Written Records, AWM54 741/5/9 PART 2 - [Patrols - Reconnaissance:] Report on Northern Territory Special Reconnaissance Unit, by Sqn Ldr D F Thomson RAAF [Report minus maps] - Part 3

15.
(d) IMPRESSMENT AUTHORITY.
O.C. 7 M.D.
I, EDMUND FRANCIS HERRING, K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., N.D.,
Major General commanding Armed Forces within the Seventh Military
District by the powers vested in me under the National Emergency
(Control Regulations) do hereby authorise Squadron Leader
DONALD THOMSON RAAF of the absolute authority to impress take
and raise any such goods chattels machinery equipment
boats craft and any other thing already impressed on being used
by the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia or any of
its allies and for such this will be his servant.
Signed at Darwin this 6th day
of April Nineteen Hundred and forty
two.
W.F. WALKER  Major General,
Commanding Seventh Military District.

16.
4. APPRECIATION ANDPLAN BY OC SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNIT
Introduction : General
After the arrival of the Aroetta in Darwin a number of
discussions were held and the role of the ship and crew laid down
in 7 M.D. Operation Order No. 1, a copy of which is attached.
The situation in the North of Australia had changed
considerably since the original discussions with the Commandant in
August; there were reports of pro-Japanese activities along the
Arnhem Land coast in the Arafura Sea, and anxiety was felt about
the position of the Roper River on the East coast and the Daly
and Victoria Rivers on the West, which were considered to be extremely
vulnerable in view of the opportunities they presented to an enemy
approaching our lines of communication.
Captain Morgan and two Sergeants of the Land Reconnaissance
Party were still operating on the west flank but no organisation had
been set up on the east. In view of the fact that there was a stretch
of coastline, without any organised military or naval patrol, extending
from Darwin east to the Gulf of Carpentaria for about 1,000 miles, and
that this area could most easily be worked by sea within a small craft
at this time of the year, it was decided that the Aroetta should
first work in the east flank, proceeding as far as the Roper River.
On the outward journey a thorough reconnaissance was to be made of the
whole coastline and of the islands off the coast, contact was to be
made with the natives, and intensive work carried out among these
people to undermine and destroy Japanese prestige. At the same time,
the nucleus of a native unit to be used for guerilla fighting and
scouting, was to be organised, trained and taken to the Roper River
for later work of the same character on the vulnerable west flank.
Appreciation of the Situation.
After being held up in Darwin for some days by cyclonic
conditions the Aroetta sailed from Darwin on February 18th. We had
a period of approximately five weeks as is laid down in the Operation
Instruction (page  ) to carry out the following work.
(i) An intensive reconnaissance of the area as far west as
the Roper River.
(ii) To establish contact with the natives throughout this area
especially where Japanese influence was known to have been
an important factor.
(iii) To form the nucleus of a scouting and fighting Unit.
The preliminary reconnaissance carried out on the journey
westward from Groote Eylandt to Darwin had only served to stress the
vulnerability of this area, when in the whole of the voyage from
Groote Eylandt to Darwin, a distance of some 2-300 miles, we had not
sighted a ship, or were challenged by an aircraft.
Probable Enemy Approaches
It was not considered likely that the Japanese would land at
any point on the coast of Arnhem Land or that there would be any
advantage in this, but it was considered possible that we would have
to meet :-
(i) landings by aircraft
(ii) infiltration by paratroops, or
(iii) parties landed from small ships or submarines
might occupy the aerodromes at Milingimbi and Groote Eylandt. It was
also considered possible that such parties, operating on a commando
basis, might land in the vicinity of the Alligator Rivers, the Roper
River or the McArthur, and from those points, infiltrate the near
flanks and lines of communication.

17.
Further, in view of the very great interest that the
Japanese had, to my knowledge and experience, arrived in this
area during 1935 and 1937, and possibly much more recently, and
their efforts to ingratiate themselves with the natives, it was
considered possible that they might attempt to make use of the
natives of Liverpool River and Cape Stewart areas, (some of whom they
had actually transported to work on luggers in 1937), as pilots
for craft approaching the east flank of Darwin. The natives are
expert pilots in inshore waters and have an infallible sense of
direction even at night.
It was known that Japanese interest and contact had not
been equal along the length of the Arnhem Land coast, but that the
area of most intensive interest and contact with the natives was
between Melville and Bathurst Islands; north of Darwin, west as far
as Cape Stewart. From Cape Stewart to the Wessel Islands including
especially, the islands of the Crocodile Group, and Elcho Island,
the Japanese had also operated and while they made some contacts
with the natives here, they had not met with the forces that they
had encountered to the east, at the Goyder River, the Liverpool, the
Blythe and at Cape Stewart itself.
Since 1935 they do not appear to have attempted to land
in the area to the south of Cape Arnhem, for the fighting natives
of Caledon and Blue Mud Bay had always disliked the Japanese and
had murdered many of the crews of the visiting luggers, the last
occasion being in 1932, when they attacked and killed most of the
crews of the luggers at Caledon Bay.
During 1937 there were many Japanese vessels on this coast
and I had seen some 70 vessels at anchor and in sight at one time off
Mooroonga in the Crocodile Group. During an aerial reconnaissance
of this area in a RAAF plane in May of last year, I continued a
series of official expeditions of these flanks of coast and also
boarded several of them. They carried about fifteen men each, so
that there must have been about 1,000 - up there in the area at that
time. The crews of the these vessels had gone to great lengths to
ingratiate themselves with the natives and give them presents
of clothes, knives, axes, mirrors and beads out of all proportion
to the services rendered.
These facts were reported fully at that time, but in the
meantime no attempt had been made since I left the area in 1937, to
make contact systematically with these native seafaring tribes, and
nothing had been done to undermine or minimise the effects of
Japanese contacts with them.
____________________________________________________________________
NOTE:
The native [[?]] [[tribal?]] men and boys have long been renowned
as fighters and have been greatly feared from earliest times. They
are not to be regarded as [[untamed?]] or untouched in the sense that
these terms may be applied to other North Australian aborigines. For
Mathew Flinders recorded that in 1802 he found 20 Malay prows in this
area, and he estimated that there were at least 1,000 Malays, from
Macassar in [[?]] [[?]] the area at that time. The Malays
established themselves on friendly terms with the aborigines, and
made annual visits, arriving with the N.W. Monsoon and returning
with the S.E. and [[?]] [[?]] a tradition of respect amounting
almost to hero worship. [[?]] [[?]] [[?]] with the Malays gave these
people a confidence and an independence that they later lost, and
they have seen countless [[?]]and [[?]] take territory and their womenfolk
against casual [[?]].  [[?]] [[?]] since the white man has
usually been the aggressors [[the?]] [[?]] gained a reputation that they
have not deserved, and [[?]] [[?]] [[?]] the Japanese who have
landed here have from time to time [[?]] [[?]] and killed.

18.
It was evident, therefore, that in order to carry out
effectively the undertaking with which I had been entrusted, a
considerable amount of work would have to be carried out, especially
between Van Diemen Gulf and Cape Stewart, to destroy Japanese
influence among these natives with whom the Japanese had undoubtedly
been able to establish a [[?ing]].
It was, therefore, necessary to allocate the time available
in order to make thorough contact with these natives, who by reason
of their comparative proximity to Darwin had already much contact
with trepang fishermen and in the past, with buffalo hunters and
were therefore extremely skilled and sophisticated in order to
deny them to the enemy as guides and pilots, if landings should be
attempted on the east flanks of Darwin.
At the same time their contact with the Japanese rendered
these natives less suitable to participate in a force intended for
guerilla fighting and it was, therefore, planned to raise this force
from among the people in Western Arnhem Land, who were notoriously
hostile to the Japanese, and had already killed many of them, who
were skilled in guerilla fighting and expert in ambush, and who still
engaged in intermittent tribal warfare. Moreover, I already knew
these patrols well and had won their respect and allegiance, was
thoroughly trusted by them and even spoke their language.
But important [[???]] surveys to be carried out among the
natives was [[?]] and in training them as guides and pilots to
the enemy [[?]] were other factors to be considered.
In any appraisal of the situation [[?]] that there were
these very vulnerable people in this in the area in which this unit was to
operate: Milingimbi, Groote Eylandt and the Roper River. At
Milingimbi and at Groote Eylandt there were "A" Class armaments,
and at Groote Eylandt, there was in addition, a well equipped Flying
Boat Base, with fuel stocks, fuelling facilities, barges and tenders,
and an Arafura Station. Groote Eylandt Flying boat base was quite
[[?]], and at which much of the [[?]][[?]]were with two to three
personnel rated as " guards". In the state of our
defences at that time, and with the great lack of aircraft for
the defences even of Darwin itself, it appeared that these [[?advanced]]
aerodromes were a liability rather than an asset of greater potential value to the enemy than to ourselves. Moreover, as it was not
possible to carry out regular aerial or naval patrols of the Arafura
Sea and the Gulf of Carpentaria, it was evident that an enemy force
moving out to sea if the middle of the Gulf of Carpentaria, and
taking its final approach at night, would reach the Roper River
undetected and would then be in a suitable position to move rapidly
up to the G. of C.
PLAN
On this day [[?]] the following general plan was made:
1. After leaving Darwin the Aroetta would sail to the eastern
side of Van Diemen Gulf.
2. On this westward journey the first objective would be to locate
new principal natives for [[?]] in the area.   Where possible this
work would be carried out by sea but if necessary land patrols
would be made to [[?]] [[?]] contact with the natives.
3. It was considered particularly important to establish contact
with the natives between Cape [[Don?]] and Cape Stewart to enable an
accurate assessment to be made of the extent of Japanese
influence among the people and of their present attitudes, and to
somehow systemically to destroy this influence.

19.
4. Although it was not considered advisable to recruit any
substantial proportion of the native force among these
natives, for the reasons stated above, it was intended to
enlist two or three reliable men to carry them on the
vessel and to train them to work thoroughly so that
if Japanese should land on the east flanks of Darwin, these
natives would be available to act as guides and to assist us
in penetrating enemy occupied territory.
5. On the completion of this part of the programme, it was
intended to enlist natives for the force required, from among
groups east of Cape Stewart, over as wide an area as possible,
and particularly in the Arnhem - Caledon Bay districts, selecting
representative members of the groups in each area so that
if a larger force should later be required, the natives already
enlisted would be used to gather their own clansmen.
6. To reconnoitre carefully each possible point of enemy attack,
and its hinterland, particularly the aerodromes at Milingimbi
and Groote Eylandt, the flying boat base at Groote, and the
approaches to the Roper River. The recently recruited native
force to be used for this work, in order that we should become
sufficiently familiar with these areas to be able to penetrate
them even under cover of darkness, mines, with an enemy in
occupation, this was the only means by which a force so small
could hope to operate effectively, and to carry out demolition
and sabotage work.
It was explained that if an enemy should occupy the
aerodromes mentioned, it would be possible to land a party
composed chiefly of natives, who themselves specialise in night
attacks, to destroy aircraft on the ground, equipment and fuel
depots, using Molotov Cocktails, hand grenades and T.S.W.'s.
7. To select, with the regard to all the possibilities, suitable
sites for depots in which stores and ammunition could be
dispersed and concealed so that in the event of the Aroetta
being lost by enemy action, we would still possess sufficient
reserve of equipment, arms and ammunition, including demolition
materials, to be able to carry on a guerilla campaign indefinitely.
8. NARRATIVE
(i) THE A.K. AROETTA ON PATROL 1942-1943
Advantage was taken of the period spent in Darwin to learn as
much as possible of the plans for the defences of the area and of the
disposition of troops defending the lines of communication so that
if an enemy landing should take place, which at this period seemed
not impossible, I would be in a position to assess the situation
likely to develop in the Darwin area and thus to carry out my own
role on the eastern flanks to better effect.
The ship was loaded to capacity with fuel and stores - the
latter sufficient for six months related service, not only for the
crew of the vessel, but also for a small native force. The utmost
assistance was rendered at headquarters by Ordnance and by all branches
to equip the Unit for its special role. It must be borne in mind
also that the situation at this time was such that it was quite
probable that the vessel might not be able to return to Darwin for
any further stores or ammunition. It was aimed therefore to secure
sufficient stores and equipment to enable this flank force to hold
out and continue to fight in the event of an enemy occupation of
the area.

20.
Although ammunition had been allocated initially up to
the full scale for the number of weapons held, I had not felt
justified in taking any of this for necessary practice until I was
assured of replacement. In Darwin we set out to obtain additional
A.A. protection and also sufficient ammunition to enable that
practice to be carried out with all the weapons which gives men
confidence in their fire power, and in their own ability to handle
them, which is vital to the morale of a small, self-contained Unit.
At the end of January and early in February, severe, almost
cyclonic, storms swept the Darwin area, delaying the departure of the
ship for some 10 days. This delay was used to full advantage
however, and during this period we were able to obtain a twin Browning
.50 calibre gun, and to have a mount made for this. We were able
to obtain the services of United States armourer to mount the gun
and to give instruction in stripping and maintenance.
We obtained, through the good officer of the Air Officer
Commanding R.A.A.F. Darwin (Group Captain Scherger) 60,000 rounds
of "hang-fire" ammunition .303 which though it was condemned for
synchronised aircraft guns, was of great value to this Unit, and for
the first time we had sufficient ammunition for adequate practice.
The .30 calibre Browning gun had just come from Manila in a
H.17 that had been riddled with bullets. The gun was very foul and
showed signs of its ordeal. We declined an offer to leave the guns
to be stripped and cleaned, however, realising that at this time
the chief consideration was to get them aboard the vessel and to see
tha t they did not leave again under any pretext. For the remainder
of our stay in port these guns were guarded jealously. The aircraft
mounting was retained, and this adapted to a heavy mount on the top
of the charthouse, where the best area of fire could be obtained.
When the guns were mounted however, we found that we could
obtain only 2.00 rounds. It was some months before .50 calibre
ammunition was available in any quantity except for aircraft. As a
special favour I obtained a further small quantity from the U.S.
Ordnance Officer and having exhausted all other avenues, made a
requisition through the A.A.Q.M.G. (Lt. Col. Peters D.F.C.) at 7 M.D.
Headquarters. Col. Peters passed me to the Military Liaison Officer
with U.S. Forces, who in turn passed me to the Colonel in Command.
The Colonel received my request for 2,000 rounds of link loaded A.F.
and tracer ammunition with the greatest courtesy, approved the issue
of this amount and, to my dismay passed me to the same Ordnance Officer
with whom I had been dealing previously, and to whom I was already
indebted for all the ammunition obtained. This Officer received the
request however without flinching, and parted with the 2,000 rounds
as if we had never met before.
In Darwin we had one long air raid alert, and the members
of the U.S. Army Air Corps, with whom we met frequently, prophesied
that the Japanese would be over in force at any time. By the end
of the first week in February we were fully equipped, and the ship
was loaded down to the copper line. Weather reports were very bad
however, and at the advice of the King's Harbour Master, we remained
in port until the weather was settled. On February 12th we sailed
from Darwin, proceeding east.
Before leaving Darwin we were warned by the Naval Examination
Service that a Japanese mine field had been laid in Clarence Straits
and that this area was closed to shipping. A lock out was posted on
the mainmast and a close lookout maintained for enemy mines.
February 13th.
The "Aroetta" anchored under the lee of South Vernon Islands.
A small double ended craft was then anchored in a bay to the southward
and an examination was made of this ship. The vessel proved to be
owned by a buffalo shooter named Black and had on board a party including
Black and one of the lightkeepers from CAPE DON Lighthouse, en
route for DARWIN.

21.
A landing was made on the mainland opposite South Vernon
Island and a report obtained from a white man resident there, of many
mines which were said to be stranded well above the high water mark in
Shoal Bay, close to Gunn Point, was passed by W.T. to Headquarters,
7 M.D. on that date.
During the night of February 12th, a native sentry reported
that a flying-boat had landed under one of the Vernon Islands. An
aircraft, apparently a flying boat, showing a single white light was
subsequently observed flying in the general direction of DARWIN, and
this was also reported by W.T.
It was considered advisable to break W.T. silence to enable
these two reports to be transmitted, in view of the close proximity
of the ship to DARWIN.
February 14th - to 18th.
On Feb. 14th moderately rough conditions with a following
sea were experienced in Van Diemen Gulf. The "AROETTA" entered
a broad but comparatively shallow river to the westward of MOGOGOUT
Island on the eastern side of Van Diemen Gulf. The leadline had to
be used constantly as the inshore waters are unchartered.
A party consisting of the O.C. Reconnaissance party, and
one aboriginal, Raiwalla, was landed here and commenced the work of
making contact with natives who might have been in touch with Japanese
pearlers in recent years. he '"AROETTA" in charge of Sergeant (now
Lieutenant) Palmer, then sailed for MOUNTNORRIS BAY via Dundas Strait
where a rendezvous was arranged on 15th or 16th.
The objective of the shore party was to locate the camp of
Mr. Rueben Cooper, a half-caste aboriginal who was understood to have
been operating a saw mill in this neighbourhood for some years and
who has been in close contact with the natives of the Coburg Peninsula.
A course to the north west, towards the hinterland of
MOUNTNORRIS BAY on the northern shore line was est, but during the
whole journey which occupied two days, during February 14th and 15th
no recent tracks or signs of occupation were noted.
The whole of this area was found to be completely depopulated
and no evidence of recent occupation by natives was seen until the
northern shoreline was reached. Native foods, especially vegetable
foods and yams were very abundant and it would have been easy to subsist
on the country. Inland game was not plentiful, but fish was
abundant on the northern shoreline and easily procured. It was
later ascertained that Cooper's camp and sawmill is now to the westward
of the course followed - about three miles inland from the
eastern entrance to BOWEN Straits, and also that the natives of this
area are not all concentrated at Cooper's camp, the newly established
Croker Island (Methodist) Mission for halfcastes, which is situated
at the head of a bay on the east side of Croker Island, and at
Goulburn Island. This means however that they are the more sophisticated
and more closely in touch with movements.
February 15th
MOUNTNORRIS BAY was reached by the overland party about midday
on February 16th. On February 16th, at 1015 hrs, the "AROETTA"
anchored in this Bay. A heavy N.W. squall was encountered and an
anchorage made on the east of Croker Island, a few hours later.

February 16th
On February 16th, a landing was located at which there was
two huts and signs of recent occupation, at the eastern end of
BOWEN STRAIT. A motor car track leading way from this landing was
followed inland for about two miles. The country was undulating,
rough and gravelly with moderately heavy timber. Heavy rains had
just fallen and the area was inundated for miles. There was an
excellent supply of permanent water in a running creek; (Apparently
permanent). It was subsequently learned that the present camp and
saw mill of Mr. N. Cooper was situated about a mile inland from
this point at which by party turned back.
February 17th
On February 17th, a visit was made to the Mission Station
at Croker Island. There is an excellent harbour at the mission, with
deep water to within 2 or 3 hundred yards of the beach. The white
personnel then at the island consisted of three men and four women.
There were about eighty half castes, including girls up to the age
of 16 or 17 at the mission station. There was also a native camp
on the beach at the anchorage.
The W.T. set, which was employed for Naval coastwatching,
as well as on private traffic, was unserviceable and Sergeant Harvey
R.A.A.F. was sent ashore to examine the set, which he was able to
repair, restoring communication with V.I.D. DARWIN.
February, 18th
On February 18th, the ship sailed for Malay Bay where I was
anxious to examine the country thoroughly for any sign of recent
occupation of JAPANESE, and also to make contact with any natives
who might be in the area. A landing was made on the afternoon of
the 18th. No signs of recent occupation by natives was noted, and
it was afterwards learned that the entire area from Van Diemen Gulf
to Goulburn Is. is depopulated and the native population now gathered
into the mission stations. Game was plentiful in the country surrounding
Malay Bay and old tracks of water buffalo were noted, but
no buffalo were met with either here or on the overland journey
carried out on foot from Van Diemen Gulf to MOUNTNORRIS BAY. Game
including fish, and native vegetable foods were abundant throughout
this area of coastline fringing the Arafura Sea, and would undoubtedly
support large bodies of men who were skilled in fieldcraft; but it
is appreciated that there appears at present to be no valid reason
why this country should be occupied by Japanese forces and the
information is merely reported for record purposes.
February 19th.
On the morning of February 19th the O.C. Recce party, set
off overland on foot to the northern shoreline, arranging a rendezvous
with the A.K. "AROETTA" which proceeded ahead to an anchorage there.
February 20th
The vessel sailed from anchorage at 0615 hours and
anchored at South Goulburn Island the same day. Mr. and Mrs. Kentish
Methodist Missionaries, were still in residence at the Mission with
their three children. It was learned that arrangements were being
made by the Methodist Missionary Society and the Department of Native
Affairs to evacuate Mrs. Kentish and her children, but that

23.
Mr. Kentish proposed to remain.^x It was stated by
Mr. Kentish that evacuation through DARWIN was being arranged and
that a vessel would be sent by Govt. or Defence authorities from
DARWIN to move the mission personnel, possibly with the aid of the
Mission vessel LAMRAPAN, from Milingimbi.
A consultation was held by the O.C. Reconnaissance Party
with Mr. Kentish during the evening regarding his own role after the
evacuation of Mrs. Kentish. As Mr. Kentish has been carrying out
naval coast watching work and as the proximity of the mission
buildings with the conspicuous wireless aerials close to the landing
ground rendered his station liable to attack by reconnaissance
aircraft, Mr. Kentish was advised to move his W.T. set some distance
into the bush to a bark hut or other inconspicuous shelter where he
could continue his work of reporting ships and aircraft with less
risk of detection and interference. Mr Kentish undertook to adopt
thissuggestion. He also asked what assistance he could render to
the country in the event of active enemy operations.
The importance of denying the natives to the enemy as guides
and informants was impressed upon Mr. Kentish, and the necessity of
keeping in the closest possible contact with these people was also
stressed. This was considered particularly important on account
of the long association of the natives in the neighbourhood of
Goulburn Island, the King River, the Liverpool and Cape Stewart, with
Japanese from DARWIN, Thursday Island, and especially from overseas,
from 1936 to 1937 onward. Many of these natives have had long
experience on boats working and and out of Darwin and its approaches,
and as they were closely associated with the Japanese in recent years
it is considered that the constitute a very real danger. It seems
not impossible that if enemy landings should be contemplated on the
near flanks of Darwin by enemy forces employing small boats, Japanese
fishermen who manned luggers which formerly worked on this coast,
might be employed by the enemy to collect natives with special local
knowledge.
It should be stressed, however, that the danger of the
employment of these natives by the Japanese is much greater in the
areas extending westward from Cape Steward that to the East where the
natives are more warlike and where they have a strong antipathy for
the Japanese, and where the have since been recruited to form a
strong fighting unit.
Mr Kentish expressed his willingness to carry on this
"propaganda" work, which I commenced and which I made my first
objective along the entire coastline, but, as a missionary, he
expressed doubt when it was suggested that he might also encourage
the natives to harry Japanese landing parties and to kill them from
ambush/an undertaking in which they excel. It is hoped that in the
event of Japanese activities in this region, or of any sign of
renewed Japanese interest, to visit the area in person or to detach
a member of the party, with some of the enlisted native force so as
to prevent active co-operation by the natives with the enemy.
__________________________________________________________________
x Footnote.
Mr Kentish was captured by the Japanese, and is now a prisoner.
He was aboard the "PATRICIA CAM" when this vessel was sunk by a
Japanese fleet plane near the Wessel Islands in Jan. 1943. After
the ship was sunk the float plane landed on the water and took
Mr Kentish aboard the aircraft. It is reported that on the following
day the Goulburn Island Station was machine gunned.
NOTE: The foregoing portion of the narrative was written some time
before the remainder of the reports. In order to avoid unduly
lengthening the narrative however it will be necessary to curtail
this considerably. The log of the vessel, covering the entire
voyage, is however attached as an appendix to the report.

24.
The fact which had not been made clear to the natives by the
missionaries that they were not at liberty to lend their services
as guides, or to bestow their allegiance at will, was impressed
upon them. They were given clearly to understand that any active
assistance rendered to the enemy would inevitably result in their
being themselves treated as enemies and it is anticipated that
this will have a strong deterrent effect.
February 21st.
On February 21st the "AROETTA" sailed from Goulburn
Island. No native camps were seen along the coast or in the
vicinity of Rolling Bay and the vessel was therefore taken into
the Liverpool River where there is a safe anchorage and abundant
fresh water, to enable contact to be made with the natives of this
area. The Liverpool River was a region of intensive Japanese
contact from 1936 and 1937 onwards. Two reliable natives from
this territory who were at Goulburn Island, were taken aboard the
vessel there as crew and the the aid of these natives contact
was made with the people at the Liverpool River where there was
a large camp.
A reconnaissance was made by motor launch for some distance
up the Liverpool to determine the upper limit to which a small craft
could be taken, and to survey the country generally along the river.
As stated in the preliminary "Appreciation", the natives of
The Liverpool - Cape Steward areas were so much in contact with the
Japanese that no attempt was made to enlist men here, with the
exception of the ten who had already been brought from Goulburn
Island.
February 24th
On February 24th the ship sailed west, passing Cape
Steward, to enter the Crocodile Islands during the same afternoon.
A call was made at Milingimbi, and the vessel then taken up the
Derby Creek where it was desired to establish contact with the
natives of the camp from which Raiwalla, who had been enlisted
in Darwin, had been taken on the journey west. On the afternoon
of the following day I set out with the motor launch for Cape
Stewart where it was especially desired to make contact with the
natives returning the following night. An important ceremony
was about to take place there, and in consequence there was a very
large gathering of the groups from the neighbouring territory.
Throughout this voyage eastwards, every effect was made to
impress the natives with the armament and striking force of the ship,
so that a greatly exaggerated idea of the size and armament would be
spread among the people. The natives were shown racks containing
tiers of rifles in the main cabin, and whenever possible machine gun
practice was carried out to impress them, particularly at night when
the most effective use could be made of tracer ammunition.
The object of these demonstrations was to impress upon the
natives the fact that the vessel was very might better equipped and
more powerfully armed than the Japanese craft of a somewhat similar
type as the "AROETTA", which had been on this coast in large numbers.
During this time valuable service was rendered by Raiwalla, whose
loyalty never flagged and who carried on anti-Japanese propaganda
in their language.
On leaving Derby Creek the vessel proceeded, via Milingimbi
through the outlying Islands of the Crocodile Group, across
Castlereagh Bay and thence into the Goyder River. In the meantime
Raiwalla had been sent to carry out a patrol overland from Derby
Creek to old Arafura Station site, thence across the Glyde River
to muster the natives from the area at the mouth of the Goyder.
Some natives were enlisted in the guerilla unit at Derby Creek, and
additional numbers were attached from the groups which now accompanied
Raiwalla on his overland journey.