Diary/notebook of Herbert Stanley Geldard - Part 1

NOTEBOOK
To be returned
to H G Bennett

Capt H S Geldard
A.I.F.
Wed Feb 11^th. Rec^d urgent message from D.A.D.M.S.

that 36-40 nurses had not been evacuated & he was
unable to get them away. Could I do anything?
Saw movement control who who told me that the DA AIF
had been in touch with them but they had no vessel
available. Then saw the last remaining naval
Rep., who controlled all shipping, who he told me the 
same. Entered into a vehement argument with
this officer & told him that S'pore would fall on Sat.,
substantiating my statements with facts about Jap.
Reinf. that he was not cognisant of. At first he
wouldn't believe that I was serious but the news
frightened him sufficiently to make him check
up with the result that 2 hrs later he rang me
to say that our nurses were to be at a certain
wharf at 3pm that day. The bal. of Bth nurses
left in S'pore were evacuated the same day.
(It was learnt later that the party this party left
on the "Vyner Brooke" on 12^th. The boat was sunk off
the mainland of Sumatra & the occupants machine
gunned in the water. Of a total of 65 sisters all
but 32 were lost in the water or shot after
being taken prisoners on shore - a particularly
cold blooded piece of work.)
Fri Order issued by His Ex that all spiritous liquor must 
be destroyed.
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One of these was picked up by A.I.F. & sent in
to Fort C. The letter enclosed in the box
called on the Bth Forces to capitulate & stated
that a white flag was to be flown at the top
of the Cathay Bldg (the highest in S'pore) at noon 11 AM 
& the Bth Comdr. was to proceed along Bukit
Timah Road leaving F.C at 2pm noon, to meet
the Nippon Comdr (The box picked up by A I F became 
my property, but was lost during evacn)
A meeting was convened at Fort C at 9 10 am at
which the foll. attended HE The Gov., Gen Percival,
Lt Gen Sir L Heath 3^rd Corps, Maj Gen Keith Simmonds Fortress,
Maj Gen Key 11^th Ind. Div. Maj Gen Beckwith Smith 18^th Div., 
Maj Gen H Gordon Bennett A.I.F. Heads of the Navy & 
Air Force had proceeded to Java, the Naval Air Force head
Admiral Spooner was captured on the way & died
of black water fever of on an Id on which he &
& party were placed.
It was agreed to capitulate, & Gen Percival
was to obtain the best terms possible. At
noon Brig. Newbigging went to meet the
Nipponese but their Comdr refused to parley
with him & demanded that Gen Percival
come personally at 4 pm. The Gen. accomp.
by Brig Newbigging, Brig Torrance Chief of Staff,
Brig Lucas Adminisn & an interpreter proceeded
along B.T. Rd at 4 pm, met the Jap Comd. at
the Ford works 10 miles away. The room in 
which the meeting took place was has since seen preserved 
in its original state by the Japs each seat
around the table being marked with

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the name of Gen Yamashita & the other
occupants; viz Ind staff & the Bt'n officers.
Gen Percival's request for terms was
not granted & he had no choice but agreeing to agree 
to unconditional capitulation.
The time to "Cease Fire" was 8.30 pm. Gen
Percival remonstrated that the intervening
time was insufficient to get orders through
to all men under his Command & asked
for an extension which was not granted.
One of his Staff officers left for S'pore 
immediately to put the order into operation.
In the meantime S'pore was being raked with
shell & mortar fire while planes came
over at will bombing & machine gunning
in an haphazard indiscriminate fashion. Orders were
issued to A.I.F that the enemy was not to be
fired at ^after 8.30 unless retaliatory, & that Jap tps
who advanced towards or thro' them without
firing were to be allowed to do so. This position
was a ticklish one & it was fortunate that
the enemy made no forward move in
our sector. Numerous "ferfies" flew around
& one that "we had capitulated at 4 pm
resulted in many soldiers of an Indian
Div. throwing their arms away at this times.
News of the Arrangement to "Capitulate at
8.30 pm came thro' at to A.I.F. about 5 o'c It
was disseminated to the tps quickly with the
result that no "incidents" occurred whatever,
in our area (cont) 

Some of the Loyals on our left didn't get
orders to ceasefire till 9 o'c & kept firing
till that time. They had been hard pressed 
all day defending their barracks. The
enemy stopped firing at 8.30 & several
who exposed themselves while shouting
"bansai" were shot at.
The last day in the A.I.F's sector was
quiet. Spasmodic firing took place,
but the Japs made no attempt to
move forward.
After daybreak ^the full day the Japs took up
positions near the concentration areas.
Everything went off quietly.
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which was general throughout the Bth Army.
In a few isolated cases some shots were
← exchanged after 8.30 but mostly the
enemy kept away from the Bth lines
or else both sides were cognisant of
the Capitulation.
When Gen G.B. left Fort C after the
meeting I drove to his HQ at Tanglin
BKs with him (about 1½ miles) & stayed
there throughout the day, but returned
at 7pm to get details regarding Capitulⁿ.
which were to be announced at 7:30.
The details terms were duly announced &
phoned thro' by me to G.B., they were
concise & contained such as the foll.
1. Cease fire at 8.30 pm
2. All tps to concentrate in Unit
areas & remain there.
3. Arms to the piled in Unit areas.
4. There is to be no destruction of
Arms, Ammunition, food or other
supplies, or property or petrol.
5 Sir Percival 5 All tpt to be parked in areas.
Gen Percival was kept at Nippon HQ
that night but ret^d to Fort C next day.
At 8pm on the 15^th Feb, I drove along some of the main streets 
before returning to AIF H.Q & saw the
destruction that took place in the City
during the day. Fort Canning, 

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Gov't Hse, Raffles College, P.O, the big municipal
buildings in fact all the largest places
in the City with the exception of the Cathay,
? Two shells through C. Cinema. approx
12 hit main building RP.
which was very slightly damaged by a
couple of small shells, were intact. It
would seem that the Japs, knowing that
capitulation was inevitable, had
purposefully avoided damaging these
buildings.
It was said by the Japs that if the Bth
Forces had not capitulated they would
have thrown several fresh Divisions into
an attack on the City in which case the
carnage would have been terrific.
About 7o'c next morning I set out
in a car & drove towards S'pore to find
out for HQ what was happening in the
City. Two (2) Jap. soldiers were posted at all
the street corners on the main roads
running into S'pore proper; the main
part of the City had not yet been occupied.
These soldiers, with fixed bayonets &
full fighting outfit including camouflaged
helmets, had control of the traffic &
held up all movement either towards
or from the City. Their control was
made effective by a kick on the shins or a
clout on the face if instructions were
not obeyed immediately. 

The Brig. after was conducted to the
Chief of Staff who instructed him to 
closely observe all regulations. He
then returned directly to his H.Q.
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Having ascertained that I was a soldier
they allowed me to proceed, much to my
relief, & I had no difficulty in getting
into the City & returning to Camp again.
By this time the news had spread that
Gen GB, his AOC, Gordon Walker; & Charles
Moses (of broadcasting fame), had got away.
x Brig Callaghan assumed command.
The Gen. was last seen about 9 P.M when
he left HQ ostensibly to go around the
perimeter.
About 9 AM ^^{next day (16th)} Brig Callaghan got word to 

proceed to Nippon HQ which was now estab. 

at Raffles College on the outskirts of the
City. Preceded by a car flying the
Nipponese Army flag & accompanied by
Brig's Taylor, Maxwell, Varley, Col Thyer &
myself he drove to the N.HQ where the
first indignity was suffered by the
Brig. & th & the A.I.F, for on arrival he
was bundled out of his well kept
car by a Jap Colonel who, by way of
exchange, gave him another with
broken windscreen much the worse
for wear.
← The Colonel made a request to the
Brig. for an Officer to guide him around
S'pore. I was detailed & with much some
trepidation but not a little curiosity,

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took a seat place on the back seat between
the Colonel & an Interpreter. At
Bukit Timah road we a column was
waiting consisting of 12 tanks and 30
lorries loaded with J armed Jap soldiers
& some more lorries with street
barricades. I was told that the Colonel
was about to take over the Rway Stn.,
docks, wharves & a section extending
to Alexandra which comprises about
¼ of the City exclusive of City Centre.
A map of S'pore, in Japanese, was shown
me & I was told to direct the column
to various points marked. Another
column was seen approaching the
City from a different direction & it
would seem that the Capital was occupied
by some 4 or 5 similar forces to our
own simultaneously. tUp to this time
there were no tps posted in the heart
of the City.
Everything was quiet in the City as
we passed along, except where fires were
burning. The people stared blandly
but displayed no enthusiasm, no
Jap flags were flying, shops were
closed & few were on the streets.
One shop was being looted by
Malays as we passed. the Jap C.O. stopped

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the car & ordered some of his men to

cover the looters with Tommy guns.

They were then made to return the goods

taken from to the store over which a sentry

was placed. At all strategic points

along the route barricades were placed

& sentries placed put on guard, until the

whole area including the Rway Stn

& Docks was properly under control.

The Colonel decided to make his HQ at

Tanjong Pagar Police Stn on the front steps

of which he sat with the interpreter on

one hand & me on the other. Here he

stayed most of the day interviewing

people, receiving verbal orders from

Nippon HQ (I never saw a written order

during the whole of my time with him)

& issuing instructions. Several times

he gave me orders to be conveyed to

camps in the vicinity, while once

we made a tour of the sector.

At 4 o'c all Chinese in the  living

within a certain radius from the

Police Stn were assembled in a street

near the Stn, & addressed by the C.O.

in lots. Probably 5000 were there inc.

men & women. All men of working

age were told to reassemble at 8 o'c

the next day for work.

From 7. am 16/2 to 9.30 pm 16/2

Geldard was at Japanese H.Q.

Early on morning of 17/2 Callaghan asked him

to go to G Percival & ask for Callaghan's promotion when

Geldard dictated the letter wh Percival signed giving

this promotion.

History p 29 states that [[B?]] on early morng of 16/2

rang AIF H.Q. This followed [[contradicts?]].

Saying that Percival was with Japs all night 15/16.

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At 9.30 pm the interpreter told me to return

to my unit & report again at 9AM.

During the day the Jap C.O. ate

nothing but some pineapple a tin of

which was opened & shared by  between

him, the interpreter & me in speared cubes 

in order of seniority with tooth picks & took

a swig of juice each. By this time some

hundreds of cars had been confiscated

from people who attempted to drive near

The Tanjong Pagar Stn. & parked in the vicinity.

I pointed out that it was impossible for

me to walk to A.I.F. HQ & was given permission

to take one of the cars. Early next

morning Brig. Callaghan called me &

requested that I go to Fort C & put forward

his claim to be promoted to Major General

& given Cd of the A.I.F. This was partic. necessary

as the Japs have no rank of Brigadier in

their army & cast some doubt on the Brig's

right to command. Gen Percival, who

looked both worn & worried, gave me a

hearing & after consulting his Brig.

adminⁿ. wrote a letter in which he

made the promotion. (The Gen. was so tired that

he couldn't concentrate & ended up by

accepting my dictation.)

Singapore at this time reminded me

of Spencer Traceys picture "Sanfrancisco",

huge columns of smoke continued to rise

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from oil tanks, dumps, supply depots,

warehouses, rubber depots & wharves.

It was depressing to think that such wonton

destruction of huge accumulations of nec.

commodities should take place, and when

one looked at the untouched part of S'pore

with its hundreds of godowns (storehouses),

& thousands of stores filled with goods,

its large buildings ^its thousands of cars

& then thought of the huge war supplies

(guns, rifles, machine guns, tommy guns

mortars, ammunition, carriers) to be

handed over to the enemy; with the main

tin & rubber resources of the world already

in their possession one realized the

immensity of the Japanese Victory, & our

corresponding disgrace loss.

Arriving at Tanjong Pagar the C.O. was

already dealing with Chinese, who were

compounded nearby ready for work.

I Shortly he produced a map & directed

us to take him to a part of the Empire

Docks. Here was a ship of some 2000

tons which had not been blown. We next

proceeded to Fort C where I got particulars

of & location of the charges, which had been

laid ^to blow the ship,apparently not fired. Returning 
to the ship we located a rope suspended

down the side of  which seemed to be there

for an ulterior purpose. The C.O. motioned