Letter from Arthur Seaforth Blackburn to his family, 1941 - Part 2 of 3

11   Lt Col AS Blackburn 2/3 MGBn AIF abroad 
the defences which was much easier now we could see. Everything 
was absolutely quiet but an officer came through from the country 
east of the Jordon & reported that the enemy had surrounded 
a place called Qounetra, 20 miles out, with a British 
garisson force of about 500 in it and that they were cut off. This 
officer reported that a member of enemy tanks were oprating 
near Qounetra. I passed this information on to Div. H.Q. about 
eleven o'clock in the morning a patrol of about 6 or 7 vans 
full of British troops passed through & over the bridge,  
guarded by an armored car & went out to see what they  
could find out about Qounetra. About two o'clock in  
the afternoon my men reported that they had seen a man 
crawl into some rocks about an hour before & that he 
was lying there watching us. I could see him through 
my glasses. He was about a mile away. I accordingly sent 
a vanful of troops out, who ran him to earth. He refused 
to stop when called upon & they had to shoot him & then 
found he was dressed as an Arab but had a French 
coat & cap where he had been lying. About four  
o'clock a messenger from the British patrol came in to  
report that three enemy tanks were moving along a 
road, which about 15 miles out ran parrallel to the main one leading to the bridge. 
I therefore sent out two anti-tank guns to occupy a 
trap on the main road & then sent three vans 
out to try to lure the tanks within rank range of the

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anti- tank guns. This party left about five o'clock in the afternoon. 
About six o'clock I received orders that two armored cars were 
being attached to my force & that I was to send a force 
forward with them, with a large quantity of ammunition, 
to try during the night to force our way into Qounetra 
to help the force there. I wa was issued orders for the party to 
cross the bridge at 10 o'clock that night so as to try to  
dash into Qounetra just before moonrise. About 9 o'clock 
my party which had been "tank hunting" returned, bringing 
with them the British patrol & about 12 or 15 men who 
had escaped from Qounetra. They reported that they had 
tried for about an hour to get the tanks to chase them but 
they had refused to do so, so my party had gone on & 
joined up with the British patrol watching Qounetra. 
Towards dusk firing at Qounetra had ceased & soon 
after they had noticed a few men crawling out of 
the town through bushes, watercourses, rocks etc. They 
had picked them up & been informed that enemy 
tanks from Damascus had got into Qounetra & the  
British force had been compelled to surrender. 
In view of this it appeared useless to try to dash into 
Qounetra with ammunition so I told my party, which was 
waiting to move off by this time, to stand fast & re-occupy 
the defences of the bridge in case the enemy tanks came 
on down the road. I then got into my car, with an officer

13 
from Force H.Q & raced away to a military telephone about ten 
miles away & reported the position to Force Command at 
Nazareth. After a long discussion in which Force expressed 
doubt as to whether the garrison of Qounetra had really 
surrendered, I was ordered by the G.O.C to send a party forward 
to  find out the real position, to go into Qounetra if it was 
still holding out & if it had surrendered to occupy the best 
position possible to prevent any further enemy advance. 
I got back to my H.Q about one o'clock in the morning 
and made my plans for the move forward & issued 
orders for the party of move at 3 a.m. I then lay down 
about 2 a.m. for some sleep as I had had practically none at  
all for two nights & three days. The party moved off 
at 3.30 a.m. & got within 1½ miles of Qounetra, meeting 
an officer of the British Bn who had been in there 
on the way & he told them Qounetra had surrendered 
at 6.30 the previous night, & he had subsequently 
escaped. The party therefore occupied a defensive 
position overlooking the exits from Qounetra. During the  
day small detachment of enemy attacked our position  
but were easily driven off. At six o'clock that  
night I received information that a Battalion of British Infantry had crossed 
the Jordan well down South & moved around the flank of Qounetra and 
were going to attack it at seven o'clock & wanted

14 
our machine guns to help. This we did. The attack was duly 
launched & completely recaptured the town. Knowing that Div. 
would like to know the result, I immediately raced back in  
my car to the telephone & at 11.30 at night 'phoned through 
the result of the attack, getting to bed back at the  
Bridge about 12.30. Next morning about 7 o'clock I returned 
to Qounetra. It was a remarkable sight by daylight. Bear 
in mind that in 48 hours it had been successively (1) held by 
a British force (2) Attacked for nearly 24 hrs by the enemy & captured (3) held 
by the enemy for nearly 24 hrs (4) Twice bombed by our 
aeroplanes (5) shelled by our artillery (6) attacked & recaptured 
by our forces. In the main street of the town was an 
enemy tank burning strongly & nearly red hot. Along 
the Streets & roads were overturned lorries - both British 
& enemy, three smashed armored cars, dead horses, piles 
of ammunition, papers, clothes, shells, guns, rifles etc. & 
several ordinary motor cars riddled with bullets. 
In spite of all this the shops - or most of them - were open & 
doing business in the usual way. Our chaps, those not  
on duty at the moment, were wandering along the  
streets, buying foodstuffs, clothes & other requirements. The 
locals were calmly sorting out their belongings, tidying 
up, doing their domestic shopping & walking about apparently 
comple utterly indifferent to the war & everything to  
do with it. I walked around the town generally

15 
and could not keep being struck by the damnable waste of war. 
Apart from civilian damage the place was littered with broken 
up implements of war, equipment & arms & ammunition. Fortunately 
the loss of life was fairly small. We are now (19^th) occupying 
the town. About midday on this day (18^th) I received additions 
to my special force, of an advanced Dressing Station complete 
with ambulances (a British show) and a Squadron of Bren Carriers 
& light tanks & my "command" has been enlarged now to  
cover all the roads east of the River Jordan right up to  
Qounetra, with a special task to keep the lines of 
communication open & to guard the crossings over the Jordon. 
It is very interesting but very tiring. Twice a day 
I visit Qounetra & visit my other defences as well. 
We are all hoping, as my force seems to be steadily 
increasing in size, that we will be given a chance 
to move out into Trans Jordia & try to work around 
the enemy's flank & attack him from the rear. The  
position is quite ridiculous. Working down from the 
north I will try to give an idea of the position. The 
enemy are holding Damascus. We are occupying a position 
about 4-5 miles South of it & across the main roads. 4-5 
miles south again & again across the main roads is an 
enemy force. Lower Further south still these main roads 
converge onto Qounetra which we are holding. 
All these successive positions have their most

16 
easterly flank just hanging in mid air out in the desert 
whilst still further east are roads & tracks by which 
we take up supplies to our forces just south of 
Damascus. Just as I finished writing the above, I received 
orders to report immediately to the H.Q of a British Div. near my  
position. When I arrived Gen. Blamey was there talking to  
Gen. Evetts the British Gen. I had a few words with Gen 
Blamey as he left & assured him that the Bn was  
absolutely fit & well trained. I then went into Gen. Evetts room 
& received orders to move out into the desert country east 
of the Jordan at 7 o'clock in the morning with on Coy (C Coy) 
one Platoon of A Coy, 5 2 pr A/TomGuns & 4 other Anti-Tank (A/T) 
guns & to work right around the flank of the enemy 
between Qounetra & Damascus and to try to capture that 
enemy force & destroy their tanks. I left at 7 o'clock in 
the morning & started on a long trip right out into 
Syria (or rather Trans Jordia) east of Jordan. About two o'clock in the after- 
noon I was met by a messenger with a change of plans. 
I had originally to be under the command of an Indian  
Bde but these amended orders were that I was to  
report personally as quickly as possible to the Gen 
commanding the Free French Forces. I hurried on to 
the appointed place - the ruins of an old Crusader's 
Arthur S Blackburn

Lt Col A.S. Blackburn  2/3 MG Bn AIF abroad. 
17  
castle - and there found myself involved in a big conference 
with its French Staff, at which I was required to take part 
through the help of an interpreter. The position appeared to  
be that the forces under the command of the Gen were 
very tired, having been continuously engaged for some 
eleven days in considerable heat & through difficult sandy 
& hilly country and now, when close to the outskirts of 
Damascus could not proceed or at least not as quickly as 
desired. I informed the Gen that my force was fresh & eager 
& could push on at once. Enemy tanks were worrying him 
and so the presence of my A/T weapons delighted him. 
I found that an attack on a small hill which was 
dominating the position was then in progress and whilst 
the Conference was still in progress, word arrived that 
it had succeeded. This appeared to me to open the way 
into Damascus and I urged that there be no resting at 
all but that every available man push into the City. 
There was considerable opposition to this as other troops 
attacking high ground on the left which dominated 
Damascus had not yet succeeded. Finally it was 
agreed that I should rush my force forward 
& confer with a Col Casseau - a  French Col in charge 
of the most forward French troops. When I met him 
and told him the composition of my force he was 
very delighted as he greatly feared some tanks or

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armored cars which were impeding his advance. He agreed 
however to push on at once if we would support him. This 
was at 3.30 in the afternoon. When however I asked him how 
soon he could go on he said "not before 6.20 at the earliest" 
I urged a resumption of the attack by 5 p.m. promising  
full support of my force. He finally agreed to do the best 
he could. I therefore brought my force right up to the  
forward lines or positions & place my A/T guns covering  
the approaches. There was not the slightest sign of enemy  
attack or activities & no shelling or gun fire although the 
roads were thick with vehicular traffic bearing away the 
killed & wounded, bringing up supplies & taking back 
captured equipment etc. Finally at about 4.30 as there was 
no sign of an enemy I got into my car & drove down the  
main road towards Damascus - in full sight & about 4 
miles away - for about 500 yds. Not a shot was fired at  
me and so, in order to spur on the French advance, I 
ordered the one Platoon of A Coy which I had in reserve 
under Lt. Edwards to move down the road in their 
vehicles & to try to occuppy a position about 1000 yds 
ahead. This they did in two bounds & although towards 
the end they encountered light rifle & machine gun fire 
they had no difficulty in reaching their objective. By 
this time it was five o'clock & Col. Casseau's force  
did not appear to be ready. I went up to him & asked him

19 
what was causing the delay & found that he wanted more 
men up before he would proceed. Finally, when I showed him  
where my machine guns were & what protection I could 
give against tanks he agreed to move forward. Even then 
he didn't start until 5.30. When everything was ready he 
stepped into his motor car, started off & went on in bottom gear 
down the road with his troops nearly all black 
men, conforming to his movements on either side of  
the road. When they reached my forward machine  
guns they stopped & so to get them to keep going, my  
machine guns were moved on another 300 yds or 
so in front & opened fire & then on came the colored 
troops again up to them. This went on until dark 
by which time they had advanced nearly 3 miles 
with very little loss & were really on the outskirts 
of Ba Damascus. Twice during the advance the enemy  
tanks had appeared in full view preparatory to an 
attack but each time artillery fire drove them  
hurriedly back. Finally they settled down for the  
night. Early next morning - apl about five o'clock - I moved out to 
the forward area and found the attack about to be resumed. 
It went on slowly but methodically in spite of occasional 
halts. About 10 a.m when really into the outskirts of the  
City, we came across a solidly built road block guarded 
by a tank. This hung things up for a bit but finally

20 
the tank was hit by artillery fire and the road block was blown up 
and we could push forward. Immediately to our left front and about 
1000 yards away was a big white building which was alleged to be 
a barracks, full of troops & thoroughly prepared for defence. The 
French artillery opened on this and it was most interesting to stand 
behind a gun & see it fired & then see the shell strike the building 
& throw up a cloud of dust, mortar & bricks. In the meantime 
the troops were advancing all around us, through the 
railway yards, through olive groves & along the main streets &  
roads. Suddenly from 400-500 yds away, from a concrete 
pill-box, machine gun fire opened up & several men fell 
wounded or killed. At the time I was standing with Col 
Casseau in the middle of the road. He immediately brought up  
two ^.75's - and started firing at the pill-box. It was, I  
think, one of the most astounding sights I have ever seen. 
A party of at least 40-50 stood alongside Col Casseau & 
myself right in the middle of a bitumen road, in full view of the pill box & within 10 yds of the 
artillery which proceeded to demolish the pill box & with it two  
or three houses, because by now the place had developed into 
continuous buildings. A few machine gun & rifle bullets 
fell amongst us but everyone was too interested to pay 
much attention to them. It was the first time I had 
watched, in broad daylight & without being crouched down 
behind cover, a bombardment by artillery at point blank 
range. It took about a dozen shells to demolish it &