Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 5, 6 May - 16 May 1915, Part 8

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Finalised
Accession number:
RCDIG0000587
Difficulty:

Page 1 / 10

Opom W MESSA Prefin Code. from Means B Ditenco Service Instructions Handed in at the T0 Dendtr , Dint FROM PLACE TIME All Porterage, Redirection, or other o the particulars of such charges and of amount OrrnL-OMA A a Army Form C2123. No. of Massage Oco Blamy. ont or sent out 16 sta Received here at AAA ake
OMH PONNS.B. WSrForm Army Form C. 2121. No. of Message. MESSAGES AND SIGNALS. Norte Care Ml M Al l Recd. At This message is on a/c of: Office of Origin and Service Instructions 10 Sor m Date Servicl annunoncmnw ECmmmm I om annnoonomon L ccee B 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Bmmmmmmm SEA Mantin ORc T0 L Col Saiman DeS AM WhsttoMnthe SertttSM AAA B141 teAtan t An 1 Estrapet the 21E Camor Wragd 400 ae AAL Lav 222 2 EStill offiier moming r HIB - From DAE Place D LAO Time W The above may be forwardted as now corrected. mmmumumm mmmmo m Censor. Sirnature of Addressor or person authorized to telegraph in his name. 2011-O This line should be crased if not required.
killed S ept missing 19 setwiity womted 2pt I returned with information that cn having coept up fully abut 100 goods thay fiunt, doew comtute votine of entings for fun dircting of knoth 710 & him te rght him
vite Oitmn MA. FONM Army Form C 2121. No. of Message.— MESSAGES AND SIGNALS. Morte OAAFE - Recd At This message is on a/c of: Office of Origin and Service Instructions Ser Date mun S mm HLcoIII FTOMman LC mum oooooeooovovoeeeoveeeeceeececccccccccccoe BY ma Bnnenm en./ Bignature of M Franking Otcer enumuumummmumum T0 Dey OMont MRENGBM SettSNite AAA 1x1 ahd forten 77 the thio o o mescade have bent this most 2 teating o tenre mn 5to is atnt 2 peen WIl see int it our monora - 14 15 52 a in - From Place Time ✓ The above may be forwarded as now corrected. eooeooeooooeoeoeoceeeocee occcccccccceececeee Censor. SFMATITE O HIEROT OTEIONAUOIned t Clerrart F HOMn. MURIS-OSS This line should be crased if not required.
Ly FoneOR O.TOMCONSA MESSAGES AND SIGNALS. SAANN M MN Raed MA 1h May Charges to collect AuresEan 0 e Manded in at te M LWSGISNSNN SAAAKSEEN AAA gvent afte with Concurseme LeSt idered exquiry has miralty Si is went 4 that Commpicate fright tinued Yfres all were today aMa Lis Genen wit hear refalt Gam lin Ci4 or aime est ade sailwa atcter successfully nal th Kille Lunchor and Ands affact Faris in repulsed sea Nenhopt an hee with TRON RAOEETIN Te Nol HM HA MA W DoBdgr &R Ltd. FormaCn TO.TOMCONA Ly FoNESRK FMESSAGES AND SIGNALS. Na of Messase. Sena Bett, FEntont [ORCe StSM Boa Codo Words - Curre to aled Ann Cuteator aa Handed in at SINAESNNNNE SATANONN LeWSYWSNANSN aaa an sidenchle Isp ade Arras duection tet louth y in aphr 14 and you Kil Teren a see lone this 10 ropst h fht 126 4 FRoM PAORETIME The the Mort M UAEE DoBadars ARLtd FormsCsi2
BACRS, RSD SISSRIS CAMA a TASTN 4 ra TIONSTSNSN DATANON SACSOTEN ap near Wach North taren atticks in Carfathean reputsed Pekin. thena ascepted fapanese Comany. tanard altimati 764 Latitania rouns sand have tation ORON PACEA MHH 80,00 Pads 81L. A B.Ltd-FormeCAIA
&mt ir AMILSHOTd Kous yu 1312 D 14t Br Chascket Hare Captodelft B54 ARlearter Major LSaa L. M.. for
11 715
AU XIXIII FRIAL FORCE for Mt. Aude Mnt Bode MeyITiors 44H Do 2 4 Oenerel Headmuarters, 11th May 1915. 1.— The General Commanding wishes to congratulate all ranks on their maguificent work of the last fortnight. He feals sure that the heroiam diaplayed by the troops at the Aisembarkation and during the subsequent operations vill send a thrill of prise throughout the whole British Enpire when the story becowes known to the publie. The arduous work of the past fartight has, however necessitated a brief pause to recong, af refit and prepare for fresh axartions. 2. Oving to the mmmerous and well planned entrenatments now held by the eneny in the vicinity of ACHI BARA and also at KARA TEPE the operations in the imnediate future will apprexinate mere to centesiege warfare than to epen eperations in the field, Further pregrees muet now be made by continuous and systemtie attacke on certain pertions of the hestile line rather than by a general action invelving the advance of the whole line at once. The first step in this nature of warfare is to conselidate offectively our own pesition acainst hoatile attack by strangthening and impreving trenchee. The second stap is to assume the offensives acainst the enemy, and gain further ground in the Peninsula. 3. The frent trenches should form one continuous lines this facilitates the reinfercement of any threatened pesition without easualties being incurred when cressing, ground, and also enables pertions that are shelled by the enany to be tempourily vacated. Such pertions should be at once reccoupled if threatened by heatile infantry attack, or directly the shell fire ceases. Every trench must be carefully traversed. Support trenches should be dug from 150 to 350 yards in rear of the front line trenches. Support tranches should be linked by atrong supporting points, or anall redoubts, the carrisons of which will not leave these pocitions but assist in the recapture of any portion of our Frent trenches which may be lest by bringing fire to bear on such tanches and thus facilitating the advance of our infantry from our support trenches. 14 is the duty of the treeps in these support trenchs to recapture at ence with the bayenet any portion of the front line of trenches which may be temperarily lest. . the postion of the machine gune in the frent line tranches must be carefully chesen with a view to bringing effective Flanking fire to bear on any heatile attack. Alternative pesitions should be constructed. For the purpose of teating the mechanian, machine suns should never fire more than single rounds, so as net to dieclose their position. In case of hestile attack their pecition vill then come as a surprise to the eneny and full benefit will be derived from their use. 3. While work on to trenches is being carried on, every effert should be made to locate the exact positions of the hoatile t enches Although considerable progress can be achioved in this direction by day, yet as a rule, this can be effectd with fewer easualties by the means of night recomatanance. The information sc, obtained should be placed on a may by the staff of the hisher formations, These mape can then be fieced together by General Headquarters, and an accurats ides can thus be ebtained of the heatile positions, Plans onn then be made for the capture of one or more of these & pesitions consecutively. Commanders should foster the offensive spitit by every maan in their power and every effert should be made to gnin ground at night by sappins, or by advancing and then disging in, but care must be taken by previous recommissance to ensure that t anches thus constructed are not under hostile enfilade firing when daylight appears. Such disging partics must be eovered by a firing party. Picked shots should be selected in each company to deal with enom entiers.
As regards the artillery the hostile area in front of the trenches should be divided into areas. One or more batteries should be detailed for the purpose of affording assistance if required to our infantry in each of these areas in case of attacks by the enemy. When our trenches are in close proximily to (i.c. within about two to three hundred yards of) the hostile trenches this is most impertant. Artilery observation officers in such cases must be lecated night and day in the infantry trenches, and the batteries must be carefully registered on the hostile trenches, In case of a hostile attack, the remaining batteries, which should have also been previously registered, make a wall of fire from 200 to 500 yards in front of those of our trenches which are being attacked with a view to peventing any supports reaching the enemy. As the front held by our treeps is comparatively small, it is necessary that as many batteries as possible should be able to fire on the area in frent of any portion of our trenches. The heavy guns should be reserved as a rule for offensive eperations against hostile trenches and artillery, on which they should be carefully registered as soon as these have been located. Telephonie communications are all important. 1f possible all 8. lines from observing stations should be duplicated or triplicated and laid dwn with connecting cross lines Artillery lines should be labelled with a triangular, and infantry lines with a square shaped, dise to facilitate the linesmen identifying their Imas wires espedally in the dark. Infantry must on no account ever approach the artillery observation pants stations, the concealment of which is of the greatest importance. Directly hostile trenche have been located artillery will be registered on them. Both in attack and defence in this nature of warfare the secrets of success are good co-eperation between infantry and artillery, and efficient communications. (88d) V.P. Braithwaite, Major-General, C.G.S. Nediterranean Expeditionary Force. Issued to : 29th Division. Composite Division. Past Lancashire Division. Australian & New Zealand Army Corps at 6 pem. Copies issued to:- 1st A.L.H.Bde. Dedails N.L. Infantry Bde N.Z.Mtd Rifles Bde. OfC No.3 Section. 4th Aust. Infantry Bde O/C No, 4 Section. N.L. Infantry Brigade C.R.A. Divisional Train. C.R.E. O/C Signals A.D.M.S. General Staff D.A.G.M.G. A.A.6.

(93)

T0 Bgde Hdqrs 
4th Infy Bgde 
  
Read  Artillery have been informed. They made 
observations but found range too close to 
fire over the crest of hills. The Engineers have 
continued to improve our trenches and a second 
machine gun emplacement is complete. The 
Turks have been busy sniping all along 
our front. Gun casualties for the day 
are 1 killed 14 wounded 2 missing 
total 17. 

FROM J Simpson Capt Adjt 13th Bttn
PLACE Popes Hill
TIME  5 p.m 10/5/15 

 

Date   10/5 
  
TO Lt. Col. Cannan 
*Sender's Number       Day of Month       
BM119                                      10th                       
Take the bearing and estimate the 
range of enemy's battery which you 
say you have located AAA Report 
AAA Artillery officer coming later 
  
From   FOURTH INF BDE 
Time   2.48 PM 
John Monash

 

1 Sgt. Killed 
4 Cpl. 1 cpl missing 
            2 pt. seriously wounded 
            1 returned with information 
that counting having crept up gully 
for about 100 yards to front, drew considerable 
volumes of enemy's fire from direction of 
Knoll 710 & from their right front.

 

Lt. Col. R. E. Courtney 
This is the third message I have 
sent this morning requesting the 
services of one of your pioneers who is 
a carpenter. Will you please see 
into it. 
  
John Monash 
Col 
11/5/15    7.52 a.m.

 

Prefix SM
Received From  QW  
By NW 
11th May 
(101) 
Received 7.30 am. 
TO Bde Majors 
Day of Month    eleventh     
  
hiss Board of Trade with Concurrence 
of admiralty has ordered enquiry 
into Lusitania Disaster. Sir 
John French Communicates that 
enemy yesterday night continued 
to attack East of Ypres. 
Further attacks today were all 
repulsed with heavy loss to enemy. 
Our line there is firmly 
established. Our armies 
successfully attacked St Andre railway 
junction North of Lille Canal 
and Bridge over the Lyon 
Paris. German attack between 
Neuport and Sea was repulsed 
with heavy loss. 

(100) 
TO  2 
We made considerable progress 
North of Arras in direction 
of Wood South of Carency. 
We captured in latter region 
two and sometimes three 
lines of strongly fortified 
trenches on a front of 
seven kilometres - Our 
advance in Certain points is 
four kilometres. We took over 
2000 prisoners and six guns - 
Petrograd "Official" Enemy 
Supported by fleet on Saturday 
evening occupied Libau after 
fighting with small Russian 
detachment - We repulsed Germans 

 

(99) 
TO       3 
  
North of Narew near Wach - 
We repulsed attacks in Carpathians 
Pekin. China accepted Japanese 
ultimatum - Cunard Company. 
announces 764 of Lusitania 
have been saved 
  
FROM   W. T. Station

 

FROM   W. T. Station 
  
13th Seen 
14th Bn ChaseMM Dare Capts Adjt. 
15th. HRCarter Major 
16th. RSWilliams Q. Ms for O.C. 

 

11/5/15 

 

AUSTRALIAN 
IMPERIAL FORCE 
MAY 17 1915   4.45 pm 
4th Infantry Brigade 

4th. Aust Int Bde 
[* CHJ]   FORCE ORDER NO. 8  Recd May 17 1915 4.41 pm
General Headquarters,
11th May 1915. 

1. The General Commanding wishes to congratulate all ranks on their magnificent work of the last fortnight. He feels sure that the heroism displayed by the troops at the disembarkation and during the subsequent operations will send a thrill of pride throughout the whole British Empire when the story becomes known to the public.
The arduous work of the past fortnight has, however necessitated a brief pause to recoup, rf refit and prepare for fresh exertions. 

2. Owing to the numerous and well planned entrenchments now held by the enemy in the vicinity of ACHI BABA and also at KABA TEPE, the operations in the immediate future will approximate more to semi-siege warfare than to open operations in the field, Further progress must now be made by continuous and systematic attacks on certain portions of the hostile line rather than by a general action involving the advance of the whole line at once.
The first step in this nature of warfare is to consolidate
effectively our own position against hostile attack by strengthening and improving trenches. The second step is to assume the offensive g against the enemy, and gain further ground in the Peninsula.
3. The front trenches should form one continuous line; this
facilitates the reinforcement of any threatened position without casualties being incurred when crossing open ground, and also enables portions that are shelled by the enemy to be temporarily vacated.
Such portions should be at once reoccupied if threatened by hostile infantry attack, or directly the shell fire ceases.
Every trench must be carefully traversed. Support trenches
should be dug from 150 to 350 yards in rear of the front line
trenches. Support trenches should be linked by strong supporting points, or small redoubts, the garrisons of which will not leave these positions but assist in the recapture of any portion of our front trenches which may be lost by bringing fire to bear on such trenches and thus facilitating the advance of our infantry from our support trenches.
It is the duty of the troops in these support trenchs to recapt
recapture at once with the bayonet any portion of the front line of trenches which may be temporarily lost.
4. The position of the machine guns in the front line trenches
must be carefully chosen with a view to bringing effective
flanking fire to bear on any hostile attack. Alternative positions should be constructed. For the purpose of testing the mechanism, machine guns should never fire more than single rounds, so as not to disclose their position. In case of hostile attack their position will then come as a surprise to the enemy and full benefit will be derived from their use.
5. While work on the trenches is being carried on, every effort xxx should be made to locate the exact positions of the hostile t enches
Although considerable progress can be achieved in this direction by day, yet as a rule, this can be effected with fewer casualties by the means of night reconnaissance. The information so, obtained should be placed on a map by the staff of the higher formations, These maps can then be pieced together by General Headquarters, and
an accurate idea can thus be obtained of the hostile positions, Plans can then be made for the capture of one or more of these xxx positions consecutively.
6. Commanders should foster the offensive spirit by every means in their power and every effort should be made to gain ground at night by sapping, or by advancing and then digging in, but care must be taken by previous reconnaissance to ensure that t enches thus
constructed are not under hostile enfilade firing when daylight appears. Such digging parties must be covered by a firing party. Picked shots should be selected in each company to deal with enemy snipers.

 

7. As regards the artillery the hostile area in front of the
trenches should be divided into areas. One or more batteries should be detailed for the purpose of affording assistance if required to our infantry in each of these areas in case of attacks by the enemy. When our trenches are in close proximity to (i.e. within about two to three hundred yards of) the hostile trenches this is most important. Artilery observation officers in such cases must be
located night and day in the infantry trenches, and the batteries must be carefully registered on the hostile trenches, In case of a hostile attack, the remaining batteries, which should have also been previously registered, make a wall of fire from 200 to 500 yards in front of those of our trenches which are being attacked with a view to preventing any supports reaching the enemy. As the front held by our troops is comparatively small, it is necessary that as many batteries as possible should be able to fire on the area in front of any portion of our trenches. 
The heavy guns should be reserved as a rule for offensive operations against hostile trenches and artillery, on which they should be carefully registered as soon as these have been located.
8. Telephonic communications are all important. 1f possible all lines from observing stations should be duplicated or triplicated and laid down with connecting cross lines 
  
Artillery lines should be labelled with a triangular, and
infantry lines with a square shaped, disc to facilitate the
linesmen identifying their lines wires especially in the dark.
Infantry must on no account ever approach the artillery
observation posts stations, the concealment of which is of the
greatest importance.
Directly hostile trenchs have been located artillery will
be registered on them.
Both in attack and defence in this nature of warfare the
secrets of success are good co-operation between infantry and artillery, and efficient communications.
(Sgd) W.P. Braithwaite,
Major-General,
C.G.S.
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.
Issued to :-
29th Division.
Composite Division.
East Lancashire Division.
Australian & New Zealand Army Corps
at 6 p.m.
Copies issued to:-
1st A.L.H.Bde                             Details N.Z. Infantry Bde
N.Z.Mtd Rifles Bde.                  O/C No.3 Section.
4th Aust. Infantry Bde            O/C No, 4 Section.
N.Z. Infantry Brigade              C.R.A.
Divisional Train.                        C.R.E.
O/C Signals                                A.D.M.S.
General Staff                             D.A.Q.M.G.
A.A.G.

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