Major Henry Charles David Marshall - Wallet 2 - Booklet 9 - Part 3

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where we were met by the Brigadier who warned us use in the

morning or I should say daylight.  He warned Theo for a

personal reconnaissance with him at daylight and we

spent the rest of the night in a very close bivouac in a

small orchard or rather grove of fruit trees sleeping on

cobbled stones with which it was paved.  In the morning

at dawn Theo met the Brigadier who said we were urgently

wanted for a rearguard action, and to get into a covering

position on 42^nd St with the utmost urgency and despatch.

42^nd St was a name given to a sunken road through this

camp.  Theo had only time to allot our frontage by measurement

Comd D were forward A and B in reserve and E Coy were also

but so placed to a flank that they became our reserve in

case the two companies of the 8 Bn who were on our right should

repeat their performance of yesterday and break.  Our left

was the 19 NZ Bn and further on the 28 Maoris.  I must say

here that the 8 Bn retrieved themselves this day.  We were

barely in position when we were attacked by rifle fire.  The

bullets whipped through the trees above our heads and

caused a great deal of panic amongst men of all units

scattered about.  I mean rather masterless men of all units

had lost their units and were not under commands.  They

started shouts of "They're here" and running and one

or two threw their arms away.  We soon stopped this by

very forceful means and threats to shoot anyone running.

It was dangerous from mass psychology and was nipped in

the bud.  The men concerned were mostly base troops i.e.

workshops etc. and only needed a leader.  After this things

settled down and Theo and I rested in the sun in a

clearing at the junction of two paths.  Suddenly a plane

appeared from nowhere and dropped its load of six bombs.

We threw ourselves over on our faces and lay flat.  The first

landed, then the next nearer, then the third very close

and we wondered about the fourth.  It seemed due right

on us but it landed just as much the other side of us

as the third was from us.  The fifth and sixth did not

matter.  The great wonder was that we were untouched.

Diagrammatically it was like this.

 

See original diagram 

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We had patrols out in front of us and so did the enemy. The

fire fight continued between the patrols for some time.  C Coys

patrol held on about 500 yards forward of our position.  The 

enemy now pressed the attack very heavily against the 8 Bn

and ourselves.  An incident occurred here which if you remind

me when reading it I will tell you.  Miller could see that

the pressure was becoming so heavy on his patrol forward

[[?]] that the enemy were massing for an attack so he

decided to relieve the pressure by a counter attack and

made his preparations accordingly.  Nelson with D Coy had

also come to the same decision and he informed us of the

position.  Theo gave the order immediately and pushed the

reserve Coys A and B forward to the positions vacated by C

and D.  I must admit we were excited and wanted to be in

it and when Theo took Halliday forward as the Coy Cdr.

next likely to be used I went too.  I should not have.  One

of us should have stayed behind and because I was 2 i/c I

was the one to remain.  We met Nelson who had been hit in 

the shoulder and was dazed coming out of the fight.  Theo

asked him why and he said he was just testing his pistol.

He then fired a shot into the bank and disappeared back

into the fight.  He must have been very dazed for the best

way to have tested his pistol was in the direction of the

enemy.  Halliday recalled us to our job and Theo sent me

back and to bring E Coy further forward into a handier

position.  The attack of C and D Coys was very successful

and must rank with our best achievements.  They pushed

the enemy back over a mile in a very hot fight and the

success cleared the front for us for four hours.  The

Maoris on the left joined in the bayonet charge as

well and did their bit to clear their front.  The Maoris

always like the cold steel and were their best in a

bayonet charge.  The fire fight recommenced and

gradually increased again in intensity as time

went on. C and D Coys returned to reserve and

brought with them 3 prisoners who at first were very

scared.  We searched them and bound up their wounds

and they calmed down.  We pushed them off to Brigade

and that was the last we saw of them.   As I have just said the

firefight increased in intensity and there was a steady stream of

casualties both during and after the attack through BHQ from all

parts of the front to the RAP where Godby and a N.Z. doctor treated

the casualties of both the N.Z's and ourselves.  The enemy had

brought up his mortars and was constantly searching the whole

front.  I first learnt to fear these weapons there as they were both

noisy and very effective.  They completely outranged our own

mortars.  Whilst at Canea we had obtained two mortars, bipods

and ammunition  but no base plates.  Search could not find

these so Keith Travis and his Engineers constructed two cross

pieces of heavy wood bolted together.  They were not guaranteed 

to last long and we could not have any chance of trying them

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One section was placed with A Coy who had to endure most of

the receipt of the enemy presents in the way of bombs.  The enemy

gradually advanced during the day but as our mortar was so

far outranged they just had to lay doggo  Then came the situation

they had waited so long for.  The enemy advanced his mortar into 

our limits and our mortar went into action.  They got off about

ten bombs before the improvised base plate broke but with the

second or third obtained a direct hit on the enemy mortar

and completely put it out of action, which gave much relief

to all of us.  I had been three or four times to the forward

companies during the day and knew quite well the feelings

of anger and ineffectiveness that we all felt whilst under the

longer range fire.  I also went across the front and established 

the fact that there was no gap between ourselves and the 19 NZ

Bn who were next on our left.  On one of these trips coming

back I ran across some food and brought as much as 

possible.  Passing a deep slit trench I was startled by a move

and investigating found the Padre in the deepest around

and some distance from BHQ.  He was rather disinclined to

leave but there was no air attack and the enemy rifle

fire was well over our heads.  Finally I got him back with

me but later he disappeared again somewhere.  Its my

candid opinion that he was now completely bomb happy as

well as punch drunk.  In the afternoon we saw through glasses

an enemy detachment which we later learnt was a mountain

company moving up the hills away on our left and

disappearing from sight somewhere towards the rear.  After

Nelson's wound he was evacuated and one officer was

superseded by Wicking to the command of D Coy.  Macfarlane

also was evacuated sick and McQueen took over B Coy.

We received orders to withdraw that night at 9.15 pm and

march to Neon Kerrion or further if possible.  During the

time left to us we destroyed all unnecessary gear we

could not carry and lightened ourselves as far as possible.

Rations were scarce as no effective supply system was

functioning - the rest of the force during the day having

continued the withdrawal march to Spharkia  and also

because most of the dumps were now either in the enemies

hands or so close that we could not operate from them.

During the late afternoon remnants of the rearguard of the

night before came back across the hills on our right near

the 8Bn.  They had been badly knocked about having

been caught in the pocket of Canea and the Valley Road

which we had avoided by our move to the left.  About 8.15

pm. Keyes of the 8Bn sent a message that one of our men (that

is British) who had been taken prisoner earlier in the day

had escaped and brought in the news that the enemy

were going to stage an attack that night.  He and Theo met

and in the absence of the Brig. Theo weighed all the 

considerations and decided to carry on with the original 

order to withdraw.  It was impossible to do so at 9.15 however

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as it was still daylight and we were pinned down by the fire

fight and it would have been exceedingly difficult and

hazardous to try as well as laying ourselves open to an

immediate attack with our forces withdrawing.  Any break

through us would mean the complete overwhelming of the

rest of the force then marching southwards. He delayed out

withdrawal an hour and at 10.15 we started by which time

it was dark.  Just at dusk a high dump of oil and petrol between

the two lines caught fire and we anticipated trouble from it

in lighting up the country.  However it did not worry us because 

the Germans did it for us, as I will explain later.  My job was

to go to the junction of the coast road and a small light 

railway and check through the companies.  The N.Zs went

out and then the reserve company of ours passed through

and marched off past the Naval barracks.  Then C and D

companies and B Coy who had disengaged themselves.

O'Reilly and I were waiting for A Coy when suddenly the

reported attack of the Germans started. In retrospect it was

a wonderful fireworks display - flares of all colours lighting up

the sky and mortar bombs landing in our forward area.  At

the time I was not so impressed for A Coy had not reported and

they may have had more difficulty than B Coy in disengaging.  The

main attack seemed to be on their area.  Just at our point a

Commando Bn which had landed the day before had established

a post - they were forming a rearguard to us.  I stood there in the

darkness wondering what had happened to A Coy and as the

fire attack of the Germans had slackened I began to wonder if

they had come out some other way.  It was not too nice standing

alone wondering whether the next figure might be a German.

Fletcher too had passed through in a truck with our wounded

who had not been evacuated so I started walking about.

I questioned some other Commando posts but they had not

seen A Coy or it they had did not know it.  I walked on

about 200 yards and around a square and ran right into

A Coy who were just moving off.  I was relieved I can tell you.

Theo had by now gone on with the rest of the Bn so we

marched up the road past the Naval barracks after them.

We passed through a road block manned by marines

went past the first nights resting place and turned off the

coast road onto what I know as the South Road leading

to Spharkia which we knew as our final embarkation point.

From the junction the road rose sharply up to the hills

and when we reached the top two big explosions behind

let us know the Engineers had blown the road to further

delay the advance of the enemy.  I have not many clear

recollections of this night as I was very tired but not so

tired as I was to be some days later.  I remember

passing through the New Zealanders in front of us and

continuing on down the road.  Theo had stopped the

Bn and formed them up on the road where we caught up

with them.  A single enemy plane caused us a long halt

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as it dropped some flares which burnt for what seemed

an interminable time as we were xxxx lying in the

ditch with our faces to the earth.  White faces show up in

the flares.  Theo had met Thomas our Intelligence Sergeant

who led us on to a position astride the road near Neon

Kerrion.  On the way we had a halt whilst an "I" tank

negotiated a bridge.  It was near a creek with some water

in it and never did water taste so sweet. - I had been

extremely thirsty and by then I must admit did not

care whether it was contaminated or not.  At one stage of

the march - where I do not know - Theo when we were

ready to move saw what he thought were three or four

sleeping figures under the olive trees.  He tried twice

to waken them before he realised they were dead - killed

on the march by our attack.  An order had not reached

Halliday and E Coy to drop off the march and take up a 

covering position so they had to wakened about two am

and sent back a couple of miles to take up the position and

to withdraw at 6 am.  That I think completes the night of

May 26/27.  Shortly after daylight Brig. Vasey arrived and said

that the enemy were behind us.  Lovely prospect.  He wanted

us to send a Coy to clear a hill behind us - the enemy

probably being the mountain coy we had seen moving off the

day before.  Savige and A Coy were sent and fortunately found

that the report was incorrect and the hill clear although they

had a very stiff long climb to prove it.  He also added that

we were to hold our position as a rear guard until 11.30 or

until the last of the New Zealanders had passed through.  About

9.30 we were attacked but drove them back.  Just about this

time a column of men appeared marching down the road from

our rear to our front waving white flags.  They were Italian

prisoners and we did not know what to do about them.  The

could easily have been stopped but we reckoned that 1000

we too much trouble for us and in any case they would be

of some use in causing trouble to the Germans so we let them

go on.  Just before 11.30 the last N.Z's went through so we

commenced our march back dispersed along the road.

Previous to leaving our last position we had destroyed our

blankets and greatcoats and carried now only ammunition

and weapons.  Our object was to march through another

rearguard position held by the 8 Bn and Commandos

an go into reserve at Balil Inn.  We had several air

attacks on the way but I cannot recall any casualties.

The Bn measured up splendidly in these conditions.  No

good for days after half rations and a very great scarcity

of water but their spirit was unimpaired.  As we passed

through the 8 Bn position the enemy were firing with

mortars on to it.  We stopped just past and dispersed among

the olive groves.  We had hardly got the last company in

when at 3.30 pm we received orders to continue the march at

once straight to the beach.  If we were unable to make it we were

343

to halt at Komatides (NIMBROS) and failing this at NIMBROS (Komatides).  During the

day Theo could not keep up the pace due to the strain of the last

few days and lack of food and water.  I led the march for most

of the day.  He recovered after taking things more quietly and was

himself again.  We had no further interruptions from the air

at at 6 30 had a half hour halt at VYRESTAS  off the road.  We

were terribly short of water and here Fletcher cracked up

physically.  For a short while I thought he was going to die but

we gave him some of our water and he recovered.  We continued

our march dragging up a very steep pass.  On the way we came

to a part of the road which had been blown up by Engineers

before the last troops had passed and some other cursing

engineers were labouring to repair the damage to get half a 

dozen trucks of wounded through as well as a couple of tanks.

There was a small well here and we got some much needed

water.  The troops had to clamber like mountain goats over

the hill and continued.  Just as Russ Savige and I were

moving off last the work was completed and we moved ahead

of the trucks.  About half a mile further on we were stopped

by a sentry who said the road was just about to be blown

in another place.  We remonstrated as we visualised the

same trouble just overcome but he said it was too late as

his mate obeying orders had gone to push the plunger and he

was not too sure where he was.  We called and shouted and

a doctor and I advanced to a curve in the road - both

of us very scared in case we would be blown sky high.

We shouted some more and in one of the silences we heard

two distinct clicks.  He had pushed the plunger but very

fortunately for us and the wounded and tanks had not

set off the explosives.  You can believe me when I say we did

not waste any time in this area.  We continued on and

found Theo had assembled the Bn near a well and

was just about ready to move on.  We got some water and

it was as well we could not see the well.  I saw it later 

and it was filthy.  The Brig picked up Theo and took

him onto Nimbros whilst I continued to march with

the Bn.  We were all very tired after two days marching

and fighting with only two hours sleep and I for one

welcomed the guides to turn us off the road at the

 spot selected by Theo.  All the same we arrived despite

our tiredness in very good order and condition and

the Coys were directed to their areas by Goodwin and

a guide who had been sent forward.  I found BHQ area

was told I was wanted for a conference at dawn and was

so tired I could not be bothered looking for a space to 

sleep but lay face down under a tree on some sharp

small rocks and instantly fell asleep.  Our area was in

and around the village of Askifou only a few miles short of

Nimbros.  That finished May 27.  At 5 am on May 28 only a

very short hour after I had laid down I attended the

conference and the situation was explained to us.  We were

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to have a rest which we badly needed in this area and

continue the march at night.  Some rations were to arrive

amounting to 1/6 tin of Bully and 2 biscuits per head.  That we

got even this much was due to the foresight of Brigadier

Vasey who had filled up one of the Brigades few trucks.  To many

of us it was the first food for two days.  We rested all day

near plentiful water - I slept most of the morning but our calm

was destroyed by the Brigadier who called at 3 pm.  His first

words to Theo was ominous.  "I'm sorry, Walker but you are

for it"  and went on to explain that we were to take up a

rearguard position and cover the embarkation of the

remainder of the force.  This was a blow as we were expecting

to march that night straight down to the beach and embark

onto boats.  Theo then left with Vasey and took the Coy

Cdrs down with him to the position which was just in front 

of Komitides and astride the road.  I was to bring the Bn

along commencing our march at 5 pm along the branch

road we were on onto the main road and then along it.

I may add here that all day we had been resting under

the impression that a rearguard of New Zealanders were

holding the pass behind us.  I was shocked about a

quarter to five to see some two or three men running

down the main road along my route with bursts of

machine gun fire kicking up the dust at their heels.

I could see no sense in obeying my orders as to the

route and as we were now ready I led the Bn across

the fields and struck the road about a mile and a half

further up.  I expected rather to have MG fire on us but

we made the journey without interference.  Where the

supposed rearguard was or whether it was ever there

I do not expect I shall ever know.  On the road we

formed up from single file into threes and swung down

and into Nimbros.  There we had great difficulty in

getting through as troops waiting for embarkation were

assembling and sorting themselves out into 50's.  I

was stopped by various officers who said I could not get

through.  I said I was going to and did.  The Bn was

absolutely splendid and kept formation and we

drove through the press.  (My eyes are getting tired and

my writing is suffering)  I had to break through a

sentry post in one place.  He stuck rather literally

to his orders that no one was to go through and said

he would report me to the Brigadier.  I am afraid

that by this time I was tired of these halts so I

told him very tersely what he could do but nothing

was stopping the 7 Bn going on to do its job.  Later I

was sorry for that poor corporal.  All down the side

of the road parties of 50 in charge of an officer were

waiting to move on.  Several of them caught me by

the arm thinking we were jumping our place in

the line, but I was too tired and angry to worry or 

345

explain and simply brushed them aside.  I sent word

back through the column to beg and steal any

ammunition and weapons from these troops as we

were dangerously short of both.  We had used up a lot 

at Suda Bay and in the following actions, I do not

know how much we succeeded in getting but we got

some Tommy Guns and Brens as well as rifles and

a lot of loose ammunition.  We continued on and

eventually caught up with Theo who was waiting for us and

the Coy Cdrs then took over and placed their companies in

position.  With us was the same troop of artillery as we had at

Georgropolis, what remained of a platoon of 1 MG Regt with a strength of

little over a section and 3 Light Tanks.  May 29. Our position was

astride the road, and very hilly and precipitous.  On our right

was a deep ravine along the edge of which the road ran.  Miller

had to get parts of the cement coping blown out by the Engineers

to give his Bren Gunners a field of fire.  I must combine the

last two days 29 and 30 and 31 as everything is a bit confused.

Early in the morning of the 29^th we were attacked by rifle fire

but the light tanks were still out ahead of us.  They cruised

around and finally had to come in after two had been put

out of action.  The last one we used as a road block and

blew the driving wheel cogs out.  We still had no water or rations

but gradually some appeared.  At no time did we get more

than 1/4 tin of bully beef and 1 pint of water per man, per day.  The

runners to companies - our only means of communication

had to be increased threefold and the journey divided into

relays as they were too weak to climb the hills without constant

rests.  Gradually the enemies fire increased and included

mortars for which we had a great respect.  They knocked one

of the Artillery Guns out and they also suffered casualties.

We could also see the enemy working his way around our

flanks but early in the three days this did not worry us

as much as later for other units were looking after this.

We also had a detachment of marines on our right

on the other side of the ravine which ended just behind

us.  Most of the 29 and 30 were what shall we say?  quiet.

Some desultory fire all the time interspersed with mortars

searching for us.  In one attempt to get us at BHQ they

caused D Coy in front of us some casualties.  I had

occasion to go to and from Brigade a number of times

and I lost so much moisture in perspiration for by now

it was terribly hot that Theo ordered a special ration

of a small mug for me after any such trip.  The runners

to the Coys also received the same and believe me

we needed it.  I also had a great craving for salt.  The

doctors say it was my body protesting at the loss through

sweat.  Derelict trucks lined the road which did not

go right to the beach and everyone had long since

had their radiators milked of all water.  In a 

search for ammunition particularly Anti Tank in

346

back of one truck I may have lost my watch as with

planes over every now and again we had to dash for cover.

In the same circumstances whilst searching a truck I

may have damaged the band in scrambling up an embankment

out of the way of another plane.  Anyway when I discovered my

loss I spent an hour or more going over the route of my journeys

but without success and when I had some machine gun

fire from a plane unhealthily close I decided the watch

was not worth it.  Your letters have since described its

travels - much of them will always be conjecture only.

The afternoon of May 31 was full of incident.  We were now

greatly worried by the enemy whom we could see moving

around our flanks instead of attacking frontally.  We

knew we had nothing to worry about frontal attacks as we feel confident

but surrounding us was different.  In the afternoon between

4 and 5 Major General Weston and Brig. Vasey came up 

and told Theo that we must hold the position for another

24 hours instead of going to the beach as we had hoped.

Theo pointed out the danger from the flanks but said we would

carry out our orders.  He again asked for rations water

and ammunition.  Whilst the orders were being prepared

for the companies I went over to the machine gun position

about 500 yards away to give them the situation.  Just

as I got there the enemy got onto it with automatic

fire so we vacated it in a hurry with the bullets

swishing through the bushes and took shelter between

two rocks on the side of the ravine.  I was just thinking

of going when we heard a distant pop and knew a mortar

had been fired.  I was warned to wait and did so.  I have

spent some bad half hours before but this was the worst.

We had apparently been observed going to this shelter

and the mortar turned on us.  The first one landed

damn close down the side of the ravine and then

a regular procession.  First the pop and then the

bomb arrived.  They all landed so accurately in

a small circle around us that I shall always

hate mortars most.  One just landed on the top of

the rock we were between and a man each side of me

was hit.  One a marine in the forehead and the other

in the buttocks.  Neither was killed but they were nasty

wounds.  How it missed me and the rest Heaven

only knows.  they must have thought they had got us

for they stopped shortly afterwards and we were all

able to get out to safer quarters and get the two wounded

men attended to.  I went back to BHQ where Theo had not

expected me and was recovering from the shock when

the Brigade Major arrived about 8.15 and said that we

were to withdraw after all at 9.15 after the marines and

go straight down to the beach.  Our orders to stand for another

twenty four hours had just gone out so we had to move

quickly.  I went across and warned the MG's to come with us 

347

and to destroy their guns.  Arrangements had been made to leave

our wounded at the RAP where volunteers from the 7^th Fd Amb

were coming to collect them.  Much as we hated it we had to leave

two or three with water and food beside them as we had no

stretchers or means of carrying them with us.  One of the worst

phases of battle and which caused Theo and I much anxiety

earlier in the day I had called in at the RAP which was

a little distance down the road and I think I was able to

help him - Godby.  We was nearly in tears from the effect of having

the Padre and two others whose nerve had been shattered with

him.  They followed him around like lost dogs wherever he

went and were undermining him.  We were wise to withdraw

them as their ailment might have been catching with disastrous

results.  I then went in the dusk to where the road joined

the valley down which we were to withdraw and checked

them through.  From now on started what I consider the

worst experience I have ever been through.  We had sent

the Intelligence section down days before in preparation

to reconnoitre the route. One by one the companies came

down the road - reserve first then the forward Coys and

when only A coy were left Theo went ahead.  One of the Intelligence

men Atock was with me and we shared a tin of potatoes he

had got.  A Coy were rather long in coming through and I was

on pins and needles as the Bn were getting further and

further away.  They finally arrived - extremely tired and

nearly exhausted as they had the most hilly and precipitous 

path to come down.  I could have no mercy on them and

I had to haze them and threaten them and push them

into a faster speed.  We crossed the road and stumbled

on after Atock who was guiding us down the centre of

this rocky valley.  Falls were numerous but I would

permit no delay as I knew that time was against us.

I remember slipping in the dark and landing flat on

my rump three feet lower.  I was sore for days.  One of A Coy

men fell and refused to get up - wanting to be left where he

fell and not caring if he were captured or not.  I got pigheaded

and obstinate and said no one would be left.  I pulled

him up and supported him for the next five miles - every

time we stopped he sagged and pleaded to be left.  Just

before we reached Komatides village there was a halt and

I went forward.  We had caught up with the rest sometime

earlier and I now met Lunn who said the Bn had gone

off on a different route to his reconnaissance and he

could not catch them.  He then dared not leave C Coy

with whom he was with.  I was in a quandary with

two out of the five coys so xxx I had to decide what to do.

Thomas was also there so he guided us over some

nightmare country - then over stone walls and through

the village.  I had great difficulty in keeping the men

together and pressing on particularly when passing

two wells as they were nearly mad for water.  We had a 

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very uneasy passage the other side of the village through

some caves.  Absolutely black and I at the head did

not know whether they had not broken in the turns

and twists in the dark.  We finally got onto the beach

road and Savige reported all through so we plodded 

on hardly able to drag one foot after the other.  I was

more than overjoyed to meet the rest of the Bn.  I went up

to the head and reported and was so exhausted that I

just fell down and went to sleep.  We had been halted for

some time waiting for orders to move onto the beach.  I

am afraid that I know nothing about the events whilst

I was asleep but Theo tells me he was waiting on orders

from Vasey.  He also had Brigade Hqr personnel with him.

As time was getting on he questioned the Staff Captain

who had brought the order - he was evasive and then

threw the responsibility onto Theo.  He decided to move on

and I went to my place at the end of the Bn.  We moved

slowly along and down cliffs similar to the photo I

shall paste in.  As we were going down columns of

men came from all directions and soon the path was

jammed with them.  These were unarmed personnel

who had been waiting for days to get off and whose

embarkation we had been covering.  This story is not

making me very happy in writing it and shall gloss

over some of it.  Theo finally got on to the beach and

put Brigade Hqrs and about twenty or thirty of those of 7 Bn

in the lead onto the landing craft.  Amongst them

were Fletcher and Lunn and BHQ  with Shorty Walker

Passey Theo's batman and mine O'Reilly.  Theo was

on the craft himself but got off to wait until more of the

Bn had been embarked - As we passed along the road

at the top of the cliff we could see the dim shapes of

ships and naval craft including a cruiser and they

made us feel very happy.  The craft went off and we

waited for them to come back.  At the end of the Bn I was

in an indescribable tangle but I think succeeded in

keeping the show together.  Then came the greatest

disappointment of all.  The sound of anchor chains

through the hawse.  Those who had had experience on

the last two nights immediately melted away to their

caves. I followed the Bn which had been slowly

moving and we assembled on the beach.  I found

Theo and we sat on the edge of a stone sea wall.  He

told me then that things were all up and that the

Navy had gone.  It took some time to sink in and

I felt like bursting into tears.  In fact I just lay back

and went dumb.   All our effort and skill wasted.

Smells were everywhere so I did not notice them but

next morning I found that I had lain back beside

a dead Greek who was black - cheerful thoughts for

new day.  Theo and Goodwin had discovered a dump 

349

of rations left on the beach by the Navy and that was one

worry over.  The next - water - I solved in fossicking about

and finding a small one in a house and the Bn filled

up.  Whilst they were doing this Theo and I discussed the

possibilities of fighting our way along the coast in the

hope that the Navy would pick us up.  In the meantime

we had to find some cover for the Bn to disperse as dawn

was not far away.  I searched for and found a way

though the village of Spharkia and returned and

led A, B and C Coys there.  E and D had gone with

Theo to the other side of the valley.  I know they were

alright so I lay down.  I was so exhausted that I could

do no more.  An hour after dawn I woke and called

across the valley to see where Theo was and Wickery

answered that he had gone to capitulate - that we

were to destroy our arms and take to the hills.  I

was so dumbfounded that I made Wickery do the

toil across the valley and explain.  It then

appeared that Major General Weston before he left

had written an order to all troops to capitulate

and it had fallen to Theo as Senior officer left to go 

and do so.  After Wickery had told me the story I explained it

to those on my side and shared out any money I had.  We made

a good job of destroying our arms and those who felt able to make

off in all directions.  Curiously Walker had swum out to a disabled

landing craft and got it going.  It had filled with all sorts of units

marines and our own etc and had commenced its journey to

Africa.  Another one had left sometime previously but not completely 

filled with troops and these exhausted all available craft.  After

seeing to all our jobs Russ Godby, Russ Savige and I made our own

attempt.  A little after 8 we tied up some rations in our 

handkerchiefs - filled water bottles and set off East.  We had a

long tiring job crawling across and around ravines.  It was

to us appallingly hot and we were in no fit condition.  About

two miles away we came across a cave about twelve feet deep

with some mattresses rolled up.  We then made the fatal mistake

of lying down and in our weak condition and our bodies

crying for sleep we succumbed.  We were rather fortunate in

one way in being in the cave as the Germans turned on

an extra special air attack.  Bombs fell in our valley

but we were quite safe although we did wonder if the cave

would fall in.  Russ Godby spent the whole time outside

in some oleander bushes - not from choice but necessity

he was caught there looking for water.  Anyway we awakened

to the fact of shouts from the hill top and Russ Godby looked

out and said that Germans were coming.  We were of course

not armed but Savige and I hid our compasses in crevices

but forgot our glasses in the usual positions around our

necks.  These were taken from us and we were shepherded

along to the general collecting point.  We were prisoners.  What

may have happened without the sleep I do not know.  I am copying

350

the capitulation order.

 

From Major General Weston

To: Lt. Col. Colvin

 

In view of the following facts.

 

a)  My orders direct me to give preference in evacuation to fighting

      troops.  This has reduced the active garrison below what is necessary

      for resistance.

b)  No rations are left this Saturday night. Most of the troops are

     too weak owing to the shortage of food and heavy strain to

     organise further resistance.

c)  The wireless will give out in a few hours and the risk of

     waiting for instructions from Middle East cannot be accepted

     as this will leave the officer in charge without any guidance

     as to his course of action.

d) There is no further possibility of evacuation.

     I therefore direct you to collect such Senior Officers as are

    available in the early hours of tomorrow and transmit

    these orders to the Senior of them.

    These orders direct this officer to make contact with the enemy

    and to capitulate.

 

Signed.  C. Weston

Major General

 

This ends my story of Crete.  I am afraid that I have hurried

over the last few days as even now two years afterwards the

thoughts are bitter and unpleasant.  The larger story of the

island remains untold in this  narrative but our only

consolation is that the 7 Bn under Theo remained to the

last a disciplined wonderful fighting force which had

never been beaten. 

351

Following this I am including extracts from "Camp" the

Newspaper printed for P's.O.W. and giving the mention of our

activities as they appear therein.  The dates shown are the issue

dates of the paper.

 

Jan 5 1941.  In the course of British offensive operations against Italian

Libya there has been heavy fighting during the past fortnight around

Bardia, which lies on the coast some miles from the Egyptian-Libyan

frontier.  The British troops mainly motorised, under General Wavell

have not succeeded in breaking the Italian resistance.

 

Jan 12 1941.  On the evening of Jan 5 in spite of the extremely stubborn

resistance of their troops who caused heavy enemy losses, the last

positions of the Italians in Bardia were taken.  In Italy the fact

is emphasised that the garrison, consisting of two divisions, was

faced by superior enemy forces of at least 250,000 men supported

by strong tank formations as well as by at least 1000 aeroplanes

and the whole of the fleet concentrated at Alexandria.  On  Dec 1

the BBC reported the arrival of fresh British troops.  Further

reinforcements by the British forces were reported to have landed on

the following days.  Since Dec 1 the impending capitulation of

the town was frequently announced.  In their advance

eastwards on Sidi Birrani the Italians had covered hundreds

of miles of desert sand and had overcome all the difficulties  of

supply and transport attendant on such a march.  Now, they

say, it will be the turn of the English to cope with the same

difficulties.  The Italian fighting strength was only slightly

diminished by these events.  The bulk of Italy's armed forces

has not yet entered the battle arena.

 

Oct 2 1941.  British forces continued their offensive in North Africa and

after heavy fighting have taken Tobruk.  Despite the numerical

superiority of the British the Italian defenders had kept up a

stubborn resistance in Tobruk for nineteen days and withstood

the onslaught of a bombardment from land, sea  and air.

 

Feb 9 1941.  In order to avoid the encirclement of the Italians positions

near Derna in the Cyrenaiaca, the Italian High Command ordered

the evacuation of that town and the withdrawal of the Italian

troops to the West and South.

 

Feb 16 1941.  In the North African theatre British troops have captured

Bengasi and have thus practically the whole of Cyrenaica in their hands.

 

Mar 9 1941.  Since the arrival of units of the Luftwaffe in North Africa

the British advance has come to a halt.  In Cyrenaica last week British

troops concentrations, objectives of military importance, and about all

the routes of approach which are of paramount importance is the British

Forces were very thoroughly bombed. On two occasions during the week

German and British armoured patrols came into contact along the

Libyan Coast.  A number of British armoured vehicles were destroyed 

and some prisoners were taken.  There were no German losses.

 

352

Mar 16 1941.  The bombing operations against enemy forces in 

Cyrenonean  was continued.

 

Mar 30 1941.  British forces have captured Giarabub after a seige

lasting several months.  Otherwise there was no great land

operations in North Africa.

 

April 6 1941.  In Cyrenaica, English troops were forced back last

week for the first time.  After a short fight El Agheila on the coast

of Syrte Bay was occupied by German and Italian motorised

troops on March 24, the enemy being driven back eastwards.

considerable war material was captured.

 

June 1 1941.  Englands last bulwark in Greek territory was the island

of Crete which extending for over 80 miles was like an enormous 

bolt in the south of Greece, blocking the Aegean Sea and forming

an important base for the control of the whole Mediterranean 

area.  Last week operations were begun by the forces of the Axis

powers.  The German attack on Crete started on the morning

 of May 20.  Parachutists and airborne troops landed on the island

They were reinforced by units of the German Army, and supported 

by aircraft formations advanced against important strategical

points of the island.  On May 25, the official German communiques

announced that the Western part of the island was in German

hands and that operations were progressing according to plan.

 

June 8 1941.   Crete is not only one of the many islands which are

situated off the Greek mainland but is also an important outpost

of Europe in the Mediterranean, and air and naval base

of vital strategical importance.  For months prior to the German

attack, England had made extensive preparations to defend

the island even in the case of Greece being evacuated.  Shortly

before the attack was launched, the Commander of the British

and Greek forces on Crete, General Freyburg, had issued an

order of the day that Crete was to be defended with the utmost

resolution, and that from Crete, Greece would one day be

recaptured.  This island has now been taken by German and

Italian troops.  The victory was won by an enterprise of

unique audacity.  The landing was effected only from the air

after days of fierce fighting and in spite of the attempt of

strong British naval forces to intervene, German airborne

troops, in cooperation with subsequently landed Italian units

finally succeeded in gaining a complete victory in the

battle of Crete.  10,000 Greek and British prisoners were

captured.  After suffering heavy losses, the British fleet was

compelled to retire from action. 

352

This, my darling one, ends my story with the exception of

pasting in some maps after this.  I started it with the idea

of pleasing you and it has grown out of all proportion

to my original conception of what it would be.  I have

endeavoured to include in it everything I could remember

of my doings and the events I took part in.  Even now I

realise that memory has played me false and that

many incidents have been left out through forgetting and

the lapse of time and that a chance reference later

will bring them up.  I hope you have enjoyed xxxx

reading this journal.  I will not say that it gave me

unmitigated pleasure to write it.  It represents over

18 months of hard work and the subject of Crete was

to full of bitter memories to enjoy.  Theo and I in

retrospect feel that we did our job to the best of our

ability and only wish that the fighting unit we helped

for forge had been allowed to carry on.  xxxx I have

not kept a diary at any time and have had to depend 

on my memory for all this.  I had no intention of

writing anything so I shall have to collect lots of

information and dates of my experiences as a Prisoner

and hope to write this at a later date.  For the present

I am going to take a holiday.