Written Records, AWM54 741/5/9 PART 2 - [Patrols - Reconnaissance:] Report on Northern Territory Special Reconnaissance Unit, by Sqn Ldr D F Thomson RAAF [Report minus maps] - Part 7

55.
While the vessel was still at Townsville, in December,
a signal was received at H.Q from Norforce reporting that Sgt.
Elkington has experienced some problems with the natives at Caledon
Bay, and requesting that steps be taken to reinforce the post with
another white man. I was at this time absent from Townsville on
duty, it was impossible to judge the nature of the trouble at that
distance and as the only white members of the Unit at this time
were Palmer, who was in charge of the Aroetta and crew in Townsville
and who did not know the natives of the Caledon Bay area, and myself
(engaged in obtaining necessary stores and equipment to complete
the refit.).
(Copy of the signal referred to is attached at the end of this
section.)
And in view of the isolation of the post and the risk of seriously
upsetting the whole of the organisation so painstakingly built up
among the natives, it was decided that I should return by air to
clear up the trouble, and leave Lieut Palmer to bring the ship
around later.
I returned to Groote Eylandt by flying boat at the end of
December, and proceeded to Caledon Bay on the following day by
Civil Aviation Department's launch, which was made available for
this purpose.
On arrival at Caledon Bay it was found that all but a few
of the natives had dispersed, and that the trouble which had
occurred was primarily caused by the N.C.O who had been left
in charge. It was ascertained that although sliding doors with
secure fastenings and a padlock had been provided, and that he was
provided with a strong box with padlock, to protect tobacco, he
had been in the habit of leaving the post unlocked while he went
on hunting trips in the bush. For some time it appeared, the
natives had been helping themselves to small quantities of food
and tobacco, and at first this had passed unnoticed. These
depredations continued for some time, growing progressively larger,
until they were at length discovered by Sgt Elkington, who then
threatened the natives with a truncheon. Further trouble also
occurred between this N.C.O. and the natives with whom he adopted
an aggressive overbearing attitude. If it had not been for the
goodwill and faithfulness of Natjialma of Caledon Bay (whose
sterling services have earned for him a special recommendation for
recognition, presented later in this report; and certain others of
these people serious consequences would probably have revolted.
As it was, Natjialma and Wongo, headmen of Caledon Bay, kept the
promise that they had made to me, and guarded Sgt Elkington and the
post until my return, dispersing the other natives in the meantime.
The attitude of Sgt Elkington, and his unsuitability for work
among natives, is indicated by entries in a log kept by him at the
Caledon Bay post, from which the following are quotes:
October 14 1948: "Slippery and his gang turned up today, and
this afternoon had a "makarata" at the beginning of which there
was nearly a row, and had to put my foot down and use the .303
as umpire. "
October 18th : "Slippery very peeved because some one wants to
pinch his wife, bullets are the only things these people understand,
they need a good swift kick in the crutch."
It was particularly unfortunate that this N.C.O. had been
entrusted with the maintenance of this important post.
Although the trouble which he experienced was largely brought
about by his own actions, the signals which he originated at
this time resulted in the visit of people to Caledon Bay who
knew nothing of the territory or its people and which greatly
increased the difficultly of the task I had to face when I
returned.

56.
As soon as the Aroetta returned to Arnhem Land in
charge of Lieut. Palmer Sgt. Elkington was returned to the ship,
and I remained ashore at the Post to restore order and re-establish
the good relations with the people. In spite of my own analysis
of the cause of the small thefts of food and tobacco that had
occurred, it was essential for purposes of discipline and control,
that once the natives knew that I was aware that they had stolen
these things, some adequate form of punishment should be meted out.
Under the conditions, which prevailed, this was a matter of
some difficulty. I enlisted the most reliable of the men whom I
have worked with over a number of years and ordered them to muster
all the men who had been concerned in the trouble at the O.P. in
my absence, setting a time limit on the date of their return.
Bindjarpuma and his group were brought from Arnhem Bay
on the Arafura Sea Coast, but it speaks most for the sense of
justice and the faithfulness of these people, when once they have
been treated with consideration and fairness, that every one of the
natives concerned returned to Caledon Bay and not only admitted,
but told me in detail, what he had done. One of the groups was
formed into a labour gang, and given some weeks of hard labour in
the garden. They were also required to make a payment of a large
number of fish. During this period they were ordered to remain at
the O.P. and were not permitted to leave the area on hunting
expeditions. Every one of these natives, when the reason for this
punishment was explained to him in his own language, admitted its
justice and not one of them defaulted.
From the leader of another group, a large sea-going
canoe was demanded, this being the only wealth that he possessed.
It was an object of great material value involving probably days
of search for a suitable tree, and then weeks of laborious work
by a specialist in canoe building. But the most difficult problem
was that of dealing with Bindjarpuma and his followers - the most
warlike group in the area who were, as was stated earlier in this
report, a predatory band of natives in the hills between Caledon
Bay and Arnhem Bay. It was necessary to punish this man, to
humiliate him, as well as to deprive him and his group of material
possessions of value and to do this publicly. But it was equally
necessary to convince him of the justice of the penalty. This
would only have been possible to one he knew well or fighting would
have ensued. On his arrival I greeted him as usual and then told
him to fall in with his group of followers in full fighting array.
This he did with a fine show of pride, for he was now on his mettle
before his rivals the people of Caledon Bay itself. Then I spoke
to these people of the trust that they had betrayed, and finally
ordered each man to lay down his spears on the ground. This was a
tense moment. So far I had carried them with me, but to have lifted
these spears at once would have been a fatal mistake. For a few
minutes I talked to them, stressing the enormity of the betrayal
of the trust I, as their leader, had placed in them, and the depth
of my own humiliation. Then I told them that I was taking forty two
of their finest spears in expiation of their offense. After this I
sent them back to their camp. For twenty four hours they remained.
If they had left instantly, this would have portended trouble. As
it was, within twenty four hours we were on our old footing except
that my own prestige had been greatly impressed throughout the
whole area, but it had been touch and go. At such times it
requires but one man to hook his spear in haste and the harm is
done. Once finished, such a matter must never be held up before them;
they must never be reminded of it or they have what they know as
"heart jump", they go bonkers. These are fighting people, killers,
whom I would have liked to lead in an action against the Japanese.
In a week or two after my return, there were nearly two hundred
natives in camp at the O.P. even more.
For some time it was necessary for us to leave this post
and on this occasion Pte Kapiu, who had carried out his duties here
so well on a previous occasion, was made acting Sgt. and again

57.
placed in full charge. He carried out this undertaking with
great credit.
On March 1st, after discussion at Norforce, the O.P
was withdrawn from Caledon Bay prior to the reorganisation of the
Special Reconnaissance Unit and my relinquishment of command, on
account of the difficulty of obtaining officers who could handle
these people.
R.A.A.F Headquarters,
North Eastern Area,
TOWNSVILLE.
Safe Hand Only.
FROM: O.C. Special Reconnaissance Unit.
TO: Advanced Headquarters, Northern Territory Force.
DATE : 8/11/42
REF:
ESTABLISHMENT OF O.P. AT. CALEDON BAY
1. Following upon my short reports of July 3rd and August
11th advising plans and movements on patrol and reconnaissance,
I have to report that the O.P and Base for this Unit was founded
at Caledon Bay as mentioned in previous communications.
2. The object of establishing this base was to enable close
contact to be maintained with the natives of Eastern Arnhem Land
who have been organised and trained by this Unit during the past
year. It was considered essential to establish a store and garden
in order to provide outward and visible proof of the permanence of
the organisation set up during the period. In this way, representatives
of most of this principal groups of Eastern and Central Arnhem
Land can be encouraged to pay regular visits to this Base, and
regular contact can be maintained with all those nomadic groups to
an extent that would not be possible by casual contact along the
coast when on patrol.
3. This will also ensure that regular intelligence reports
are brought in of all movements and occurrences of note in this
region, and particularly, that if fighting men are ever required
to harass an enemy landing on this Coast, the natives can be
contacted immediately and enabled to muster their own groups.
4. With these objectives in view, after return from the
Roper and McArthur Rivers the O.P. established by this Unit
at Gulnare Bluff was handed over to No. 4 Independent Company, and
the most suitable site was carefully selected. The site finally
selected is at Caledon Bay. It is close to the beach where a house
of two rooms has been constructed of bark to serve as living
quarters and store, and a large garden made. The initial work of
establishing and laying out this base was carried out by me in
person, and I remained here to organise the natives of the Area,
some of whom have been enlisted in the Detachment with which we
have carried out extended reconnaissances during the present year.
5. Subsequently, after the initial work had been done, I
left in charge, Pte Kapiu a native of Badu, Torres Straits, who
served with me previously on special work among these people.
This is covered by Operation Order No. 6, copy of which is attached.
6. Finally, in order not to risk losing contact with these
people and to be assured that in the event of enemy landing or any
renewal of interest in this area during the absence of the Aroetta,
the natives could be quickly contacted and organised. I left
Sergeant Elkington in charge of the O.P. This was covered in my
signal At/66 of September 15th.

58.
7. Copy of the operation order under which Sergeant
Elkington is operating (No. 9) is attached hereto; together with a
list of the equipment and medical supplies with which he has been
provided.
8. W/T Communications: The O.P was equipped with W/T and
arrangements were made for three standing schedules per day with
RAAF GROOTE EYLANDT in the meantime. This is set out in Operation
Order and further in a communication to the O.C. of the R.A.A.F. A
C.B. at GROOTE EYLANDT, a copy of which is also attached.
9. A signal was sent to GROOTE EYLANDT, via N.W. Area,
on November 2 (S.20) to confirm the fact that the O.P. at
Caledon Bay is still in wireless communication with GROOTE. On 2/11
the following was received:-
"Groote advised VJBS operating successfully. Two way
communication held last schedule C150/H/8. Refer S85
ex Groote and NGIT , ex NWA".
10. It is requested that as soon as possible after the
return of the A.K. Aroetta to Arnhem Land, Sergeant Elkington be
relieved and granted special extended home leave.
Squadron Leader,
COMMANDING SPECIAL RECONNAISANCE UNIT.
Encls. 1.........Operation Order Nos. 4, 5, 7, 8, 9.
 2.........List of Equipment at O.P. Caledon Bay
 3.........Letter O.C. R.A.A.F. C.B. GROOTE EYLANDT
K7/GDOS
SECRET.
TO LANDFORCES MELBOURNE
FROM NORFORCE
Originators No/s OSI/7468 Date 3 [[?D.S.C]] [[?1938]] KL THI 1941 KL
REF GS1/7318 OF 3 DEC. ELKINGTON REPORTED NORFORCE RAAF GROOTE
NATIVES ENTERED HOUSE STOLE TOBACCO 21 NOV.
RINGLEADER TURNED NASTY TOOK TO STORE WITH GANG. COMUNICATIONS
WITH ELKINGTON DIFFICULT AT TIME OWING FAULTY W/T TRANSMITTER.
R.A.A.F. GROOTE DESPATCHED PARTY GRAYS CAMP PATCHED W/T AND LEFT
AIRMAN. NOW RECOMMEND ELKINGTON HAVE ADDITIONAL WHITE MAN ASSIST
POST MAINTENANCE. POSN REPORT NORMAL. 2ND NOV GOT R.A.A.F. POST
GROOTE BEING WITHDRAWN SECRETLY AND OBVIOUS AIRMAN ONLY TEMPORARILY
AVAILABLE. N A O U VESSEL FROM ROPER RIVER DESPATCHED INVESTIGATE
BUT DO NOT WISH PLACE ENTRIES N A O U FROM THOMSON AREA. CONSIDER
ONE THOMSONS PERS AT TOWNSVILLE WOULD RETURN GROOTE BY FLYING BOAT.
WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE ETA AROETTA'S ARRIVAL THESE WATERS.
Copy to:
[[?]]

59.
11. RETURN TO TOWNSVILLE - Refitting of the Vessel.
The voyage to Townsville at the end of September 1942
has been covered in the narrative above.
On arrival it was found that no definite arrangements
had been made to slip the vessel, and on account of priority
arrangements for all work then in force, some time elapsed before
the ship could be got on the slip. In the meantime arrangements
were made for Lieut. Palmer to proceed at once on home leave while
I remained with the ship to slip the vessel, remove the stores and
care for the native crew. On return of Lieut. Palmer to duty he
remained in charge of the vessel while I went to Sydney and Melbourne
to facilitate purchase of necessary stores and equipment and thus
to accelerate work on the ship.
On December 27th I left Lieut. Palmer in charge of the
Aroetta with orders to sail on the same day, and to rendezvous
with me at Caledon Bay where I proceeded in advance, by flying boat.
Although it had been understood that the Unit would be
reorganised and additional personnel supplied, no action was taken
at this juncture and, accordingly, in order to make it possible to
keep faith and to carry on the undertaking for which I was
responsible, I applied to the A.C.C. North-Eastern Area
(Air Commodire Cobby) for two additional men, a second W.T. Operator
and an Air Gunner-Armourer. To this request Air Commodire Cobby
at once acceded and although only a few hours remained before the
ship sailed, he arranged with R.A.A.F. Headquarters to make the
selected men available and thus provided the ship with the necessary
minimum complement to carry on patrol work in an operational area.
It is not proposed to further encumber this report with
details of the fitting out of the vessel which have been covered in
several official communications.
12. NARRATIVE.
On December 27th the Aroetta sailed from Townsville under
Lieutenant Palmer. Very bad weather was encountered during part
of the voyage up the Great Barrier Reef. On January 8th, 1945,
the vessel arrived at Caledon Bay.
The narrative of the patrols carried out by the ship
between her departure from Townsville on December 27th and the
handing over of the vessel in Darwin on April 12th have not been
covered in the narrative of the first period of service in this area,
but in view of the length of this report, and the fact that the
essential details of this narrative are covered by the ship's log
it has been considered necessary to curtail this section.
13. RE-ORGANISATION OF THE UNIT NT FORCE COASTAL RECCE UNIT RAE,
Following upon the settlement of the trouble which had
occurred at Caledon Bay during my absence with the ship in Queensland
I proceeded, on January 21st, to Advanced H.Q. Norforce in response
to instructions received by signal. Here a conference was held on
the reorganisation of the Unit, which had now been agreed upon.
As a result of this conference a memorandum was prepared
by me setting out what I considered the minimum personnel required
to man the ship on armed patrol. It was decided by the G.O.C. at
this time, in view of the difficulty of obtaining officers with
the necessary experience and training to handle the natives, to
close the O.P. at Caledon Bay and to restrict the activities of the
Unit henceforth to coastal patrol.

60.
The recommendations set out in this memorandum were
adopted in the main and later formed the basis of the war
establishment laid down for the Unit, which was now reorganised
under the name of "Northern Territory Coastal Reconnaissance Unit,
R.A.E."
TO: B.G.S. NORFORCE
FROM: OC Special Reconnaissance Unit Norforce.
DATE: 23 Jan 43.
Following the discussion on the work and organisation of
the Special Reconnaissance Unit which took place this morning, I
have to submit the following:
ORGANISATION AND PERSONNEL
The Special Reconnaissance Unit was organised at AHQ (LHQ)
during September 1941 and details are covered by communication to
Northern Command S.O.489 of 13th Sept 1941, under the heading
"Reconnaissance Party for duty 7 M.D."
The white personnel was set out in the abovementioned
memorandum as follows:-
" OC Squadron Leader THOMSON, D.F. who has been seconded from
the RAAF to Army Headquarters for a period of 6 months.
WX 10583 Lieutenant MORGAN H.G. No. 4 Independent Coy
QX 19653 Sergeant PALMER A.H. No. 4 Independent Coy
NX 31242 Sergeant ELKINGTON T.H. No. 4 Independent Coy, and
two other Sergeants whose particulars will be forwarded
later."
The two Sergeants later selected were Sgts MAZARAKI &
MacDONALD. In addition, six Solomon Islanders and one Torres
Straits Islander were selected by the OC and were enlisted, in the
case of the Solomon Islanders, for special duty, under an arrangement
made between the Prime Minster's Department and the High
Commissioner for the Western Pacific. Two further members were
added to the party subsequently, a Torres Straits Islander and an
Arnhem Land Aborigine, both of whom had served with me for some
years and were well known to me personally. These men were also
enlisted on a special basis.
It was originally planned, following discussion which took
place with the Commandant, to divide this Reconnaissance Party
into two sections under one OC - a Land Party in charge of Capt
H.G. MORGAN with two Sergeants and a boat party aboard the "Aroetta".
In the initial stages the land party was to operate on the West
flank of Darwin, commencing in the Victoria River area, while the
"Aroetta" worked on the eastern flanks.
After their selection, the white personnel were sent to
the Guerilla School at Foster and received training in Independent
Coy tactics.
In August 1941 I was borrowed by the General Staff and
sent in company with Lt.-Col. SCOTT DSC to Darwin to confer with
the Commandant on the disposition of the Independent Companies
which were to be stationed in this area. Subsequently Col SCOTT
returned to AHQ and I proceeded to Townsville Brisbane and Sydney to
inspect ships and to locate a suitable vessel for the undertaking.
The "Aroetta" which I had known for several years before the war

61
was inspected in Townsville with other craft and finally her
purchase was recommended to the Army. The vessel secured, a
new engine purchased, and the ship was completely refitted under my
direction.
When this work was well in hand I left the ship and the
native crew, which had now arrived from the Solomon Islands, under
the supervision of Sergeant (now Lieut) PALMER and proceeded to
where I met Capt MORGAN and the two Sergeants who constituted the
land party. After consultation with the Commandant I took this
party by MT to Victoria River Downs, furnished Capt MORGAN with
a detailed Operation Order (Operation Order 1s) and then returned
alone via Darwin to Townsville, where I joined the "Aroetta".
On Jan 1st 1942, the "Aroetta" fully equipped sailed from
Townsville for Darwin via Groote Eylandt and the coast of Arnhem
Land. After provisioning in Darwin, an Operation Order (7 MD
Operation Instruction No. 1 dated Feb 5th) was issued and the
"Aroetta" returned to Arnhem Land. The undertaking with which I
was then entrusted was to undermine and destroy Japanese prestige
among the natives of the North Coast of Arnhem Land, with whom the
Japanese had had much contact in the years 1935, 1936 and 1937, to
deny these natives as guides by careful and systematic work among
them and to build up the nucleus of a native force for guerilla
scouting and fighting. This work was systematically carried out
during the months of February and March 1942.
In April 1942 a second Operation Order, covering the same
ground as the first, but greatly extending the scope of the undertaking,
was issued by HQ 7 MD. This was Operation Instruction
No. 13 defining the scope of the work to be carried out. This
Operation Order also laid down that the Unit would henceforth be
known as the "Special Reconnaissance Unit".
The Land Reconnaissance Party meanwhile carried out its
work on the western flank of Darwin, paving the way for No. 4
Independent Company Coy, to which it is understood that the three personnel
were attached for some time, after the arrival of No. 4 Independent
Coy at Katherine.
Capt MORGAN and the two Sergeants were finally posted to
other duty without reference to this Unit.
The Special Reconnaissance Unit now consistedof four white
men, the OC, the 2nd in charge (Lieut PALMER), Sergeant ELKINGTON,
Sergeant K.R. HARVEY RAAF (Wireless Operator) and six Solomon
Island natives. One of the Solomon Island natives had in the
meantime become ill and was finally invalided out of the Unit.
In addition, a native detachment, flexible in numbers and
organisation, but generally maintained at a strength of between
50 and 60. was gradually built up and regularly trained. This
native detachment was used chiefly for reconnaissance and scouting
work in conjunction with the ship.
In view of the obvious vulnerability of the Roper River
and its importance as a possible means of approach to the L of C, it
was soon apparent that a permanent OP must be maintained at the
mouth of the Roper River to watch the approaches of the estuary.
This involved the detachment of Sergeant ELKINGTON and thereby
reduced the strength of the white personnel aboard the vessel to
three, of whom one was the RAAF W/T Operator. As this NCO's time
was fully taken up with W/T watches, the maintenance of W/T and
electrical equipment and the operation of Aldis signalling lamp
whenever ships or aircraft were sighted, he was not available, even
if he had been otherwise qualified, to carry out deck watches.
The whole of the work on the ship, navigation, maintenance
engine room duties and maintenance, armament duties and training
of the natives of both the crew on the ship and the detachment ashore,
fell upon Lieut PALMER and me. It was soon apparent that additional
trained personnel, particularly an engineer and qualified machine

62.
gunners were necessary for full efficiency.
It was also felt that if the Unit was to be maintained
a definite identity and establishment with a separate colour patch
were essential to foster a sense of pride and solidarity, which
it is felt are essential to any Unit, however small. A proposal
on these lines with a request for a special colour patch and for
adequate personnel were submitted to Norforce in August 1942, but
apparently no action was taken.
Work was carried on with many long patrols on shore, under
increasingly difficult conditions until the end of September, when
approval was granted by HQ NT Force for the ship to proceed to
Townsville to be slipped and refitted.
Before leaving Arnhem Land, a final patrol was carried out
over the whole of the area covered by the operation Order under
which the Unit was working. An OP was established at Caledon Bay
and Sergeant ELKINGTON who had been aboard the vessel again for
some time was again detached and left in charge of the OP there, to
maintain contact with the natives in the absence of the ship.
On arrival in Townsville Sergeant HARVEY RAAF, the W/T
Operator, who had been seconded originally for a period of only
4½ months, which term had expired on March 15th, returned to his
own service, leaving two white men only - Lieut PALMER and myself
with the ship.
It was anticipated that leave would be available for all
personnel, who had served for long months on isolated service under
very exacting conditions. Home Leave of eight days was obtained for
Lieut PALMER, but on account of the work to be carried out, no leave
was possible for any other of the ship's company, including myself.
A.W.T. Operator, Cpl EGAN, was made available by the
RAAF to take the place of Sgt HARVEY.
In the meantime representations had been made to LHQ by
me for a war establishment and additional personnel. It was hoped
that approval would be granted to this application in order that
advantage might be taken of the period spent in TOWNSVILLE to
select carefully suitable personnel. It cannot be stressed too
strongly that in addition to technical and military qualifications
men for such a unit must be temperamentally suited to long periods
of lonely and isolated service under conditions which are often
monotonous and sometimes severe.
No action appears to have been taken in this matter and
when the vessel was ready for sea it was very evident that the crew
available was quite inadequate. Although my own period of
secondment had long expired, and no action had been taken to provide
me with the necessary minimum assistance to carry out the special
undertaking for which my services had been sought from the RAAF by
the Army, I still felt it my obligation to do all in my power to
obtain some additional personnel, in particular a second wireless
operator and at least one gunner. I was fortunate in being able
to secure from a RAAF operational squadron an NCO who combined the
duties of armourer and air gunner. At this stage I made application
to Air Board on my own responsibility for the services on a
temporary basis of these two men, the W.T. Operator and the
Armourer-Airgunner. This request was at once granted by Air Board.
In the meantime a signal had been received by LHQ from
NORFORCE suggesting that white personnel should be sent from my
Unit by air to reinforce Sgt ELKINGTON at the O.P. at CALEDON BAY,
who was reported to be having some trouble with the natives there.

63.
It will be appreciated that as this message was
received by me before I had succeeded in obtaining additional men
from the RAAF, I was placed in a difficult position, as the only
white members of the Unit were Lieut PALMER (who was supervising
work on the ship at TOWNSVILLE) and myself (engaged in securing
necessary material and completing arrangements for the refit in
BRISBANE.
It was of little use to send Lieut PALMER who does not
know the natives of ARNHEM LAND, and accordingly, I proposed to
LNQ that I should return in person by air to take charge, leaving
Lieut PALMER to bring the vessel.
On arrival in ARNHEM LAND, on December 26, I relieved
Sgt ELKINGTON, and he was subsequently returned to the "AROETTA".
In the light of all foregoing experience it is felt that a
number of additional personnel are required on a vessel of this size.
Review of Present Personnel - A.K. “AROETTA”.
At present there are, therefore, six white men either
on board the 'AROETTA" or ashore at the O.P. or on Patrol.
O.C. Squadron Leader D.F. THOMSON, RAAF.
2 I/c Lieut PALMER A.H., AIF.
Sgt ELKINGTON, T.H., AIF.
Cpl. RITCHIE, G.N. RAAF, Armourer-Airgunner.
Cpl. EGAN, RAAF, W.T. Operator-Mechanic.
LAC VASSE, RAAF. W.T. Operator.
In addition, there are the five SOLOMON ISLAND natives,
one TORRES STRAIT native and one enlisted ARNHEM LAND native.
In my interviews with the COC and SG5 today I pointed out
that I considered that I have now completed the undertaking for
which I was seconded. After having been loaned by Air Board to the
General Staff, AHQ, for some weeks for special duties (letter from
Secty. of Army), I was seconded for a period of six months to date
from September 18, 1941 "to be Officer Commanding coastal patrol and
reconnaissance for a period of six months to date from September
1941". (Communication from DCO3 ref SO.384 11 Sep 1941). Nearly
sixteen months have now elapsed and I feel that I have now competed
fully this undertaking, and I desire hereby to ask that I be
relieved as soon as a suitable officer can be nominated to take
over the command of this Unit.
It is further understood that application has now been
made to HQ NT Force for the services of Lieut. PALMER and Sgt
ELKINGTON and that it will be necessary therefore to replace these
men.
It has been pointed out above that the other members of
the crew of the "AROETTA" are temporarily attached to me by RAAF
and will therefore require to be replaced by Army personnel. I have
now received instruction to change over the W.T. communication to
Army frequency and army procedure and codes, and it is anticipated
therefore that the replacement by Army Signals of the present
operators will follow on this change.
Native Crew
The special circumstances and special conditions of the
enlistment of the native crew which was undertaken by the Prime
Minister's Department through the High Commissioner for the Western
Pacific is on the official files. These natives have given sterling
service since their enlistment in 1941. None of these men has had
any home leave and it does not appear practicable to grant them
adequate recreation leave under present conditions. Moreover, it is

64.
well known that Polynesians are particularly prone to what is known
as "home sickness". A petition submitted by these natives recently
in TOWNSVILLE has already been submitted to HQ NT Force and to LHQ.
It will be appreciated that these natives even more than
white soldiers must have some relaxation and respite. In all the
circumstances it is suggested that this is an appropriate time to
release all the native members of the crew, including the BADU
Islander KAPIU and the ARNHEM LAND native RAIWALLA from further
military service and to repatriate them.
It is further suggested that the white crew also be
relieved and that an entirely new crew consisting of Army personnel,
with the same establishment as now laid down by Army for any other
vessel of the size and with the same operational function as this
vessel, be appointed in their place.
Two further recommendations are also advanced, which bear
directly on this matter. In view of the known difficulty of
handling the aborigines of EASTERN ARNHEM LAND, and the difficulty
of securing the services of an officer with knowledge, understanding
and regard for these people, the advisability of retaining the
O.P. at CALEDON BAY, with untried personnel, upon which I have now
been asked to state my views, is very much doubted. It appears
probable therefore that it will be advisable to confine the
activities in this area under present conditions to a coastal patrol
by sea.
The second concerns the employment of a native crew. The
responsibility of handling and caring for a native crew necessitates
the employment of men with experience in handling and working
natives in addition to their other qualifications. It is felt that
this difficulty, together with the length of time necessary to
train these natives to handle arms, especially machine guns and
explosives, renders the enlistment of a native crew - unless handled
by experts - a very doubtful proposition.
My conclusion is that it will be advisable from every
standpoint to depend wholly on trained Army personnel to man this
Unit.
Minimum strength of the Unit.
I have today sighted the provisional War Establishment
for the Special Reconnaissance Unit submitted by HQ NT Force and
consider that this is quite inadequate to man a vessel of the size
of the "AROETTA", apart from requirements for shore parties or
patrols.
It will be noted that this War Establishment is much below
that originally set out provisionally in ANQ memoranda, which were
based on my recommendations for an organisation which at that time
was expected to use a much smaller vessel than the "AROETTA" (A.K.
"ROGIKA").
As I have been requested to submit a recommendation as to
the crew which I consider necessary I suggested the following as a
minimum to man the "AROETTA" on patrol duties:
Officers: Two. Thoroughly qualified in sea-going duties and
preferably with operational experience and knowledge
of machine guns and small arms. Each must be capable
of taking a watch and of maintaining the ship.
N.C.Os: Three. 1 Engineer warrant-officer, qualified to
handle and service marine diesel engines.
2. W.T. Operator-Mechanic.
3. Bosun.