make his arrangements to meet our attacks accordingly.
(i) Artillery observation stations are just as important
as the guns, and must be equally well concealed. They must
be approached by covered communications, and the personnel
must never be seen to walk into them, as has frequently been
the case.
(j) The same remarks about concealment apply equally to
bodies of troops in rear, whether within artillery range
of the enemy or not. The enemy is always on the alert to
ascertain our dispositions and the position of our reserves,
and these must not be given away. Strict discipline in this
matter must be enforced. The excellence of the discipline
of the enemy in this matter is a standing reproof to us.
(k) The same applies, in some degree, to Depots of Supplies
and Ammunition, which must be concealed as far as possible,
and only approached under cover of darkness.
(Sgd) W.G. BRAITHWAITE,
Lieut-Col.
General Staff,
N.Z. & AUST. DIVISION.
26
SM I Kam 92
GW
BJ
26/5/15
(70)
Handed in at NZ Office 9-51 a m. Received 10 am.
TO OC 4th aust Inf Bde
[[To man]] 26
Sender's number ADC 32 Day of Month 26th
HQ anzac has approved of
the appointment of Capt C
H Jess A.I.F. Staff to the
2nd Inf as Bde Maj with
the rank of Maj aaa
Promotion to date from the
time he takes over his new
duties aaa To enable the
transfer and promotion to appear
in D O please inform me when
he takes over.
[[?]]
FROM A D C. NZA Div Anzac Cove.
[[Exdt Hn LL]] CW
WJ
27
26/5/15
(71)
Handed in at NZ Office m. Received 9 pm
TO H Q 4th Inf Bde
Sender's number NZG 709 Day of Month 26/5/15
Two officers and about eighty other
ranks going up to you
at once.
FROM Div HQ Anzac Cove
PLACE & TIME 9 p
L.H.B. No. 33
No. 3 Section Defence.
MONASH VALLEY,
26/5/1915
DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS NO. 3 SECTION.
From 9.am 11 am to-morrow.
__________________________________________________________
(1).- COURTNEY'S POST - Garrison - 14th. INF
Local Reserve - 14th. INF.
(2) QUINN’S POST. - Garrison - 100 all ranks 10th A.L.H.
350 all ranks 13th. INF.
Local Reserve - 15th. INF.
(3) POPE'S POST. - Garrison - 300 all ranks 2nd A.L.H.
100 all ranks 10th. A.L.H.
Local Reserve - 16th. INF.
(4) PICQUET between QUINN'S and POPE'S POSTS.
1 Off., 1 Sgt., 1 Cpl., and 10 men from
the Garrison of QUINN'S POST to be in
position at 7 p.m. and remain on duty until
5 a.m.
(5) PICQUET between POPE'S POST and No. 4 SECTION.
1 Off., 1 Sgt., 2 Cpl., and ∧22 24 men from
15th. INF. to be in position at 7 p.m.
and remain on duty until 5 a.m.
(6).- INNER DEFENCES. - 3rd A.L.H. - to find 1 Officer and 2
Observation Posts of 1 N.C.O. and 8 men
each on the Inner Line of Defence . The
post on North side of MONASH VALLEY will
furnish a patrol of 2 men to move ∧every 1/2 hour up the
communication trench from the left of the
post to meet the patrol from No. 4 Section.
These Observation Posts mount at 7 p.m. xxx
and dismount at 5 a.m. the following
morning. 3rd. A.L.H. will also man the(7).- GENERAL RESERVE. Inner Defences if ordered.
(7).- GENERAL RESERVE. 1st A.L.H. 3rd. A.L.H. (less Inner Defence
Troops). 10th. A.L.H. (less QUINN'S and
POPE'S POSTS). 13th. INF. (60 all ranks).
(8).- SIGNAL UNIT ON DUTY. BDE. SECT. 4th. INF. BDE.
(9).- DISTRIBUTION OF MACHINE GUN SECTIONS.
(a).- POPE'S POST. 1st A.L.H. M.G. Sect. - 2 guns
2nd " " " 2 "
RESERVE 9th. A.L.H. M.G. ½ " - 1 " (from 7
p.m. to 7 a.m.)
(b).- COURTNEY'S POST.- 3rd. A.L.H. M.G. Sect. - 2 guns
8th. " " " - 2 "
16th. INF " " - 2 "
RESERVE 8th. A.L.H. " ½ " - 1 " (from
7 p.m. to 7 a.m.)
(c).- INNER DEFENCES.- 10th. A.L.H. M.G. Sect. - 2 guns
13th. INF. " " " - 1 "
15th. INF. " " " - 2 "
CW Williams
Major
B.M. 1st. A.L.H. Brigade.
Issued at 10:45 p.m. to COURTNEY'S POST, QUINN'S POST, POPE'S, SECT. H'Q.
1st. A'L'H'. 3rd. A'L'H' 10th. A.L.H. 4th. INF. BDE. H'Q" 13th., 15.,
16th. INF. SIG' TRP.
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