Written Records, AWM54 741/5/9 PART 2 - [Patrols - Reconnaissance:] Report on Northern Territory Special Reconnaissance Unit, by Sqn Ldr D F Thomson RAAF [Report minus maps] - Part 10

13.
APPENDIX I -
continued

small sections be taken to advanced camps at any one time, and that 
the period of time during which they remain detached in the bush 
away from the main body of the Company, should be strictly limited.

19. It is felt that this difficulty, which is anticipated in 
maintaining the morale of white troops chafing for action, has an 
important bearing on the suggestion to organise one or two sections 
of natives to be employed on patrol work, either for the flank 
protection of Darwin, in conjunction with the Independent Companies, 
or for later infiltration in the Malay Archipelago.

20. The existence of such a body of scouts on a permanent basis 
would supply a continuity which would do much to compensate frequent 
change in white personnel as the Company or Companies were moved 
elsewhere.  They would form a useful standing body which could be 
employed for any long reconnaissance patrols that might be required, 
and they would form the nucleus of fighting patrols of natives which 
would be of incalculable value in active guerilla operations against 
the Japanese if an invasion should ever come to pass.

21.  At the risk of labouring this point, the absolute necessity 
of permitting only specially selected officers, with proven ability 
in this direction, to handle the natives, is pointed out. While I 
have no doubt whatever that the natives, especially a selected 
group from Arnhem Land, would make scouts without equal, and would 
also be capable of severely harassing a Japanese force by guerilla 
tactics, it would be worse than useless to place them under charge 
of an officer whose attitude was unsympathetic or who regarded them 
with contempt. Nowhere would the question of leadership be more 
important than in relation to these special troops.

22. In employing these natives it is also pointed out that they 
should never be brought into regular camp lines or barracks, nor 
should they be quartered in or near Darwin or any other large town. 
Where it is necessary to hold a section in one place they should be 
in an encampment of their own making, apart from other troops.

23. Where possible, their employment should be based on a 
modification of their own tactics, and organisation.  In other 
words, it is suggested that successful handling of these, and 
probably of most other natives troops, rests on the ability of the 
officers to adapt their organisation and methods, and to modify 
these skilfully when employing them, rather than to endeavour to 
insist on training the natives in orthodox military methods.  The officer 
can then employ his own initiative to bridge the gap.

Service in Malay Archipelago.

24. In initial discussions on this scheme, I was under the belief 
that the possibility of using a small body of Arnhem Land natives 
for infiltration and reconnaissance in the islands of the Malay 
Peninsula was contemplated.

25. That the natives of Arnhem Land are particularly fitted for 
service in this area to the Northward is apparent. They have had 
long contact with the Malays from Timor and Macessur who were 
accustomed to visit them each year.
These people arrive on the coast of Northern Australia with the 
North-West monsoon and return home with the South-East, remaining 
on the coast of Arnhem Land for several months.

25. the natives have a tradition of respect for the Malays and 
many of the old men can still speak Malay. They state that many 
of their number visited Timor and Macessur with the Malays, 
returning to their own country with the return of the Malays in the 
following year.

 

14.
APPENDIX I -
continued

27. It is not suggested that large numbers such as would depopulate
their own country should be enlisted, but merely that a small body
consisting of, say, one section, might in emergency perform valuable
services in the Malay Archipelago, in conjunction with Independent
Companies. They would quickly establish themselves on a friendly 
footing among the native population, and once they had been landed
and had dispersed in an area which it has intended to infiltrate or
attack, their presence would not be easily detected by the Japanese
Intelligence in a situation where the presence of even a single
European stranger would be very conspicuous, and would arouse
immediate suspicion. 

28. Finally, it is pointed out that in all approaches to the natives
of Northern Australia the greatest care would be exercised in
handling them. Contacts with them should be controlled at least
to some extent and be made the responsibility of selected officers. 
Some elementary information instructing in native custom would
probably be useful as a preliminary. 

29. It should be stressed from the outset that nothing must be
done which will disrupt or disturb the organisation of these people,
especially in Arnhem Land, unless this is made unavoidable by the
threat of active invasion in the Northern Territory. In these
circumstances, invaluable service could be rendered by the natives
in guerilla warfare, on both flanks of Darwin, but the organisation
of a small number of natives in the initial stages would be all
that is required to serve as a Cadre or nucleus for any larger
organisation which might have to be set in motion in extreme
emergency. 

(Sgd) Donald F. Thomson,
Flight Lieutenant, 

R.A.A.F.
June 1941
 

15. 
APPENDIX I -
continued

APPRECIATION
MOST SECRET
1. OBJECTS:
Reconnaissance -
To carry out a reconnaissance of the coastline from
McARTHUR RIVER, Gulf of Carpentaria to BROOME,  Western Australia,
with the object of re-establishing contact with the natives, and
of assessing the nature and extent of recent Japanese influence
in this area.
(a) Carry out coastline reconnaissance between -
GRRTE EYLANDT
ROPER RIVER
BATHURST AND MELVILLE ISLANDS
DARWIN
DALY RIVER
FORT KEATS
FITZMORRIS RIVER
VICTORIA RIVER
WYNDHAM
DERBY
BROOME
(b) Carry out island reconnaissance in respect of L. of C. area
and in alternate L. of C. route (old stock route). (The
old stock route extends from BOROLOOLA on the McARTHUR
RIVER via ROPER BAY Police Depot and MATARANKA to DARWIN).

Patrols - 
To establish and maintain, employing the natives of the
area, a coast watching organisation and fighting patrols in ARNHEM
LAND and the ports west of WESTERN AUSTRALIA for the flank
protection of DARWIN. 

Independent Company -
The use of an Independent Company to implement flank
protection of DARWIN, including L. of C. 
2. RELATIVE FORCES:
(a) [[Envoy / Enemy?]] - 
An appreciation by the Commandant, 7 M.D. dated 10th July,
considered that the forces which the enemy are likely to
employ against the L. of C. from distant flanks, only
small detachments. 
(b) Own Troops -
The forces at our disposal, excluding those held by
Commandant, 7 M.D., are as follows -
1st phase: A reconnaissance party consisting of two officers
and four sergeants.
2nd phase: One Independent Company consisting of sixteen
Officers and one attached A.A.N.C. doctor, 
seven sergeants and 249 other ranks. 
3. AREAS VITAL TO THE DEFENCE OF DARWIN
Some of these have been dealt with by the Commandant, 7 M.D.
in his defence plan, and including BATHURST and MELVILLE ISLANDS and
the L. of C.
 

16.
APPENDIX I -
continued

The main routes likely for an enemy approach to use the L. of C.
are set out by 7 M.D. Plan are -
(a) PORT McARTHUR to DALY WATERS
(b) PORT ROPER to BIRDUM
(c) WYNDHAM - VICTORIA DOWNS - DALY WATERS
Is it considered that the likelihood of an enemy approach
over these routes would be a task of such magnitude as unlikely to
succeed, even if attempted. 
It is considered that an enemy landing aimed primarily at
L. of C. and crossing the routes mentioned above in (a), (b) and (c)
is, as has been stated, unlikely. The reasons why the routes
(a), (b) and (c) against the L. of C. are considered improbable
are as follows - 
(i) The country is at all times difficult and the seasonal
nature of travel in this area would render the country
practically impassable for motor transport for
approximately six months of the year, December - May. 
(ii) There is no evidence that the Japanese have ever taken 
any interest in these inland areas. It is certain, however,
that they are aware of the difficulties and of the great
distances of the inland which separate them from our L. of C.
(iii) On account of the length of the enemy L. of C. his forces
would be extremely vulnerable in attack, especially by small 
bands of guerilla troops such as are now contemplated. 
(iv) It is considered that large enemy forces and not small 
enemy forces would be require to attempt to carry out
either (a), (b) or (c).
(v) It is considered that an attack on the L. of C. from distant
flanks can only be carried out by using air borne troops
(parachute troops) operating from such points as WYNDHAM,
GROOTE EYLANDT and BATHURST ISLAND.
It is therefore a matter for consideration what role should 
be assigned to an Independent Company in 7 M.D.
There are two roles which are suggested -
(1) The defence of L. of C. from flank attack by air borne
troops;
(2) The employment of the Independent Company as guerilla
troops attaching and raiding the flanks and rear of the 
enemy in the event of a landing in force and occupation
of the DARWIN Defences. 

4. AERODROMES: 
Aerodromes have been constructed by the R.A.A.F. at such
places as GROOTE EYLANDT, MILIMGIMBI, BATHURST ISLAND, in 7 M.D.
and at WYNDHAM and DERBY in Western Command. In the case of
WYNDHAM, one Coy. V.D.C. Western Command has been established as a 
Guard and 1 Platoon V.D.C. Western Command has been established as a
Guard at DERBY.

5. ACTION:
Phase 1 - 
It is proposed to send a reconnaissance party consisting of

 

17.
APPENDIX I -
continued

two Officers including the O.C. Reconnaissance Party, Flight-
Lieutenant THOMSON, R.A.A.F. and Lieutenant MORGAN, and four
sergeants, to the DARWIN area where they will carry out a preliminary
Reconnaissance of the coastal area between DARWIN and BROOME.
At the conclusion of this reconnaissance, Lieutenant MORGAN
with his two sergeants, will remain in the area of VICTORIA RIVER and
proceed with general intelligence enquires as laid down by the O.C.
Reconnaissance Party.
Flight-Lieutenant THOMSON and two sergeants, will then
proceed to the areas BIRDUM - MATARANKA - ROPER RIVER - BOROLOOLA.
The above tasks will be completed within three months.
Approval has been obtained to purchase an auxiliary ketch
which will be used by the Reconnaissance Party when purchased, 
as a Headquarters and able to proceed to any point of the coastal
area between GROOTE EYLANDT and BROOME as required. 

6. NATIVE CREW TO AUXILIARY KETCH:
It is considered most desirable and indeed essential that
in addition to the O.C. Reconnaissance Party and Corporals [[FLAMER?]]
and [[ELMINGTON?]], only natives should form the crew of the vessel. The
selection of suitable natives who would be personally well known to
the white members of the party, is of great importance and will
contribute materially to the success of the undertaking.
Natives are particularly suitable for work of this nature
in unchartered waters and under conditions which would be 
climatically sever and to most whit men otherwise exacting and
monotonous. 
It is proposed to employ on the boat seven natives to be
recruited on the Coast of Arnhem Land. Six of the natives selected
and t be employed, are now in the BRITISH SOLOMON ISLANDS Protectorate, 
and one in TORRES STRAITS, North Queensland. The native crew
from the BRITISH SOLOMON ISLANDS are -
1. Edwin Richardson [[SENIBO?]], Melanesian, Engine driver
2. Papai LAMAPOLI Polynesian, Boatswain
3.)
4.) TIHI, LAUBIA and HEO * Polynesian, Crew
5.)
6. [[GECH?]] Melanesian, Crew
From TORRES STRAITS Islands -
7. [[KAFIU?]], Torres Straits Islander, 2nd Boatswain,
In addition, a message will be sent through MILLINGIMBI
Mission to the natives of ARNHEM LAND informing them of the return
of the O.C. Reconnaissance Party to work among them, and naming the
natives who served previously with the O.C. Reconnaissance Party for
service. In the case of the British Solomon Islanders, permission
will be required for the six natives required for the crew to leave
this Protectorate. 
It is suggested that this permission can be obtained most expeditiously
by making representations officially through the High Commissioner
for the Western Pacific at SUVA, FIJI, asking for the necessary
authority and NOT through the Resident Commissioner at TULAGI, who is
subordinate to High Commissioner. 
* NOTE: Nakeu, also a Polynesian native, was finally substituted for 
NEO. 

 

18.
APPENDIX I -
continued

It will probably be necessary to send either Corporal
[[BALNAR?]] or Corporal [[MINIHUTCH?]] to TULAGI to recruit the members of 
the crew, and to bring them back to Australia. This could possibly
be done most economically by arranging for the Corporal selected to
fly to [[NABAUL?]] by civil aircraft in time to get the M. V. "MALAITA"
and returning by that ship to TULAGI. A further possibility
would be an arrangement with the R.A.A.F. for the selected
personnel to be taken to TULAGI by service aircraft if such be
leaving about the required time. 
The reconnaissance party, in addition to the objective 
set out in paragraph 1, will make contacts with officers in charge 
of Police Stations in the area for the purpose of obtaining their
assistance in organising potential guerilla units in the event of an
actual invasion of the Northern Territory. These units to be
trained and lead by experienced members of Independent Company.
In this way it is hoped to utilise on a voluntary basis, all the
responsible station owners and managers in each area, and make an
initial list of all suitable white settlers. 
Each police station in areas of strategic importance
could be used as a depot for a reserve store of arms, ammunition
and demolition materials for the use of independent companies and
guerilla hands in emergency.
Each police depot or camp possesses a valuable reserve of
native trackers, horse sellers, as well as pack horses, and mules, 
paddle horses and pack equipment, which could be made available in
connection with this scheme. Each police officer to be requested to
produce a careful list of all suitable white men known personally
to him for the guerilla forces mentioned above. A census to be 
taken of all fire arms and ammunition in the possession of white
residents in the area. 
It could be arranged, if desired, that each station owner
or station manager enlist his own stockman, both white and native,
for training in guerilla tactics, and in addition each prepare a
list of equipment including arms and ammunition. 

7. COAST WATCHING ORGANISATION:
The method to be adopted in arranging patrols as set out in 
paragraph 1 will be as follows -
The coast watching organisation will employ the natives
of the area. It is intended to divide the entire region from the 
ROPER RIVER to WYNDHAM into a number of sectors, each of which will
serve as a unit in the reporting system.
The natives in each of these areas will be instructed as 
to what information is desired, and will be induced to make visits
at regular intervals to furnish reports from their sectors, even
if there be nil reports. 
In the initial stage, it is proposed to make use of the
existing W/T stations which are situated along the coast, mainly at
BOROLOOLA, ROPER RIVER mission, ROPER DAM [[?]], GROOTE EYLANDT,
[[WIRRLALA?]] (near Cape Arnhem), MILLINGIMBI, GOULBURN ISLAND and
BATHURST ISLAND, for translation of these reports.
It is probable that additional S/T posts may be necessary
at such points, for example, as KLORO ISLAND, and this will certainly 
be the case on the Western Australian side of DARWIN. The number
of such stations and their location must be determined by the
results of the reconnaissance. 

 

19.
APPENDIX I -
continued

Phase 2 - Use of an Independent Company