Diary of service - Donald Morrison, 1940 - 1945 - Part 11
with his headlights blazing. As he drove off he was stopped by Bill Miller of the Provost. Bill
let forth a few profanities and was not at all interested in the rank of the occupant of the car.
The lights must be put out. No! – One headlight was smashed. The lights must be put out. No!
– The other headlight was smashed and the car was allowed to proceed on its way. Too many
staff cars were in the habit of driving with headlights on into our Headquarters, but it was
only the odd officer who flung his rank about and refused to black out when asked to do so.
During daylight, particularly AIF officers had to leave their vehicles in a nearby transport
park and then hoof it to Headquarters. An odd figure or two approaching a building would not
unduly worry an enemy observation post or a recce plane but a shuttle service of cars would
make them investigate further, most probably with a round or two.
get all the sleep I could as I anticipated many trips between Yong Peng and Segamat which
was to be Headquarters of 27 Brigade. Luckily it was no hardship to sleep anywhere whether
it be sitting against a tree or just lying on the ground and I made the most of it for the day.
Coast and contact in person a Commander Pietry, address unknown, and tell him how to
communicate with Westforce. At Batu Pahat I found my way to the Police Station and there
picked up an English speaking native policeman who, greatly daring, hopped on the back of
Gertie and directed me to the Assistant Advisors House. The Assistant Advisor was
entertaining some lads from the Royal Navy and from them I learnt that Pietry would not
arrive until the following day. Consequently, I returned to Headquarters without delivering
the message and got a good kick in the pants for doing so.
going up the plank onto the ferry just outside Batu Pahat (the idea was to move forward
slowly in first gear balancing the bike with one foot on the two foot wide plank) when my
foot slipped and Gertie and I went into the water. The boongs on the ferry just laughed, but, I
was not amused as I hurt my groin and had a limp for several days. Pietry was still absent but
this time I left the message and got back in time for breakfast.
27 Brigade and then spent a couple of hours chasing Wyett and Jessup around the town. I was
so intent on my riding that I did not notice Mel Johnson, who tried to attract my attention a
house in which to establish Westforce Headquarters in the Field. The first one chosen was too
small and they eventually selected one opposite Headquarters 9 Indian Division.
Segamat with Harry’s batman but he used his own discretion and sent my things to Labis
where Division Headquarters had established themselves in a lovely house bang alongside a
railway bridge. An ideal target for aircraft which the Nips did not bother about.
to tail all the way with no thought given to interval between vehicles. Traffic jams were
occurring all along the road and the Provost had a difficult and full time job in sorting it all
out. It was a wonder that the Japs did not bomb or machine gun the road as the vehicles could
not get out of the way; instead the planes concentrated on their main objective, Singapore.
which was cluttered with vehicles in the daytime and at night was lit up like Bourke Street
during late shopping. From the safety of our slit trenches, just across the road, we saw two
planes approaching and wondered if by any chance they would drop their loads a bit early and
hit us instead. We saw the bombs leave the planes and the betting was odds on our
Headquarters getting a direct hit. We ducked. The bombs screamed louder and louder and
then there was a terrific blast and the earth fairly shook. We were safe but 9 Division got five
direct hits and suffered ten casualties. They moved their Headquarters to other parts very
smartly. As this was 13 January, we thought it was a pretty good omen for the AIF.
through Gemas and so the forward Company of 2/30 Battalion put the prepared road block in
position. About half an hour later twenty seven trucks of Indian troops pulled up and wanted
the road reopened. This was done after conferring with Black Jack. Unit Commanders in 111
Corps had no idea what was happening nor where the enemy were. The last CO to pass
through reiterated what Dawks had said at Jemaluang about Japanese tactics and added the
reliable information that the enemy were at least twenty four hours behind. Naturally, BJ was
glad of the additional time to have up his sleeve; another run through of the plan would be a
big help. Once more things went wrong and only two hours behind the Indian troops the
Japanese marched in the ambush at Jementah and the AIF were in action. For this part and for
the part that his unit played in this action BJ was awarded the DSO.
15 – 31 January 1942
Headquarters should have been much fuller than it was. This meant much additional work for
the staff who had to find out too many things for themselves, as well as co-ordinate it, so that
units could be kept in the picture as much as possible. No one formation was to blame for this
lack of information. Brigade would tell Division that Battalion A had moved but Battalion B
would know nothing about the move as A had forgotten to tell them, and so on in similar
combinations of circumstances.
the lot, and visit Dawks at Labis with the result. The road was quite good but windy and hilly
and I never knew what I was going to meet around the next bend. I still liked a clear track
when I went riding on Gertie.
Labis and had set up my camp in the allotted space thinking I would be there that night. I
didn’t arrive but a heavy rain storm swept into the tent and saturated all my belongings. I was
not very happy.
Officer to the Dutch Guerrillas who were being sent behind the lines and were patrolling the
East flank to give warning of any signs of infiltration from Kelantan. Bill Miller was another
frequent visitor but he had the foresight to come armed with a drop of the doings.
forward some identification photos of these troops but something went wrong and but for
Harry Jessup the men would have been shown photos of the wrong troops to let through their
lines. The photos sent were those of Ambon born Japanese.
Division which were dispersed around Segamat in support of Westforce. The only unit to be
deployed and to offer no target from the air was the 5/11 Sikhs. Air sentries were well posted
and the troops could move at very short notice, after the CO had folded his steamer chair
equipped officers messes and the troops were grouped rather than dispersed.
Brigade. This threat to the rear of Westforce made the GOC send 2/29 Battalion less “D” Coy
down the Muar Road to recapture the town which was held by about “only two hundred
Nips”. Whether this information was purposely misleading or not I cannot say. 2/29 could not
get anywhere and so 2/19 Battalion were sent down to get the former out. The latter could not
make contact and so the 2/29 Battalion had to fight their way back. The Japanese pressure
was too great and the whole force had to retire and eventually broke up when everyone was
given instructions to find his own way back.
back to Labis. The AIF were to reform on the line Mersing – Kluang – Ayer Hitam – Hatu
Pahat.
left Segamat. The idea might have been all right but the fire got out of control and 9 Indian
Division had a ticklish job getting over the bridge across the river. The traffic was very thick
and the whole place was brilliantly lighted by the fires. Thank goodness the Japs did not take
advantage of the target. Jock Dole did a marathon job under very difficult conditions directing
and organising the three lanes of traffic that converged on the Segamat Bridge.
felt a new man and had hopes of putting my feet up for awhile but no; Operations moved back
to Yong Peng and I had to tag along too.
immediate message to 27 Brigade at 2000 hours that night ordering them back to Yong Peng
instead of only to Labis. Three hours later Colonel Thyer rang the Signals office and found
that his message had not been sent. Bang! …. Normally slow to anger Thyer certainly let
himself go that time. I was the mug who was sent forward with the message. It was one of the
worst rides I had as the road was cluttered with 9 Indian Division Transport going in the
opposite direction, south, and the night was as black as your hat and remember there were no
lights. On one occasion I rode right into a shell hole and out the other side and did not bat an
eyelid; I must have improved in my riding.
bridge at Labis and the Brigade Major took a bit of finding and when I did run him to earth it
seemed an act of cruelty to awaken him, he was sleeping so peacefully in the back of his car.
However, it had to be done and soon SAF was writing out the movement order while I went
to look for the Brigadier who was at Labis watching the MT bringing the battalions into their
defensive areas. I told him what was happening so he left immediately for Division to find the
cause of the alteration in plan. I tried to keep up with his car but it was a losing battle until the
driver put the staff car into a ditch and burst the steering but caused no casualties – after all a
driver has to have a bit of sleep sometimes. I took with me to Labis a plan of the new
battalion areas, drawn by Dawkins and Baynes, and everything went off very well.
of Yong Peng towards Muar. The idea was to give the men of 2/26 and 2/30 Battalions at
least two days rest as they had been hard at it for more than a week. 53 British Brigade was
out in front protecting them.
of the road about a mile behind the two battalions. The staff would be Vincent and Metcalfe,
who would act as Liaison Officers between the battalions and myself, one Don R, an
interpreter, a driver and Chris. Means of communication between Division and myself was to
be by car or Don R and in cases of emergency only by 109 set. Rations were tinned and very
scarce at that.
battalions were to deal through me straight on to Division. To each battalion I had to take a
Malay and a Chinese Interpreter who were not wanted by the CO’s and very obviously knew
it and felt most uncomfortable. However, I had my orders and they had to stay. These
civilians were very embarrassed by their reception and must have felt sorry that they
volunteered for such work.
been seen and the IO’s went off to the battalions. I paid a couple of visits to each of the units
and found them pretty tired. 2/26, especially Boyes, I thought were more down in the mouth
than they should have been. Black Jack’s mob were as tired but their morale was much
higher; was this because of the ambush?
then for good measure our little area was machine gunned from the air; the latter seemed to be
a haphazard spraying of the area and caused no damage.
decided to get 53 Brigade to recapture Bukit Payang ridge in the early afternoon but the attack
never came off – various excuses were put forward by the Brigade Commander for not getting
on with the job not one of which seemed to hold water. It was a very poor show and the GOC
and Colonel Thyer were disgusted.
line so I packed up and cleared out too. I had been in position for twenty four hours and
achieved nothing as far as I could see. Yong Peng was still burning as we crossed over the
bridge for the last time; it was another four hours before the bridge finally collapsed. Two
companies of 2/30 Battalion were left to form a rear guard while Westforce took up the line at
Kluang – Batu Pahat. Brigades were established on the main road at the 45½ mile stone.
and Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, leader of the force, came on to Division to tell his story
and was made much of. It was unfortunate that Bowring was not present to give the 2/29
picture as 2/19 got all the praise. It was not until we had been at Changi for sometime that the
2/29 part in the Muar fighting came out.
whiskey in my pocket and set off to see who had come through. “B” Echelon, under Bertie
Kemp, were functioning well and had a hot meal ready. Everyone was in a bad way – half
starved, foot sore and unutterable weary. I saw Bara, Luke and many others. A sergeant from
45 Indian Brigade poured a tale of woe into my ear. He had been entrusted with the Cyphers
and secret papers by his Brigade Sergeant Major. When the latter had been killed the Sergeant
had burnt all the papers and he wanted me to assure Headquarters that they could not fall into
enemy hands. I told him I would have him commended for his action, and told his story to
Colonel Thyer on my return.
Greener could not be bothered and muttered something about “another damned sentry with
the Nips had come much further down the railway line than the staff realised then.
recommending the leader of Muar Force for the Victoria Cross for his leadership and daring
during the whole time he was with the Force. This cable had been dictated just after the force
broke up and was to be sent to Australia as soon as it became known who the senior survivor
was. It has been sent off that evening.
have put finish to the Headquarters of some show or other – Westforce, Dalforce, 9 Indian
Division, Artillery, Signals and so on. For a change we did not occupy the largest house,
merely the next best.
us under foot trying to get the Muar story. I think it was Baynes who had the job of keeping
them happy until the press release was prepared. On looking them over, I noticed a head the
same shape as Desmond’s and realised it must be Ian Morrison. I introduced myself and we
had a bit of a yarn. Many months later I learnt that he cabled Mum on 13 February 1942 to
say that I was fit and well..... Very thoughtful.
day to Brigade Headquarters at the 49 mile stone to get the latest reports of troops arriving
from Muar and on the fighting around Ayer Hitam where 2/30 Battalion were at the cross
roads and 2/26 west of the town. I was at Brigade when Dave West came in and said that
Muar force had broken up into parties of about twenty men each under an officer or NCO and
had made their own way out.
questioned by Harry Jessup, found guilty and then shot by Norman Couch. Norman just sat
them on the ground and then walked behind and put a shot in each head. The idea of shooting
them in cold blood did not worry him in the least.
a very effective counter attack at Kluang when they got quite a bit of booty.
keep Headquarters open while the new location at the 22 milestone was set up. No food had
been left for us to I went around to Brigade and managed to rake up half a loaf of bread, a
pound of butter, a tin of camp pie and some coffee. I stuffed the whole lot inside my shirt and
returned. Half an hour later I told the other two that lunch was ready and the GI was a bit
taken aback when he saw the way in which it was served. However, we were all hungry and
enjoyed the so called meal.
position at 48 mile stone. The CO Stitt and the Recce Group – one battle buggy and two
carriers – arrived on the scene and I learnt how not to carry out a recce. Stitt stood in the
rubber plantation, with its very limited field of vision, had a look at the map, pointed with his
stick to the Company positions and that was that. No attempt was made to go over the ground.
It looked like a busy night ahead so I got what sleep I could in short bursts on the side of the
road. The actual change over went off very well, the Gordons got into position and then 2/26
and 2/30 broke contact, embussed and were taken back to their new positions at 45½ mile
stone.
it suddenly drove off. The driver had been asleep and did not remember starting up and
moving off but reckoned he must have done so when he found the car with himself at the
wheel in a ditch alongside the road. No one could explain what made the driver act the way he
did.
to get the Signallers to hurry their contact with the Gordons. I got tangled up with the traffic a
few times but made the return journey without undue incident. When the changeover was
finally complete, I returned to the 29 mile stone and slept for about two hours before going on
to Division Headquarters to report Brigade as established and everything under control.
He and my gear had been sent back to rear Headquarters at Senai. I had not had a change for a
couple of days and was a bit peeved to find my things missing. I then went back to Brigade
but found that they had flown. During my absence, they had been bombed and had suffered
one killed and seven wounded. I eventually located them at Seenak Estate about one mile
short of 9 Indian Division Headquarters. After notifying Division of their new location I went
was very worried about his brother Paddy, reported missing at Muar. We eventually decided
that he would be happier if he returned to the battalion so he was transferred back to 2/29
Battalion which was being reformed at Johore Bahru under Pond. Chris had been a wonderful
help to me and have made my job much easier with his cheerful assistance.
in the middle of the afternoon. A short time after my arrival a Don R from the Gordons rode
in with a message signed by the CO. The Battalion was being heavily attacked, the two
forward companies were nearly out of ammunition and the whole show was withdrawing. The
Brigade staff went into a huddle and decided that the Gordons should take up a position
adjacent to 2/26 Battalion at the 43 mile stone and would be under cooperative command.
Two patrols of 2/26, one North West of Simpang Rengam and one to the east would be
withdrawn. Brigade would arrange for ammunition to be sent forward.
Battalion while a Don R went forward to the Gordons. Time seemed to be the essence of the
contract, so I let Gertie have her head. Luckily it was still daylight. I found Boyes still in the
same mental state as at Yong Peng. I had just explained the position to Boyes when a Liaison
officer from the Gordons arrived with the news that they had completed their withdrawal to
behind 2/26 Battalion. He contradicted the statement about the shortage of ammo; but
admitted they had received no orders to move. Before withdrawing the Gordons had
neglected to blow the bridge at the 49 mile stone. It later turned out that the Gordons had no
rations, no water and no reserve ammo; and they were a regular unit of the British Army.
Boyes was rather worried, naturally about the whole show so Mickey Moore came back with
me to Brigade. At the 30 mile stone Gertie went and got a puncture so I left her by the side of
the road and got a lift as far as the turn off to Sedanak Estate and from there Moore dinked me
to Headquarters. A pretty rough ride but we got there!
of lads from the Ack Ack Platoon and their utility and went back to pick up Gertie. On the
return journey, it was now midnight or thereabout, that I had not had any tea. The boys
stopped the truck, fossicked round in the back and produced some biscuits and cheese which
were really beautiful. I handed Gertie over to Jock Dole’s mob who had her puncture mended
and gave her a bit of a check over before breakfast. As far as repairs and maintenance went
individuals to get me out of strife and to whom I was very grateful.
in the rubber plantation. Nevertheless the officers still maintained an A and a B mess. I could
understand the distinction from the point of view of rank which in most cases is also a matter
of age but I could not understand the reason for the addition of one item to the ration scale of
"A" Mess – Black Coffee with the evening meal. Why, oh why? "B" Mess as a Mess could
not be served black coffee but a commissioned motor bike rider who happened to be late for
Mess was always given a cup.
plan Westforce and Eastforce were to come under command 111 Indian Crops who had their
Headquarters at Johore Bahru. I was at Brigade that afternoon when a highly polished sedan
pulled up at the main entrance to the Headquarters and right in the open. Out stepped a
Liaison Officer from Malaya Command dressed for a walk downtown rather than in battle
dress. Maxwell gave him a good ticking off for his stupid method of approaching
Headquarters and the troops were very peeved too. They dragged the Indian syce out of the
car, removed his flowing white uniform and dressed him in khaki. At the same time others
plastered the car with mud and slapped a bit of green paint for good measure. I'm afraid that
the lesson was wasted as the same chappie did something similar the next day Division and
was given a piece of Colonel Thyer's mind.
one of whom was, unfortunately killed. Two other Don R's were hurt the next night in similar
circumstances. Fast driving under black out conditions was not really necessary; a well
hooded light would have warned approaching vehicles yet not have been visible from the air.
and very few of them got away. Brigadier Paynter was afterwards beaten up by the Japs
because he would not tell them what our plans were for the defence of the Island. He was not
believed when he said that he did not know, although such was the case. General Barstow,
AQ Trott and Charles Moses were walking up the railway line looking for the Brigade when
they too were ambushed. The General must have dived down the wrong side of the
embankment as he was never seen again. Moses and Trott came out of it all right, but, were a
bit the worse for wear.
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